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Preface 
 
 
In the late autumn of 2002 I was asked to undertake a short inquiry into a failed attempt made by 
the National Co-operative Association (NKL) to expand into the furniture business. The failure 
had led to substantial losses for the NKL and the NKL Board of Representatives had asked for 
an independent investigation into the chain of events leading up to the failure, as well as its 
economic consequences. At that time I was working at the Institute for Social Research and 
together with a colleague I finished the report in March 2003. 
The report marked the start of a long and fascinating journey into the history of retailing 
in general and the history of consumer co-operative enterprises in particular. Just a few months 
after the report of the furniture failure was completed, I was asked to participate in long-term 
project studying the history of the Norwegian consumer co-operatives. Working on this project I 
was immediately fascinated by the finding that consumer co-operative enterprises had developed 
so unevenly in different Western European countries during the post-war period. Not least I was 
fascinated by the discovery that the Norwegian consumer co-operatives were among those which 
had developed most successfully. How had this development come about? Why had the 
Norwegian co-ops developed so positively in the post-war period, when so many other consumer 
co-operatives had declined and even collapsed totally during this period? The question 
immediately triggered my curiosity. But, the history of the Norwegian co-ops had to be finished 
and there was only limited time to explore this broader comparative issue.  
Then, in 2004 I was granted a Ph.D. scholarship by the Forum for Contemporary History 
at the University of Oslo. The scholarship gave me the opportunity to study in more depth the 
development of consumer co-operative organisations as alternative forms of retailing enterprises. 
I chose to approach the task by way of a comparative study of the Norwegian and British 
consumer co-operatives, focusing on these two organisations’ divergent economic developments 
in the post-war period. The present thesis is the result of this work.  
Academic research is often a lonely endeavour. The present study has, however, benefited 
from the support of numerous people to whom I owe a great debt. First of all I would like to 
thank Fredrik Engelstad and Trygve Gulbrandsen, two great Norwegian sociologists. Neither of 
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them have had any direct influence on the present work, but they have both played a crucial role 
in providing me with the academic skills necessary to successfully finish a Ph.D. thesis. When I 
was writing my Cand.polit. thesis in sociology, Fredrik was my supervisor. Later I was privileged 
to have him as my manager at the Institute for social research and together with two other 
colleagues we also co-authored a book. Fredrik has taught me a lot about doing research. Most 
importantly, he has taught me that the empirical facts always have to come before any advanced 
theory. I am also grateful to Trygve Gulbrandsen. In addition to being a great intellectual, Trygve 
has taught me a lot about the importance of positive feedback within academic life and of 
treating students and colleagues with respect and humility. 
Secondly, I need to thank the hiring committee at the Forum for Contemporary History 
for providing me (a sociologist by training), with the opportunity to become a part of one of the 
best and most stimulating historic research milieus in the country. Being a Ph.D. student at the 
Forum has given me the opportunity to meet, become acquainted with and learn from a number 
of highly talented historians. I am especially indebted to all participants at internal Ph.D. seminars 
for their comments and suggestions on chapters and earlier drafts of this thesis. 
Thirdly, my long term collaborator Jon Vatnaland deserves a big thank you. We first met 
as first year students in sociology. From then on, we were almost inseparable for years, writing 
our Cand.polit. thesis together and later collaborating on several research projects, including all 
the above mentioned studies. With his bubbling enthusiasm and endless intellectual imagination 
Jon is a very stimulating colleague. He has also made several important suggestions on the 
present study. 
My colleague Eivind Merok has read and reread the thesis meticulously and provided 
important suggestions and comments. He has also provided invaluable technical guidance as well 
as much needed administrative assistance in the final stages of completing the present work.  
Finally, I need to thank my supervisor, Professor Even Lange. First of all for believing in 
me and for recommending me for a Ph.D. scholarship in history; then for helping me develop 
and complete the thesis.  
Apart from the people that have contributed intellectually, I am also indebted to a series 
of other people who in different ways have contributed to the completion of the study. For 
archival work to be efficient and successful, assistance and guidance is necessary. Here I have also 
been privileged. The sources on which the study is based have largely been collected from two 
national archives, the archive of the Norwegian Co-operative Association (NKL) in Kirkegata 4, 
Oslo and the National Co-operative Archive in Manchester, UK. In the NKL archive, the head 
of administration Helene Mevik has been an invaluable source of help and support. Working in 
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the National Co-operative Archive in Manchester I have been ably assisted by the knowledgeable 
and always welcoming archivist Gillian Lonergan, as well as her two very helpful assistants, Janice 
Miller and Karyn Stuckey. I am also extremely indebted to my proof reader Natja Thorbjørnsen, 
who has been vital in transforming the document into readable English. 
I could not have finished this thesis without the immense support and patience of my 
wife, Monica. Monica is one of those rare people who is able to offer the combination of 
advanced intellectual stimuli and enjoyment of life's simple pleasures. This thesis is dedicated to 
her and our daughter Agnes.  
 
 
Blindern, February 2008  
Espen Ekberg 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The theme of this study is the divergent development of consumer co-operative organisations in 
Western Europe in the period from 1950 to 2002. It explores the reasons why some consumer 
co-operatives throughout this period failed to defend their market share and lost a substantial 
number of members, while others strengthened their market position and increased their 
membership. The study investigates this question by way of an in-depth comparative historical 
analysis of the post-war development of the Norwegian and the British consumer co-operative 
movements. 
By the inter-war period consumer co-operative enterprises had been established as one of 
the major players in the food retail market of most Western European countries, controlling a 
substantial market share and organising a considerable number of members. As a user 
(consumer) owned and democratically governed business, ‘the co-op’ was firmly established as an 
important alternative to traditional forms of capitalist commerce. From the 1950s onwards, 
however, most of these organisations started to stagnate. Market share was lost, membership 
evaporated and the economic results gradually worsened. In countries such as the Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, Germany and Austria, consumer co-operative trade disappeared more or less 
completely. In others, such as the UK, the co-ops managed to survive, but with huge losses in 
both market share and membership.1 
This development pattern was, however, not unequivocal. In Norway, the national 
consumer co-operative movement continued to grow and strengthen its position in the years 
following the Second World War. By 2002, roughly 24 per cent of the Norwegian food retail 
market was controlled by co-operative retailers. And with almost one million registered members, 
roughly half of the total number of Norwegian households held a co-operative membership.2 
Along similar lines, consumer co-ops in the other Nordic countries, most notably Finland, as well 
as in Italy and Switzerland, also managed to retain a substantial position in their respective home 
markets.3  
                                                 
1 For a broad overview of these developments, see J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a changing 
world, vol.1 and 2 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989). 
2 E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. Forbrukesamvirkets historie i 
Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006). 
3 For Finland see R. Schediwy, ‘The consumer co-operatives in Finland’, in In J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), 
Consumer co-operatives in a changing world, vol. 2 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989); for Italy see P. 
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The main objective of the present analysis is to explore these divergent development 
patterns. It does so by way of a comparative analysis of the divergent development paths of the 
Norwegian and British consumer co-operative movement. The fundamental question to be 
answered is why the Norwegian consumer co-operative movement, throughout the post-war 
period, managed to strengthen and sustain its market share and increase membership, while the 
British movement in the same period lost substantial market share and saw membership figures 
decline dramatically. 
Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in studying the historical development of 
consumer co-operation.4 Important insights have been gained from these studies. But, in terms of 
understanding the divergent development paths of post-war consumer cooperative enterprises, 
they are hampered by important limitations that invite further research. 
First, existing histories of consumer co-operative enterprises have normally been written 
in a narrative of rise and decline. This is understandable to the extent that such a narrative seems 
to capture the development pattern of most consumer co-operative organisations. But, such 
studies tend to neglect the organisations that actually managed to defend and strengthen their 
position during the post-war years. To fully account for the post-war developments in consumer 
co-operative organisations this divergent development pattern needs to be investigated in more 
detail. This calls for comparative investigations, systematically analysing co-operative 
organisations showing divergent development paths. The present thesis seeks to show the 
possible merits of such an approach. 
Secondly, the pre-dominance of the rise and decline narrative has helped sustain a 
commonly held assumption about the consumer co-operative as an outmoded organisational 
form that simply was unsuited to operate in the post-war capitalist consumer society. But, as long 
as consumer co-operative enterprises continue to operate and flourish in several countries, such a 
general assumption can not be upheld. At least, it needs to be critically examined through 
systematic empirical research, exploring in detail why so many consumer co-operatives failed to 
adapt to the competitive and societal changes of the post-war period and why and how other co-
                                                                                                                                                        
Battilani, ‘How to beat competition without loosing co-operative identity: the case of Italian consumer co-
operatives’, in ACTA of the International Congress, Consumerism versus capitalism? Co-operatives seen from an international 
comparative perspective (Gent: AMSAB, 2005) or V. Zamagni, P. Battilani and A. Casali, La cooperazione di consumo in Italia 
: Centocinquant'anni della Coop consumatori: dal primo spaccio a leader della moderna distribuzione (Bologna, il Mulion, 2004); for 
Switzerland, see J. Setzer, ‘Switzerland’, in J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a changing world, vol. 
1 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989). Another exception at the positive end is the Co-operative 
Retailing System in western Canada, see B. Fairbarn, Living the dream. Membership and marketing in the Co-operative 
Retailing System (Saskatchewan: University of Saskatchewan, 2003). 
4 For an overview, see L. Black and N. Robertson (eds), Taking Stock: Consumerism and the Co-operative Movement in 
Modern British History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, forthcoming 2008). 
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ops managed to adjust to these changes. The present study aims at such a critical, empirical 
examination. 
Finally, existing histories of consumer co-operative organisations have largely failed to 
explore the interplay between the co-ops' overall development and major changes in the 
competitive and societal environment in which these organisations actually operated.5 In short, 
there has been too little dialogue between historians of consumer co-operatives and historians of 
modern retailing. The present study seeks to address this shortcoming by focusing specifically on 
how the Norwegian and British consumer co-ops developed their retailing operations in meeting 
with fundamental competitive and societal transformations. It simply explores how the two 
movements adapted their stores, their organisational structure and ideological profile to secure 
continued economic survival. As such, the study is an attempt to develop a thorough economic 
history of the post-war consumer co-operative enterprises. 
Our understanding of the divergent development paths of post-war consumer co-
operative enterprises is still inadequate. The present analysis is an attempt to improve this 
situation. It seeks to do so by examining and explaining the divergent post-war development 
paths of the British and Norwegian consumer co-operatives. In addition to identifying the 
particular factors contributing to the divergent development of these two organisations, such an 
analysis may also provide new and improved insights into the more general phenomenon of post-
war success and decline among consumer co-operative organisations. 
The remaining part of this introduction provides a background presentation of the 
empirical phenomena to be studied. It further presents and critically evaluates existing research 
on the post-war development of consumer co-operative organisations and outlines the analytical 
and methodological framework of the analysis, including a critical examination of the sources on 
which the study is based. A final sub-chapter provides a short outline of the study as a whole. 
 
                                                 
5 Important exceptions include A. Hallsworth and J. Bell, ‘Retail change and the United Kingdom Co-operative 
Movement – new opportunity beckoning?’, International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, 13.3 (2003), 
301-15; L. Sparks, ‘Being the best? Co-operative retailing and corporate competitors’, Journal of Co-operative Studies, 104 
(2002), 7-26 and P. Battilani, ‘How to Beat Competition without Loosing Co-operative Identity: the Case of Italian 
Consumer Co-operatives’, in ACTA of the International Congress, Consumerism versus Capitalism? Co-operatives seen from 
an International Comparative Perspective. Gent: Amsab Institute of Social History, 2005). These are discussed more 
thoroughly in a subsequent sub-chapter.  
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Consumer co-operatives – organisational characteristics and historical developments  
A co-operative is a specific form of economic enterprise.6 Compared with the traditional, 
investor-oriented firm, the co-op differs in at least three important respects.7 First, while 
investor-oriented firms are owned by financial investors without any other necessary relation to 
the firm than their investment, co-ops are owned by their users. Secondly, in a traditional 
investor-owned business, the control of the enterprise is decided by the number of shares held in 
the company. In co-operatives, the users control the enterprise democratically on the principle of 
one member one vote.8 Finally, while other businesses return the surplus on the basis of capital 
holdings, the co-op returns the surplus on the basis of use. The more extensively the member 
uses the enterprise, the larger the share of the surplus. 
Co-operatives come in many different forms and exist within many different sectors of 
the economy. They operate within the banking and insurance industry, in farming and fisheries, 
in housing, within different types of services industries and in retailing. Consumer co-operatives 
primarily operate within the retailing industry.9 In their original form consumer co-operatives 
were established to secure the interest of the consumers in the retail market and they primarily 
did so by opening retail stores owned and controlled by the consumers as members. 
The core business of these retail co-operatives has always been the food trades.10 In truth, 
many societies were originally established to cater for the broad needs of the consumer. They 
thus held a wide selection of products, including numerous non-food items. Throughout the 
post-war years, most co-operative societies continued to offer a wide selection of merchandise, 
either through department stores, superstores and hypermarkets or through separate non-food 
outlets. In fact, a recurring challenge discussed by most retail co-operatives throughout the post-
                                                 
6 Throughout the thesis I use the term ‘co-operative’ and ‘co-op’ and not ‘cooperative’ and ‘coop’. This denotes the 
traditional usage in Great Britain. Non co-operative businesses will, following Barton, in general be termed investor-
oriented firms (IOFs) (D. Barton, ‘What is a cooperative?’, in D.W. Cobia, Cooperatives in Agriculture (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989). When natural, other more specific names such as ‘joint-stock company’, and 
‘family owned businesses’ may be used. For the sake of simplicity and variation I also employ expressions such as 
‘private firms’ and ‘investor owned firms’ to describe organisational forms other than co-operatives, even if these 
expressions blurs the principle characteristics demarcating these different types of organisations. Co-operatives are 
also ‘privately owned’ and the members may obviously be regarded as investors in the co-op enterprise.  
7 According to D. Barton, ‘What is a cooperative?’, in D. W. Cobia, Cooperatives in Agriculture (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989). For an overview in Norwegian, see T. Johnstad, Samarbeid og samvirke. Utvikling og 
organisering av samvirke (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1998). 
8 True, there are exceptions to this principle. Specifically in larger federative co-operative systems voting rights may 
be weighed against differences in sales, differences in number of members etc.  
9 This is true even if many of them have also operated their own wholesaling and production facilities. Recent years 
have also seen some consumer co-ops – such as the British – develop heavily into the service industry. Their main 
form of trade has, however, always been in retailing. Illustrative of this is that in the UK, the term ‘retail co-
operative’ is used interchangeably with ‘consumer co-operative’.  
10 For the purpose of variation, I use the terms ‘consumer co-operative society’, ‘consumer co-operative’, ‘consumer 
co-op’, ‘co-operative society’, ‘retail co-operative society’, ‘retail co-operative’ retail co-op’ and ‘retail society’ 
interchangeably. 
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war period was how to decrease their reliance on food and strengthen the position in the non-
food trades. Food has, however, remained the main form of trade in which the consumer co-ops 
operate. By 2002 it constituted close to 80 per cent of total co-operative retail trade in Norway.11 
The similar figure for the UK movement’s retail trade was 83 per cent.12 
Local retail societies have formed the basic units in the development of national co-
operative movements. As the retail societies developed their strength locally, national secondary 
co-operatives, owned and controlled by the retail co-ops, were established to take care of 
common functions. Of these, wholesaling has been the most important. Hence, in 1863 British 
retail co-operative societies had already established a common wholesale business, the 
Cooperative Wholesale Society (CWS).13 Five years later a similar organisation was set up in 
Scotland, the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society (SCWS).14 In Norway, the National Co-
operative Association (NKL) was established in 1906, partly to take on wholesaling functions for 
the local retail societies.15 By 1911, similar national co-operative wholesaling organisations had 
been established in most countries where retail co-ops had been formed.16 
In addition to wholesaling, the majority of these federative organisations also developed a 
substantial productive business. At its height in 1939, the CWS ran 117 different manufacturing 
plants producing everything from biscuits (its first factory, opened at Crumpsall in 1873) and 
bread to bacon, shirts, shoes, bicycles, umbrellas and corsets.17 In Norway, the NKL opened its 
first factory in 1911. The factory produced margarine. By 1956 the national association ran 13 
factories, producing such diverse products as tobacco, flour, shoes, washing machines and 
radios.18 Sales from the factories accounted for close to 30 per cent of the NKL's total turnover.19 
                                                 
11 Figures estimated from Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Annual report 1997. Note that figures are from 1997 
and concern sales from the NKL to retail societies.  
12 Co-operatives UK, Consumer Co-operatives Performance Review 2002 (Manchester: Co-operatives UK, 2003). Note, 
however, that as the UK co-ops operate a substantial non-retailing business, such as funeral services, travel agencies, 
motor trade companies and dairies, food constituted only 41 per cent of total consumer co-operative trade in 2002. 
As a share of the movement’s retail trade , however, it constituted more than 80 per cent. Food was also the single 
largest trade operated by the co-op movement in terms of turnover, followed by funerals. 
13 P. Redfern, The New History of the CWS (London: J. M. Dent and Sons Limited, 1938). 
14 J. Kinlock and J. Butt, History of the Scottish Co-operative Society Limited (Glasgow: Co-operative Wholesale Society 
Limited, 1981). 
15 For a full description of the establishment of the NKL, see E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. 
Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. Forbrukesamvirkets historie i Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006), pp. 57-87. 
16 This happened in France (UC 1885), the Netherlands (DCA 1889) Switzerland (VSK 1890/93), Germany (GEG 
1894), Denmark (FDB 1896), Sweden (KF 1899), Austria (ZÖK 1903), Finland (SOK 1904/KK 1916) and Italy 
(1911), see J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a changing world, vol. 1 and 2 (Geneva: International 
Co-operative Alliance, 1989) and N. F. Christiansen, ‘Between farmers and workers: Consumer cooperation in 
Denmark, 1850-1940, in E. Furlough and C. Strikwerda (eds), Consumers against Capitalism? Consumer Cooperation in 
Europe, North America and Japan, 1840-1990 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1999).  
17 For a full description, see W. Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-operative 
Wholesale Society Limited, 1977), pp. 65-8. 
18 In addition, coffee was produced at regional NKL warehouses.  
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Similar developments were also seen in most other countries. Throughout the latter half of the 
twentieth century most of these production facilities were, however, disposed of in a process of 
thorough rationalisation. But historically they had played a major role in building up the position 
and competitive strength of consumer co-operation. 
In some countries the common wholesaling and productive organisations would also take 
on educational and ideological functions. They served as an arena to discuss the practice of co-
operation and to promote the co-operative business model to the political establishment, the 
business community and the general public. When the Norwegian Co-operative Association 
(NKL) was formed in 1906 for example, it was consigned to establishing a ‘close connection 
between educational work and commercial activities’.20 This combination of commercial and 
ideological functions was typical also of the Danish and the Swedish national associations 
(Fællesforeningen for Danmarks Brugsforeninger (FDB) and Kooperativa Förbundet (KF)), both 
formed in the latter half of the 1890s. In other countries, most notably the UK, commercial and 
ideological functions were organisationally separated. Hence in Britain, a separate Co-operative 
Union was formed in 1869 as a second national federation, owned by both English and Scottish 
retail societies.21 The principle purpose of the organisation was, in the words of the organisation's 
centenary historian, to be a ‘guardian of co-operative principles; the forum of co-operative 
discussion; the defender of co-operative liberties and the driving force of a social and economic 
movement.’22 The union operated alongside but fully independent of the CWS/SCWS. 
On the basis of this development pattern, national consumer co-operative movements 
typically developed into large federative organisations. Local retail co-ops formed the primary 
units, while national federative organisations, owned and controlled by the retail societies, were 
developed to serve common functions. Together they formed a national, consumer co-operative 
business. 
The historical development of this business is, as already noted, most often written as a 
narrative of ‘rise and decline’. And this narrative indeed captures the development pattern of 
                                                                                                                                                        
19 E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. Forbrukesamvirkets historie i 
Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006), p. 333. 
20 Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Protokoll fra det Kooperative Landsmøtet 1906 (Kristiania: Norges Kooperative 
Landsforening, 1906), cited in E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. 
Forbrukesamvirkets historie i Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006), p. 91. 
21 That is, the first co-operative congress was held in London in 1869, in order to mark the formation of the 
organisation later to become known as the Co-operative Union, see D. Flanagan, A Centenary Story of the Co-operative 
Union of Great Britain and Ireland (Manchester, Co-operative Union Ltd., 1969). 
22 Ibid., p. 3. 
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most consumer co-operative organisations.23 From their emergence in the mid-nineteenth 
century, consumer co-operative movements gradually managed to gain substantial market share 
in their respective home markets. By the inter-war years, co-ops were firmly established as an 
important alternative to the dominant forms of private food retailing in most Western European 
countries. From the 1950s onwards, however, a large number of co-operative enterprises came 
into severe economic difficulties. In countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Austria 
and Germany the consumer co-operative movement more or less totally collapsed. While some 
small, local and independent retail societies managed to survive, the co-op simply disappeared as 
a national movement in these countries. In other countries, most notably the UK, the co-
operative form of enterprise had to accept a dramatic decline in market share. By the turn of the 
millennium, the overall position of co-operative trade in Western Europe was thus dramatically 
weakened. After having risen to prominence in the final decades of the nineteenth and first half 
of the twentieth century, the post-war years turned out to be a period of more or less unbroken 
decline. 
This narrative of rise and decline does not, however, capture the experience of all 
consumer co-operative movements. In countries such as Norway, Finland, Italy, Switzerland, 
Denmark and Sweden developments in the post-war period were much more positive. Consumer 
co-operatives in these countries manage to defend and in some instances even strengthen both 
their market position and their membership. 24 By the turn of the millennium they continued to 
hold a substantial market share in their respective home markets. 
The history of the consumer co-operative enterprise is therefore broadly a history of rise 
and decline, but with some important exceptions. Despite the fact that the co-op as an alternative 
form of economic organisation has been marginalised in many Western European countries, 
some national consumer co-ops still hold substantial market position and an impressive 
membership. It is these divergent development patterns that serve as the basic starting point for 
the present study. By analysing the more successful experiences in light of the less successful 
ones, it is believed that new insights can be gained about the development patterns of consumer 
co-operative organisations in post-war Europe. 
                                                 
23 See E. Ekberg, E Lange and E. Merok, ‘A successful latecomer: Growth and transformation of the Norwegian 
consumer co-operatives 1920-2000’ Paper presented at the XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, 21.-25. 
August 2006. 
24 Note, however, that the strong position of the Danish and Swedish movements hides the fact that these 
organisations have experienced huge profitability problems since the 1970s, and have largely survived by the selling 
of assets. In Finland, the development has also been characterised by numerous ups and downs. The dominant S-co-
operative was close to collapse in the 1980s, but managed from the early 1990s onwards to regain new growth. The 
other main co-operative group, Tradeka, as well as the Helsinki based Elanto co-operative, were close to bankruptcy 
in the mid-1990s, but were ultimately saved by a so-called chapter 11 application. 
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To carry out the investigation, two consumer co-operative movements showing divergent 
development patterns have been selected. These are the Norwegian and the British consumer co-
ops. These two cases represent ideal empirical examples of the divergent development patterns 
just outlined. The experience of the Norwegian consumer co-op is perhaps the best illustration of 
how the co-operative movement managed to survive, despite dramatic transformations in the 
competitive and societal environment in which it operated. The Norwegian co-ops developed 
steadily throughout the post-war period, producing stable profits and without experiencing any 
fundamental economic crisis threatening their very existence. Since the mid-1970s, the co-
operatives share of the food retail market has been stable at approximately 24 per cent and the 
organisation is the market leader in several different store segments. Parallel to these economic 
achievements, the movement has also experienced a steady rise in membership. With close to one 
million members by 2002, twenty per cent of the population or half of the total number of 
households hold a co-operative membership.25 
The development of the British consumer co-operative movement on the other hand is 
an evocative example of the many problems experienced by consumer co-operative enterprises in 
the post-war period. True, with more than 3,000 outlets and a turnover in 2002 of roughly five 
billion pounds, by the turn of the millennium British co-operatives are still running a substantial 
food retail business.26 In addition, the movement controls substantial operations within such 
diverse trades as pharmacies, funeral services, motor trades, banking and travel. However, the 
market position of the UK co-ops at the beginning of the new millennium, not least in the food 
trades, has dramatically weakened from what it was fifty years ago. From the mid-1950s to 2002, 
the share of the food retail market was reduced to a fourth of its peak level of more than 20 per 
cent. Membership has also declined. While more than thirteen million people, or close to half of 
the total number of households, were reported to be involved in the co-op by the mid-1960s, in 
2000 real figures were down to less than 2 million or approximately 8 per cent of all households.27 
 The divergent developments of the British and Norwegian consumer co-operatives are 
thus indicative of the general pattern of consumer co-operative development in post-war Europe. 
The British experience is representative of the large number of co-ops that have lost out 
dramatically, while the Norwegian development is typical of the ones that have managed to 
                                                 
25 National Co-operative Association archive, Kirkegata 4 Oslo, from now on referred to as K4, anteroom of the 
administration, ‘figures developed by AC Nielsen for the Boston Consulting Group and Coop NKL’, 24 January 
2006 and Coop NKL, Våre tall 1907-2005 (Statistics compiled by Tore Kristoffersen, Coop NKL, 2006). 
26 Co-operatives UK, Consumer Co-operatives Performance Review 2002 (Manchester: Co-operatives UK, 2003). 
27 Figures from Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative statistics (selected years); National Statistic, Social trends No 36 
(amended 2006 edition); National statistics, Population trends no 123 (spring 2006) and The Co-operative Commission, 
The co-operative advantage. Creating a successful family of co-operative businesses (Manchester: The Co-operative Commission, 
2001). See the sub-chapter ‘Sources’ for a discussion of the UK membership figures. 
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survive and even strengthen their position. Before our analysis of these divergent developments 
can proceed, however, a thorough examination of the research that already exists on post-war 
development of consumer co-operative enterprises is necessary.  
 
Existing research 
As previously indicated, recent years have seen a revival of interest in studying the historical 
development of consumer co-operatives. The majority of these studies have, however, focused 
on the establishment and early development of the movement. They have also tended to focus 
most attention on the social, cultural and political aspects of the co-op, while their development 
as economic entities has received less attention.28 Studies of post-war consumer co-operative 
development are fewer and more dispersed. At the same time, they have been more interested in 
understanding the overall economic development of the movement. The present sub-chapter 
intends to summarise and briefly evaluate the main insights from these studies. It focuses on the 
different types of explanations that have been introduced in the literature and evaluates their 
possible contribution to our understanding of the divergent post-war development of consumer 
co-operative enterprises. 
 
                                                 
28 For a few examples of the first, see especially P. Alex, Den rationella konsumenten. KF som folkeupfostrare, 1899-1939 
(Stockholm/Stehag: Brutus Östlings Bokförlag, 1994); P. Gurney, Co-operative culture and the politics of consumption in 
England, 1870-1930 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996); P. Gurney, ‘Labour’s great arch: Cooperation 
and cultural revolution in Britain, 1795-1923’, in E. Furlough and C. Strikwerda (eds), Consumers against Capitalism? 
Consumer Cooperation in Europe, North America and Japan, 1840-1990 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 
1999); E. Furlough, ‘French consumer cooperation, 1885-1930: Fom the “third pillar” of socialism to a “movement 
for all consumers”’, in E. Furlough and C. Strikwerda (eds), Consumers against Capitalism? Consumer Cooperation in 
Europe, North America and Japan, 1840-1990 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1999); N. F. 
Christiansen, ‘Between farmers and workers: Consumer cooperation in Denmark, 1850-1940, in E. Furlough and C. 
Strikwerda (eds), Consumers against Capitalism? Consumer Cooperation in Europe, North America and Japan, 1840-1990 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1999); P. Alex, ‘Swedish consumer cooperation as an educational 
endavour’ in E. Furlough and C. Strikwerda (eds), Consumers against Capitalism? Consumer Cooperation in Europe, North 
America and Japan, 1840-1990 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1999). Hilson, ‘Consumers and 
Politics: The Co-operative Movement in Plymouth, 1890-1920’, Labour History Review 67:1 (2002), 7-27 and K. 
Friberg, The workings of co-operation. A comparative study of consumer co-operative organisations in Britain and Sweden 1860 to 
1970 (Växjö: Växjö University Press, 2005). For a few examples of the latter, see M. Purvis, ‘Co-operative retailing in 
Britain’, in J. Benson and G. Shaw (eds), The Evolution of Retail Systems c. 1800-1914 (London: Leicester University 
Press, 1992), M. Purvis, ‘Societies of consumers and consumer societies: co-operation, consumption and politics in 
Britain and continental Europe c. 1850-1920’, Journal of Historical Geography, 24:2 (1998); 147-69; M. Purvis, ‘Stocking 
the store: Co-operative retailers in North-East England and systems of wholesale supply, circa 1860-77’, in N. 
Aleksander and G. Akerhurst, The emergence of modern retailing, 1750-1950 (London: Frank Cass, 1999) and E. Lange 
(ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. Forbrukesamvirkets historie i Norge (Oslo: 
Pax, 2006). 
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Competition 
Throughout the post-war period the food retailing industry in which the co-ops mainly operated 
was undergoing a fundamental transformation. From being largely a small-scale industry 
dominated by independent shopkeepers operating one or a few stores, retailing became a large-
scale and highly competitive industry controlled almost totally by large, multiple retailers.29 The 
most commonly held assumption concerning the development of consumer co-operative 
enterprises in the post-war period is that the co-ops on a general basis were unsuited to tackle 
these developments. Within this framework, consumer co-operative decline is thus viewed 
primarily as a result of the co-op’s inability to handle strengthened competition. Consumer co-
operative success, on the other hand, is related to the existence of less competitive markets. 
Hence co-operative researchers Johan Brazda and Robert Schediwy contend that ‘those co-
operatives that stay successful for decades seem to thrive in markets with imperfect competition 
and high mark-ups […] Economic spheres with very high levels of competition seem, on the 
other hand, more testing for co-operatives. This has been the case for normal retailing since 
about 1970.’30 Similar views have been expressed by the Italian economic historian Patrizia 
Battilani, who argues that ‘consumer co-operation has become the market leader in precisely 
those countries where the transformations of the distribution system took place more slowly’ – 
i.e. where competition was weaker. 31 
The empirical evidence to support these statements is indeed quite convincing. Battilani’s 
empirical point of reference is the consumer co-ops of Italy and Spain. In both these countries, 
‘the transformations of the distribution system took place more slowly’ and consumer co-ops 
have managed to retain a substantial proportion of the food retail market. And while Battilani 
clearly recognises that the expansion of the Italian consumer co-ops during the last quarter of the 
twentieth century was closely related to their ability to reform and modernise their store 
structure, rationalise their organisational structure and redefine their co-operative image, the 
underlying argument is still that the weak competitive climate, characteristic of the Italian retail 
market, was decisive in helping the consumer co-ops thrive. 
                                                 
29 A short overview is provided by R. Bell, ‘Food retailing in the United Kingdom’, European Retail Digest, 28 (2000), 
22-8. Thorughout the thesis I use the term ‘multiple retailer’, ‘multiples’, ‘multiple chain’, ‘chain store’ 
interchangeably. See the introduction to part two in the present thesis for a short description of the main 
organisational charachteristics of these retailers.  
30 J. Brazda and R. Schediwy, ‘Preconditions for successful co-operative ventures in the light of historical evidence’, 
Review of International Co-operation, 94:1 (2001), 39. 
31 P. Battilani, ‘How to Beat Competition without Loosing Co-operative Identity: the Case of Italian Consumer Co-
operatives’, in ACTA of the International Congress, Consumerism versus Capitalism? Co-operatives seen from an International 
Comparative Perspective. Gent: Amsab Institute of Social History, 2005), p. 112. 
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The argument finds further support when looking at the development of consumer co-
operatives in countries such as the Netherlands, France, and Germany. In all these countries, 
large integrated food chains developed fast and forcefully already from the late 1940s onwards. 
Competition in retailing was thus intense throughout the post-war period and in all countries the 
consumer co-ops slowly but surely declined.32 On the grounds of these general observations, 
there seems to be substantial merit in explanations which point to the level of competition and 
specifically the strengths and achievements of multiple food retailers, being a main force in 
shaping the destiny of consumer co-operatives in post-war Western Europe. 
A principal objection to this kind of reasoning is, however, that it tends to infer the 
causes for one macro observation (survival or collapse of consumer co-operation) more or less 
directly from the existence or non-existence of another macro observation (competitive climate), 
without identifying the mechanisms that may have created such a connection. While the assertion 
that increased competition caused the decline of consumer co-operative enterprises probably has 
substantial merit, it needs to be specified exactly how and why this happened. This is of some 
importance when we know that a competitive retail environment has not always caused decline 
among consumer co-ops. There simply is empirical evidence pointing in another direction. In a 
country such as Sweden for example, where competition from multiple retailers was fierce already 
from the immediate post-war years, the co-op movement managed to prosper. And despite some 
difficult years in the 1980s and 1990s, Swedish co-ops still control a substantial share of the 
Swedish food retailing market.33 Another case in point is the development in Switzerland. The 
Swiss consumer co-operative movement also prospered during the post-war period, despite fierce 
competition, most notably from the consumer owned Migros group.34 These comparative 
findings indicate that there can be no simple connection between the level of competition in a 
country’s food retail market and the survival of consumer co-operative enterprises. Rather, the 
relationship between the two needs to be investigated in detail, focusing specifically on how 
competition has in fact been perceived and approached by consumer co-operative organisations 
in different countries. How did the rise of the multiple retailer challenge the competitiveness of 
                                                 
32 See J. Reintjes, ‘The consumer co-operatives in the Netherlands’, in J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-
operatives in a changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989); R. Schediwy, ‘The consumer 
co-operatives in France’, in J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a changing world, vol. 2 (Geneva: 
International Co-operative Alliance, 1989) and J. Brazda, ‘The consumer co-operatives in Germany’, in J. Brazda and 
R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989). 
33 See R. Schediwy, ‘The consumer co-operatives in Sweden’, in J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives 
in a changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989). 
34 See J. Brazda and R. Schediwy, ‘On search of consumer co-operative excellence – lesson from the past and present 
in order to master the future’, in The Preparatory Committee of the International Co-operative Research Forum, 
Japan, What are the viable co-operative models and contributions for the future? Proceedings of the Tokyo Forum 1992 (Tokyo: 
Japanese Society for Cooperative Studies, 1992). 
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co-operative retailers, what did the co-ops do to confront these challenges and how did their 
strategic responses shape their economic development? 
 
Organisational and managerial factors 
A second type of explanations move attention away from the competitive climate in which the 
co-ops operate and focus more on factors internal to the co-operative enterprises. As such, they 
take explanations focusing on competition one step further by analysing how specific 
organisational and managerial aspects of the co-operative form of trade shaped the co-ops' 
competitiveness. These explanations are of three main types. The first focuses on how the 
federative organisational structure, characteristic of most national consumer co-operative 
movements, has been both impractical and inefficient in competing with the highly centralised 
structures of the competing multiple retailers. As noted by Schediwy: ‘it seems evident that the 
federal co-operative organisation is definitely disadvantaged at the national as well as the 
international level.’35 
The main empirical evidence presented to support this claim is the development in many 
Western European co-ops of dispersed and fragmented organisational structures, unable to 
exploit the full potential of scale economies and bulk buying. The major empirical example is 
France, where the collapse of the movement, according to Schediwy, was closely linked to the 
development of regional and local strongholds unable to co-operate efficiently with the central 
organisation. 36 As local retail societies increased in size, they tended to decrease their loyalty to 
the national federative organisations. Further problems were created as parallel federative 
organisations also failed to cooperate efficiently. The end result of such developments was, in the 
words of Brazda and Schediwy, detrimental ‘tensions between parallel organisations on a central 
level’ as well as substantial ‘problems of pluricentrism created by large regional mergers’. 37 
These problems of coordinating the activities of the different parts of the co-operative 
federation are further related to the inverted structure of the federative model. In consumer co-
operative federations it is the co-operative retail societies that are ‘the parent companies’. These 
local/regional enterprises own and control the central organisations (which then become ‘the 
                                                 
35 R. Schediwy, ‘International co-operation between consumer co-operatives’, Yearbook of Co-operative Enterprises, 
(1990), 119 
36 R. Schediwy, ‘The consumer co-operatives in France’, in J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a 
changing world, vol. 2 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989). As we shall see later , similar problems have 
also hampered the British co-ops.  
37 J. Brazda and R. Schediwy, ‘Consumer co-operatives on the defensive. A short overview’, in J. Brazda and R. 
Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989), p. 
33. 
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daughter companies’). This inverted form of enterprise is believed to create fundamental 
problems of coordination. Again in the words of Schediwy: 
 
an organisation that functions top-down with a central headquarters that sees to 
it that the subsidiaries are all working well … certainly offers practical advantages 
over a central organisation that is owned by a multitude of “parent” co-
operatives who jealously try and protect their independent sphere of action. 
Central organisations of this second type nearly always have to struggle with the 
problem that they are in the end risk-bearers for the whole movement… But 
they still have very few rights in ensuring the grass-roots level is working 
properly. All this may be justified in terms of “this is the price that has to be paid 
for more economic democracy”. But in some cases this price is simply too high 
to be paid.38  
 
Taken together, this type of reasoning has caused researchers to conclude that the federative 
model practised by most national consumer co-operative movements is simply uncompetitive. 
Hence, as pointed out by Brazda and Schediwy: ‘compared with hierarchical organisations like the 
giant transnational corporations, the federal model usually adopted by co-operatives seems to be 
at a serious disadvantage’.39 
There can be no doubt that the federative organisational model characteristic of the 
consumer co-operative enterprise may have caused a variety of problems and affected the 
development of many consumer co-operative movements negatively. But, the comparative 
developments of consumer co-ops show that many rather successful national consumer co-
operative movements still operate on a federative organisational structure.40 It is also evident that 
many movements that have chosen to abandon the federative model in exchange for a more 
centralised structure, have experienced severe problems and even collapsed.41 The actual effect of 
the federative organisational model on the development of consumer co-ops thus remains 
unclear. As Norwegian co-operative researcher Tom Johnstad has concluded in a study 
specifically addressing the federative aspects of co-operation: ‘maybe the problem in many of the 
troubled co-operative systems was not the federative system itself, but the opposite. Maybe the 
                                                 
38 R. Schediwy, ‘International co-operation between consumer co-operatives’, Yearbook of Co-operative Enterprises, 
(1990), 119. 
39 J. Brazda and R. Schediwy, ‘Federal co-operative systems – part of the problem or part of its solution?’, The World 
of Co-operative Enterprise, (1996), 11-16. 
40 Most prominently the Norwegian consumer co-operatives, the Finnish S-movement and the Italian co-op 
movement. 
41 Most notably the Dutch, the German, the Austrian consumer co-operatives and the Finnish E-movement. 
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viability of the federation in an earlier form had been violated’.42 On these grounds, there is still a 
need to develop ‘better knowledge of the federative aspect of co-operatives and other 
associations ... and of the federation as a form of governance compared to other forms.’43 
The second type of internal explanations moves attention away from the organisational 
structure of the consumer co-ops towards their organisational culture. Typically such 
explanations focus on the decline seen in many consumer co-ops during the post-war years and 
relate this decline to deficiencies in the competitive culture of the co-ops. Summing up their 
large, edited study of the development of consumer co-operative enterprise in nine Western 
European countries (as well as Japan), Brazda and Schediwy for example, as one of several 
reasons for co-operative decline, point to how ‘”a culture of not facing problems” and an art of 
explaining them away … has proved very detrimental’. 44 As consumer co-ops had expanded 
more or less continuously and accumulated substantial wealth during their heydays of the first 
half of the twentieth century, many co-ops had strong confidence in their business model and 
tended, again in the words of Brazda and Schediwy, ‘all too easily to “overlook” the first serious 
losses, to regard them as temporary or to blame outside factors’.45 On similar lines, German 
historian Michael Prinz has shown how a strong, conservative culture among the leading 
management in the German co-op movement delayed the much needed transfer to self-service, 
ultimately preparing the process of decline that gradually led the movement into full collapse.46 
Explanations pointing to the importance of culture in shaping co-operative development 
are obviously fruitful. But they still remain under-scrutinised. They have also been solely 
concerned with the declining co-ops and thus failed to discuss the role played by organisational 
culture in the more successful cases. Along the lines initiated by Prinz, there is therefore a need to 
understand more closely how cultural factors actually have shaped the day-to-day retail 
operations of co-operative movements. There is also a need to explore in more detail how 
different organisational cultures actually developed. Why did some co-ops develop an 
organisational culture resistant to change while others managed to build a culture more willing to 
adapt to the transformative trends of the post-war retail environment? 
The third type of internal explanations focus on the importance of the co-operative 
management. On a general basis, this implies that focus is put on how co-operative development 
                                                 
42 T. Johnstad, ‘Co-operatives and Federations”, Journal of Co-operative Studies, 89 (1997), 56. 
43 Ibid., 57. 
44 J. Brazda and R. Schediwy, ‘Consumer co-operatives on the defensive. A short overview’, in J. Brazda and R. 
Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989), p. 
33. 
45 Ibid. 
46 M. Prinz, ‘Consumer Co-operatives’ history with politics left in?: The German case’, Paper presented at the XIV 
International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, 21.-25. August 2006. 
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may be related to the role played by the leading managers, often those situated at the central 
headquarters of the national federative organisations. Most often, such explanations have been 
used to understand decline. Schediwy’s analysis of the decline and subsequent collapse of the 
Austrian consumer co-operatives is indicative.47 After a massive policy of expansion in the early 
1970s, the Austrian consumer co-operative movement came under acute financial pressure by the 
end of the decade. The solution chosen was a total merger of all the co-operative retail societies 
into one large co-operative – Konsum Austria.48 The merger allowed for a new start. And, 
indeed, as Schediwy points out, ‘had the big rescue operation … been followed by energetic 
attempts at modernizing, streamlining and cost-cutting … it might have been successful.’ 
However, this is not what happened. Rather, the organisation failed to meet the increasing 
competition of the 1980s with the necessary measures; deficits were hidden behind a complex 
system of sale and lease back arrangements and, according to the analysis of Schediwy, both the 
general manager and the chairman of the board remained oblivious to the warning signals. Thus, 
the subsequent crisis was largely caused by a ‘management of ignorance’. When the two leading 
figures retired in 1990, the problems were so acute that a scandal was inevitable. By 1995 
Konsum Austria collapsed in what came to be the largest bankruptcy in Austria since the Second 
World War. And as Schediwy’s analysis concludes, ‘the true candidates for a personification of 
Konsum’s decay appear to be the two top men.’49 
A somewhat similar analysis is provided by Johann Brazda in his account of the collapse 
of the German consumer co-operative movement.50 After years of struggling to sustain its market 
share and secure a stable profit, by 1981 a majority of German retail societies had been merged 
into one single enterprise, the Coop Zentrale AG, a limited liability company. 51 The 
developments in the first half of the 1980s looked promising. But, by 1989 the whole structure 
collapsed. By then, the Coop AG had expanded to become the second biggest trading group in 
West Germany. The expansion had, however, been based on fraudulent behaviour on the part of 
the management. By 1986 the top leadership of the company had managed to buy up the 
majority of the shares via letterbox companies and the company was in practice owned by itself. 
Brazda’s broad analysis shows how the ultimate decline of the German consumer movement was 
the result of several interdependent causes. Still, the final collapse is largely related to the problem 
                                                 
47 See R. Schediwy, ‘The Decline and Fall of Konsum Austria, Review of International Co-operation, 89:2 (1996), 62-8.  
48 Only one small rural co-operative society refused to participate in the merger, see Ibid.  
49 Ibid., 64. 
50 J. Brazda, ‘The consumer co-operatives in Germany’, in J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a 
changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989). 
51 The process of transforming the co-operatives into a single limited liability company had started already in 1974 
with the establishment of Coop Zentrale AG, see Ibid., p. 204.  
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of mismanagement. As he concludes, the movement was in the end ‘ruined by managers who 
cared much less about the well being of their company and its employees than about their own 
fortunes.’52 
Both these examples show how co-operative managers have played pivotal roles in 
shaping the decline of their national consumer co-operative organisations. The existing literature 
offers, however, few, if any examples of the role of managers in creating post-war success in 
consumer co-operative enterprises. Indeed, Brazda and Schediwy have later argued how “’the 
most successful “mature” co-operatives … are the ones […] managed in a “benevolent 
authoritarian way” by charismatic leaders acting as “social entrepreneurs”’.53 But their examples 
are typically co-operative leaders of the inter-war period, such as the Swedish Albin Johanson and 
Austrian Otto Sagmeister. The two researchers also note how one of the most important 
challenges of such “mature” co-operatives, ‘seems to be the continuation of an effective and yet 
co-operatively minded management’. But they do not offer any examples of co-ops that have 
actually managed to confront this challenge and developed positively.54 The role played by co-
operative managers in shaping the post-war development of successful consumer co-operatives 
thus needs to be investigated more closely. 
 
The role of politics 
A third type of explanations are those focusing on the role of politics in explaining the 
development of consumer co-operatives. These are of two main types. On the one hand there are 
those who relate decline in consumer co-operative retailing to the existence of adverse regulatory 
practises or outright political hostilities. The immediate post-war problems of the German and 
Austrian movement are the typical examples. Both the German and the Austrian movements 
were dissolved by the Nazi-government during the Second World War and the many difficulties 
created by this development are seen to have hampered the progress of these two movements 
throughout the post-war period. 55 From the early 1950s onwards the German movement was 
                                                 
52 Ibid., p. 214. 
53 J. Brazda and R. Schediwy, ‘Preconditions for successful co-operative ventures in the light of historical evidence’, 
Review of International Co-operation, 94:1 (2001), 39. 
54 Ibid. 
55 J. Brazda, ‘The consumer co-operatives in Germany’, in J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a 
changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989) and B. Fairbarn, ‘The rise and fall of 
consumer cooperation in Germany’, in E. Furlough and C. Strikwerda (eds), Consumers against Capitalism? Consumer 
Cooperation in Europe, North America and Japan, 1840-1990 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1999). For 
Austria se R. Blaich, ‘The consumer co-operatives in Austria’, in J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-
operatives in a changing world, vol. 2 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989) and G. Hauch, ‘From self-help 
to konzern: consumer co-operatives in Austria’, in E. Furlough and C. Strikwerda (eds), Consumers against Capitalism? 
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also hampered by substantial regulatory difficulties as it suffered from legal restraints on the 
payment of dividends. The subsequent result of these regulations was a steep decline in equity 
capital, ultimately damaging the movement’s growth potential. 56 
A somewhat similar argument has been presented by British retail management academics 
Alan Hallsworth and James Bell in their recent examination of the UK co-operative movement.57 
Analysing the post-war decline of the co-op movement in Great Britain, the authors examine, 
among other things, the role of market regulation and especially the abolition of Resale Price 
Maintenance (RPM) in 1964. RPM was a regulatory device providing manufacturers with the 
exclusive right to integrate a recommended price onto the branded packaging. When RPM was 
abolished, the ability of the retailers to offer large discounts by exploiting the possibilities of bulk 
purchasing and bulk sales increased dramatically. According to Hallsworth and Bell this proved 
devastating for the co-ops as ‘their one big advantage had been that they could sell products 
locally at the same (fixed) price as any rival ... and yet offer a “dividend”. …Once this advantage 
was dispensed with under RPM, a key plank of their policy was removed.’58 
But, political factors have not only been propounded as an explanation for co-operative 
decline. The second main type of political explanations concerns how the post-war progress of 
consumer co-operative enterprises may be related to the existence of a favourable political 
environment providing the co-op with regulatory advantages. This type of reasoning is most 
forcefully advocated by economic theory and specifically by proponents of the economic theory 
of the firm.59 These researchers have had a hard time explaining why consumer co-operatives still 
exist in many competitive markets. According to the principle theoretical arguments, retail firms 
established on the basis of customer ownership will necessarily be less efficient and less well 
governed than traditional investor-oriented forms. This is because customer ownership creates 
large transaction costs as well as substantial principal/agency problems, ultimately leading to bad 
corporate governance.60 The decline seen among many consumer co-operatives during the post-
                                                                                                                                                        
Consumer Cooperation in Europe, North America and Japan, 1840-1990 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 
1999). 
56 J. Brazda, ‘The consumer co-operatives in Germany’, in J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a 
changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989). 
57 A. Hallsworth and J. Bell, ‘Retail change and the United Kingdom Co-operative Movement – new opportunity 
beckoning?’, International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, 13.3 (2003), 307-8. 
58 Ibid. 
59 For a short overview, see O. Hart ‘An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm,’ Columbia Law Review, 
89:7 (l989), 1757-74. 
60 A summary of the critique is provided by J. Nilsson, ‘Organisational principles for co-operative firms’, Scandinavian 
Journal of Management 17 (2001). For a more thorough outline of the main arguments in relation to transactions costs, 
principal agency and consumer co-operative development, see H. Hansmann, ‘The Ownership of Enterprise’, Journal 
of Law, Economics and Organization, 4:2 (1988), 267-304. See also H. Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1996). 
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war period fits well with this theoretical reasoning. The successful cases are, however, much more 
difficult to account for as they run counter to the fundamental logic of the theory. The typical 
answer from the economists in such instances is that consumer co-operative enterprises that 
continue to survive in competitive markets have to enjoy some form of public support in the 
form of subsidised interest rates, lower taxes, etc. A recent OECD-analysis of regulation and 
performance in the European retail sector provides a revealing example of such reasoning. Here 
it is argued that the continued strength of the Italian consumer co-operative movement is directly 
linked to the persistence of numerous regulatory advantages. The Italian regulatory system has 
favoured co-operative arrangements and this explains why Italian co-operative chains have gained 
such significant market share relative to the private, multiple retailers. The end result of this 
situation has been, as stated by the report, that ‘the most efficient store formats have not been 
able to expand.’61 
Explanations pointing to political and regulatory factors in explaining the post-war 
development of consumer co-ops also offer interesting and important viewpoints. The role of the 
political environment should be recognised in all studies of post- war consumer co-operative 
development. But existing accounts fail to convince in their analysis of how the political milieu 
actually shape consumer co-operative strategic choices and subsequently their development. This 
goes both for the studies pointing to political hostilities as a reason for co-operative decline and 
those focusing on public support as a reason for consumer co-operative progress. Specifically, 
there is a need to investigate in more detail the actual interplay between the co-operative 
organisations in question and how they actually dealt with the regulatory and political regime they 
were confronting. How have political attitudes shaped the day-to-day strategic focus of the 
consumer co-operative enterprises and how has this focus in turn shaped the economic 
development of these enterprises? 
 
Ideological factors 
A fourth set of explanations point more directly to how success and decline in consumer co-
operative organisations may be related to how these organisations have managed to adapt their 
broader ideological foundation to the competitive, societal and cultural developments of the 
post-war period. Again, different sub-types of explanations may be detected. A first type is 
represented by Brazda and Schediwy when they highlight, again as one among several 
explanations, how the increasing failure among post-war consumer co-ops to offer the traditional 
                                                 
61 D. Pilat, Regulation and performance in the distribution sector (Paris: OECD, 1997). 
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dividend on purchase may have had detrimental effects on their development. As they note, the 
increasing competitive pressures of the post-war period caused ‘a downward pressure on margins 
… [that] made it difficult to earn the traditional dividend’.62 This in turn may have caused 
members to recall their shares, subsequently leading to substantial capital loss for the co-
operative societies. While this may seem a reasonable suggestion for some of the problems 
experienced by post-war consumer co-operative enterprises, the explanation is, however, not 
further examined. Hence, the role of the traditional dividend in the development of consumer co-
operative enterprises remains a hypothesis in need of further empirical exploration. 
Perhaps the most prominent example of ideologically oriented explanations is to be 
found in a more recent analysis edited by the two historians Ellen Furlough and Carl Strikwerda, 
published under the title Consumers against capitalism?. 63 In this study, the main focus of attention 
explicitly rejects the role of economic factors and organisational weaknesses. Evaluating the 
decline seen among many consumer co-ops during the post-war years the editors explicitly argue 
that this development was not primarily caused by ‘the movement’s economic weakness, but by 
its obligation to confront the consumerist revolution.’64 Hence, rather than focusing on internal 
economic and organisational weaknesses or the role of strengthened competition, the study 
concentrates more on how transformations in the cultural and social climate in which the co-op 
operated put into question the overall legitimacy of the co-operatives as alternative forms of 
economic organisations and how this development in turn caused the decline of the large 
majority of the co-op movement. As an example, it is argued that a major reason for the decline 
was the co-op movement’s inability to adapt to the ‘shift away from food as the primary item of 
expenditure’.65 More broadly, they contend that the rise of the affluent, individualist consumer – 
mainly oriented towards consumption in terms of pleasure and desire – did not fit with the 
culture of consumption the co-operatives traditionally had advocated. And as long as the co-ops 
failed to redirect their operations and reformulate their mission to account for these societal and 
cultural transformations, decline was more or less inevitable. 
The reasoning advocated by Furlough and Strikwerda offers many interesting suggestions. 
But, a major problem is that it largely fails to present convincing empirical evidence on how the 
                                                 
62 J. Brazda and R. Schediwy, ‘Consumer co-operatives on the defensive. A short overview’, in J. Brazda and R. 
Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989), p. 
34. 
63 E. Furlough and C. Strikwerda (eds), Consumers against Capitalism? Consumer Cooperation in Europe, North America and 
Japan, 1840-1990 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1999). 
64 E. Furlough and C. Strikwerda, ‘Economics, Consumer Culture and Gender: An Introduction to the Politics of 
Consumer Cooperation’, in E. Furlough and C. Strikwerda (eds), Consumers against Capitalism? Consumer Cooperation in 
Europe, North America and Japan, 1840-1990 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1999), p. 33. 
65 Ibid., p. 34. 
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co-operatives actually perceived and acted upon the cultural and social transformations taking 
place. As a consequence, the question of both whether and how these transformations more 
precisely affected the consumer co-operative movements’ developments remains largely 
unspecified. The analysis presented by Furlough and Strikwerda is in fact not based on any 
thorough historical analysis of the post-war development of an individual consumer co-operative 
organisation. In the introduction, the editors repeatedly refer to the different case studies 
presented in the book, but none of these offer a substantial analysis of post-war developments.66 
Thus, even if this important historical work provides us with some possible explanatory 
mechanisms for understanding consumer co-operative development in post-war Europe, it is 
largely insufficient as a historical theory. For that purpose, it simply fails to provide convincing 
empirical backing for the conclusions drawn.67 An alternative analysis along the lines suggested by 
Furlough and Strikwerda would thus need to better specify the concrete links between the social 
and cultural transformations taking place and the actual development pattern of the co-op in 
question. 
A third type of ideologically oriented explanations are those focusing on the role of 
democratic participation in explaining consumer co-operative development. The typical argument 
expounded among these studies is that the ability of the co-ops to uphold a viable and well-
functioning member democracy forms a vital element in the overall development of these 
enterprises. An emblematic example can be found in the broad study on participatory democracy 
                                                 
66 Of the eleven case studies presented, only three actually analyse developments in Western European co-ops all the 
way up to the 1980s. However, these also focus primarily on pre-war developments. In Carl Strikwerda’s analysis of 
the Belgian case only two and a half of a total nineteen pages are devoted to post-war developments. Similar ratios 
for Gabriella Hauch on Austria are two to twenty-three and for Brett Fairbarn on Germany three to thirty-one, see 
E. Furlough and C. Strikwerda (eds), Consumers against Capitalism? Consumer Cooperation in Europe, North America and 
Japan, 1840-1990 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1999). 
67 It should also be noted here that the introductory chapter by Furlough and Strikwerda is hampered by several 
other problematic shortcomings. While initially having a clear focus on societal and cultural factors in explaining co-
operative development, later the authors do not seem to agree with themselves about what actually were the most 
important explanations. At one point the authors argue that ‘cooperation did not suffer necessarily from failures to 
exploit economies of scale’. Five pages later, however, they conclude that ‘during the twentieth century … 
cooperation … failed to integrate vertically to create real economies of scale” (E. Furlough and C. Strikwerda, 
‘Economics, Consumer Culture and Gender: An Introduction to the Politics of Consumer Cooperation’, in E. 
Furlough and C. Strikwerda (eds), Consumers against Capitalism? Consumer Cooperation in Europe, North America and Japan, 
1840-1990 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1999), p. 30/p. 35). One is thus left in confusion about 
whether organisational integration and the ability to realise scale economies should be regarded as a problem for 
consumer co-operatives or not. A similar confusion has been pointed out by historian Gerd-Rainer Horn in a review 
of the book. It concerns to what extent the co-operatives managed to adapt to changing tastes and cultures of 
consumption, whether such adaptation was a necessary means to survive or whether adaptation in fact caused 
further decline. In the introductory chapter it is argued that lack of adaptation caused decline. In the chapter on 
France, however, successful adaptation is said to have caused decline, as it meant that the co-operators had to 
abandon the traditional goals of creating a collective and social ideology. Again, one is left in confusion as to what 
explanatory status the process of adoption to changing tastes actually has, see G-R Horn, Review of Ellen Furlough and 
Carl Strikwerda (eds.), Consumers against Capitalism? Consumer Cooperation in Europe, North America and Japan, 1840-1990. 
Lanham: 1999 (Economic History Service (EH.NET), 1999). 
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in co-operative enterprises conducted by the so-called ‘international joint project on co-operative 
democracy’ and presented at the centennial congress of the International Co-operative Alliance 
(ICA) in Manchester in 1995.68 This study forcefully argues that the most important factor in 
explaining failure among co-operative organisations in the post-war period is the lack of ability to 
stimulate democratic participation. In the plain words of the authors: ’the decline of consumers’ 
co-operatives in many places is a result of the failure of leaders to stimulate sufficient 
participation in both the business enterprise and the voluntary association side of the 
movement.’69 
Again, however, while being an interesting hypothesis, it largely lacks thorough empirical 
backing. Indeed, existing historical evidence seems to suggest that democratic involvement has 
not been a vital precondition for the economic development of consumer co-operatives. As 
Brazda and Schediwy have argued in an article intended to summarise existing empirical 
knowledge on consumer co-operative development: ’the necessity of a well functioning member 
democracy … should not be exaggerated. … co-operatives in trouble are not usually saved from 
economic perdition by member democracy, but by a new, energetic leadership in whom the 
members can put renewed trust.’70 For sure, these objections do not make the explanatory model 
itself uninteresting. What is needed, however, is a comprehensive historical investigation of how 
different consumer co-operative organisations actually have approached their members and to 
what extent the strategies employed have worked to recruit new and loyal members. 
Subsequently, to what extent such recruitment affected the actual development of the co-ops as 
economic entities also needs to be analysed. 
 
Adaptation  
A final set of explanations that need to be analysed are those focusing explicitly on how the 
consumer co-operative movement has managed to adapt its retail operations to ongoing changes 
in the competitive and societal environment. Three specific studies are worth mentioning. 
The first is the earlier cited work by Hallsworth and Bell.71 Studying the recent 
development of British consumer co-ops and specifically the decision made by the co-ops in the 
                                                 
68 The project was set up as a combined group of both co-operative scholars and representatives from the co-
operative organisations themselves, see The International Joint Project on Co-operative Democracy, Making 
membership Meaningful. Participatory Democracy in co-operatives (Saskatchewan: Centre for the Study of Co-operatives, 
University of Saskatchewan, 1995). 
69 Ibid., p. 3. 
70 J. Brazda and R. Schediwy, ‘Preconditions for successful co-operative ventures in the light of historical evidence’, 
Review of International Co-operation, 94:1 (2001), 35-42. 
71 A. Hallsworth and J. Bell, ‘Retail change and the United Kingdom Co-operative Movement – new opportunity 
beckoning?’, International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, 13.3 (2003), 301-15. 
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late 1990s to retreat from large-scale retailing and focus on convenience retailing, the authors' 
attempt to show how a combination of internal organisational factors, and a rapidly changing 
external trading environment, have often combined to disadvantage the retailing prospects of the 
UK Co-operative Movement.’72 They further point to a diverse set of what they term ‘power 
sources, or ‘power factors’ to explain ‘why some retail chains grow while others decline’.73 These 
factors are ‘technology, market regulation, changing production and distribution systems, 
unionisation and access to capital.’74 The authors argue that compared to the multiples, co-ops 
have been at a disadvantage in relation to all these factors. The co-ops were simply unable to take 
advantage of the same ‘sources of power’ as their main competitors. This is seen to have been a 
vital impediment to the co-op’s market competitiveness and ‘eventually led to it having to retreat 
from the successful superstore format so favoured by its rivals.’75 
In their attempt to analyse the recent development of British consumer co-ops, 
Hallsworth and Bell rely on an important analytical principle, namely the need to relate consumer 
co-operative development to ongoing transformations and trends in the retail environment in 
which the co-ops actually operate. But their subsequent analysis remains quite confused, the 
different power factors discussed seem quite randomly chosen and it is not easy to pinpoint 
exactly why these factors are regarded as the most important. 
Much more promising, then, is the work of retail analyst Leigh Sparks, also studying the 
recent development of the British consumer co-operatives. To illustrate the major problem of co-
operative retailing at the turn of the millennium Sparks focuses explicitly on three distinct 
transformations within the retailing environment. These are ‘the development of new formats, 
the development of the corporate brand and the importance of logistics.’76 Sparks show how the 
co-ops have been unable to measure up against the multiple retailers in adopting these three 
strategic components and that this is illustrative of the major problems experienced by British co-
operative retailers.77 He thus also offers a simple and straightforward analytical scheme from 
which one may detect some of the reasons behind co-operative decline in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century: inability to develop new and competitive retail stores, inability to develop a 
                                                 
72 Ibid., 301. 
73 Ibid., 305. 
74 Ibid. Hence, the regulatory dimension earlier discussed is only one out of several explanatory components.  
75 Ibid., 301. 
76 L. Sparks, ‘Being the best? Co-operative retailing and corporate competitors’, Journal of Co-operative Studies, 104 
(2002), 14. 
77 We turn to these different elements in more detail in the subsequent analysis, see especially chapter five, eight and 
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coherent and attractive co-operative image/brand and inability to develop efficient systems of 
distribution/logistic.78 
A similar framework has been adopted by Battilani in her earlier cited outline of the 
development of the Italian consumer co-operatives during the second half of the twentieth 
century.79 In addition to the weak competition characteristic of the Italian retail sector, Battilani 
shows how the progress of the Italian consumer co-ops during the post-war era was linked to three 
basic factors, namely ‘technological innovation, the creation of a system of firms and the 
definition of new consumer co-operation ideals and significance’.80 Basically, these are the same 
factors as outlined by Sparks. They focus on the development of retailing stores (technology), the 
development of an efficient system of distribution (logistics/system of firms) and the ability to 
develop a coherent and attractive corporate image as vital ingredients in shaping the post-war 
development of food retailers. There thus seems to be some form of common understanding 
between the two about what constituted the major success factors in post-war food retailing. The 
difference is only that while in Britain these success criteria were held by the multiples, in Italy 
they were held by the co-ops. 
The major advantage of these explanations, as opposed to the other main types 
presented, is that they explicitly explore the link between the co-op and their societal and 
competitive environment. They detect the major success formulae within the retailing industry 
and explore to what extent the co-ops managed to measure up to this formulae. Hence, they are 
genuine attempts to treat the co-ops as economic entities and to explore how their history has 
been shaped by economic processes. Still, while these studies form an important point of 
reference for the subsequent analysis, there is a large untapped potential to widen the scope of 
their analyses. This may be done both by increasing the time span covered and by developing 
systematic comparisons including two or more cases of co-operative development. 
 
                                                 
78 The question obviously remains why the co-ops failed to adopt these basic business strategies. In an earlier work 
Sparks has discussed at length the reasons why British co-operatives lagged behind so dramatically during the post-
war period (L. Sparks, ‘Consumer co-operation in the United Kingdom 1945-1993: Review – and prospects’, Journal 
of Co-operative Studies, 79 (1994), 1-64). But again, while the outline of the major business changes affecting the co-ops 
as well as the immediate reactions taken by the co-ops towards this development is emblematic, his discussion on the 
reasons for decline is much more difficult to decipher. His general outline of the development of the British co-ops 
during the post-war period development does, however, form an important secondary source in the subsequent 
empirical analysis. 
79 P. Battilani, ‘How to beat competition without loosing co-operative identity: the case of Italian consumer co-
operatives’, in ACTA of the International Congress, Consumerism versus capitalism? Co-operatives seen from an international 
comparative perspective (Gent: AMSAB, 2005). 
80 Ibid., p. 109. 
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Existing research evaluated  
From the complexity of the above presentations one is led to believe that there exists fairly well 
developed knowledge on the development of consumer co-operative enterprises in post-war 
Europe. And indeed, all the explanatory components presented offer valuable insights. Some of 
them also inform the present study. As we have seen, most of the existing explanations are, 
however, hampered by significant problems. The first of these problems concern the surprising 
lack of dialogue between students of co-operative development and general studies of retailing. 
Apart from the few studies just cited, most existing accounts have failed to properly analyse the 
concrete interplay between co-operative development and the competitive and societal climate in 
which the co-operative organisations operated. There is therefore still a need to increase our 
knowledge of how developments within the retailing industry during the post-war years actually 
affected the retail operations of the co-ops. 
A second shortcoming is related to how existing accounts have tended to focus 
exclusively on cases of decline and failed to exploit the full potential of comparative 
methodology. There indeed exists some comparative approaches, but these tend to take the form 
of ‘anthology comparisons’, where single case studies are presented in subsequent chapters and 
where the anthology’s editors present an introductory summary of the articles that contain some 
comparative reflections.81 These studies surely provide valuable insights, but they are not 
‘comparative in the strict sense’.82 The comparative approaches that do exist have also tended to 
analyse similarities between failing societies and the overall goal has been to find the common 
causal factors for collapse.83 The successful cases have, on the other hand, largely been ignored 
and the potential of comparing cases with different outcomes has not yet been scrutinised. 
Finally, several of the existing explanations have failed to present robust and convincing 
historical data capable of supporting the claims they make. Most accounts certainly have some 
support from historical sources, but many of the explanations offered remain superficial as the 
concrete mechanisms connecting the phenomena to be explained and the suggested explanation 
are not convincingly specified. Theories pointing to changes in the culture of consumption for 
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example, largely remain at the macro level and have had quite a few problems with specifying 
how the co-operatives actually perceived and acted upon the cultural and social transformations 
taking place. There is simply a need to conduct more basic empirical work if we are to understand 
the post-war development of consumer co-operative enterprises. 
 
Analytical approach 
The present study will draw important lessons from existing research. However, it also seeks to 
expand on these accounts and if necessary, to develop alternative interpretations. To achieve this 
end the analysis is grounded in an analytical approach focusing in full on the concrete interplay 
between the consumer co-operative organisations in question and the transformations in the 
competitive and societal environments in which these enterprises operated. It further employs a 
comparative methodological approach, systematically analysing the development of two 
consumer co-operative movements showing divergent development paths. Finally, the analysis as 
a whole will be based on thorough archival studies as well as secondary literature, providing for 
robust empirical backing of the conclusions drawn. The remaining part of this sub-chapter 
outlines in more detail the analytical approach. The methodological approach and the empirical 
sources on which the study is based are presented and discussed in the following sub-chapters. 
The analytical approach of the study is based on two fundamental premises. First, that 
consumer co-operative enterprises are primarily retailing organisations and that their survival and 
growth is intimately linked to how they approach the major challenges of the retailing market. 
Any study seeking to understand why so many consumer co-operatives disappeared during the 
post-war years while others managed to prosper should therefore direct its main attention 
towards how the co-ops developed their retailing business. While the political, social and cultural 
history of consumer co-operation is an interesting field of study, it is the economic history of 
consumer co-operation that has to be studied to understand its actual survival. 
The second premise proposes that in order to develop a satisfactory economic history of 
consumer co-ops, the main focus of attention has to be directed towards the interplay between 
the internal dynamics of the consumer co-operatives in question and their competitive and 
societal environment. The co-operative organisations simply have to be studied in close relation 
to the environment in which they operate; or to cite the American sociologist Richard Scott, 
make sure that ‘the interdependence of the organization and its environment receives primary 
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attention.’84 In investigating the divergent developments of the Norwegian and British consumer 
co-ops, the present study will thus give full attention to how these two organisations approached 
the major competitive and societal transformations of the post-war retailing industry. It will 
analyse how the two organisations developed their retailing businesses in confronting these 
challenges and discuss how differences in approach shaped their economic developments. 
What then were the main societal and competitive transformations facing the post-war 
consumer co-ops? As already indicated, the food retailing industry – where the consumer co-ops 
have had their core area of business – underwent drastic transformations in the post-war era.85 
Two of the most dramatic changes were, in the words of retail analyst Paul Dobson, ‘the 
emergence of new, large store formats and the increased prevalence of large retail chains.’86 The 
industry has been transformed both operationally and organisationally; from a structure 
dominated by small counter-serviced shops, owned individually by independent shopkeepers, to a 
structure where self-serviced supermarkets and hypermarkets owned by a few large, integrated 
businesses control the majority of the market. These transformations fundamentally challenged 
the market position of co-operative retailing. 
Additional challenges were presented by a third major transformative process. 
Throughout the post-war period increased competition, alongside parallel societal 
transformations, came to challenge fundamental premises of the co-op as an alternative form of 
business organisation. The actual economic advantages offered by co-operative membership were 
questioned, the democratic decision-making structure was losing popular support and the 
legitimacy of the co-op as the main proponent of consumer interest was increasingly challenged. 
In order to survive in the new competitive and societal environment of the post-war period the 
co-op movements thus not only had to deal with ‘the emergence of new, large store formats and 
the increased prevalence of large retail chains’, they also had to formulate a new ideological 
mission for their activities, able to attract the support of late twentieth century affluent 
consumers. They simply had to develop a more attractive co-operative image. 
The present analysis will take as its starting point these three major transformative 
processes. Inspired by the analytical schemes offered by Sparks and Battilani, it seeks to analyse 
how the co-operatives developed their retailing operations in the wake of the self-service and 
supermarket revolution.87 It will further examine how they adapted their organisational structures 
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85 For an overview see R. Bell, ‘Food retailing in the United Kingdom’, European Retail Digest, 28 (2000), 22-28. 
86 P. W. Dobson, ‘Competition and collaboration in European grocery retailing’, European Retail Digest, 39 (2003), 13.  
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to tackle the superior organisational efficiencies of the multiple retailers. Finally, it explores how 
the co-ops sought to adapt their ideological profile to be more in line with the competitive and 
societal climate of the late twentieth century. 
 The analysis will be organised in three separate sections, namely ‘retail outlets’, 
‘organisational structure’ and ‘ideology’. Each section explores how the Norwegian and British 
consumer co-operatives approached the challenges they were facing and how differences in 
approach shaped the two movements’ economic developments. The analysis will specifically 
focus on how the co-operators perceived their situation, how these perceptions changed 
throughout the time period covered, what strategies they chose to meet the challenges they were 
facing and what the consequences were in terms of market development, profitability and 
membership. By employing such an analytical approach the study intends to show how the 
divergent development of the British and Norwegian consumer co-ops was fundamentally 
shaped, not by some intrinsic feature of the organisational structure itself, nor by a static 
adaptation to outer pressures, but by the dynamic interplay between organisational choice and 
environmental changes. 
 
Methodological approach 
Having specified the analytical approach of the study, a more thorough presentation and 
discussion of the methodological approach is necessary. As repeatedly indicated, the 
methodological approach of the study is comparative. Hence, the study does not only intend to 
explore how the British and Norwegian consumer co-operatives approached the major challenges 
of the post-war retail business. It also systematically compares differences and similarities in 
approach. By way of such an analysis it is believed that new and improved insights can be gained 
concerning the factors shaping the two movements' divergent developments. 
The strategy of using comparisons as a method to develop knowledge about historical 
processes has a somewhat undecided position within historical research. On the one hand, the 
legacy of the historicist tradition still prevails among many historians. They generally argue that 
comparisons, due to the genuine singularity of historical processes, are of limited value. As the 
German historian Jürgen Kocka has stated: ‘dem historismus blieb das systematische Vergleichen 
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fremd.’88 On the other hand, comparative approaches have long been a popular tool within 
historical research. As Kocka argues, despite the scepticism from historicists, comparisons in 
historical research have been proven to serve several important purposes.89 Comparisons may 
work as a heuristic means to identify problems and interpretations that would possibly not have 
been seen without the use of comparative glasses. Comparisons also serve the purpose of more 
clearly identifying the specificity of an individual case. They provide researchers with a tool to 
better detect factual relationships, may help prevent the use of assumptions taken for granted and 
serve to open up the analysis to alternative hypothesises. In the words of Kocka, comparative 
history may simply ‘render historical science theoretically more stringent and analytically more 
powerful and at the same time … increase its scale and relevance’.90 
Despite the increasing acceptance of comparison as a valuable tool in historical research, 
systematic attempts at spelling out the specific methodological challenges and preferred lines of 
action when conducting comparisons in history are still fairly limited.91 At the most general level, 
inspiration has been drawn from works within the social sciences.92 The standard reference has 
been John Stuart Mill and the distinction between two different comparative designs: the method 
of difference and the method of agreement.93 The logic of the former is to compare cases (i.e. 
nations, organisations etc) that, despite being very similar, have developed differently with respect 
to one specific historical phenomenon. The simple idea is that by isolating the few critical factors 
that actually were different between the two cases one comes closer to discerning the probable 
factors causing the differences in outcome. Features that were similar between the two cases are 
logically ruled out as possible explanations and one is left with the variables that varied between 
                                                 
88 J. Kocka, ‘Historische Komparatistik in Deutschland’, in H-G Haupt and J. Kocka, Geschichte und Vergleich. Ansätze 
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samfunnsforskning 29 (1988), 435-48. 
93 J. S. Mill, A system of logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, reprint, 2002). The 
analytical basis of these approaches has been presented in numerous books and articles and I do not intend to repeat 
these here. I thus limit myself to a very short description to relate these standard approaches to the present study. 
For overviews see B. S. Tranøy, ‘Komparativ metode – mellom ideografiske og nomotetiske idealer, Sosiologi i dag, 
23:4 (1994), 17-40; T. Landmann, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics (London: Routledge, 2000) and F. Sejersted, 
’Sammenligning er ikke bare sammenligning, i F. Sejersted, Sannhet med modifikasjoner (Oslo: Pax, 2003). 
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the cases. The opposite approach is that of the method of agreement, where the idea is to 
compare very dissimilar cases that, despite their huge differences, show similar development 
traits. The logic of this approach is that by isolating the few factors that actually were similar in 
both cases, one has detected the probable factors causing the similarity in development traits. 
Neither of Mill's analytical tools, which are basically simplified techniques of ruling out 
‘irrelevant’ variables in order to come up with a few, or preferably one single explanatory factor, 
should be uncritically transferred to historical inquiries.94 Indeed, as several commentators have 
noted, the logical rigour of Mill's approach has shown to be difficult to apply to and, many would 
say, unsuitable for the development of complex historical investigations. Norwegian historian 
Francis Sejersted has argued that the method of difference in particular settings may be fruitfully 
employed by historians, but is sceptical of using the method as a singular tool. He therefore calls 
for the eclectic combination of different methodological approaches when doing comparative 
history.95 French historian Paul Veyne takes an even more radical stance when he simply claims 
that ‘comparative history has nothing to do with the “method of difference”.’ 96 The argument – 
also propounded by historically oriented sociologists – is basically that the analytically stringent 
models simply fail to grasp the complexities of social processes, as ‘many phenomena of interest 
… are shaped by constellations of factors rather than just one in isolation.’97 Historical 
comparisons thus generally need to account much more for the complexities of both the 
differences and the similarities of the cases in question. Subsequently, they also have to allow for 
less parsimony in the explanatory models developed. 
The present study is an attempt at doing systematic comparative history. It is comparative 
in the sense that it ‘systematically investigates two … historical phenomena with reference to 
their similarities and differences to arrive at explanations, interpretations and further conclusions’, 
to use Kocka’s words.98 It further purports to be ‘systematic’ in the simple sense that it, from the 
outset, has clarified ‘why X is being compared with X, in what respect and with what aim.’99 
Rather than aiming at isolating one or two explanatory variables explaining the divergent 
developments of post-war consumer co-operative organisations, the present comparison puts the 
main emphasis on examining the complexities of factors shaping the divergent developments of 
                                                 
94 H. Rinde, Kontingens og kontinuitet. Franmveksten av stiavhengigr organisajonsmønstre i skandinavisk telefoni (PhD 
dissertation, University of Oslo, 2004), p. 14. 
95 F. Sejersted, ’Sammenligning er ikke bare sammenligning, i F. Sejersted, Sannhet med modifikasjoner (Oslo: Pax, 2003). 
96 P. Veyne, Writing History (Middeltown: Wesleyan University Press, 1984), p. 127. 
97 D. Ruescehemeyer and J. D. Stephens, ‘Comparing Historical Sequences – A Powerful Tool for Causal Analysis, 
Comparative Social Research 16 (1997), 57. 
98 J. Kocka, The uses of Comparative History, in Ragnar Björk and Karl Molin (eds), Societies made up of history, 
Edsbruk: Akademitryck AB 1996: 197. 
99 Ibid., p. 198. 
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the two organisations in question. The study reconstructs how the British and Norwegian 
consumer co-operative movements approached a selected set of challenges and by way of this 
reconstruction proposes a broad historical explanation of their divergent developments. 
The systematic comparison that will be carried out throughout the study will then serve 
the heuristic purpose of helping to identify explanatory components that would possibly not be 
noticed; or at least would be more difficult to notice without the use of a comparative design.100 It 
will also have the analytical purpose of ruling out or elaborate existing explanations as well as to 
develop new ones. This comparative approach forms the basic methodological tool on which the 
study bases its main conclusions  
Sources  
Having stated the analytical and methodological approach of the study, we also need to assess the 
sources on which it is based. What kinds of empirical data will the study use to answer the 
questions it has posed and to what extent are these sources reliable, representative and sufficient? 
The available data on the British and Norwegian consumer co-operatives is immense. As 
regards the selection of empirical data, I have therefore focused on material gathered in the two 
movements' main archives. The main source of information on the Norwegian development has 
been the archive of the Norwegian Co-operative Association (NKL) in Oslo. Data on the UK 
development have been obtained from The National Co-operative Archive in Manchester. Both 
these archives hold substantial collections allowing for a comprehensive study of all the major 
aspects of consumer co-operative development in the post-war period. 
The Oslo archive holds the full company record of the NKL. It holds all major statistical 
information on the Norwegian movement as well as an abundance of other types of printed 
sources, including stenographic congress proceedings, annual reports of the NKL, major strategy 
documents, co-operative journals and co-operative newspapers. The archive also contains some 
private archives of leading NKL officials. Finally, the archive has a broad collection of secondary 
literature, including numerous histories of local retail societies. 
The National Co-operative Archive in Manchester holds a similar wealth of varied 
information on the British consumer co-operative movement. It holds a complete set of the Co-
operative Statistics, published annually by the Co-operative Union since 1876. The statistics give 
information from the balance sheets of individual co-operative societies as well as regional and 
national summaries of figures such as membership, number of employees, sales, surplus and 
                                                 
100 See P. Veyne, Writing History (Middeltown: Wesleyan University Press, 1984), p. 126: ‘Comparative history reveals 
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dividend.101 Other important printed sources held are annual reports and accounts of the CWS, 
stenographic congress proceedings, printed reports from commissions, strategy documents and 
trade reports, as well as an abundance of different national and international co-operative 
journals, including a complete collection of the Co-operative News, the world’s oldest co-operative 
newspaper.102 The archive also holds substantial secondary material, such as existing histories of 
the national federative organisations (The Co-operative Union, the CWS and the SCWS), 
histories of local societies and general literature on the British as well as the international 
consumer co-operative movement. 
All these different types of sources have been applied in the present study and they form 
the study’s main source of information. Some additional sources have also been used. Most 
prominently, some information on the Norwegian development has been taken from a series of 
open-ended interviews made with a selection of CEOs and NKL chairmen, as well as with a 
selection of board members and employees in both the NKL administration and local co-
operative societies. The interviews were conducted in the period between 2002 and 2005, as part 
of a larger research project on the history of the Norwegian consumer co-operatives. And while 
they suffer from all the standard weaknesses of qualitative interviews (the problem of recollecting 
events accurately, the tendency of interviewees to overstate their own importance and ignore 
their mistakes, an unwillingness to disclose sensitive information, etc), they provide fruitful 
insights into the main strategic visions of many leading Norwegian co-operators. The interviews 
also contain several more or less critical assessments of the co-op’s development during and after 
the interviewees own reign, which provide interesting starting points for subsequent analysis. 
The study has also adopted some statistical information gathered from the head offices of 
the ICA, Intercoop and the NAF Group, as well as from national consumer co-operative 
movements around Western Europe.103 This information has primarily been applied to 
developing general statistical overviews of market development and membership figures in 
Western European consumer co-ops. To account more fully for the development of consumer 
co-operative trade in these countries the study has also relied on secondary sources in the form of 
published books and journal articles. While visits to the headquarters of the different 
international co-operative organs or to different national co-operative archives might have 
provided more extensive information, this was deemed neither necessary nor cost efficient. The 
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102 In 2001 the News celebrated 130 years of continuous weekly publication, see www.thenews.coop. 
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objective of the study has not been to provide a full outline of developments in European 
consumer co-operatives. Apart from presenting a convincing statistical overview of the main 
development trends, the overall commercial, organisational and ideological developments of co-
operative retailers in other countries are, when presented, largely intended as a contrast through 
which the British and Norwegian developments can be made more comprehensible. For that 
purpose secondary literature was considered sufficient. 
The study does not to any particular extent draw on archives of local retail societies but 
rather focuses in full on the national co-operative archives of the British and Norwegian 
consumer co-ops. Information on specific developments in co-operative societies is instead 
collected from existing societies' histories. While these societies' histories obviously are of an 
extremely varied quality, information used from these sources have largely been applied as 
examples or factual accounts on general developments such as when and where a new store 
opened and how concrete national policies were adopted (or not adopted) at the local level. The 
value for the present analysis in collecting data from local archives would in any case be limited. 
The study is primarily devoted to the general development of national consumer co-operative 
movements taken as a whole and does not intend to offer detailed inquiries into e.g. 
technological and organisational innovations among single, independent retail societies. Hence, a 
meticulous analysis of local archives would not lead to any major alterations in the existing 
interpretations of the overall development patterns studied here. 
A final point regarding the selection of empirical material concerns the use of unprinted 
company records versus the use of printed sources. As already noted, the archive of the 
Norwegian consumer co-op holds a full company record of the NKL, including internal records, 
strategy reports, minutes and protocols. These have been applied throughout the analysis and 
thus form an important source of information on the Norwegian development. Similar company 
records have not been adopted in the UK case. The analysis of this case is therefore based 
entirely on printed sources. For example, the development of an organisation such as the CWS 
has been recorded from sources such as published strategy reports, articles in co-operative 
journals and in the co-operative press and existing secondary analyses, most prominently one 
book and one outline of a book on the post-war history of the national wholesale federative.104 
Also, the analysis of the more general development of the movement is based on such printed 
sources. The lack of unprinted sources should, however, not be regarded as a major shortcoming. 
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First, some of the printed sources are in practise reprints of internal strategy reports and thus 
provide a full insight into the organisation’s strategic consideration and ultimate choices. Second, 
as regards the internal co-operative journals specifically, these largely functioned as arenas where 
local and national co-operative managers and elected officials spelled out their main strategic 
vision as well as the practical steps that had been taken to face them. This also goes for the 
debates of the Co-operative Union congresses, reprinted as yearly stenographic reports. Third, 
factual development trends are also openly available in the printed sources and can be sufficiently 
detected without access to internal, unprinted records. Hence, it is generally held that the printed 
sources applied provide more than enough information to answer the research questions posed. 
Having stated the major sources of information adopted in the study, what remains is a 
closer presentation and examination of these sources. The first source to be considered is the 
statistics. For the Norwegian development the study relies on statistics developed by the NKL. 
Each year, the local retail societies reported their main trading figures to the NKL, who 
systematised the figures and developed general overviews. From the 1950s these overviews were 
published yearly under the heading Forbrukersamvirket i Norge. A selection of this statistical 
material has later been gathered by the statistics department in the NKL in the database Våre Tall 
1907-2005.105 Some statistical overviews have also been constructed by combining these figures 
with data reported in the annual reports of the NKL. Finally, some statistical information on 
recent developments gathered by the Boston Consulting Group and Ac Nielsen Norway for the 
co-operative movement in Norway has also been applied in the analysis.106 
Concerning statistical data on the UK consumer co-ops I have mainly relied on the Co-
operative Statistics, published yearly by the Co-Operative Union. Similar to the Norwegian statistics, 
this publication was ‘compiled, in the main, from Annual Returns made by societies to the co-
operative Union.’107 This publication contains, as already noted, a wealth of information on the 
development of local retail societies as well as on the movement as a whole. To some extent the 
study has also applied statistical information gathered from international co-operative 
associations as well as other consumer co-operative organisations around Western Europe. 
How reliable is the statistical data? As a general conclusion I would say; very reliable. 
Obviously, in any statistical material of a dimension similar to that of the Norwegian and British 
consumer co-operatives, unsystematic errors will always occur. There are, however, no apparent 
                                                 
105 From now on referred to as Coop NKL, Våre tall 1907-2005 (Statistics compiled by Tore Kristoffersen, Coop 
NKL, 2006). 
106 K4, anteroom of the administration ‘figures developed by AC Nielsen for the Boston Consulting Group and 
Coop NKL’, 24 January 2006. 
107 Co-operative Union, Co-operative statistics (Manchester: Co-operative Union, 1950), p. 3.  
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reasons to suspect any form of systematic bias in the figures. First, the statistics have been 
recorded regularly each year over a substantial period of time. This has facilitated regular control 
and correction of the submitted data. Secondly, collection of retail society statistics has 
throughout the history of the co-operative movement been regarded as an important means of 
recollecting the achievements of the organisation. The national federative organisations have 
operated separate statistical units with separate statistical managers, securing a professional 
treatment of the data collected. And thirdly, it is simply difficult to see any reason why the retail 
societies would systematically report wrong figures when submitting their trading figures to their 
own federative organisation. 
On these grounds there are few immediate reasons to doubt the accuracy of the statistical 
figures reported. Looking closer at some of the main variables presented and analysed in the 
present study there is still a need to make a few remarks. The first concerns the membership 
figures. These are known to be inaccurate. While the trends of rising and declining membership 
reported by the figures probably show a fairly precise trend, the number of members reported to 
be affiliated to the co-op is too large. Already in 1938, a separate report from the Co-operative 
Union noted that ‘the trading membership of the Co-Operative Movement is at least 1,000,000 
less than the total membership figure’.108 These problems escalated throughout the post-war years 
and in 2001, a large commission on the British consumer co-operative concluded that ‘The 
current estimate of membership of the UK Co-operative Movement, of around 10 million, we 
believe is a substantial overestimate and the true membership figure may be less than two 
million.’109 
The reasons behind these highly inaccurate figures are fairly straightforward. Retail 
societies on a general basis simply failed to update their membership lists and continued to report 
members that had left the society, moved or died. In cases of mergers between societies 
membership records also tended to be passed on without being checked. The records of the new 
society thus ended up being highly inaccurate. 
This systematic error in the number of members does not, however, seriously affect the 
general statistical trend of rising and declining membership. It is evident that the popular support 
for co-operative trade in Britain, estimated by the number of members affiliated to the co-op 
movement, is much weaker than the official statistics indicate. But as the level of the figures are 
systematically biased, the statistical trend showing an increase in membership prior to 1960 and a 
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decline in membership after 1960, may still be regarded an accurate description of the overall 
trend. 
Another important figure steadily reported in the analysis is that of co-operative market 
share. This is a difficult estimate, especially in the decades prior to 1970. Historically, insufficient 
trade statistics made accurate estimates of market shares in specific retail trades difficult to 
collect. Such figures are thus seldom reported in the existing statistics. When reporting on the co-
operative market share in the food trades I have therefore drawn on additional sources to that of 
the co-op statistics. In the British case I have used the estimates presented by retail analyst and 
co-operative researcher Leigh Sparks in an article on the post-war development of the British 
consumer co-ops, presented in the Journal of Co-operative Studies in 1994. These figures have, 
according to the author, been obtained from the Co-operative Union. They should therefore be 
fairly reliable. 110 In the Norwegian case I have used estimates presented by NKL employee Stein 
Halvorsen in a 1954 article presented in the co-operative journal Forbrukeren and estimates 
presented in an internal NKL report on developments in co-operative trade, completed in 
1968.111 These two estimates are simply the only figures obtainable on the market position of 
Norwegian co-operative trade in this period. The fact that the two figures reported correspond 
quite well does, however, indicate that they are also fairly accurate. 
Turning to the statistics on co-operative sales and co-operative profits, the data reported 
are most likely correct. Some challenges do however exist when comparing these figures across 
national borders. Most importantly, different regimes of price regulation make direct 
comparisons of average profit of limited interest. Typically, accounts of average profits have thus 
been used primarily to compare the achievements of co-operative trade with those of competing 
retailers or to illustrate internal ups and downs in the fortunes of the two national consumer co-
operative organisations. 
A final point relates to how changing principles of accounting will always affect the 
accuracy of statistical time series. Changes are, however, seldom so fundamental that they affect 
the ability to illustrate general trends. In this respect, it also needs to be taken into account that 
the present thesis restricts itself to very simple and straightforward statistical comparisons and 
does not intend to provide any advanced statistical analysis of the economic development of the 
Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives. 
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A second main group of sources employed in the analysis are the stenographic reports 
recorded at the co-operative congresses in UK and Norway. In Norway, the NKL hosted a co-
operative congress every second or third year.112 These congresses gathered delegates from co-
operative retail societies around the country. While the principal rules governing the authority 
and responsibilities of the congress changed throughout the period, its basic function was to 
work as the highest decision-making organ in the movement. Formally, it elected members to the 
governing board of the NKL and debated and voted over the annual reports of the national 
association. It was also the prime arena for discussions on general issues of co-operative trade, 
co-operative development patterns and future strategies. 
In the UK, congresses were held annually, gathering several thousand delegates from 
around the UK. The authority of the congress over trading matters was much weaker in the UK 
than in Norway. As we recall, the Co-operative Union is not primarily a trading organisation, but 
more of a general interest organisation for the retail societies. Still, throughout its history the 
Union provided substantial advisory services to the retail societies on issues of co-operative 
trading. The yearly congresses therefore also functioned as an important arena for discussing 
issues of trade and the general economic development of the retail societies. 
The debates referred to in the congress proceedings thus provide invaluable insight into 
major issues of co-operative trade, the competitive climate as it was perceived by the British co-
operators, as well as the different solutions presented and debated to solve the different 
challenges. On similar lines, the reports of the Norwegian co-operative congresses provide both 
valuable factual information on the movement’s development and offer an invaluable insight into 
the general perceptions and attitudes held by Norwegian co-operators. True, a possible problem 
with adopting these proceedings as data is related to the large and formal character of the 
congress discussions. It is not evident that all opinions actually existing in the movement were 
openly expressed under such circumstances and thus the congress debates may only partly reflect 
the actual attitudes of British and Norwegian co-operators. But these problems are not of a major 
kind. And when the information gathered from the congress proceedings are applied together 
with other sources they provide an important source of information on the development of the 
two consumer co-ops. 
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A third group of important sources are the annual reports and accounts of the NKL and 
the CWS, together with the many commissions, strategy documents and trade reports developed 
within the movements from the 1950s onwards.113 The account of the British development has 
especially profited from the use of these latter sources. They include such reports as: Questions and 
answers on co-operative self-service (1949), Self-service shops. A joint report (1952), The Co-operative 
Independent Commission Report (1958), The National Amalgamation Survey (1960), Report of the Joint 
Reorganisation Committee (1965), Regional Plan for Co-operative Societies in England, Wales and Ireland 
(1968), Forbrukersamvirket under utvikling (1968), Regional Plan II (1974), Strategiplan for S-lagene og 
NKL 1985-1994 (1986), and The Report of the Co-operative Commission (2001). Most of these reports, 
except for the Independent Commission and the Co-operative Commission, were largely 
researched and written by internal representatives from the co-op movements. In the British case 
this included representatives from the Co-operative Union, the CWS and local retail societies. In 
the Norwegian case representatives from the NKL and the local retail societies participated. The 
reports represent an important source of information on the basic perceptions and views held by 
Norwegian and British co-operators throughout the post-war years, as well as the ideas and plans 
spelled out to meet future challenges. They simply offer very good insights into the major trading 
problems experienced by the two movements, the strategies chosen to meet them and, at least to 
some extent, how successfully these were implemented. 
A final set of important sources are the many different co-operative journals published by 
the co-operative movement in Norway and the UK, including trade journals, member’s 
magazines, newspapers and scientific journals. In Norway, most prominently Kooperatøren and 
Forbrukeren. In the UK, the major journals consulted are The Co-operative Review, Agenda, Co-operative 
Management and Marketing (from 1975 renamed Co-operative Marketing and Management and from 
1988 renamed Retail Marketing and Management), Society for Co-operative Studies Bulletin (from 1985 
renamed Journal of Co-operative Studies), and The Co-operative News. Some information and viewpoints 
have also been collected from the official journal of the International Co-operative Alliance, the 
Review of International Co-operation. 
The data collected from all these journals has generally been treated on similar lines as 
data from the other printed sources. The publications are all edited within the co-op movements 
and the large majority of them are primarily targeting different types of movement 
representatives, be they managers, elected officials or members. They often contain important 
factual information on the development of the co-op movement as well as numerous articles 
written by managers, elected officials and lay members of the movement presenting viewpoints, 
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local histories or broader analysis of ongoing or past development trends in the movement. To 
some extent these journals also contain articles written by outside academics, analysing historical 
development trends or other aspects of co-operative retailing. These contributions have been 
treated as secondary literature and are specifically referred to in the bibliography. 
The question again arises whether the two last groups of sources provide accurate 
descriptions of the developments to be analysed. The general answer to this question would be 
that as long as the analysis draws its information from a wide variety of such sources and to the 
extent that these different sources together may be used to develop a convincing and coherent 
argument, they should be regarded a fruitful, necessary and reliable form of data in the historical 
analysis. 
We turn then to the secondary sources. As already noted, secondary material has been 
applied to account for the general development trends among consumer co-operative 
organisations in Western Europe. It has also been used to gather information on local retail 
societies and to some extent to account for the main development trends within the CWS. Some 
secondary sources have, however, also been applied in the broader analysis of the Norwegian and 
British development. Most importantly, in analysing the Norwegian development, some of the 
main parts draw heavily on a recent publication of the history of the Norwegian consumer co-
operative movement.114 This study is, however, an edited work in which I participated as one of 
five authors. Any reference to this work is thus to be considered as the use of research I myself 
have partly conducted and for which I bear responsibility. Apart from this study, a few recently 
published master theses and research reports on different aspects of consumer co-operative 
history have been applied.115 
Concerning the UK case, existing secondary literature on post-war developments is fairly 
limited. The most encompassing and convincing analysis to date of the post-war UK consumer 
co-operative development has been provided by the British retail professor Leigh Sparks. This 
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study was published in the Journal of Co-operative Studies in 1994.116 Sparks has also written an 
important article on the development in the last half of the 1990s and into the new millennium.117 
Studies taken from outside the realms of the co-op movement itself include Franz Müller’s broad 
account of the British consumer co-operative movement published in the earlier presented two 
volume work Co-operatives in a Changing world, a study by Joshua Bamfield on the post-war strategic 
development of the British co-ops and Alan Hallsworth and James Bell’s recent article focusing 
on post-war consumer co-operative decline, as well as on possible paths for a future revival of 
the British consumer co-ops.118 All these studies provide important insights into the development 
of the British consumer co-ops, most prominently in the form of further factual accounts of the 
movement’s post-war economic development. 
A final group of secondary literature is represented by company histories of the co-ops' 
main competitors as well as more general studies of retailing.119 These studies are primarily used 
to account for the more general development trends in the post-war food retailing market and to 
compare the developments in co-operative retailing with that of their main competitors.  
To summarise, the present study draws on material from a wide selection of different 
sources. This sub-chapter has presented the main types of such sources and evaluated to what 
degree they are reliable, representative and sufficient. Taken together, it has been argued that the 
empirical data selected is both consistent and adequate to answer the research question posed. 
Structure of the thesis 
The subsequent analysis is organised in three main sections. The first section deals with the major 
post-war transformations at the retail level. Specifically, it investigates how the co-operative 
movements in Norway and the UK faced the rise of the large, self-serviced supermarkets, 
superstores and hypermarkets within the food retail industry, as well as the later development 
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Kingdom Co-operative Movement – new opportunity beckoning?’, International Review of Retail, Distribution and 
Consumer Research, 13.3 (2003), 301-15. 
119 The most prominent examples include, A. Strand, Dagligvarekjøpmennene og samfunnet 1958-1988 (Oslo: Norges 
Dagligvarehandels Forbund, 1988); D. Powell, Counter revolution. The Tesco Story (London: GraftonBooks, 1991); B. 
Williams, The Best Butter in the World. A History of Sainsbury’s (London: Ebury Press, 1994); D. Bredal, Kampen om ditt 
daglige brød. Bak kulissene i dagligvarebransjen (Oslo: Schibsted, 1996); N. Wrigley and M. Lowe, Reading Retail. A 
geographical perspective on retailing and consumption spaces (London: Arnold, 2002) and E. Røsrud, Dagligvarefobundets rolle og 
virke mot år 2000 (Oslo: Handels- og Servicenæringens Hovedorganisasjon, 2003). 
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among leading multiples of a multi-format structure of stores. This section consists of four 
chapters. The first (chapter two) analyses the arrival of self-service retailing and how this was 
approached by the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives. The next chapter (chapter 
three) presents and analyses the rise of the supermarket, while the following deals with the 
development of superstore and hypermarket trading (chapter four). The last chapter of the 
section (chapter five) analyses the process of retail diversification, which seriously took off in the 
Norwegian and British food retail industry from the 1990s onwards. 
The second section moves the focus beyond the level of the store and analyses the role of 
organisational factors in explaining the divergent developments of the Norwegian and British 
consumer co-ops. It specifically explores how the rise of the large, multiple food retailers was 
dealt with by the Norwegian and British consumer co-operative movements. This section is 
organised in three chapters. The first (chapter six) shows how the competitive situation in the 
Norwegian and British food retail sector was perceived and acted upon by the two countries’ co-
operative movements in the immediate post-war years. The second chapter (chapter seven) 
specifically discusses how amalgamations of local retail societies into larger units in the 1960s and 
1970s came to form a basic strategy for both the British and Norwegian co-operative movement 
in dealing with the chain store challenge. The third and final chapter of the section (chapter eight) 
specifically discusses the different attempts made by co-op societies to better coordinate the 
operational procedures and overall flow of goods in the movement through different forms of 
organisational standardisation and integration. 
The third and final empirical section of the thesis turns the attention away from the 
operational practises and organisational structures of co-operative trade and deals more 
specifically with its ideological role and profile. It explores how competitive changes, as well as 
parallel societal changes, challenged the viability and relevance of co-operation as an alternative 
form of retail trading. This section is divided into two chapters. The first chapter (chapter nine) 
concerns how the co-operatives in the UK and Norway tackled the increasing questioning of 
their traditional role as a consumer movement. It further explores how the two organisations 
perceived and interpreted the lack of popular enthusiasm for their democratic governance 
structure and shows the practical steps taken to approach this development. The second chapter 
(chapter ten) explores more specifically how the Norwegian and British consumer co-operative 
movements worked to revive and improve the economic principle of the dividend in order to 
make it relevant and economically attractive for the post-war affluent consumer. 
On the basis of these empirical analyses the study aims to provide a broad answer to the 
question initially raised, namely why the Norwegian consumer co-operative movement 
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throughout the post-war period managed to strengthen and sustain its market share and increase 
its membership, while the British movement in the same period lost substantial market share and 
saw its membership figures decline dramatically. In a final chapter (chapter eleven) the different 
themes discussed to provide an answer to this question are drawn together in a final, concluding 
analysis. 
  
 50
 
  
 51
Section I: Stores 
The post-war period witnessed several radical transformations in how food was sold to the 
consumer. In 1946 practically all food stores in Western Europe were based on counter service. 
Most of these stores were highly specialised, selling meat, fish, fruit, bread, milk or groceries. The 
stores were small, numerous and located close to the consumer. They were also very similar in 
kind. Stock, outlay and pricing policy was more or less the same in all stores. Apart from obvious 
variations in the quality of how the store was run, the main visible difference was the name of the 
store. This would typically refer to the surname of the store’s owner. The stores received regular 
visits from their customers. Shopping for food was done on a daily basis and implied visits to 
various speciality retailers. 
By the end of the century this situation had been drastically altered. Most food was now 
sold on a self-service basis in stores stocking all daily household requirements, including fresh 
products such as fish, meat and milk, as well as a wide range of non-food products. The average 
size of the stores had risen tremendously, while the number of shops had been drastically 
reduced. In the period from 1950 to 2000 the number of food stores in the UK was reduced 
from 256,000 to 14,500.120 In Norway a similar period saw a reduction from approximately 
13,000 to 4,022.121 Stores varied substantially in their outlook and operational rationale. Small, 
centrally located convenience stores traded alongside large out of town hypermarkets. Some 
stores would trade on the promise of offering high quality products while others focused more 
exclusively on convenience or low price. At the same time, many of these different store formats 
were owned by single enterprises and they traded under similar brands across the country in 
which they belonged.122 Alongside these transformations at the corporate level, consumer habits 
had also changed radically. Shopping for food was done on a much less frequent basis than 
earlier and most daily provisions were bought by way of one stop shopping. 
The theme of this section is to explore how these fundamental changes in the selling of 
food were approached and handled by the co-operative retail organisations of UK and Norway. 
                                                 
120 Figures taken from Co-operative Union, Co-operative Independent Commission Report, Manchester 1958: 40 and Nordic 
competition authorities, Nordic Food Markets – a taste for competition, Report 1/2005: 59/67. The figures for 2000 only 
include shops that belong to chains, excluding speciality food shops and independent kiosks. This does not, 
however, alter the general picture of a drastic decline in the total number of food stores. 
121 This is an approximate figure as there are no reliable data on the number of food stores in Norway in 1950. In 
1963, there were 12, 664 food stores in Norway according to A. Strand, Dagligvarekjøpmennene og samfunnet 1958-1988 
(Oslo: Norges Dagligvarehandels Forbund, 1988) and E. Røsrud, Dagligvarefobundets rolle og virke mot år 2000 (Oslo: 
Handels- og Servicenæringens Hovedorganisasjon, 2003). 
122 Some companies would also trade internationally under the same brand, e.g. Spar, Aldi, Lidl, Tesco, Carrefour. 
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The development of self-service technology offered possibilities for substantial improvements in 
the productivity of the retail store. Properly applied, it could both increase the sales and reduce 
the costs of the operations. Further economies were exploited by increasing the size of the store. 
The most radical examples of such scale economies in food retailing were represented by the so-
called hypermarkets. While the traditional counter serviced store of the early 1950s typically 
operated on a sales area well beyond 1,000 square feet, the hypermarkets held a minimum sales 
area of 55,000 square feet.123 In addition to scale, food retailers gradually also started to exploit 
the competitive advantages of being present in many different markets. Hence from the 1980s 
and 1990s onwards major retailers increasingly operated a diversified structure of stores, 
including small, local convenience stores and kiosks, as well as medium sized supermarkets and 
large, out of town and edge of town hypermarkets and superstores. 
The ability to confront these dramatic transformations in the operational principles of the 
major food retailers was fundamental in shaping the market survival of post-war retailers. To 
survive in the market place, it was simply necessary to develop a structure of stores capable of 
exploiting the full economic potential of the self-service system. To remain among the market 
leaders, it became necessary to develop a multi-format approach and compete aggressively in 
many different market segments. 
The economic development of the co-operative movement throughout the post-war 
period was intrinsically linked to how these challenges were dealt with. As it turned out, the 
challenges were approached differently by the British and Norwegian consumer co-ops. In the 
UK, the co-operative movement soon lost its initial lead in the development of new retail 
formats. After introducing self-service trading in the British market the co-ops were surpassed by 
private retailers in the further development of the most competitive and attractive stores. By the 
turn of the century the organisation decided to abandon its large scale operations and concentrate 
exclusively on smaller, in-town convenience stores. Hence, while most major retailers diversified 
their structure of shops to compete in different market segments, the co-ops chose to 
concentrate their operations in one, specialised segment. The most visible consequence of these 
developments was a substantial loss in market shares. By 2002, the co-operative societies’ share 
of the food retail market had been reduced to 5 per cent, a quarter of its peak level of 
approximately 20 per cent in 1955. 
In Norway by contrast, the co-operative movement managed to hold on to its initial lead 
in self-service and supermarket trading. On average, co-op stores remained larger than those run 
                                                 
123 Estimates from F. Lambert ‘Self-service review’, Agenda, September (1954) and N. Wrigley and M. Lowe, Reading 
Retail. A geographical perspective on retailing and consumption spaces (London: Arnold, 2002), pp. 76-83. 
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by private retailers. In 1968 the co-ops opened the country’s first hypermarket, and throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s a chain of co-operative discount stores, a chain of supermarkets as well as a 
chain of local community stores were developed. The co-operative movement thus managed to 
diversify its structure of shops and remain an important player in all the major segments of the 
market. Sales and market share rose gradually throughout the immediate post-war years to be 
stabilised from the mid 1970s onwards at around 24 percent. 
The present section describes and analyses this divergent development. Specifically, it 
seeks to show how the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives approached the coming of 
the self-service store, the growth in the size of the retail outlets and the development among 
major food retailers of a diversified, multi-format structure of stores. It analyses similarities and 
differences in how these challenges were approached and how the differences shaped the 
divergent economic development of the two movements. The analysis proceeds through four 
chapters. The first chapter (chapter two) concerns the coming of the self-service store. It briefly 
presents the major features of the self-service technology and shows how the co-op movement 
approached the challenge of transferring their stores to self-service. The second chapter (chapter 
three) analyses the development of the supermarket while the third chapter (chapter four) deals 
with the development of superstore and hypermarket retailing. The chapters present the principle 
operational rationale of the supermarket, the superstore and the hypermarket and discuss 
differences and similarities in how the co-operative movement in the UK and Norway 
confronted the development of such large scale retailing formats. The fourth and final chapter 
(chapter five) presents the process of retail diversification and how this was perceived and 
approached by members of the Norwegian and British co-operative movements. 
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Chapter 2: Self-service  
 
In 1942 the London Co-operative Society, under the leadership of Harold Wicker, opened what 
has come to be regarded as the first self-service store in the UK. 124 Five years later, in October 
1947, the Oslo Co-operative Society opened Norway’s first outlet constructed on self-service 
lines. The opening of the two stores is illustrative of the important role the co-operative societies 
of the UK and Norway were to take in the implementation of self-service within their respective 
home markets. By 1950, co-op societies still controlled more than 90 per cent of all self-service 
stores in the UK. A similar, if somewhat inferior lead was taken by Norwegian co-operative 
societies. 
Despite the innovative role taken by both the British and Norwegian co-ops, the 
transformation to self-service was to become an important starting point in the process by which 
the two organisations departed on very different development paths. As it turned out, while the 
UK co-ops gradually started to lose out to their major competitors in the development of the 
self-service system, Norwegian co-operators remained leading proponents of self-service retailing 
in the Norwegian market. 
This chapter describes this development and explores some possible reasons for the 
divergence in development. The analysis focuses on three main questions. The first concerns 
how the transformation to self-service was approached by the co-operative societies. Was it 
primarily based on fast and simple conversions of existing premises or did it imply more 
meticulously planed refurbishments or the opening of new, purpose built stores? The second 
question deals with how private retailers responded to the self-service system as it was introduced 
by the co-operative societies. Did the private food retailers manage to counter the early initiatives 
taken by the co-operative societies into self-service trading or were they in one way or other 
hindered from competing with the co-operative stores? Finally, how was the transfer of trade to 
self-service affecting the general system of distribution operated by the retail societies? Was the 
self-service revolution mostly dealt with as a retail transformation, or did it affect the whole 
system of distribution and merchandising? 
 
                                                 
124 The early development of self-service is discussed in detail in F. Lambert ‘Self-service review’, Agenda, September 
(1954), 81-112. For more recent accounts stating the 1942 London opening to be the first self-service venture in the 
UK, see D. Powell, Counter revolution. The Tesco Story (London: GraftonBooks, 1991), p. 51. 
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The self-service technology 
The traditional grocery shop as it had developed from the 19th century was based on counter 
service. Basically, this implied that the shop-floor was divided in two and that most of the 
products sold in the store were stacked behind a counter, separating the customers from the sales 
staff. The customers were served on an individual basis presenting their requests to a sales person 
who would then pick up the item from behind the counter. Most goods were stored in large 
sacks, barrels and bins and had to be weighed, packed and priced by the sales personnel on the 
premises. The selection of merchandise stored in any given shop varied. Generally, the shops 
stocked basic groceries such as flour, sugar, coffee and canned food. Some stores also sold fresh 
food such as fish and meat, but, at least in the cities, these products were normally confined to 
speciality shops. Many shops also stocked a wide selection of non-food merchandise, but again, 
the extent of this practise varied and whereas non-food sales in the cities were mostly sold in 
speciality outlets, shops in more rural areas were more often all-purpose shops.125 
The introduction of self-service radically altered this practice. The self-service technology 
had originated in the USA in the early twentieth century, and as it reached Europe by the early 
1950s it had already been adopted by a majority of food retailers in the USA.126 The major visual 
and operational transformation of the self-service system was the elimination of the counter 
separating the customers and the goods sold and the establishment of a checkout counter. The 
customer was free to walk around the shop to pick up whatever she wanted from the available 
assortment and payment would be made at the checkout. As a contemporary definition of the 
system stated: ‘Self service might be summarised as “Personal selection and acquisition of all 
requirements from easily available stock, with one cash transaction only after all purchases have 
been made.”’127 The only actual process of selling conducted by the sales personnel in a self-
service store, apart from the collection of payment at the checkout, was the displaying of the 
products in a practical and alluring manner: ‘The self-service store has no selling staff, but 
requires a well-trained personnel for maintaining a good system of stock control, for replenishing 
the shelves and for checking and packing.’128 
                                                 
125 R. Lavik and R. Brusdal, Varehandelens utvikling. Kjøp ute og hjemme (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996), pp. 88-103; A. 
Seth and G. Randal, The Grocers. The rise and rise of the supermarket chains (London: Kogan page, 2001), pp. 1-2; J. 
Vatnaland, Stability and change in the organization of industry. The chain store innovation and the transformation of American 
retailing in a comparative perspective (PhD dissertation, University of Oslo, 2007), pp. 65-81. 
126 G. Shaw, L. Curt and A. Alexander, ‘Selling Self-Service and the Supermarket: The Americanisation of Food 
retailing in Britain, 1945-60’, Business History, 46:4 (2004). 
127 A. E. Hammond, Self-service Trading (Lockwood Press: London, 1949), p. 16. 
128 Ibid. 
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The introduction of self-service was not only a retail transformation. The system implied 
fundamental transformations in the whole process of manufacturing and distribution. In order to 
make it possible for the customers to actually serve themselves, the goods had to be weighed, 
counted, packed and priced beforehand. Early on in the transformation to self-service, pre-
packaging remained the responsibility of the retailer. Typically, the retailer would pack and price 
the goods by hand before putting them on display in the shop. Gradually, however, the process 
of packaging was transferred to the food manufacturers, who were able to do the work more 
efficiently through the use of mechanised equipment. This transferring of responsibilities from 
the retailer onto the manufacturers was necessary to fully exploit the economies of the self-
service system. 129 At the same time, as self-service became the preferred trading method for more 
and more retailers, manufacturers also gained a commercial interest in controlling the packaging 
process. As goods increasingly sold themselves, producers needed to mark off their products 
with distinct brands and distinct types of packaging. Hence, the self-service system spurred the 
development of product branding. The system also demanded a systematic restructuring of the 
system of distribution to secure a steady flow of goods and especially to obviate warehousing at 
the retail end. 
What genuinely characterised the self-service system was thus that both the customer and 
the producer were given more active roles in the process of selling, and that the system of 
distribution providing the stores with goods had to be simplified and rationalised. As reported in 
an OECD analysis presented in 1960, the self-service system involved ‘transferring some of the 
functions previously performed by the retailer to his suppliers and others to his customers.’130  
 
The introduction of self-service in the UK  
The opening of the self-service section in Romford in 1942 was an important first sign that the 
self-service technology was about to make its way into the European market. As early as 1936, 
representatives from the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS), together with Swedish co-
operators, had visited the US specifically to inspect the developments in retailing.131 But no stores 
had been opened in the UK before the London society took the first step. In the period between 
June 1942 and May 1944 a total of seven self-service units were opened by the London society. 
In truth, these stores were primarily established as a means to overcome war-time staff shortages, 
                                                 
129 K. H Henksmeier, The economic performance of self-service in Europe (OECD: Paris, 1960). 
130 Ibid., p. 12. 
131 The following paragraph is based on F. Lambert ‘Self-service review’, Agenda, September (1954), 81-112. 
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and did not represent a full blown adoption of the self-service technology. The units did, 
however, soon prove to be a considerable economic success. They recorded higher than average 
sales increases, as well as improved productivity through higher sales per assistant and reduced 
wages cost per  of sales. The stores were thus an important first demonstration of the possible 
advantages of the self-service technology. 
Despite the positive experiences made by the London society, for some years yet the 
actual opening of new self-service stores remained limited. The prevalence of rationing and food 
shortages as well as lack of packaging materials and equipment – problems present both in the 
UK and Norway into the early 1950s – limited the immediate attractiveness of the technology. 
Building restrictions also hindered the spread of self-service. The possibilities of establishing new, 
purpose built self-service stores was limited and conversions had largely to be done by rebuilding 
existing premises. By 1947 there were hardly any self-service food stores in operation outside the 
United States and Canada.132 From then on, however, a rapid development started. 
During the immediate post-war years several representatives of the co-operative 
movement had visited the United States to study the self-service technology first hand. Their 
experiences were gradually starting to spread to the movement in the form of conferences, 
pamphlets and articles in the co-operative press. In February 1947, a special trade conference was 
held by the Hants and Sussex district council of the UK consumer co-operative movement on 
the subject of self-service trading. Mr. Webber of the district council, ‘who had visited America 
and Scandinavia’, introduced the listeners to the possible advantages of the self-service system. A 
year later, in January 1948, a ‘sixpenny pamphlet’ on self-service, written by the then director of 
the Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society, John Corina, was published by the Co-operative 
Union.133 The pamphlet was intended to give ‘a factual account of self-service shops in the U.S.A 
… the causes of their success and prospects for their development in Britain’. 134 Its conclusions 
were plain. According to Corina, self-service was ‘inevitable … because (a) The public prefer it; 
(b) It is more economic; and (c) It is a form of rationalisation which must be applied in the public 
interest to the chaotic retail trades’.135 
The spread of knowledge gradually started to materialise in the form of actual openings of 
self-serviced stores. Hence, in April or May 1948, the Portsea Island Mutual Co-operative opened 
                                                 
132 W. Applebaum, ‘Developments in self-service food distribution abroad’, Journal of Farm Economics, 38:2 (1956), 
348-55. 
133 J. Corina, Spotlight on self-service (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd., 1948). At this point, Corina was also the 
chairman of the Co-operative Union. 
134 Ibid., back page. 
135 Ibid., p. 30. 
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the first true self-service shop in Britain, located at Albert Road in Southsea, Portsmouth.136 In 
contrast to the units in London, this store was a full blown self-service unit operating on all the 
principle aspects of the technology. The success was immediate. By the end of the year the 
Portsea society had converted a total of 12 shops into self-service.137 The stores recorded 
substantial increases in sales combined with reduced labour costs. In the autumn of 1948 it was 
reported that one of the recently opened stores had recorded a 45 per cent increase in sales.138  
The positive experience of the Portsea Society gave further inspiration to other societies 
and many more started to convert their stores to self-service. Important practical guidance was 
also provided when The Hants and Sussex District Council in 1949 issued a separate publication 
based on the experiences made at Portsea.139 The booklet was entitled: Conversion to self-service, A 
Practical Guide, and comprised information on the ‘physical aspects of planning shop interiors, 
fittings, use of shop machinery, baskets, trolleys and display shelves.’140 It specifically focused on 
how to transfer existing counter serviced premises to self-service, while the planning of new 
shops was provided with less attention. In the view of The Co-operative Review, commenting on the 
publication it its 1949 February edition, this gave the booklet ‘a readier acceptance’ among other 
societies.141 Building restrictions, as well as the fact that most retail societies did not have the 
finances to plan and build new shops, implied that most societies had to rely on transforming 
existing outlets. The Portsea report was believed ‘to set a pattern for any conversion, however 
difficult the shape of the present premises.’142 And truly, as one contemporary commentator 
noted: ‘The opening of the Albert Road shop set a match to the fuse of co-operative self-service 
                                                 
136 According to Lambert the opening was in April (F. Lambert ‘Self-service review’, Agenda, September (1954)). But, 
according to Jacques and Wilding, who had personally managed the Portsea store opening, it was in May (J. Jacques 
and H. G. Wilding, Conversion to self-service. A practical guide (Manchester: Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd, 1949)). 
Already in February the official journal of the UK Co-operative Union, The Co-operative Review, reported that ‘some 
self-service shops have been opened … by British co-operative societies within the last few weeks.’ This indicates 
that there were self-service stores in operation even before the Portsea store opening. It has, however, not been 
possible to detect what stores the Review was actually referring to here. As far as both the contemporary and the more 
recent sources state the Portsea outlet to be the first, these earlier stores were most likely self-service units similar to 
the ones opened by the London society during the war (‘Spotlight on self-service’, The Co-operative Review, 22:1 (1948), 
19). 
137 ‘Self-service guide’, The Co-operative Review, 23:2 (1949), 31. 
138 ‘Self-Service is inevitable. Some reasons for its success’, The Co-operative Review, 22:6 (1948), 116-17. 
139 J. Jaques and H. G. Wilding, Conversion to Self-Service. A Practical Guide (Southampton: Hants and Sussex Co-
operative District Council, 1949). 
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development.’143 Before the end of 1949 an approximate of four hundred self-service stores had 
been opened within the movement. A little more than a year later the figure was six hundred.144  
The advantages of self-service were by now also repeatedly reported in The Co-operative 
Review. Chief among the arguments presented to the readers was how the self-service technology 
offered prospects of radically increased labour productivity. By transferring the preparation and 
packaging of goods into the hands of the manufacturer and by delegating the actual process of 
picking the goods to be bought to the consumers, labour cost could be minimised. As had been 
expressed in a Review article as early as June 1948, it was ‘generally accepted that the self-service 
system, properly applied, greatly reduces wage costs per 1 of sales.’145 Another argument 
repeatedly propounded was how a transfer to self-service implied several advantages for the 
consumer. According to housewife Jean Howe, reporting in the Review in the summer of 1949, 
the ‘chief advantage’ of self-service was ‘on the consumer’s side’.146 Howe particularly pointed to 
the possibility for the consumer to ‘inspect goods closely and at her leisure and that a large 
number of customers can be served comparatively quickly’.147 Also, the Portsea report had noted 
that self-service ‘speeds up service’ as ‘customers can do their shopping in about one third of the 
time.’148 The report had, however, also remarked how this was not only an advantage for the 
consumer. As the report went on to note, the increased speed of service; ‘in addition to attracting 
new trade … reduces the number of customers in the shop at any one time, relieves congestion 
at busy periods and increases the potential turnover in relation to floor space.’149 Specifically, the 
report noted how the possibilities of bringing a much greater range of products to the notice of 
the consumer had the effect of increasing the total turnover, ‘especially in those commodities 
which are available in variety, e.g. canned soups, and those which are sold in food stores but are 
often bought in other shops, e.g. toilet rolls, patent medicines, &c’.150 Hence, the practical 
advantages for the consumer were paralleled with several obvious economic advantages for the 
organisation operating the store. 
In short, the many advantages of the self-service technology were quickly acknowledged 
by central co-operative organs, and they were repeatedly reported in pamphlets, at conferences 
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and in the co-operative press. Together with the positive experiences actually made by societies 
who had transferred some stores to self-service, the arguments in favour of the new system were 
becoming more and more convincing. The effect was that retail societies started to convert their 
shops to self-service at an unprecedented rate. As we recall, by the end of 1949 approximately 
four hundred stores had been opened. And even if private traders had also started to view self-
service with increasing interest, by 1950, 90 per cent of all self-service stores in the UK were run 
by co-operative societies.151 In truth, most of the large, private retailers had started to experiment 
with the system. In 1950 it was reported that companies such as Marks & Spencer, Lyons, Pearks, 
Liptons, Express Dairies and Tesco all had opened at least one self-service store.152 Apparently, 
Tesco had opened a self-service store at St.Albans as early as 1947.153 But within a year the store 
had been reconverted to counter service, to be reopened again as self-service in 1949. At this 
point, it was still the only Tesco shop out of a total of 110 stores run on a self-service basis.154 
Hence, the clear impression, as expressed by a 1950-report on self-service trading from the 
British Market Research Bureau, was that when it came to self-service trading, ‘the Co-operative 
movement … [had] a definite lead over other retailers.’155  
 
Self-service in Norway 
Similar to the UK co-ops, the Norwegian co-operative movement took the lead in introducing 
self-service in Norway. And the pattern of expansion proved to have many similarities to the one 
seen in the UK. The first store was opened by the Oslo Co-operative Society in October 1947.156 
The opening had been directly inspired by developments in Sweden, where Europe’s first fully 
equipped self-service store had been opened in the spring of 1947.157 Numerous enthusiastic 
reports on the development of self-service in the USA were also delivered in the co-operative 
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5 and H. Kylebäck, Varuhandeln i Sverige under 1900-talet (Göteborg: BAS, 2004), p. 147-54. 
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press, and most importantly in the journal Forbrukeren.158 Gradually, more societies started to 
open self-service stores. And even if the commentators revealed several challenges that had to be 
overcome before the self-service system could be efficiently implemented in Norway, it was soon 
agreed that self-service had to be given the greatest attention in the future development of co-
operative shops.  
The arguments supporting such a conclusion were largely the same as the ones seen in the 
UK. It was believed that the new technology, properly applied, could induce both huge cost 
savings and increased sales. The advantages for the consumer in terms of time saving were also 
propounded.159 In contrast to the UK development, however, the Norwegian co-ops were not 
alone in converting their shops to self-service. Private retailers were also soon to adopt the self-
service model. Immediately after the first co-operative store had been established in Oslo, local 
shopkeeper, Peder Aas, opened the country’s first privately owned self-service store at Skreia, a 
small rural community in the eastern part of the country.160 And already by 1952, a majority of 
the established self-service stores were run by private traders.161 By 1957, less than forty per cent 
of all Norwegian self-service shops were run by co-operatives.  
Still, even if the Norwegian co-ops no longer ran a majority of the self-service shops by 
the beginning of the 1950s, the pace of conversion was at least as high as seen among the British 
co-operators. As figure 2.1 reveals, in 1957 the share of co-op shops run on a self-service basis 
was in fact slightly higher in Norway than in the UK, being 22 per cent in Norway and 18.3 per 
cent in the UK.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
158 Some examples of articles include, H. Nilsson , ’Selvbetjening i amerikanske næringsmiddelforretninger’, 
Forbrukeren, 2:2 (1947), 35-40; O.D. Koht Norbye, ’Glimt fra amerikansk detaljhandel’, Forbrukeren, 3:5 (1948), 98-
102. 
159 H. Nilsson, ’Selvbetjening i amerikanske næringsmiddelforretninger’, Forbrukeren, 2:2 (1947), 35-40. 
160 Some sources state the year of the first opening to be 1949 (A. Strand, Dagligvarekjøpmennene og samfunnet 1958-1988 
(Oslo: Norges Dagligvarehandels Forbund, 1988), p. 26). Røsrud, draws heavily on Strand, but provides more 
detailed information. He explicitly dates the first opening to 1947(E. Røsrud, Dagligvarefobundets rolle og virke mot år 
2000 (Oslo: Handels- og Servicenæringens Hovedorganisasjon, 2003), p. 15). This is also supported by Henksmeier’s 
study of self-service in Europe. His figures are ‘partly based on estimates’, but reports that two self-service shops 
were established in Norway in 1948, (K. H Henksmeier, The economic performance of self-service in Europe (OECD: Paris, 
1960), p. 16).  
161 E. Røsrud, Dagligvarefobundets rolle og virke mot år 2000 (Oslo: Handels- og Servicenæringens Hovedorganisasjon, 
2003), p. 16. 
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Table 2.1: Self-service stores as a percentage of all stores by type of retailer, 1957162 
 
 Norway UK 
Consumer co-operatives 21,9 18,2 
Multiple retailers and departement stores 0 6,6 
Independents 7,5 0,4 
Off all outlets 10 2,6 
 
Moreover, even if Norwegian co-operators were behind their private counterparts in the number 
of self-service stores operated, they outperformed them in the share of trade converted to self-
service. By 1957, less than 8 per cent of the total number of privately owned stores had been 
transferred to self-service, as opposed to the 22 per cent transferred by the co-operators. And 
while the Norwegian co-ops controlled 36 percent of all self-service shops in 1957, the total co-
operative market share was less than 20 per cent. More than reflecting that the Norwegian co-ops 
were lagging behind, these figures show that the conversion to self-service was comparatively fast 
both in private and co-operative trade in Norway. In 1957, Norway together with Sweden, had 
the highest density of self-service shops in Europe. 163 The two countries had also transferred the 
highest number of self-service stores relative to the total number of food stores. In 1957, 10 per 
cent of all Norwegian food shops had been converted into self-service, whereas the similar figure 
for the UK was less than 3 per cent.164  
The dominant position of the British and Norwegian co-ops in the early transformation 
to self-service reflected a general pattern seen in many western European countries. In Sweden, 
experiments in self-service trading had been carried out as early as in 1940, when a store 
operating on self-service lines had been opened by Ringen Co-operative Society at Motala in the 
central part of the country.165 A year later the Stockholm Co-operative Society had opened a self-
service store at Odengatan in Stockholm. Neither of these stores were, however, fully equipped 
self-service stores, and neither of them proved an immediate success. The store at Motala was 
reconverted to counter service within a year of its opening, and the Stockholm store from the 
very beginning struggled to sustain its trade. In the spring of 1947, however, the store at 
Odengata was completely refurbished and reopened as Sweden’s first true self-service store. 166 
                                                 
162 Figures estimated from E. Røsrud, Dagligvarefobundets rolle og virke mot år 2000 (Oslo: Handels- og Servicenæringens 
Hovedorganisasjon, 2003) and K. H. Henksmeier, The economic performance of self-service in Europe (OECD: Paris, 1960). 
163 Estimated as ratio of self-service shops to population, K. H. Henksmeier, The economic performance of self-service in 
Europe (OECD: Paris, 1960), p. 18. 
164 Ibid., p. 21. The figure for Sweden was approximately 13 per cent (as estimated by supplementing the figures from 
Henksmeier with H. Kylebäck, Varuhandeln i Sverige under 1900-talet (Göteborg: BAS, 2004), p. 164. 
165 H. Kylebäck, Varuhandeln i Sverige under 1900-talet (Göteborg: BAS, 2004), p. 147-54. 
166 It should be noted that before the store at Odengatan was reopened, a modernised self-service store had been 
opened by the co-op movement at Järbo outside the town of Gävle. It is however the store at Odengata that has 
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This store soon proved the full potential of self-service food retailing. According to the retail 
analysist Edward Hammond, writing on the specificities and current development trends of self-
service trading in 1949, the store at Odengatan was in fact ‘the first fully equipped self-service 
store in Europe.’167 Along similar lines Esbjerg Co-operative society opened Denmark’s first self-
service shop in 1949.168 Co-operative societies were also first to introduce self-service in Germany 
(Produktion, 1949) and Austria (Linz, 1950).169 And even if the co-operative movement in 
Europe taken together accounted for only 6 per cent of the total retail trade in 1955, it was 
estimated that about half of the existing self-service stores were operated by co-operative 
societies.170  
What is clear from this short presentation is that the co-operative movement in both 
Norway and the UK, together with their sister organisations around Western Europe, played an 
important role in introducing self-service as the preferred sales technology within the post-war 
food retailing business. Widespread local experimentation combined with direct influences from 
centrally coordinated studies of American retail practises, as well as extensive diffusion of 
knowledge between co-operative societies, both nationally and internationally, gave the co-
operative organisations an early lead. The difference between the Norwegian and the British case 
is primarily that the private traders in the UK were somewhat slower to adapt to the new trading 
technology than their Norwegian counterparts, and that the UK co-ops remained leading for 
longer in terms of the number of shops run on a self-service basis. As it turned out, however, the 
early lead held by the UK co-operatives in introducing self-service camouflaged a systematic 
weakness in how the new stores were constructed and operated.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
come to be regarded as the first self-service store in Sweden. See H. Kylebäck, Konsumentkooperation i strukturomvandling 
Del 1 1946-1960 (Kungälv: Minab/Gotab, 1983), pp. 94-5; H. Kylebäck, Varuhandeln i Sverige under 1900-talet 
(Göteborg: BAS, 2004), p. 147-54 and Centrum for Näringslivshistoria, Den svenska handelns historia (Bromma: 
Centrum for Näringslivshistoria 2006) (A DVD comprising more than 235 articles and 700 photos and videos on the 
history of Swedish trade). 
167 A. E. Hammond, Self-service Trading (Lockwood Press: London, 1949), p. 66. 
168 ’Danmarks første selvbetjeningsbutikk’, Forbrukeren, 4:8 (1949), 166-8. 
169 For Austria, see G. Hauch, ‘From Self-Help to Konzern: Consumer co-operatives in Austria, 1840-1990’, in E. 
Furlough and C. Strikwerda (eds), Consumers against Capitalism? Consumer Cooperation in Europe, North America and Japan, 
1840-1990 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), pp. 191-219. For Germany, see J. Brazda, ‘The Consumer Co-
Operatives in Germany’, in J. Brazda, and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva : 
International co-operative Alliance, 1989), pp. 140-226. 
170 W. Applebaum, ‘Developments in self-service food distribution abroad’, Journal of Farm Economics, 38:2 (1956), 
348-55. Market share figures are estimated from J. B Jefferys and D. Knee, Retailing in Europe. Present structure and future 
trends (London: MacMillan, 1962), p. 65. The market share figures of the different countries have been weighed 
according to population to provide a more accurate picture of the total market share in Western Europe (typically, 
the shares were higher in the more scarcely populated Scandinavian countries and lower in countries such as 
Germany, Italy and France). Note that the figures are from 1960 and that they are estimates of total retailing market 
shares. The market share for food alone was probably somewhat higher. Accurate data is hard to come by, but based 
on estimates from a few selected countries they were probably around 12 per cent. 
  
 65
Divergent paths 
When The Co-operative Review in 1957 reported on the latest figures of the research department of 
the Co-operative Union regarding the development of self-service in the UK, the attitude 
expressed was one of pre-eminence and condescension. The editor proudly ascertained that ‘a big 
majority of all the self-services in this country are co-operative stores’, and even if private traders 
were trying to catch up they were ‘still behind the co-operatives in the technique of retailing and 
are likely to stay so for years ahead.’171 The editorial concluded on a very optimistic tone, 
indicating that the lead now obtained in self-service trading would provide the co-operatives with 
a competitive advantage for years ahead: 
As we hear loose statements in the general Press sometimes, about co-operative 
inefficiency or the lack of ideas in co-operative stores it is well that co-operators 
should remind themselves if need be of their superiority in the retail trades. They 
have pioneered once more the provision of services which their members require 
and are well ahead of their capitalist competitors. It may take a generation for 
capitalist retailer, large or small, to catch up with the present pre-eminence of the 
co-operative society.172 
There are many reasons to believe, however, that the Review editor at this point confused a 
quantitative lead in the introduction of self-service with a qualitative pre-eminence in retail 
trading. The economy of the self-service system was fundamentally connected with how the 
shops were constructed and run; most prominently the size of the shop, its attractiveness in 
terms of store fittings and stocks held and, consequently, the level of sales it managed to 
generate. 
While the British co-ops had been quick to transfer their stores to self-service, the outlets 
had generally been small and in many instances unsuited to host an efficient and modern self-
service business. They were, in the words of Norwegian co-operator Peder Fremstad, who had 
studied the early transfer to self-service trading within the UK movement, often ‘”cheap” 
reconstructions’ which had yet to prove their economic viability.173 A similar characteristic was 
also provided by the manager of the CWS market research department, Fred Lambert, at an 
address held at the Co-operative College in September 1953. In his talk, Lambert warned the 
listeners that the ‘many co-operative conversions carried out some years ago were quite 
inadequate to present day trade requirements.’174 In a larger report presented in the co-operative 
                                                 
171 ‘Pioneering Still’, The Co-operative Review, 31:9 (1957), 194. 
172 ‘Pioneering Still’, The Co-operative Review, 31:9 (1957), 194. 
173 P. Fremstad, ’Selvbetjeningsbutikker. Forsøk og erfaringer i Oslo’, Forbrukeren, 4:7 (1949), 146. 
174 The address was printed in the co-operative periodical Agenda, F. Lambert, ‘The nature of competition’, Agenda, 
December (1953), 61. 
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journal Agenda a year later, Lambert more specifically noted how the early co-operative store 
conversions had been ‘carried out at the minimum of expense’ and ‘run with a considerable 
measure of disregard of generally accepted principles’.175 The immediate success the stores had 
experienced were, according to Lambert, largely the result of the ‘special and temporary 
advantage’ of competing ‘only with counter-service shops.’ 176 As long as competition remained 
weak, the stores had managed to produce results which made the conversions well worth while. 
But, as Lambert warned, these conditions were now about to change. More and more private 
firms were turning their stores into self-service, and the established co-operative outlets were, as 
Lambert bluntly had expressed in his 1953 college talk, in danger of becoming ‘the slums of self-
service’.177 On these grounds, Lambert’s conclusions were clear: ‘I feel quite sure that unless there 
is, by some means or other, a revival of general co-operative interest in self-service we shall, as a 
movement, lose in the next five years much of the real lead we have established in the past five 
years.’178 As it turned out, this was exactly what happened. 
At the beginning of 1950 only fourteen self-service stores in the UK were reported to be 
operated by multiple retailers. As we recall, at this point co-operative societies operated no less 
than four hundred stores on self-service lines. Seven years later, the number of co-op stores had 
increased to two thousand, a growth of 400 per cent. At this point, however, the number of 
stores operated by multiples had increased more than 5,000 per cent, to eight hundred.179 
Another four years later, the multiples had close to regained the absolute lead originally held by 
co-operative societies in self-service trading, operating 3,200 self-service stores, as compared to 
the 3,370 now operated by co-operative societies. More importantly, the multiple self-serviced 
stores together recorded a total turnover almost 1.4 times higher than the stores operated by co-
operative societies. Hence, while total turnover in multiple self-service stores was  246 million, it 
was  177 million in co-operative stores.180 This reflected that the self-service stores operated by 
the co-ops were in general smaller than the ones operated by multiples. In fact, in 1961, figures 
from the Board of Trade’s Census of Distribution showed that while 77 per cent of all co-
operative self-service trading was done in stores with sales less than  2,000 a week, only 45 per 
cent of the multiples’ self-service trading were done in such stores.181 Hence, even if the co-
operative societies originally had reported a substantial rise in turnover when converting their 
                                                 
175 F. Lambert ‘Self-service review’, Agenda, September (1954), 95. 
176 Ibid. 
177 F. Lambert, ‘The nature of competition’, Agenda, December (1953), 61. 
178 F. Lambert ‘Self-service review’, Agenda, September (1954), 112 (emphasis in original). 
179 Figures taken from J. M. Wood, ‘The challenge of the multiples’, Agenda, June (1959), 53-63. 
180 Figures taken from Co-operative Union Ltd., ‘Self-service trading, 1961’, Trade Advisory Bulletin, 12 (1964). 
181 Figures form the census were reported in Co-operative Union Ltd., ‘Self-service trading, 1961’, Trade Advisory 
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stores to self-service, the average weekly turnover remained below those of the multiples. The 
Census figures also revealed how co-operative self-service had problems reaping the alleged 
economic benefits of the self-service system. Productivity in terms of sales per square feet and 
sales per employee remained below those of the multiple retailers.182 Comparisons between self-
service and counter serviced stores within the movement also showed that that the economic 
potential in the system was not satisfactory exploited. As a 1964 trade report from the Co-op 
Union concluded: ‘co-operative self service stores show higher productivity than counter-service 
but the difference is smaller than it should be.’183 
Compared to their competitors, co-operative retailers had been quick to transfer their 
trade to self-service. But, the new stores largely failed to reap the full economic benefit of the 
system, and as the multiple retailers seriously started to open self-service units, the co-operative 
stores were not competitive. A closer look into one of the British movement’s main competitors 
may illustrate the problems gradually occurring. By 1950 the then family owned Sainsbury’s chain 
of stores had yet to open a self-service outlet. Ten years later years later the chain was by far 
UK’s most efficient operator of self-serviced stores. The Sainsbury’s chain had been established 
as early as in 1869, when John James Sainsbury and his wife Mary Ann Staples opened their first 
store at 173 Drury Lane, Holborn, London.184 After four years of trading they opened a second 
shop, and from then on a steady expansion started. By 1937, Sainsbury’s consisted of 248 
branches, a large warehouse at Blackfriars London, and several production facilities producing 
the Sainsbury's own brand. Considering its level of vertical integration, its standardised retail 
outlets and centralised decision-making structure, Sainsbury's was already by the end of the 
Second World War a modern retailer comprising many of the characteristics that soon were to 
guide the organisation of the retail business as a whole.185 It was, however, not until the summer 
of 1950 that Sainsbury's opened their first self-service outlet. An obvious reason for this slow 
start was the simple fact that it had been difficult to obtain the necessary licence to modernise 
existing shops or build new ones. It is also clear, however, that compared with the fast 
conversions of the co-operators, the development of self-service in Sainsbury's was generally 
                                                 
182 See Co-operative Union Ltd., ‘Self-service trading, 1961’, Trade Advisory Bulletin, 12 (1964). This was at least true 
for the larger stores. On average the difference was negligible, being  6244 per person in the co-ops as compared to 
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approached with a much stronger deference. The organisation spent more time analysing how the 
challenges of constructing economically viable self-service stores could best be met, and worked 
more systematically to ensure that the shops actually converted were capable of exploiting the full 
potential of the system. The result of this general attitude of thoroughness was clearly seen when 
the first Sainsbury's self-service store, after ‘twelve months’ research and development’, finally 
opened at 9/11 London Road in Croydon.186 
With a floor space of more than 3,000 square feet, and incorporating numerous technical 
improvements, the Sainsbury's store at Croydon was probably the most modern self-service 
outlet ever seen in the UK. The entire store was equipped with fluorescent lightning. Acrylic glass 
was used to make canopies for counters, lighting covers and display equipment, such as bins for 
tea. In addition, and most importantly, the store contained refrigerated cabinets for the storage of 
frozen foods, as well as air cooled counters allowing for perishable foods such as fresh 
vegetables, fruit, and eggs to be kept fresh and chilled. These technological improvements made 
possible the sale of a much wider product range than had earlier been handled by one single 
shop. The opening impressed and startled co-operators. Commenting on the opening of the store 
in the November issue of the magazine, The Producer, co-operative market researcher Ernest 
Wilkinson warned that ‘this self-service store may well be the first of a flight’ and that ‘if it is, a 
number of self-service co-operative shops will be out of date in the very near future’.187 The 
economic potential of this unusually large and modern type of store was also underlined, when 
Wilkinson concluded that: ‘this particular shop is certainly doing a weekly volume of trade greater 
than that of any grocery shop in this country.’ 188 
Despite the immediate success of the first store, the conversion to self-service in 
Sainsbury's continued to proceed at a slow pace. In contrast to many co-operative societies, the 
Sainsbury’s management seemed reluctant to secure a fast transfer to self-service through the 
rebuilding of existing stores. Most of the existing premises were viewed as too old and too small 
to be suitable for self-service. And, rather than opening many stores at a fast rate, the Sainsbury's 
management sought to exploit the economic potential in concentrating trade in fewer, but larger 
shops. 
In 1955 Sainsbury's opened a shop in Lewisham High Street measuring 7,500 square feet; 
to that date the largest self-service food store in Europe. The opening, and the development 
subsequently following it, illustrates clearly the Sainsbury's management’s dedication to retail size 
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rather than number of retail stores operated. In the years following the Lewisham opening, the 
number of shops run by Sainsbury's started to fall and in the period from 1960 to 1970 the 
overall number of branches was reduced from 256 to 225. In the same period however, total 
sales area increased from 95,000 square feet to 806,000 square feet. And even if Sainsbury’s rate 
of conversion was slower than both the co-op’s and other private retailers', both the size of the 
new stores and their turnover were well ahead. By 1958 the average Sainsbury’s self-service store 
recorded sales per square feet more than three times those of the large co-operative stores.189  
If the UK co-ops had long had a leading role in transferring shops into self-service, the 
qualitative standard of the new shops, compared to those of the private sector, were not 
competitive. The Sainsbury's example is only one out of many. Increasingly, multiple competitors 
such as Tesco, Fine Fare and Victor Value started to challenge the position of the co-ops, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. At the end of the 1950s the tendency was clear; the co-operative 
societies were seriously starting to lag behind their competitors in developing their self-serviced 
stores. 
Turning to the Norwegian case, some interesting contrasts are revealed. Most 
importantly, Norwegian co-operators managed to hold on to their initial lead in self-service 
retailing. In absolute terms, private retailers soon passed the co-ops in the number of self-service 
stores operated. But the co-operative stores remained substantially larger than those of the 
private retailers. In 1954 the average turnover in co-operative food stores was more than twice 
that of the private retailers.190 The co-ops also outperformed the private retailers in terms of the 
share of trade transferred to self-service. As we recall from a previous section, while 22 per cent 
of co-operative trade had been converted to self-service by 1957, less than 8 per cent of private 
trade were operated on self-service lines. How do we explain this comparatively strong position 
of the Norwegian co-ops in the development of the self-service system? 
The first thing to note is how Norwegian private retailers, in sharp contrast to their 
British counterparts, continued to operate on a small scale basis. Due to legal restraints on the 
operation of several branches under centralised control, no multiple retailers had been established 
in the Norwegian market by 1950. Non co-operative retailing continued to be fully dominated by 
small, independent traders operating a single store. This situation prevailed also after the ban on 
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branches had been lifted in 1951.191 Moreover, and despite their comparatively quick response to 
the self-service development, private independent retailers continued to trade in very small stores. 
The self-service units opened were largely based on simple conversions of existing premises as 
few had the capital necessary to finance extensive rebuilding. As late as 1973, retail stores with 
less than one million NOK of yearly turnover, equivalent to a turnover of roughly  71,000, were 
still the major shop type in Norway.192 By comparison, in 1968, the average yearly turnover of a 
Sainsbury's store was  180,000.193  
The small scale nature of the private retail sector laid important grounds for a continued 
domination of the co-op movement in introducing and operating self-service stores. Indeed, the 
Norwegian private retailers seem to have experienced many of the same problems as the British 
co-ops did. But the weakness of the private retailers can not be regarded as the only reason for 
the co-ops comparative success. Most importantly, it is evident that Norwegian co-operators 
avoided many of the pitfalls that had hampered the UK movement when transferring their stores 
to self-service. First of all, while UK co-operators advocated fast and simple conversions of 
existing premises, the Norwegians generally seem to have been more sceptical of such hasty and 
simple adoptions of the system. As we recall, the manager of the Oslo co-operative society, Peder 
Fremstad, had warned against the ‘”cheap” reconstructions’ of the British co-operators.194 
Fremstad’s basic view was that it was ‘dangerous to do this [transfer trade to self-service] too 
simplistically ’.195 He generally warned against rebuilding existing counter serviced stores, as these 
were viewed too small and not suitable to host efficient self-service operations. His suggestion 
was that if a store was to be opened on self-service lines it needed to be at least between 1,000 
and 1,600 square feet, and concluded that ‘if a change is to be made, it has to be made 
completely.196  
The attitude of Fremstad was indicative of the views held by other leading co-operative 
managers. Already two years earlier, Bjørn Theien of the Hamar society had warned against a too 
hasty transfer to self-service. 197 While recognising the obvious economic advantages to be gained 
by transferring trade to self-service, he advocated a ‘gradual transfer’ to the system, based on the 
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view that neither the consumers nor the existing system of packaging, distribution and 
merchandising had been developed to a level where it was capable of supporting the efficient 
operation of self-service stores.198 Along similar lines, Ulrik Paasche, co-operative district 
accountant in Northern Trøndelag, in 1954 warned readers of Forbrukeren against the dangers of 
opening self-service stores without meticulous preliminary planning. 199 Location and store layout 
had to be carefully considered. It was also suggested that the staff should be given the possibility 
of working in already existing self-service stores in order to become ‘familiarised with the 
subtleties of the system.’200 Paasche further warned against any ‘attempt at reducing the cost of 
reconstruction by not investing in the most efficient equipment’ as there were ‘many examples 
showing that this may have unfortunate consequences for the future operations of the society.’ 201 
On these grounds, societies should avoid opening stores without first securing the necessary 
capital to finance a full conversion.  
Clearly, many co-operative self-service stores were opened without adhering to these and 
similar recommendations. They experienced difficulties with sustaining their trade and were not 
operated efficiently. Still, the general impression seemed to be that the transfer to self-service 
within the Norwegian co-op movement, to a lesser degree than in the UK, was driven by the 
obligation to open as many stores as fast as possible. The advocated mark of success was not to 
hold a quantitative lead over the private retailers, at least not in absolute terms, but rather to open 
well furnished and efficient stores. Compared with the UK conversions, it seems that the stores 
opened were generally more often purpose built and more suited to reap the potential economies 
of the system.202 The opening of the first self-service store in Tromsø in 1955 for example, 
coincided with the opening of a new, large headquarters for the city’s co-operative society.203 The 
store was large and purpose built, comprising a total sales area of 4300 square feet and stocking a 
broad range of products, including meat. In Oslo, the pioneering role taken by the city’s co-
operative society in 1947 was followed by several new openings. Small, counter serviced outlets 
were closed down and stores specifically constructed to operate on self-service lines were 
established. When the new store at Keyserløkka, on the outskirts of the city centre was opened in 
                                                 
198 Ibid., 103 
199 U. Paasche, Grundig planlegging av selvbetjeningsbutikken er ubetinget nødvendig’, Forbrukeren, 9:1 (1954), 5-9. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid. 
202 By 1953, 25 per cent of the self-service stores in operation were purpose built (C. Røhne, ’Overgang til 
selvbetjening – en tilpasningsprosess’, Forbrukeren 10:7 (1955), 141-43 and C. Røhne, ‘Selvbetjening – et nødvendig 
ledd i handelens rasjonalisering’, Forbrukeren, 10:7 (1955), 166). Comparable figures for the UK have not been 
obtained, but all qualitative data indicates that the large majority of the early openings were in the form of 
conversions. 
203 L. H. Hansen, Fra landhandel til stormarked. Forbrukersamvirket NORDSs historie (Tromsø: Forbrukersamvirket 
NORD, 1996), pp. 68-9. 
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1951, it was characterised as a ‘remarkable store … comparable with the best seen abroad, 
perhaps even better at several points.’204   
A consequence of these and similar factors seem to be that the first self-service stores 
opened by the Norwegian co-operative societies in general were both slightly larger and more 
efficient than those opened by UK co-ops. Even if comparable figures are hard to come by, the 
data that does exist clearly indicates such a pattern. Hence, a study of the existing self-service 
operations, made by the Norwegian Co-operative Association (NKL) in 1953, showed that the 
average size of co-operative self-service stores was 80 square metres or 860 square feet.205 The 
average UK co-operative grocery store in 1954 was estimated to have a selling space ‘around 800 
square feet or even less’, and ‘statistics collected … do not suggest that the size of co-operative 
stores converted to self service is very much bigger than average.’206 More importantly, the 
Norwegian self-service stores seem to have traded on substantially higher productivity rates than 
the British. Hence, while the NKL study showed that average yearly sales per employee in co-
operative self-service stores in 1953 was NOK 134,000 or the equivalent of  6,680, the similar 
figure in the UK, recorded in 1951, was  3,880.207 The indications available thus point in the 
direction that not only were the co-ops outperforming private retailers in terms of size and 
turnover. From early on, they also managed better than their UK sister organisation to more fully 
exploit the economic potential of the self-service system.  
A further advantage held by the Norwegian co-operators was that the transfer to self- 
service, from being based on local initiatives, was gradually incorporated in a general, NKL led 
drive to modernise the totality of co-operative trade. The newly established Co-operative College, 
owned by the NKL, soon started to educate store consultants. These were employed as advisers 
by local retail societies across the country keen to transfer their trade to self-service. The college 
also held several courses for employees working in local retail societies. Similar functions were 
also taken on by the Co-operative College in the UK. But the sheer size of the UK movement as 
compared to the Norwegian reduced the ability of the British college to have a full-blown 
influence. Even more importantly, however, the NKL seem to have gained a readier acceptance 
from the retail societies that in order to serve the self-service stores efficiently, the system of 
distribution needed to be drastically rationalised. There was a particular need to simplify the 
ordering routines, to increase the rate of stock turn and reduce the need for warehousing at the 
retail end. To achieve these ends, a plan for how to centralise all wholesaling to regional, NKL 
                                                 
204 S. Dalen, ’Kooperasjonen leder utviklingen av norsk detaljhandel’, Forbrukeren, 6:7 (1951), 150. 
205 C. Røhne, ‘Selvbetjening – et nødvendig ledd i handelens rasjonalisering’, Forbrukeren, 10:7 (1955), 166. 
206 F. Lambert, ‘Self-service review’, Agenda, September (1954), 90-4. 
207 J.A. Hough and F. Lambert, Self-Service Shops. A Joint Report (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd., 1952), p. 3. 
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owned warehouses, was developed and set in motion. New ordering routines based on pre-
arranged lists and less frequent deliveries were employed to serve the self-services stores more 
efficiently. While these were challenges to be faced both by British and Norwegian co-operators, 
the focus on the merchandising and distributional aspects of a self-service system seem to have 
been more pronounced in Norway than in the UK. While the UK retail societies largely 
interpreted the challenges of making the self-service form of trading work as a question of 
retailing efficiency, Norwegian co-operative entrepreneurs both at the retail and wholesale level 
treated the self-service form of retailing more as one out of many necessary steps to make the 
entire process of distribution more efficient.208 
 
Conclusions 
The transformation to self-service was among the first challenges facing the co-operative retail 
movements of the UK and Norway in the early post-war period. In both countries the co-ops 
served as innovators, opening the first self-service stores in their respective countries and leading 
the way in converting old counter service shops into self-service.  
The transformation to self-service was soon, however, to mark the beginning of a process 
whereby the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives developed along divergent paths. 
Put simply, in Norway, the introduction of self-service worked to strengthen the position of the 
co-operative societies in the country’s food retailing business. In the UK, on the other hand, the 
self-service form of trading, despite the co-operative societies’ innovative role, sparked off a 
process of decline in co-operative trading. The present chapter has described this development 
and discussed how it came about. 
The analysis has focused on three main aspects. First of all, it has been argued that while 
the UK co-operative societies had been innovators in introducing self-service, they largely failed 
to exploit the economies inherent in the self-service system. The co-operative stores were 
generally too small. Based on cheap and simple reconstructions they also failed to attract the 
necessary custom. In 1950 co-operative retail societies controlled 90 per cent of self-service 
stores in the UK market. But as soon as the large private multiples started to open their highly 
modernised and purpose built self-serviced outlets, the co-op stores became outdated. In Norway 
by contrast, even if the speed of conversion to self-service soon surpassed that of the British, the 
co-operative openings seem generally to have been based on more meticulous planning and a 
                                                 
208 The organisational transformations taking place within the Norwegian and British co-operative movement in the 
post-war period is the main theme of section two in this thesis. 
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greater acknowledgement of the possible pitfalls in self-service conversion. While the UK co-
operators largely based their openings directly on American ideals, and had little or no 
experiences of how the system would work within a European context, the Norwegians referred 
both to Swedish and British experiences, in addition to the American models, in their process of 
converting stores to self-service. As a consequence they managed from the outset to develop 
stores of a better quality and with a more stable competitive potential. 
Secondly, it has been shown how the private retailers in the UK and Norway reacted very 
differently to the innovative steps taken by the co-ops. In Norway, private retailers were soon to 
convert their stores to the new system. But as these retailers were all independent, small scale 
enterprises, the finances necessary to make extensive conversions were not readily available. 
Private self-service stores thus generally came to rely on basic conversions of small premises with 
limited scope for drastic expansion of the existing trade. The co-op societies in contrast, opened 
larger, often purpose built stores, averaging a higher annual trade. The transformation to self-
service within the Norwegian food retail market thus generally implied that the co-operative 
movement further strengthened its position vis-à-vis its private competitors. In the UK the 
situation was the exact opposite. Here it was the large private retail chains, such as Sainsbury’s, 
Fine Fare and Tesco which managed to make full use of the cost savings available in the self-
service system, while the co-ops lagged behind. Financially, the private multiples were superior 
both to their independent Norwegian counterparts and to the majority of the co-operative 
societies in Britain. At the same time, they also tended to focus more on the quality of the stores 
than on opening as many stores as quickly as possible. The co-ops on the other hand, in many 
cases due to limited financial resources, had to rely on basic conversions of existing stores. At the 
same time they advocated the value of fast conversion, and for a long time tended to judge their 
quantitative lead in self-service trading as a sign of superior trading skills. But this reasoning was 
false. Indeed, the basic and ‘cheap’ characteristic of the early conversions made by the British co-
operators came to drastically hamper the store’s long term competitiveness. 
Finally, it has been shown how the conversion to self-service within the British 
movement was largely governed by local initiative and, as opposed to the Norwegian experience, 
not adequately coordinated. Self-service was not only a different way of selling. It also demanded 
a new system of distribution and merchandising. In Norway this responsibility was actively taken 
by the NKL, and it was by and large accepted by the local retail societies. While supporting the 
construction of self-service stores within the local retail societies, the national association also 
implemented important organisational reforms. The local retail societies for their part, gradually 
adopted the new system to provide for more efficient wholesaling, distribution and 
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merchandising. In the UK, by contrast, the transfer to self-service was primarily treated as a retail 
transformation and not thoroughly analysed in relation to the existing system of distribution and 
merchandising. On these grounds, the full economic potential of the self-service system became 
more difficult to exploit. The effect of this situation was to become even more pronounced, as 
the second main retail innovation of the post-war period, the supermarket, was starting to make 
its presence felt by the beginning of the 1960s. 
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Chapter 3: The supermarket  
 
The introduction of self-service trading fundamentally transformed the face of food retailing. 
Existing grocery stores had to be totally rebuilt or replaced with completely new, purpose built 
self-serviced outlets. The role and working method of the shop-owner and his staff was 
fundamentally altered. And for the consumer the new selling technology implied a radical shift in 
how they went about their shopping. Despite the far-reaching consequences of the change, by 
the beginning of the 1960s it was recognized by most retailers and retailing experts that the self-
service system was the future of food retailing.209 And by the 1970s the majority of food sales in 
most western European countries were done in self-service stores.210 The self-service store of the 
1970s was, however, very different from the self-service store of the early 1950s. Most 
importantly, the size of the store had been drastically enlarged and the range of stock held was 
broader than had originally been the case. As a consequence, the food store of the 1970s had 
largely replaced the wide range of specialist stores originally operating alongside the grocer, such 
as butchers, bakeries, tobacconists and greengrocers. This increasingly dominant and rapidly 
expanding type of food store was commonly known as the supermarket. 
The development of the supermarket proved to be yet another challenge to co-operative 
trade. In both the UK and Norway co-operative societies struggled to adapt to the new and 
enlarged self-service format. With its broad product range the supermarket attracted trade by 
offering the convenience of one stop shopping. The stores were also offering the most modern 
and technologically advanced layouts, providing the customers with the feeling of luxury and 
dedicated service. The size of the supermarket operations also made it possible to reap substantial 
benefits from economies of scale. Hence the supermarket offered the possibility of both 
increased sales and reduced cost. Their establishment and efficient operation, however, also 
demanded substantial investments. They demanded skill in large scale retailing and they 
                                                 
209 In 1963 the chief of the marketing branch of the food and agriculture organisation of the UN, John C Abbot, 
noted in an article on the development of the food trades in western Europe that ‘any doubts about self –service and 
acceptance of pre-packaged and other convenience foods which supposedly dominated food traders’ ideas as late as 
1957 have now been dispelled’ (J. C. Abbot, ‘Food marketing in Western Europe today’, Journal of Marketing, April 
(1963), 17. 
210 This is true, even though the majority of food stores in many countries were still operated on counter service. 
Hence, in Norway in 1972, 65 per cent of all food stores were still operated on counter service, but these accounted 
for only 20 per cent of total food sales. The remaining 80 per cent were conducted in self-service stores (E. Røsrud, 
Dagligvarefobundets rolle og virke mot år 2000 (Oslo: Handels- og Servicenæringens Hovedorganisasjon, 2003), p. 15). 
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demanded a system of distribution capable of supporting the large stores with a steady influx of 
products obtained at a competitive price. 
While the transfer of trade to supermarkets promised the realisation of substantial 
economies, it also demanded substantial financial resources and operational skills. The major 
challenge was how to obtain and make use of such skills and resources. As it turned out, in the 
UK, the development of the supermarket became the definite process whereby multiple retailers 
caught up with, and passed the co-ops, as the leading operators of self-service food stores. Simply 
put, the British multiples were much more successful than the co-ops in transferring trade 
towards the larger and more efficient supermarket format. By the end of the 1960s, co-operative 
societies had lost substantial market shares, and the growth of supermarket retailing had thrown 
the movement into a serious economic and operational crisis. The situation in Norway was 
radically different. Here, the development of supermarket trading was approached much more 
evenly by private and co-operative trade. In fact, throughout the 1950s and 1960s the overall 
market position of the co-operatives was gradually strengthened, and the movement became the 
leading operator of supermarkets within the Norwegian food retailing sector. 
This chapter explores this divergent development in more detail and discusses how it may 
be explained. Two main themes take centre stage. The first concerns the ability of the co-
operative societies to transfer trade to supermarkets and take advantage of the economies 
inherent in the system. What were the co-operator’s attitudes towards the new form of retailing 
represented by the supermarkets, to what degree did they manage to transfer trade towards the 
new and evidently more efficient format, and how were the stores operated? The second deals 
with the role of the private retailers in developing the supermarket format. How was the coming 
of the supermarket approached by these retailers and to what extent did their ability to take on 
and develop the new format challenge the position of co-operative food retailing? 
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The supermarket 
As with self-service, the supermarket was an American invention.211 The rise of the supermarket 
as a distinct retail format was originally the outcome of American retailers who saw possibilities 
in establishing retail outlets in closed-down manufacturing plants. The basic idea was to create a 
shop stocking a large and broad range of products serving all basic household requirements. 
Earnings should be made through scale economies where price cuts and low profit margins were 
countered by a vast increase in daily turnover. The first supermarkets opened in the 1930s, and 
they soon proved to be a viable method of selling food to the consumer.212  
Immediately before and after the war, many West Europeans studying American retail 
practices visited American supermarkets. It was not only the total dominance of the self-service 
system that stunned the visitors, but also the size of the food stores and the range of products 
they were carrying. Norwegian co-operator, Ole David Koht Nordbye, reporting from a study 
trip to the US in Forbrukeren in 1947, gave much attention to the fact that American self-service 
stores were stocking ‘all kinds of foodstuff’. The Americans were even ‘selling fruit, groceries, 
meat, cheese, etc. !’ in their stores. The visit convinced Nordbye that such ‘”all in one place” 
stores were the solution for the housewife – as well as for society as a whole’.213  
Still, it was not until the mid 1950s and early 1960s that the term and trading practice of 
the supermarket started to become widespread knowledge in Western Europe, and that the 
differences in terms of economic potential between a store based on self-service and an actual 
supermarket were acknowledged. In the UK a monthly trade periodical named Self-Service and 
Supermarket was already being published in 1951. But, writing on the economics of the 
supermarket in the The Economic Journal in 1962, retail analyst W. G. McClelland recorded that: 
‘while self-service began to spread rapidly from 1947 onwards, supermarkets had to wait until the 
end of rationing and the lifting of building restrictions in 1954, and even then a year or two went 
                                                 
211 On supermarkets in general, see J. M. Mayo, The American Grocery Store: The Business Evolution of an Architectural Space 
(Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993). 
212 Exactly what store is to be regarded as the first supermarket is not quite clear. Neil Wrigley and Michelle Lowe 
mention both the King Kullen store at Long Island, opening in 1930, the Big Bear store in Elizabeth New Jersey, 
opening in 1932, and ‘similar stores in Los Angeles dating from the 1920s’ to be ‘early versions of … supermarkets’ 
(N. Wrigley and M. Lowe, Reading Retail. A geographical perspective on retailing and consumption spaces (London: Arnold, 
2002), p. 73. Rachel Bowlby holds that the very first supermarket to be operated probably was the Big Bear store 
opened in 1932 ‘in the abandoned plant of the Durant Motor Car Company in Elizabeth, N.J.’ (M. M. Zimmerman, 
Super Market: Spectacular Exponent of Mass Distribution (New York: Super Market Publishing Co., 1937), p. v, cited in R. 
Bowlby, Carried Away: The Invention of Modern Shopping (London: Faber and Faber, 2000), p. 135.). In any case, all of 
these stores operated on trading practises that were soon to be headed supermarket. None of them were, however, 
called supermarkets. The expression ‘super market’ was first used by William Albers who founded Albers Super 
Markets, Inc in Cincinnati in 1933, see R. Bowlby, Carried Away: The Invention of Modern Shopping (London: Faber and 
Faber, 2000), p. 138. 
213 O. D. Norbye, ‘Glimt fra amerikansk detaljhandel’, Forbrukeren, 3:5 (1948), 98-102. 
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by as operators took their bearings and plans matured.’214 By 1957, however, a separate annual 
directory on supermarkets was provided from the Self-Service and Supermarket periodical. According 
to McClelland there were at this point at least 80 supermarkets in the UK.  
As the annual supermarket directory started to record the statistical development of 
supermarket stores, a precise definition was necessary. The first generally accepted definition was 
presented in the 1961-62 directory. It read as follows: 
A supermarket is a store of no less than 2 000 sq.ft. sales area, with three or more 
checkouts and operated mainly on self-service, whose range of merchandise comprises 
all food groups, including fresh meat and fresh fruit and vegetable, plus basic household 
requisites (i.e., soaps and cleaning materials)215  
As is clear from this definition, supermarkets were largely demarcated from general self-service 
stores by their larger size and the broader range of products offered in one store.216 Many of the 
early self-service outlets had not widened the range of goods sold, and in the early years of 
transformation to self-service, speciality shops remained important providers of fresh food such 
as meat and fish. With the coming of the supermarket this situation changed. In contrast to the 
early self-service grocery stores, the supermarket developed on the principle of one-stop-
shopping. The idea was to create a store where the consumer could stock up on all basic 
household requirements, leaving behind the years when one had to share the daily purchases 
between several different speciality shops.  
The development of the supermarket was highly dependent on the introduction of 
technological innovations such as refrigerated display counters and new systems of hygienic pre-
packing.217 These were essential prerequisites for storing, displaying and ultimately selling a much 
wider variety of products. Fresh food especially could now more easily be handled than by the 
traditional grocer. The supermarket also began to offer several non-food items such as soap, 
cleaning materials and other requisites regularly used in the household. The result was that the 
range of goods sold through the supermarket rose dramatically. As an illustration, the number of 
merchandise handled by the private Norwegian wholesaler Joh. Johansson rose from 1,740 in 
1960 to 5,700 in 1988. In the period from 1960 to 1973 alone, the consumption of frozen food 
                                                 
214 W. G. McClelland, ‘Economics of the Supermarket’, The Economic Journal, 72:285 (1962), 156. 
215 Quoted in Ibid., 154. 
216 The most often referred to Norwegian definition operated with a minimum floor space of 300 square meters or 
roughly 3,200 square feet (see e.g. O. Fagereng, ‘Hva er et varehus?’, Forbrukeren, 21:5 (1966), pp. 107-9). 
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grew fivefold, from 2 kg to 9.5 kg.218 Roughly 70 per cent of these products were distributed 
through food retailers.219  
 
The supermarket and the UK co-operatives  
In a 1964 publication from the British Co-operative Union one could read the following 
introductory statements:  
Dynamic and momentous changes are taking place in the British economy and 
these are playing their part in retail distribution. In no field of distribution is the 
change more dramatic than in that of food retailing […] There have in fact been 
two successive major changes since 1945. The first was the massive introduction 
of self-service into grocery shops […] The second major change in retailing arose 
from the realisation that really large shops operating on self-service and offering 
a full range of food could make even better reductions in the cost of distribution 
[…] These ‘supermarkets’ are based on the principle of combining various food 
trades together and operating wholly or largely on self-service.220 
The statements are excerpts from a trading guide on supermarket retailing, ‘compiled by a 
Specialist Working party to assist Co-operative societies in establishing and operating a 
Supermarket’.221 At the time of its publication, supermarkets had become the leading edge of 
British food retailing. A growing concern was evolving among the co-operators, however, that 
the movement was lagging behind its competitors in developing this new form of retail trading. 
As with self-service, the UK co-operatives had been early innovators of the supermarket. 
In 1953 co-ops were running 66 per cent of all shops fitting the supermarket definition.222 But, 
again similar to the self-service experience, this early lead in the number of stores operated was 
soon put under pressure. Hence, by 1960, private retailers had passed the co-ops in the number 
of stores operated, controlling 62 per cent of all supermarkets in the UK.223 More importantly, 
the supermarkets operated by the multiples tended to record higher average sales. On a general 
basis, they also traded more efficiently than the co-op stores. It soon turned out that the early co-
operative lead in supermarket trading had camouflaged systematic weaknesses in how the stores 
were operated and run. By the end of the 1960s it was clear that growth of supermarket retailing 
                                                 
218 Equal to 4.4 and 19.8 lb. 
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had drastically weakened the competitiveness of the co-operative retailers. At the same time it 
had marked a breakthrough for the multiple retailers.  
Why did the transfer to supermarket retailing prove so difficult for the British co-
operative retailers? The reasons are many. First of all, it is evident that the early lead held by co-
operators in the number of supermarkets operated, did not reflect a deep-rooted 
acknowledgement of the economic advantages and possibilities of this type of retailing. Rather, it 
was mainly the result of some retail societies being comparatively fast in transferring their shops 
to self-service, combined with the fact that the co-op's stores originally had a surface area larger 
than private retailers.224 Several of the stores converted to self-service in the early and mid 1950s 
were simply operating a total floor space exceeding the demanded 2,000 square feet. And to the 
extent that these stores also stocked the necessary breadth of both food and non-food 
merchandise they had been defined as supermarkets. Hence, the early lead in supermarket trading 
was, as one contemporary commentator noted, largely ‘a by-product of the early and long-held 
Co-operative lead in the conversion of existing shops to self-service’.225  
As late as in the mid-1950s only limited recognition of the future importance of 
supermarket trading existed within the co-op movement. Indeed, the opening in 1954 of two 
large supermarkets by the Nottingham Society, one with a main selling area of more than 5,500 
square feet, the other with nearly 4,000, was considered ‘quite exceptional’ and did not reflect a 
broader co-operative strategy of transferring trade to larger formats.226 Rather, as the market 
research manager of the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS), Fred Lambert remarked, it was 
believed that ‘competition over the next few years will be mainly from converted multiple-owned 
shops similar in size to those at present operating on the self-service principle.227 Hence, despite 
the fact that co-operative societies at this point were operating the majority of large supermarkets 
in the UK, influential co-operators were reluctant to accept that the supermarket format was in 
fact the future of British food retailing.  
A second decisive problem was related to the developments among the co-op’s main 
competitors. While the co-op movement reacted with hesitation to the future prospects of 
supermarket retailing, multiple retailers such as Sainsbury’s, Victor Value and Finefare embarked 
on heavy investment programs from the mid-1950s onwards, and dramatically increased the 
average size of their shops. In the period from 1956 to the end of 1960 alone, Finefare, a 
                                                 
224 According to Lambert, ‘the typical co-operative grocery shop’ operating in the beginning of the 1950s was ‘much 
bigger than the typical shops of other multiple and private traders’ (F. Lambert ‘Self-service review’, Agenda, 
September (1954), 94). 
225 W. G. McClelland, ‘Economics of the Supermarket’, The Economic Journal, 72: 285 (1962), 157. 
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completely new chain of food stores owned and operated by the Weston group, established no 
less than forty-three supermarkets.228 A year later the company had added twenty-nine more to 
reach a total of seventy-two. The Weston group operated another 46 supermarkets under the 
names of Coopers, Burtons and L. & N, and together the group controlled one fifth of all 
supermarkets in the UK by mid-1961.229 Along similar lines the Sainsbury’s chain also started to 
radically expand the average size of their stores from the mid-1950s.230 In the sixty year period 
from 1890 to 1950 the average sales area of new stores opened by the chain had been doubled, 
from 1,000 square feet to 2,000 square feet. In the following ten year period, the average size was 
tripled, and by 1965 the average sales area of a new Sainsbury’s store had reached 6,700 square 
feet.231  
These drastic expansions among the private multiples seriously challenged the market 
position of the British co-ops. The new stores dramatically outperformed the many smaller, local 
co-op stores still in operation. A special report on The present competitive situation in the grocery trade, 
published by the CWS at the end of 1960, gave ample evidence of the problems confronting the 
co-ops. As an example, the report noted how a retail society in a North Midlands town from one 
year to the next lost 12 per cent of its trade in an expanding market, the ultimate cause being the 
opening of two supermarkets, doing ‘nearly as much grocery trade as the local society does in the 
entire Borough’.232 Along similar lines, a private supermarket established in a Lancashire town 
was believed to do a weekly trade of  5-7,000 only a couple of weeks after its opening. This was 
believed to be ‘at least equal to the whole of the local society’s trade from 20 shops.’233  
By the early 1960s it was thus evident that the development of supermarket retailing was 
fundamentally challenging the market position of the co-ops. The expansion of the multiples 
outperformed the local co-op stores and the initial quantitative lead held by the movement in 
supermarket trading was lost. The problems experienced by the co-ops were, however, not only 
related to the limited number of large stores opened, or to the radical expansion of the multiples. 
It gradually turned out that the co-op supermarkets that had been opened were also hampered by 
a series of shortcomings. An evaluation made by the Co-operative Union’s Food Trades 
                                                 
228 This according to Co-operative Wholesale Society, The present competitive situation in the grocery trade (Manchester: Co-
operative Wholesale Society, 1960), p. 3.  
229 As reported by W. G McClelland, ‘Economics of the Supermarket’, The Economic Journal, 72: 285 (1962), 157. 
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Department in 1960 showed how most of the existing co-operative supermarkets were actually 
not run as supermarkets in the strictest sense. 234 In many shops, space was excessive viewed in 
relation to the sales it managed to generate, and the average rate of stock turn was generally 
viewed to be unsatisfactory. The actual range of products held in most large co-op stores also 
continued to resemble more the old grocery store than a modern, full range self-service 
supermarket. A further problem was related to how the co-op supermarkets generally failed to 
operate on the aggressive price and merchandise policies characteristic of private supermarkets. 
Quite to the contrary, as the Food Trades Department’s report stated, ‘Co-operative 
supermarkets … normally trade on the basis of the general price policy of the society operating 
them and thus co-operative societies in the main have not used the price weapon to attract trade 
into the larger units”235 The ultimate effect was that the multiples outperformed the co-ops in 
terms of average sales per food store. In 1957 co-operative shops were still averaging higher 
annual sales than the multiples. As table 3.1 reveals however, by 1961 the multiples had overtaken 
the co-ops, and from then on the differences rose dramatically  
 
Table 3.1: Annual average sales per food store (£), 1957-1971 
 
 1957 1961 1966 1971
  
Co-operatives 30618 31116 35517 68506
Multiples 26100 32425 50398 93626
  
 
The failure of the co-ops to increase the level of sales per square foot was detrimental. The whole 
basis of the supermarket economy was to create increased surplus, not by way of ample margins, 
but by way of increased sales created by a cut in prices. Most co-operative societies were, 
however, reluctant to cut prices. It was a widely held view among British co-operators that the 
lower margins of supermarket trading would reduce the possibilities of earning the trading 
surplus necessary to pay a dividend. As co-operative researcher Joshua Bamfield has argued, ‘Co-
operatives were particularly anxious to reduce the dividend: this was not only the major 
inducement to trade for most members, but was seen by co-operatives as their prime claim to a 
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consumer-oriented distinctiveness.’236 On these ground many societies decided against a lowering 
of the prices.  
The running of the co-operative supermarkets was thus hampered by a series of 
shortcomings, fundamentally limiting their competitive potential. Met by aggressive private 
multiples these failures further added to the decline now about to seriously mark the 
development of the co-operative food retail trades. As was stated by the chairman of the newly 
established Grocery and Provisions Trade Association, J. C. Grace, in his report to the 1961 Co-
operative Congress, the co-ops had ‘by and large […] not managed to adapt fast enough to the 
ongoing “dynamic evolutionary change” in the food trades.’237 In the view of Grace and his 
associates too many shops were still too small, investments in supermarkets had been too slow, 
sales and price policy were in need of a drastic review, and the merchandising methods were 
characterised as no less than ‘pathetic’.238  
The process of transferring trade to the supermarket format was thus also hampered by a 
general failure among the co-operators to fully exploit the economies of the system. Not only did 
they fail to transfer enough stores to the supermarket format, the stores that were transferred did 
not manage to realise the full economic advantages of the system. Alongside the parallel and 
drastic expansion of the multiples, these problems made the transfer of trade to the supermarket 
format a challenging task for the British co-operators. A fourth more general factor also played a 
major role. It was related to how the movement on a general basis was hampered by a 
conservative culture and a general reluctance to accept that the traditional co-operative small-
store was becoming less and less attractive.  
As late as in the early 1960s a noticeable resentment towards large-scale supermarkets 
remained among many co-operators. Many co-operators simply refused to accept that the small, 
local retailing formats had to be replaced by large scale supermarkets. Debating at length the 1961 
report by the Grocery and Provisions Trade Association, several of the representatives speaking 
from the podium spoke explicitly against a fast transfer to supermarkets, warning about what 
they saw as an ‘epidemic of supermarket hypnosis.’239 The reasons for the representatives’ 
scepticism were numerous. Some were critical of the conclusion that supermarkets would 
dominate future food trading. Mr. Baily of the Midland Sectional Board for example, argued that 
the popularity of the supermarkets among the consumer should not be expected to last. As he 
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remarked: ’They [the consumers] go there the first six weeks or so, but sooner or later they feel 
that dragging the groceries home a mile-and-a-half from the High Street is not so satisfactory as 
walking 200 yards and getting the goods in our shops as cheaply as they can get them in the 
supermarkets, and in addition receiving a dividend on all purchases.’240 Others held a more 
general scepticism towards the very prospect of developing large scale supermarket trading within 
the co-operative movement. According to Mr Elias of the North Sectional Board large-scale 
retailing simply went against the very ideal of co-operative trading: 
I am one of those who do not want to see the development of the Co-operative 
Movement along the lines of big business without a soul. We have to remember 
that the Co-operative Movement for a generation or more has had a soul and has 
had some regard for its customers. We do not want a situation in which people 
simply come in and collect their goods and then we forget all about them.241 
Such attitudes slowed down the co-op movement’s general response to the supermarket 
revolution. The many deep-rooted resentments towards the supermarket as a new form of food 
retailing also hampered the operational efficiency of the supermarkets that actually did open. The 
ultimate consequence was that the co-operative societies fell behind their private competitors in 
the transfer of trade to larger, more efficient units.  
The supermarket challenge continued to trouble Co-operative Union representatives 
throughout the 1960s. In the winter of 1968 a separate Trade Advisory Bulletin on Co-operative 
supermarkets was issued by the Co-operative Union.242 A separate co-operative conference on 
successful 'supermarketing' was also held in London during October the same year. The nature of 
the problem was made apparent by the fact that out of a total of 539 societies in operation at the 
time, only 82 attended the conference. At this point, less than a quarter of all societies were 
actually operating supermarkets, while among the stores in operation, ‘a number [...] [operated] 
below normal standards of commercial success.’243 Thus the problems of the late 1950s and early 
1960s were still present in full by the end of the decade. In the words of Bamfield:  
The supermarkets were run like corner shops – even as late as 1968, 73 % of Co-
op supermarkets had the same price structure as corner shops, would make up 
orders and provide a delivery service. Self-service/supermarkets were seen by 
Co-operatives as modern shop layouts rather than methods of capitalizing on the 
(hitherto slight) economies of shop size, and so lowering percentage personnel 
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cost by using new promotional and price cutting techniques to boost volume 
sales.244 
The challenge of transferring trade to the supermarket format was unsuccessfully approached by 
the British co-operators. Despite an early lead in the number of supermarkets operated, the 
movement soon lagged behind its competitors. The ultimate consequence of this development 
was that the decline in co-operative market share starting in the mid-1950s continued also into 
the 1960s. By the end of the decade the movement controlled approximately 12.5 percent of the 
food retail market. This implied that the share of trade controlled by co-operative retailers had 
been reduced by almost forty per cent since 1955.245 The failure to adapt to the coming of 
supermarket retailing played an important role in this market decline. The importance of this 
factor becomes even clearer when looking closer at how the challenge of supermarket trading 
was approached by Norwegian co-operators. In Norway it was the co-ops who played the main 
role in introducing supermarket retailing. As a consequence, throughout the late 1950s and 1960s 
the movement gradually strengthened its market position within the Norwegian food retail 
market.  
 
The supermarket in Norway 
As in the UK, supermarket trading in Norway seriously started to make its presence felt from the 
mid-1950s onwards. Similar to the UK experience, the co-operative societies in Norway made the 
initial inroads into supermarket retailing even before the term and the operational practises of the 
format had been fully recognised. The major difference between the two countries is how the 
Norwegian co-op movement managed to hold on to its initial lead, and similar to the self-service 
experience came to dominate the transformation to supermarket retailing within the Norwegian 
market. The co-op enthusiastically advocated the transfer of trade to larger units and managed to 
find the financial resources and operational skills necessary to develop efficient and competitive 
stores. 
As we recall from the previous chapter, the small shop dominated the Norwegian food 
retail sector throughout the 1950s. We also recall how the co-op stores by the mid-1950s were 
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well ahead of their private competitors in terms of their reported average yearly turnover.246 The 
co-ops had transferred a large proportion of their trade to self-service and the co-operative stores 
were larger than the stores operated by the private shopkeepers. The development of the 
supermarket throughout the 1960s did not alter this general picture.  
In 1960 Oslo Co-operative Society opened two supermarkets in the new and growing 
suburbs of Bøler and Lambertseter outside Oslo.247 A year later the society opened another large 
store at Oppsal. According to the annual report of the society, these new stores were of a size 
and offered a range of stock ‘as yet unheard of in Norway.’ 248 Throughout the 1960s many new 
stores of a similar size and stock range were opened. Typically, these stores would be constructed 
as department stores offering a broad range of products, but with a large, adjoining food section 
run as a separate supermarket. The stores were primarily situated in the many new suburbs 
established around the city of Oslo. Alongside the expansions into supermarket retailing, the 
society also closed down many of its smaller inner city stores. The ultimate goal was to increase 
the average size of the society’s trading units. As the governing board of the society stated in 
1963: 
[the] process of transformation towards larger units taking place in many fields 
of society, are becoming more and more pronounced also within our own 
organisation. The small branches are replaced by larger, well equipped units, with 
modern store fittings and a broad product range. Many projects of this type will 
be carried through in the years to come.249  
Similar transformations were also carried out among retail societies in other parts of the country. 
In the early 1960s large co-operative supermarkets were opened in most cities and towns, as well 
as in the major rural district centres. A few examples may illustrate the point.  
By the 1950s, the local retail society of the northern town of Harstad operated a single 
outlet in the city centre.250 It employed six people, including the manager. The store was 
completely run down. According to the society’s historian it was among the most old-fashioned 
stores in the city. There was no hot water and ‘the walls were insulated with newspapers from the 
1880s.’ The society did, however, own the property next door. And after some consideration the 
governing board of the society decided to the tear down the existing premises and build a 
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completely new and larger store. By 1964 a new and modern four story building had been 
constructed. It hosted a large supermarket on the ground floor. In the basement a consumer 
electronics department as well as a sports department had been established, the first floor hosted 
a shoe and clothing department while the second floor hosted a modern cafeteria. The remaining 
space was used for offices and storehouses.  
In Haugesund, a town situated on the south-western coast of the country, the coming of 
supermarket trading was to become the definitive point of breakthrough for the town’s co-
operative retail society.251 A major reason was the introduction of supermarket retailing. In 1952 
the town’s two co-operative societies merged. In 1959, after some initial years of struggling, the 
new society managed to open a completely new supermarket. The store had been fully financed 
by local members’ capital, and it facilitated a massive turnaround in the society’s fortunes. In 
1960 the society could report an increase in turnover of NOK 130,000, equal to  6,500. This 
implied an increase of 28 per cent. The rise had, as stated by the society’s local historian, been 
obtained ‘without any registered growth in costs’.252 Such a positive development soon spurred 
increased member trust. Between 1962 and 1963 alone members' share capital was doubled. The 
savings helped finance the opening of yet another supermarket in 1964. In its first eleven months 
of trading the new store alone recorded twice the turnover than the society had produced in total 
only five years earlier. Positive developments continued throughout the decade: existing stores 
were enlarged and rebuild, and new, larger stores were opened. A positive spiral of rising 
turnover figures, increased member savings and a steady opening and rebuilding of large stores 
turned the society into one of the major businesses in the town of Haugesund. In the course of 
the 1960s alone, turnover rose from NOK 600,000 to NOK 19 million.253 In real terms, this 
implied a growth of 2,500 per cent.254  
Similar stories were repeated in many towns and rural districts across the country. The 
many openings reflect the positive attitudes that generally seem to have characterised leading 
representatives of Norwegian retail co-operatives towards self-service and supermarket trading. 
In society after society, old, small and run down premises were substituted with modern outlets, 
most often new and purpose built. Hence, while British co-operators continued to express 
reluctance towards the new retail formats, the Norwegians embraced it and employed it as a 
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means to increase co-operative presence in the Norwegian food retail market. Rather than 
scepticism and reluctance to change, Norwegian co-operators simply advocated a much more 
pragmatic stance towards the need for change. As the NKL formulated it in a critical statement 
to the Consumer Council on the future prospect of home delivery services: ‘The efficient store is 
the large store’.255  
In addition to these positive and pragmatic attitudes, Norwegian co-operators also 
managed to more easily overcome existing building restrictions, to find the necessary finances to 
establish the new stores and to operate them in an efficient and competitive manner. The capital 
problem had been an issue of particular concern within the UK movement. Many small societies 
struggled to find the necessary capital to finance expansions into supermarket retailing. 
Continuous erosion of sales and weak profitability severely hampered their financial situation. 
Negative publicity and increased competition for savings also caused members to withdraw their 
deposits. Hence, in the period from 1945 to 1985 share capital in the UK movement declined by 
95 per cent in real terms.256 In the short period between 1968 and 1970 alone, fifty million or 
twelve per cent of total capital employed was withdrawn from societies.257 Further problems were 
created by government legislation restricting the possibilities for self-investment of existing 
funds. Instead, retail societies were forced to dispose of their employees' pension funds in 
external equities, without, as a co-op, having the possibility of receiving similar investments in 
return.258  
The situation in Norway was very different. A co-operative savings campaign sparked off 
in 1954 had a tremendous effect on the total level of share capital. In the period from 1950 to 
1980, members' savings grew eightfold in fixed prices. As we recall from the experiences in 
Haugesund, such growth in members’ savings played a vital part in the process of expanding 
trade into the supermarket segment. Increased savings made the establishment of new and larger 
stores possible. These stores facilitated increased earnings and attracted new customers to the co-
op. More members could thus be recruited, further increasing the amount of savings and share 
capital. A virtuous circle of growth was thus induced. Compared with the private retailers, the 
Norwegian co-ops had several advantages in the race to establish supermarkets. Still operating on 
a small scale, the maximum level of retained earnings was restricted among the private retailers. 
And as long as the stores were independently owned, typically by a single family, external finances 
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were limited. As such, the small private retailers in Norway in many ways experienced the same 
problems as had many of the British co-operative societies.  
This is not to say the Norwegian co-operative movement found the change towards 
supermarket trading easy, or that it was alone in introducing the supermarket to the Norwegian 
market. Already in 1956 what was presumably the first privately owned supermarket in Norway 
had been opened by Didrik Hvalstad in Bærum, outside Oslo. The shop operated a sales area of 
4,300 square feet and it presumably traded an annual turnover of 5 million NOK, or  250,000.259 
Throughout the 1960s private retailers started to seriously challenge the market position of the 
co-operatives within the supermarket segment. Typically, the challenge was fiercest in the larger 
cities. Hence in Oslo, and despite the substantial expansion of the city’s Co-operative Society, 
private competitors managed to increase their share of the market. The major recipe of these 
retailers was to establish large supermarkets in the high street, to compete aggressively on price 
and to co-operate in horizontal chains.260 As such they employed many of the same strategies as 
their British counterparts. The ultimate success of their approach is made evident by the fact that 
while both the actual number and the share of stores operating in the inner city area was reduced 
during the mid-1960s, the share of total food trade conducted in the same area increased. Hence, 
while 45.8 per cent of all food trade was done in the inner city area in 1963, the share had risen to 
48.1 by 1967. In the same period the actual number of inner city stores was reduced by 12 per 
cent. 261 As was reported by a contemporary analyst, a major reason behind these developments 
was most likely ‘the many large supermarkets based on the discount principle that have been 
established in the inner city areas’.262  
The developments in Oslo substantially challenged the position of the city’s co-operative 
society. Despite their rapid expansion into the supermarket segment, from the mid-1960s 
onwards the society experienced consecutive years with a declining market share, weakened 
profitability and failure to pay the yearly dividend.263 The general picture was, however, still one 
of expansion and growth. Despite the problems experienced in the largest cities – most 
prominently Oslo – the Norwegian co-ops remained the leading operator of large scale 
supermarkets within the Norwegian market. In 1968 the average sales of co-operative stores was 
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close to double that of private stores.264 And while supermarket retailing had been successfully 
adopted by some private retailers, most of them continued to trade in the smaller formats. The 
co-operative retail societies for their part managed to expand more quickly and more evenly into 
the larger formats, increasing dramatically their overall sales. The pattern was clearly reflected in 
market share developments. From 1955 to 1978, co-operative societies increased their share of 
the food retail market by more than 40 per cent, from an approximate of 18 per cent to 26 per 
cent.265 Compared to the developments seen in the UK co-ops, the progress of the Norwegian 
co-operatives was also marked. We recall how the market position of the British co-operatives 
was drastically eroded throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Similarly, developments in turnover 
show that while co-operative turnover in the UK was reduced in fixed prices, the Norwegian co-
ops in the period from 1960 to 1970 strengthened their sales by close to 70 per cent.266 Looking 
at supermarket development specifically, it is also noticeable that the Norwegian co-ops 
outperformed their British counterparts. By 1966, 13 per cent of all co-operative shops in 
Norway were run as supermarkets.267 The equivalent figure for the UK movement was 3 per 
cent.268 
 
Conclusions 
The Norwegian consumer co-operatives managed to transfer their food trade to the larger and 
more cost-efficient supermarket outlets at a faster pace than the UK consumer co-ops. In the 
UK, co-op societies largely failed to develop a competitive structure of supermarkets capable of 
facing the radical expansions of the private retailers. The consequence was a continuous erosion 
of sales and market share throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. The Norwegian co-ops by 
contrast managed to defend and strengthen their position in relation to their private competitors 
during the same period. By introducing supermarket retailing in their home markets, small retail 
societies grew to become substantial local businesses. At the national level, the co-operative 
movement saw a steady growth in market share.  
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A major reason behind this divergent development needs to be related to the differing 
competitive strengths of the Norwegian and British private retail sector. As this chapter has 
shown, the introduction of supermarket trading reached a decisive point when British multiple 
retailers started to eat directly into the market shares of the co-operative societies. These retailers 
had both the capital and the strategic capabilities necessary to fully exploit the potential in 
supermarket trading. Companies such as Sainsbury’s, Tesco, and the Weston Group dramatically 
outperformed the achievements of the co-operative societies and became the new frontrunners 
of British food retailing. As an example, in the period from 1960 to 1970 Sainsbury’s tripled its 
sales while doubling its total profits, the major reason being substantial investments in the 
establishment of new supermarkets. 269 While the number of branches operated by the company 
fell, the total selling area increased. The simple reason, as stated by the company's historian, was 
that, ‘often a large store replaced several smaller stores’.270 During the 1960s the average sales area 
in a new Sainsbury’s branch increased from 4,750 to 10,200 square feet. The total selling area of 
the company’s self-service stores grew from 95,000 to 806,000 square feet. In the same period, 
the number of product lines in a single shop was doubled, from approximately 2,000 to 4,000. By 
1970, Sainsbury’s was the country’s second largest food retailer in terms of sales, even if only 20 
per cent of the population lived within the reach of a Sainsbury’s shop. Taken as a group, the co-
op movement was at this point still the country’s largest food retailer, controlling approximately 
12.5 per cent of the market.271 But, partly due to the rapid expansion of the multiples, the trend 
was negative, both in terms of sales, profits and market share.  
The contrast with the Norwegian experience is stark. In Norway the private retail industry 
remained weak and fragmented. This provided ample room for the co-operative societies to 
experiment and expand. The result was that the co-operative societies could, more easily than the 
British, take on a leading role in the development of supermarket retailing. Still, the divergent 
development of the two movements can not only be confined to differences in the competitive 
climate of the two countries. As this chapter has shown repeatedly, the UK co-ops also lagged 
behind their Norwegian sister organisations in their ability to transfer trade to the supermarket 
format. This divergence was caused by differences in attitude towards the large scale supermarket 
format, differences in the ability to finance the establishment of new stores and differences in the 
capabilities of operating these stores efficiently. While the British co-ops were gradually spurred 
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into a vicious cycle of declining trade, reduced consumer confidence, withdrawal of share capital 
and financial difficulties, the Norwegian co-ops managed to set in motion more positive cycles of 
development. More generally, the strategic reluctance observed within large parts of the UK 
movement to abandon their small, outdated and ‘ideologically correct’ ways of trading can be 
contrasted with the more pragmatic views of the Norwegian co-operators. The Norwegians 
simply seem to have taken on a much more positive attitude to the prospects of large-scale 
supermarket trading. Rather than co-operation equalling small and local, they defined their co-
operative mission more as one of serving the consumer through rationalisation on a broad scale. 
The introduction of supermarket retailing was simply a natural step in such a process. The 
pragmatic stance of the Norwegian co-operators proved even more vital in the years to come, 
when superstores and hypermarkets even more intensely challenged the traditional co-operative 
way of doing business.  
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Chapter 4: Superstores and hypermarkets 
 
We are now entering the third stage of the retailing revolution. The creation and 
operation in Birmingham of large scale hypermarkets will radically alter the 
pattern of trading in the coming decade.272  
 
These were the words of representative Charlie Job of Kent, taking to the podium at the 102nd 
Co-operative Union congress in Eastbourne in June 1971. Job had entered the congress stand to 
support a proposal submitted by the North-Eastern Society, concerning the need to establish a 
long- term planning unit, controlled by the Co-op Union, the Co-operative Wholesale Society 
(CWS) and the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society (SCWS). The unit would, if established, 
provide the retail societies with authoritative advice and practical assistance on trading issues, 
including a ‘determination of the Co-operative market: the growth markets, the kind of stores 
and shops needed – their location, size, and merchandise mix’.273  
What specifically concerned Job was the growth of the so-called superstores and 
hypermarkets. These were a new type of stores, typically located out of town or on the edge of 
towns and cites. They comprised a total floor space of at least 25,000 square feet. Their basic 
operational procedure was a strict cost structure, a radical pricing policy and a broad product 
range. These stores were gradually making the supermarket look dated and seen as the most 
modern and efficient form of food retailing. According to Job, ‘the growth of the hypermarket 
movement … [was] phenomenal, especially in France.’ 274  
Superstores and hypermarkets seriously started to make their presence felt in Europe 
from the mid-1960s onwards. And gradually they came to dominate the food retail market in 
several countries, including Britain. The economic potential of the superstore and hypermarket 
was even more obvious than had been the case for the supermarket format. But, even more so 
than the supermarkets, the establishment of hypermarkets demanded substantial capital 
investment. To be operated efficiently the stores also had to be supported by a comprehensive 
system of buying, wholesaling, distribution and merchandising and the daily running of the stores 
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required considerable administrative skills. To become a successful operator of superstores and 
hypermarkets demanded a complex set of organisational capabilities.275 A pertinent question for 
the co-operative societies in the UK and Norway by the beginning of the 1970s was whether they 
possessed or were capable of developing such skills.  
The growth of superstore and hypermarket retailing came to have a tremendous effect on 
British food retailing. While the country had lagged behind for thirty years in the development of 
supermarkets, the growth of superstores and hypermarkets throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
paralleled developments in the US.276 While there were hardly any superstores and hypermarkets 
in operation in the UK at the beginning of the 1970s, at the turn of the millennium, more than 
fifty per cent of all food sales were in such stores.277 According to retail geographers Neil Wrigley 
and Michelle Lowe, during the 1980s all the major UK food retailers became heavily involved in 
superstore development.278 The co-operative movement was no exception to this trend. It soon 
turned out, however, that the co-operative superstores and hypermarkets could not compete with 
those operated by the multiple retailers. With a market share of 10.5 per cent the UK co-ops 
were, taken as a group, still the largest food retailer in Britain by the beginning of the 1980s. By 
the turn of the millennium, however, the movement had been relegated to fifth place, with a 
share of the market just below 6 per cent.279 A major reason behind this decline was that the 
British co-ops had failed to successfully approach the increasing dominance of large-scale 
superstores and hypermarkets within the country’s food retail market.  
The development in Norway was very different. First of all, the influence of the 
superstores and hypermarket formats remained comparatively limited in Norway. While such 
stores by the turn of the millennium accounted on average for 30 per cent of food sales in 
Western Europe, and more than 50 per cent in the UK, in Norway they controlled only 5 per 
cent of sales.280 Secondly, the majority of this trade was controlled by co-operative societies. By 
2002 more than fifty per cent of the trade conducted in superstores and hypermarkets was in the 
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hands of co-operative retail societies.281 Hence, while the growth of superstore and hypermarket 
retailing had further added to the decline of the British co-operative movement, in Norway the 
development of such stores stabilised and in some areas strengthened the market position of the 
Norwegian co-ops.  
The present chapter explores how these divergent developments unfolded and discusses 
how they can be explained. Three main questions are investigated. Was the superstore and 
hypermarket viewed as an important and viable store type for the co-ops and how did they 
approach the format in its initial phase of development? How did the societies obtain the 
finances and operational skills necessary to establish and operate stores of the size and scope 
these formats demanded? And how did the co-operative superstores and hypermarkets deal with 
the developments among competing food retailers also seeking to exploit the potential in 
superstore and hypermarket retailing?  
 
The hypermarket 
The superstore and the hypermarket were two slightly different types of retail formats. They were 
both characterised by their large size, their broad product range and their location in single-level, 
out of town buildings supported by extensive (free) car parking. What differentiated the two was 
basically that the hypermarket was even larger than the superstore, typically constructed at around 
55,000 square feet as compared with the minimum of 25,000 square feet of the superstores.282 
The hypermarkets would also stock a higher share of non-food products, normally at the range 
of 35 per cent of total sales.283 
According to authoritative sources, the first hypermarket in Europe was established by 
the French retailer Carrefour, at St Geneviève-des-Bois, south of Paris, in 1963. 284 At 2,500 
square meters, the Carrefour store was actually a superstore, not a hypermarket in the strict sense. 
It is also evident that already in 1962 the Swedish private retailer Wessels had opened a 7,000 
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square meter store in Jägersro outside Malmö.285 In any case, the opening of these stores marked 
the beginning of a substantial growth in large- scale retailing throughout Western Europe. 
According to retail historian James B. Jefferys, reporting on the development of large retail units 
in the co-operative trade journal Co-operative Management and Marketing in 1972, the number of 
stores operating a floor space exceeding 25,000 square feet rose from three in 1962 to 604 in 
1972.286 Combining the growth in department stores, variety stores and supermarkets, the total 
selling space of large units had increased by 125 million square feet within the same ten year 
period. In the words of Jefferys: ‘Never in the history of European retailing has there been such a 
spectacular development in such a short space of time.’287  
The economic viability of the superstore and hypermarket was connected to several 
interrelated factors. 288 Constructing the store in large, simple, one storey buildings situated 
outside city centres greatly reduced the costs of property relative to the actual surface area. 
Reduced costs were also secured by keeping the interior simple and standardised and by focusing 
on products with high turnover rates. The most important cost factor was, however, related to 
the possibilities of reducing wage costs. The stores could simply handle a much larger amount of 
trade with a relatively smaller staff than other retail formats.  
At the same time, the superstores and hypermarkets also generated higher sales densities, 
i.e. a higher level of trade per square foot of selling space. The cost reductions obtained made 
possible a substantial lowering of prices. This increased sales directly. In addition, the stores 
would also stock a wider product range with more ‘value added’ lines. Stocking a larger 
proportion of non-food products, the hypermarkets would particularly take advantage of such 
enhanced operating margins. Finally, customers would typically spend a higher average amount of 
money in the superstores due to the possibilities of one- stop shopping. As a consequence of the 
size and the isolated location of these stores, superstores and hypermarkets simply gained from 
holding what was in practice a local monopoly.  
The ultimate result of these operational features was that the superstores and 
hypermarkets were capable of producing sales with such low costs previously unheard of within 
the food retailing industry. As soon as such stores started to be established in a given food 
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market, it became imperative for the existing retailers to find ways of dealing with the challenges 
they represented.  
 
The first hypermarkets in Norway  
As the 1970s approached, both the UK and the Norwegian consumer co-operatives were well 
aware of the economic potential of hypermarket retailing. Within the Norwegian movement, the 
tremendous economic possibilities of the hypermarket had been reported as early as January 
1964, when the co-operative journal Forbrukeren presented an article on the opening of the 
Swedish co-operative movement’s first ‘discount department store’.289 The store, named Obs!, 
was opened and operated by the co-operative society of Stockholm. It was a hypermarket in 
every sense of the word.290 It was situated about 20 kilometres south of Stockholm. At 15,000 
square meters, or more than 160,000 square feet, the store was twice as large as the Wessels store 
outside Malmö.291 The outside parking lot could hold 3,000 cars. The store stocked a wide variety 
of products and prices were 10-15 per cent lower than in inner city stores. The store operated on 
the premise that wage costs should not exceed one third of normal wage costs in department 
stores, and the rent of property should be less than one fifth of the standard rate in inner city 
areas.292 When the store opened on the 5 January 1963, it clearly must have been among the 
largest food stores ever seen in Europe.  
The hypermarket outside Stockholm was an immediate success. The budgeted turnover 
for the first year of trading was estimated to be SEK 25 million. In practice, it achieved a 
turnover of almost SEK 37 million.293 As a consequence, more stores of a similar kind were soon 
established. In 1964 a second store was opened in Gärde, outside Västerås, and by 1967 five 
hypermarkets had been opened.294  
The success of the Swedish hypermarkets was soon recognised by Norwegian co-
operators. Inspired by the radical economic achievements of these new and large stores, the 
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leadership of the Norwegian Co-operative Association (NKL) decided to investigate the 
possibilities of developing similar kinds of outlets in Norway. It was clear from the outset than 
no single retail society at this point had the financial or the managerial capacity to build a store on 
the scale that was being considered. As was noted in an article on the prospects of out of town 
superstores and hypermarkets in Forbrukeren, it was generally ‘not possible for co-operative 
societies to establish such enterprises’.295 Such large stores had rather to be ‘established and 
operated in cooperation between the local co-operative society and the central association 
NKL.’296  
In 1967 the NKL board decided that an opening should be attempted at Lade, just 
outside the city of Trondheim. The store was to be established and operated as a cooperative 
endeavour between the NKL and a group of co-operative societies already operating in the 
region. It was finally opened in October 1968. It operated a net sales area of 5,600 square meters, 
or roughly 60,000 square feet on a single level. It stocked a total of 20,000 different articles, of 
which a substantial share was non-food products and it operated on a strict low price policy.297 
Placed on an out of town site it relied almost totally on car ownership and the parking lot was 
constructed to hold 800 cars.298 The success of the store was immediate. In the first full year of 
trading the store recorded a total turnover of 45.5 million NOK, equal to 2.6 million pounds in 
1969. Of this, close to 50 per cent came from the sale of food. 299 Five years later the turnover 
had almost trebled in running prices.300 In fixed prices the turnover growth was 100 per cent. The 
profitability of the store was also generally very positive. In its first year of trading the store 
recorded profits in percentage of sales of close to four per cent.301 
The immediate economic success of the Lade store implied that the economic potential 
of the hypermarket format had been clearly proven. The opening had also shown the true 
potential of close cooperation between local retail societies and the national association. 
Originally, the premises on which the store was build had been owned by the national 
association, while the responsibility for running the store was given to the local retail societies. 
When seven of these societies decided to merge to form a single, regional retail society full 
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ownership of the property was handed over to these societies.302 With full ownership and 
operational control, the new society, named Trondos or the Co-operative Society of Trondheim 
and Environs, was given a head start. With the hypermarket at Lade as the fundamental driving 
force, the society gradually developed to become one of the strongest co-operative societies in 
the country. As such, the opening and immediate success of the Lade hypermarket was more 
than an important economic achievement. Both administratively and financially, the opening 
became a model for the future establishment of co-operative hypermarkets.  
Despite the success of the Lade opening, the number of new openings remained limited 
for some years yet. In September 1976 a superstore, operating a total selling area of 3,150 square 
meters, equal to 34,000 square feet, was opened at Slitu in the south-eastern part of the 
country.303 The store was owned and operated by the co-operative society of Østfold, a newly 
formed regional co-op. This store also proved an immediate economic success, recording 
substantial yearly increases in both sales and profits. But it remained the only large- scale opening 
made by the co-op movement throughout the entire 1970s. 
The reasons for this limited interest in the superstore and hypermarket format were 
many. First of all, the market potential for such stores was still limited. With a relatively small 
population spread thinly across the country, the number of customers necessary to run an 
efficient out of town hypermarket was simply not achievable in many places. Nor was the capital 
needed to fund such large stores readily available. Despite the co-op’s possibilities to secure 
increased financial strength through local and national cooperation, limited availability of capital 
slowed down expansion into the superstore and hypermarket formats. Finally, a sceptical attitude 
towards the demographic prospects of out of town retailing also seems to have prevailed among 
influential co-operators. Until the coming of the superstore and hypermarket, most store 
development had been confined to inner city areas, suburbs or regional town centres. As such, 
the retail store had remained an important part in the process of building coherent and viable 
urban and regional communities. The establishment of superstores and hypermarkets, however, 
implied that trade was moved out of these communities. A substantial scepticism seems to have 
prevailed towards such a development. The continued commitment of the Norwegian co-
operators to restrict their large- scale developments to inner city department stores is indicative 
of such an attitude. 
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The restricted development of superstores and hypermarkets throughout the 1960s and 
1970s clearly reflects the fact that the co-op movement was not yet ready to fully adopt the large, 
edge of town and out of town formats. By the end of the 1970s the co-op movement operated 
only two such stores. But some important achievements had been made. The opening of the two 
stores had induced increased cooperation between the national association and the local retail 
societies, as well as strengthened cooperation at the local level. Both the Lade and the Slitu store 
were operated by large regional societies established just prior to or as a consequence of the 
large- scale opening. Both stores were owned and controlled independently by these regional co-
ops, but they were run under a common logo and according to common operational procedures. 
The sales potential of the superstore and hypermarket had also been clearly proven. While the 
two stores represented only 0.1 per cent of total stores operated by the movement, in 1980 they 
controlled 2.5 per cent of total sales.304 Hence, while the actual opening of stores had been 
limited, the first experiences with the format had been positive and the future potential of such 
stores was obvious.  
 
Early development of superstores and hypermarkets in the UK 
Similar to the Norwegian experience, very few out of town superstores and hypermarkets had 
been established in the UK by the early 1970s. Rather, most new store openings continued to be 
confined to the High Street, where competition for the best locations remained fierce. Gradually, 
however, the efficiency potential of these new, large retail formats was increasingly recognised.  
Within the co-operative movement specifically, a wait-and-see attitude towards the 
prospects of large scale, out of town retailing seems to have dominated. By the early 1970s, many 
societies were still struggling to overcome the challenges from the supermarkets and they were 
not ready to handle yet another store format. As an editorial in the Co-operative Management and 
Marketing noted, many societies had just finished a ‘painful revolution as they have been virtually 
forced from old established premises, formerly well sited, into new shopping centres.’305 The 
worry was that these societies would now ‘have to face another traumatic experience as they find 
that even these centres are … threatened by out-of-town developments.’306   
The co-ops seem, however, to have held a positive attitude towards the cost- saving and 
price- cutting potential of the superstore and hypermarket formats. In a common memorandum 
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on superstores and hypermarkets issued to the Department of the Environment in 1971, the 
CWS, SCWS and the retail societies stated that, ‘as a consumer’s organisation’, the co-operative 
movement was principally supportive of any measures capable of favouring the consumer by 
‘minimis[ing] distribution costs.’307 As such, they were also in favour of the superstore and 
hypermarket formats as far as these could contribute to such savings. At the same time, the 
memorandum, summarised in the July edition of the Co-operative Review, also revealed that leading 
co-operators did not foresee a dominant future for out of town food shopping. Rather, it was 
expected that the large scale formats would develop alongside the existing stores types. The 
hypermarkets and superstores were viewed to be a supplement, not a replacement:  
There is no evidence of any actual retreat by leading food or other “convenience” 
goods retailers from the large city and town centres. Indeed Co-operative 
experiences and that of our principal competitors indicates a steady and 
continuing increase in town centre facilities … this is now being complemented – 
but not replaced – by supermarkets, etc. established in new suburban district 
centres and on “edge of town” locations. It will be further complemented, 
planning requirements permitting, by some developments of free-standing 
superstores.308  
Hence, while the efficiency potential of the new, large formats was fully recognised, many 
remained sceptical of the future role of these types of stores within the British food retail market. 
The question thus remained how the coming of superstore and hypermarket retailing could best 
be approached in practice. 
As it turned out, and similar to the self-service and supermarket experience, the co-ops 
took an early lead in the opening of superstores and hypermarkets within the British food retail 
market. In the summer of 1973, the Co-operative Retail Services (CRS), by then the UK‘s largest 
retail society, opened one of its first purpose built superstores in Pyle near Bridgend, South 
Wales.309 The store operated a selling area of 29,000 square feet and provided parking facilities for 
400 cars. It soon traded a total turnover of more than  3 million, equal to NOK 40 million. As 
with the Norwegian hypermarkets, the store was operated with a separate trading name, Leo, 
clearly distinguishing it from the traditional co-operative grocery trade.  
By 1974 a total of six Leo superstores were in operation. Apart from the store at Pyle, 
these were situated in Scunthorpe in Humberside, Birkenhead in Merseyside, Liverpool, 
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Glamorgan and Cardiff.310 While the stores represented less than 1 per cent of all stores operated 
by the CRS, they accounted for close to ten per cent of the society’s total turnover. On average, 
they traded on a net profit of 3.7 per cent of sales. As we recall, the similar figure for the Lade 
hypermarket in its first year of trading had been 3.9 per cent.  
Along similar lines as the CRS, the North Midlands Society, trading in the areas of North 
Staffordshire and South Cheshire, developed their Normid superstores and hypermarkets from 
the early 1970s onwards.311 The first venture into superstore retailing had been made in 1971, 
when the department store at Crewe was rebuild. After the conversion the store experienced a 
dramatic increase in sales, from  336,000 in 1970 to  3 million in 1975. In real terms this 
implied a growth of more than 400 per cent. The first purpose built superstore was opened at 
Hamil Road, Burslem in May 1973. It held a total of 30,000 square feet of net selling space.312 By 
the following year two more stores had been opened, one converted store at Newcastle-under-
Lyme and one purpose built store just outside Tunstall. Then, in the autumn of 1975 the first 
hypermarket was opened at Talke, Stoke-on Trent. The store operated a total selling area of 
roughly 70,000 square feet.  
Apart from the initial store at Crewe, all the large stores traded primarily in food. They all 
operated under the same Normid brand. And as the following figures clearly show, they helped 
push forward a dramatic strengthening of the society’s economic performance. When the Co-
operative Society had been formed in 1969, total turnover was roughly  8.5 million. This trade 
was collected through a total of 264 trading units. By 1975, the number of trading units had been 
reduced to less than half, while total turnover had been quadrupled.313 Out of the now total sales 
of  34 million, the four Normid superstores alone were anticipated to account for some 15 
million. Three years later, and including the trade at the Talke Hypermarket, total turnover had 
risen to  66 million. In real terms, this implied a growth of 33 per cent, half of which was 
accounted for by the five Normid stores. As a consequence of these radical sales increases, North 
Midlands advanced from being the thirty-fourth to become the twelfth largest retail society in 
Britain in terms of turnover. In terms of actual trading performance, the society held an even 
stronger position.  
By 1976 the co-op movement operated a total of seventeen superstores and 
hypermarkets. This implied that the co-ops were Britain’s second largest operator of such stores. 
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Two years later ten more stores had been opened, making a total of 27. The market leader was 
still Asda, while Tesco held third place. Similar to the self-service and supermarket experiences, 
the co-ops had thus managed to take on a leading role in introducing superstores and 
hypermarkets into the British food retail market. These developments again provided renewed 
confidence and optimism among co-operators that the movement indeed remained among the 
country’s most innovative and dynamic retailers. Commenting on the developments in an 1976 
edition of the Co-operative Marketing and Management journal, the general manager of the Retail 
Management Services of the CWS, Laurie Denton, concluded that it was ‘quite on the cards that 
before long the Movement will be the most important operator’ of superstores in the British 
market, the main reason being that ‘the number [of large stores] in the process of development is 
much greater than any of our rivals.’ 314  
 
Divergent paths in hypermarket retailing 
The British and Norwegian consumer co-ops had pioneered both the self-service system and 
supermarket trading. And as has just been shown, they also took an early lead in the development 
of the superstore and hypermarket formats. As we recall from the two previous chapters, 
however, the innovative role taken by the British consumer co-ops in self-service and 
supermarket trading did not provide them with a long term competitive advantage within these 
types of retail trading. Quite to the contrary, the self-service and supermarket breakthrough had 
sparked off a process of dramatic decline in the British co-operative movement. Private retailers 
had gradually surpassed the co-ops in the operation of self-service stores, and they had also better 
managed to reap the economic possibilities of supermarket trading. In Norway, the story had 
been different. Here, the co-ops had managed to hold on to their pioneering position in self-
service and supermarket retailing and gradually developed to become a leading operator of such 
stores within the Norwegian food market. Rather than decline, the development of the self-
service and supermarket form of retail trading had thus implied a strengthening of co-operative 
trade in Norway.  
The development of hypermarket retailing showed much the same pattern. Even if the 
UK co-ops in 1979 were among Britain’s largest operators of superstores and hypermarkets, they 
once again failed to transfer this first mover advantage into long term competitiveness. The 
reasons for this were many. Most importantly, while many stores had been opened in the course 
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of the 1970s, it soon turned out that the development had been fragmented and lacked overall 
co-ordination. As was noted by J. H. Perrow in his presidential address to the 1979 Co-op Union 
Congress in Eastbourne:  
the Co-operative Movement is the second largest operator of superstores in this 
country and at this moment there are 16 in course of building, which will be 
opened in the next year or so. Nevertheless, our development is patchy and 
decisions are taken by individual retail boards of Directors with only one 
consideration in mind, that of their own local society.315  
At this point three main groups of co-operative superstores and hypermarkets could be 
identified.316 The first consisted of the ten large stores now operated by the CRS, the second the 
five stores operated by the North Midlands Regional Society. The majority of stores, however, 
belonged to the third group. This consisted of a grand total of twenty separate retail societies, 
which between them operated a total of twenty-one superstores, hypermarkets and four other 
large stores.317 As a general rule, these stores were operated independently and without the 
support from a co-ordinated, national development program. Compared to the stores operated 
by the CRS and North Midlands Co-operative society, they traded below average performance. 
Hence, while several co-operative superstores and hypermarkets had been established, lack of 
coordination systematically weakened their competitive potential.  
The problems related to this fragmented approach became radically intensified as the 
multiple retailers from the early 1980s onwards seriously started to expand their operations into 
the superstore and hypermarket segments. The period from the late 1970s to the early 1990s – 
later termed ‘the golden age of British retailing’ – saw an explosion in superstore development 
causing the private multiple retailers to double their sales manifold.318 The lax regulatory regime 
of the Thatcher government paved the way for heavy investments and multiple retailers such as 
Sainsbury’s, Tesco, Asda, Argyll (later Safeway) and Gateway (Later Somerfield) expanded 
dramatically reaping the full sales and profitability potential of the hypermarket and superstore 
format. Due to the aggressive expansion of these retailers, competition over the most attractive 
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318 N. Wrigley, ‘Is the “golden age” of British grocery retailing at a watershed?’, Environment and Planning A, 23 (1991), 
1545-60 
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development sites became extremely fierce, giving birth to expressions such as ‘store wars’.319 A 
couple of examples may illustrate the point.  
From being mainly focused on the market around London and the south-east the 
Sainsbury’s chain seriously started to expand its trading area from the mid- 1970s onwards.320 The 
major goal was to become a true national retailer. Parallel to its geographic expansion the 
company also continued to expand the average size of its stores. In the period from 1970 to 
1985, average floor space of new stores opened by the chain more than doubled, from 10,200 to 
26,000 square feet. A major part of this growth came from the establishment of edge-of town 
superstores and from the end of the 1970s onwards through the development of the separate 
Savacentre hypermarkets. The ultimate consequence of these parallel expansions was that the 
company in the mid- 1980s passed the co-op as the country’s largest food retailer.321 Moreover, 
pre-tax profits rose on average 26 per cent every year throughout the 1980s, making the company 
by far the most efficient food retailer in the country. Hence, even if the co-ops had pioneered the 
introduction of hypermarket retailing in the British market, Sainsbury’s managed much better 
than the co-operative to combine increased size and an increased number of large stores with 
dramatically strengthened productivity and efficiency.  
Along similar lines, the Tesco chain started an intensive process of expansion from the 
late 1970s onwards, primarily growing through the establishment of large superstores. In the ten 
year period between 1980 and 1990 alone, the average size of Tesco’s stores rose to over 26,000 
square feet. By 1990, the average size of new stores under construction was 40,000 square feet.322 
At this point the group was opening more new superstores than Sainsbury’s, and in 1995 it 
achieved market leadership.323 From 1997 onwards the leading position was further strengthened 
as the company also started to move into the hypermarket segment. By 2002 the company 
operated no less than 44 hypermarkets under the Tesco Extra name.324 Other dominant retail 
groups were Asda, Argyll/Safeway and Somerfield. By the end of the 1990s these five multiple 
                                                 
319 See N. Wrigley and M. Lowe, Reading Retail. A Geographical Perspective on Retailing and Consumption Spaces (London: 
Arnold, 2002), p. 32-7. 
320 The following paragraph is largely based on B. Williams, The Best Butter in the World. A History of Sainsbury’s 
(London: Ebury Press, 1994), p. 212-13. 
321 Exactly when Sainsbury's passed the co-ops in terms of market share is difficult to specify precisely, as it depends 
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322 N. Wrigley and M. Lowe, Reading Retail. A Geographical Perspective on Retailing and Consumption Spaces (London: 
Arnold, 2002), pp. 77-8. 
323 G. Owen, ‘Corporate strategy in UK food retailing 1980-2002’, London School of Economics: unpublished seminar paper, 
2003, 10. See also D. Powell, Counter Revolution: The Tesco Story (London: GraftonBooks, 1991) and N. Wrigley and M. 
Lowe, Reading Retail. A Geographical Perspective on Retailing and Consumption Spaces (London: Arnold, 2002), pp. 31-3. 
324 The first Tesco Extra was opened in Pitsea, Essex in 1997 (www.tescocorporate.com); G. Owen, ‘Corporate 
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retailers controlled more than half of the total British food retail market.325 The large majority of 
their sales came through large superstores and hypermarkets. Their stores were centrally 
governed, supported by an integrated distribution system and operated on a standardised basis.  
In an attempt to keep pace with these rapid developments, several new co-operative 
superstores and hypermarkets were opened. By 1986 the co-op movement was running 65 such 
stores, still giving them a leading position in terms of the number of stores operated. But, the 
efficiency of these stores in terms of sales per square foot remained way behind that of the 
competitors. As noted by co-operative commentator Ted Stephenson, co-operative superstores 
and hypermarkets continued to be ‘spread thinly across a number of societies’ causing 
fragmentation and problems of realising the potential economies of these large scale formats.326 
In contrast to the standardised and centralised approach of the major multiples, co-operative 
superstores and hypermarkets were governed independently by local retail societies and they were 
run on a non-standardised basis. Most visibly, while all Tesco stores operated under the Tesco 
brand, and all Sainsbury’s stores under the Sainsbury’s brand (except for the Savacentre 
hypermarkets), co-op superstores were run under numerous different brands. As Desmond 
Hopwood pointed out in a 1993 article in the Journal of Co-operative Studies: ‘Regional advertising 
campaigns in the provincial press feature a variety of different names for Co-op superstores. The 
latter bear a hotch-potch of formats – “Co-op Plus”, “Leo’s”, “Normid”, “Rainbow”, Scotmid” 
and “Shopping Giant”.’327  
The expansion of many co-ops into the superstore and hypermarket segment also caused 
substantial financial difficulties. Limited availability of capital implied that expansions often had 
to be financed by way of huge and expensive loans. But these loans soon put a heavy cost burden 
on the retail societies when the new store failed to produce the expected profit. The situation in 
Scotland was perhaps the most problematic. As managing secretary of the North Angus Co-
operative Society John Anderson reported, ‘the problems of the Scottish Co-operative movement 
are even worse that (sic) those English societies, difficult though that is to believe.’ 328 By 1982 the 
large majority of the 47 Scottish societies still in operation were relying on shops less than 2,000 
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square feet. In addition, these societies had ‘little or no capital to develop new shops’.329 The 
severity of the situation was plainly formulated by Anderson: 
Competition is strengthening in Scotland … What a frightening prospect! How 
do you compete with superstores when you have small shops and little or no 
money? Some societies are trying but it has to be an uphill struggle. A multiple 
can open a superstore and wait three or four years for it to return a profit but no 
Scottish society can do that. Any development no matter how great its potential 
must make a profit the first year or it means financial ruin”.330 
Taken together, the overall consequence of the problems in England and Scotland, was that the 
loss of market share starting in the late 1950s continued throughout the 1970s, -80s and 90s. In 
the years from 1980 to 2000 alone, market share was almost halved.  
The continuous problems in the superstore and hypermarket segments gradually pushed 
forward a radical reformulation of the co-operative movement’s overall strategy. In 1997 the 
CWS, by now the largest retail co-operative within the movement, announced that they were to 
sell off all their large scale units and focus their food retail trading in convenience stores and 
medium sized supermarkets.331 Similar strategic shifts were also made by other large retail 
societies, gradually realising that they were unable to compete effectively in the superstore and 
hypermarket segments. Large stores were sold off and the movement increasingly defined itself 
as a community retailer, operating strictly in the smaller segments.332 By 2001, the number of 
superstores and hypermarkets operated by the UK co-ops was the same as it had been in 1979, 
constituting 1 per cent of all co-operative food stores.333 After more than twenty years of 
superstore and hypermarket retailing, it was evident that this was a type of trading where the co-
ops had failed to compete effectively. 
The experiences of the Norwegian co-ops stand in contrast to the British development. 
In Norway, the innovative role taken by the co-operatives in introducing the hypermarket and 
superstore format was further developed and the co-op became the leading exponent of 
superstore and hypermarket retailing within the Norwegian food retail market. As we recall, after 
the Obs! hypermarket at Lade had been opened, only one new superstore opening had taken 
place in the 1970s. This was the Obs! superstore situated in Østfold. From the early 1980s 
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onwards, however, hypermarkets and superstores were strategically defined as ‘the most 
promising store type’ run by the co-operative movement and a process of rapid expansion 
began.334 Already in 1981 a third large store was opened in Oslo. And by the end of 1984 another 
three had been established.335 In the following years roughly two stores were launched each year, 
meaning that by 1990 a total of fifteen superstores and hypermarkets were in operation.336 All 
these stores traded under the Obs! brand, were established in a concerted and coordinated effort 
including both local retail societies and the national federation and were run according to similar 
operational ideals. Taken together these stores controlled 17 per cent of total turnover within the 
movement.337 
The rapid expansion into the hypermarket and superstore segments during the 1980s was 
fuelled both by a new NKL leadership keen to explore the possibilities of large scale formats and 
a booming national economy. As in the UK, the Norwegian economy was expanding rapidly 
during the early and mid- 1980s. In 1981 the Conservative Party had gained office. As part of 
their economic growth policy, strong emphasis was placed on stimulating supply by reducing 
growth in public spending, by cutting taxes for higher income households and businesses and by 
deregulating markets. The result was one of a veritable boom in bank lending and investments, 
both for private households and businesses. The co-operative movement was no exception to 
this trend, as the rapid growth in superstore and hypermarket retailing bear clear witness.  
Just as important as the favourable economic surroundings, however, was the change of 
central leadership taking place in the NKL in the early 1980s. In 1983 the former CEO of 
Trondos, Knut Værdal, had been appointed CEO of the NKL. As we recall, Trondos was the co-
operative society that had been responsible for the Lade hypermarket. The success of the Lade 
store had been substantial. Arriving at the NKL, Værdal already had first hand experience of the 
economic potential in large- scale, out of town retailing.338 He soon set out to transfer the 
Trondos recipe to the rest of the co-operative movement. In practice this implied that the retail 
societies were strongly encouraged to invest in new and large out of town stores and that the 
NKL took on a more active role in helping retail societies to develop these formats. In some 
instances this implied that a separate organisation owned jointly by the NKL and the local retail 
society was set up to establish and run the new store. In others the NKL owned the property and 
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the building in which the new store was established, while the retail society owned the actual 
store and was responsible for running it. The national association also participated by providing 
general administrative and managerial support. This model of joint action developed by the 
Norwegian co-op movement was decisive in securing the finances, facilities and administrative 
skills necessary to develop a competitive chain of co-operatively owned hypermarkets and 
superstores.  
The many new Obs! stores established during the 1980s soon made the co-operative 
movement the single, dominant player in the superstore and hypermarket segment. In 1987 the 
retail magazine Fritt Kjøpmannskap reported that of the ten largest food stores in Norway, six were 
operated by co-operative societies.339 The largest of these was the store at Lade, recording a yearly 
turnover of NOK 229 million in food only. 340 In addition, the Obs! stores in Bergen, Tune, 
Stavanger, Oslo and Fredrikstad were among the country’s ten largest retail stores.341  
During the following decade the rate of expansion slowed down somewhat. By 2001 only 
six new stores had been established. But with a total of twenty-one stores, the co-ops continued 
to be by far the country’s largest operator of superstores and hypermarkets. More than fifty per 
cent of total trade through superstores and hypermarkets was now controlled by co-operative 
retailers.342 The Obs! superstores and hypermarkets accounted for 23.5 percent of total co-
operative turnover, and close to 5 per cent of total food sales within the Norwegian market.343 
On the basis of these figures alone, there can be no doubt that Norwegian co-ops had 
successfully managed to develop and take advantage of the opportunities in superstore and 
hypermarket retailing.  
 
Conclusions 
The development of superstore and hypermarket retailing from the mid- 1960s onwards, implied 
yet another major challenge to the market position of co-operative trade. Again, the challenge 
was approached differently by the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives. In Norway, 
the development of superstore and hypermarket retailing turned out to be more or less 
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completely dominated by the co-op movement. The establishment and rise of these large retail 
formats helped to further secure the market position of co-operative trade and to sustain its 
competitiveness and overall profitability. In the UK by contrast, the development of the 
hypermarket and superstore formats became the ultimate step whereby private multiple retailers 
bypassed the co-ops as the country’s leading food retailers. During the 1970s the co-ops had 
taken a leading role in introducing the superstore and hypermarket type of trading in the British 
market, but by the mid- 1990s they were forced to sell off their large- scale trading units and 
focus their grocery business in convenience stores and medium sized supermarkets. The present 
chapter has described this divergent development and analysed how it may be explained.  
A major reason for the divergent development observed can be related to differences in 
how the co-op’s major competitors approached the prospects of large- scale retailing. In Norway, 
private retailers to only a limited extent sought to explore the potential in hypermarket and 
superstore retailing. In the UK by contrast, superstore and hypermarket development became 
‘the critical arena of competition between major food retailers’ as retail geographers Neil Wrigley 
and Michelle Lowe put it.344 The UK co-ops failed to contend with these developments. Clearly, 
the world class efficiency of retailers such as Tesco and Sainsbury’s would have been hard to 
handle for any retailer. The fact that no competitors with strengths anywhere close to that 
represented by these retailers were present in Norway is an obviously important factor in 
explaining why the Norwegian co-ops could take on such a dominant role in superstore and 
hypermarket retailing.  
Factors related to how the co-operative retail societies actually approached the challenge 
of superstore and hypermarket retailing also need to be considered of major importance. In 
Norway, the co-ops developed their large stores in a coordinated effort, comprising both local 
retail societies and the national association and agreeing on a common brand and mode of 
operation. From the very beginning, Obs! was launched as the co-operative large- scale brand. 
Even if the two first large- scale stores were established by two different retail societies in two 
very different parts of the country, they operated their stores according to a similar formula and 
under a similar brand. During the process of further expansion, cooperation between the local 
retail societies and the NKL was widespread. Truly, many of the stores established during the 
1980s ran into profitability problems. But as the stores were planned and operated in concert 
between the retail societies and the NKL, viable problem solving was readily available and the 
long- term competitiveness of the stores could more easily be restored. And at the turn of the 
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millennium the co-op movement still controlled the majority of superstore and hypermarket 
trade within the Norwegian market. 
In the UK by contrast, the development of co-operative superstores and hypermarkets 
was characterised by a fundamental lack of national cooperation. The movement did manage to 
open some of the first and largest hypermarkets in the country, but as in the previous case of 
self-service and supermarket trading, major problems soon arose in the actual running of the 
stores. Stores were established and run on principles decided singularly by each responsible 
society. Well-functioning structures of managerial, financial and operational support comprising 
local retail societies and national federations were also generally wanting. The consequence was 
overall that the established stores failed to live up to their full potential. In many cases, they 
instead drained the responsible societies of capital and thus added to the decline experienced by 
the movement since the late 1950s. 
A major consequence of the UK co-op’s failure to compete in the superstore and 
hypermarket segment, was that the large majority of the retail societies decided to focus their 
trade in smaller convenience stores and medium sized supermarkets. The operational rationale 
was to concentrate trade in one distinct market niche and thus to create a more coherent and 
unified image of co-operative trade. The Norwegian movement by contrast, being more 
successful in hypermarket retailing, as well as in other segments such as supermarkets and soft 
discount stores, came to rely on a diversified strategy, operating everything from small stores in 
rural districts, to city centre supermarkets and out of town hypermarkets. Hence, while the UK 
co-ops decided to focus on being the best in one market segment, Norwegian co-ops continued 
to compete in many different segments. 
These development patterns reflected a broader process of transformation occurring 
within the food retail industry in the last quarter of the 20th century. The dominant food retailers, 
from being solely focused on developing larger and larger stores, started to turn their attention 
towards other segments of the market. Gradually, these retailers sought to operate a multitude of 
different formats, and they capitalised not only on the advantages of scale, but also on the 
advantages of being present in many different markets. This development and how it was 
approached by the co-operative movement in the UK and Norway will be explored in full in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter 5: The coming of the multi-format retailer 
 
 
By the turn of the millennium, food retailing in Norway and the UK looked very different from 
how it had looked fifty years earlier. The number of stores had been dramatically reduced, while 
their average size had been drastically enhanced. The independent store, owned and run by 
individual shopkeepers single-handedly, had been replaced by stores owned and run by large 
national retail chains. These chains controlled a substantial number of stores spread across the 
country in which they operated. The different stores were run according to standardised 
operational procedures and marketed under similar, national brands. As such, the food retail 
market had moved from being fragmented and heterogenic to becoming standardised and 
structured around a similar pattern of strategies and operational ideals.  
In store development specifically, the order of the day throughout the post-war period 
had been to increase the average floor space in order to exploit the economies of scale in selling. 
After self-service had been introduced and accepted, the possibilities of scale in selling had first 
been exploited through the introduction of the supermarket. The next step was the introduction 
of the edge of town and out of town superstores and hypermarkets. The main competitive 
attractions of such large stores were the convenience of one stop shopping and the ability to 
offer substantial price reductions. In the UK, major retailers such as Tesco and Sainsbury’s 
transferred the majority of their trade to the superstore and hypermarket format. In Norway, a 
similar if less marked pattern occurred. The superstore and hypermarket formats gained a much 
smaller share of the market than in the UK. But Norwegian retailers also exploited the 
advantages of scale in selling and the average size of food stores grew continuously throughout 
the post-war period.345 
The one-sided focus on scale in selling was, however, gradually to be supplemented with a 
stronger focus on market related factors. Already from the 1980s onwards retailers across 
Western Europe had started to reassess their view of the food market. Traditionally, the food 
retail market had been treated as a single, coherent market. This view was now about to change. 
Increasingly the view was held that consumers could no longer be treated as a singular group 
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holding similar attitudes and expectations towards the food retailers. Rather, they had to be 
treated as belonging to different market segments. Some consumers preferred low prices, others 
were more concerned with the quality of the products sold, yet others were attracted by 
convenience. In order to secure further influx of trade it was deemed necessary to develop store 
formats specifically adapted to these different types of consumers. Retailers simply needed to rely 
less on basic structural features such as their market power or their ability to realise economies of 
scale and become more market-oriented.346 In particular, stores needed to be adapted to the 
characteristics of the different consumer segments for which they sought to cater. A major 
question for food retailers approaching the 1980s and 1990s was thus what kind of strategies 
were best suited to handle these transformations.  
Simply put, two different strategic approaches were followed. Some retailers preferred 
differentiation. This implied that they focused their trade in one distinct segment, and turned all 
their energies towards developing first hand knowledge of this particular segment. Other retailers 
chose a strategy of diversification. This implied that they sought to cater for all or a variety of 
segments and developed stores of varying size, location and operational principles.347 Both in the 
UK and in Norway, this was the strategy ultimately chosen by the largest and most dominant 
retailers. Hence, from the mid- 1990s onwards, major British retailers such as Tesco and 
Sainsbury’s began a strategy of diversification, opening outlets ranging from petrol station 
forecourt shops and city centre stores to large hypermarkets of 80, 000 square feet or more. In 
Norway, three of the four major retail groups came to rely on a diversified structure of stores 
destined to serve different segments of the market.348 Hence, from a situation were the dominant 
retailers simply sought to focus their operations in larger and larger stores, towards the end of the 
twentieth century they increasingly came to rely on a so-called multi-format strategy. This process 
of retail diversification represented a final step in the post-war transformations of the dominant 
operational practices of the food retail industry. It also represented yet another challenge to how 
the co-operative societies operated their food retail stores.   
Again, the co-operative movements of UK and Norway approached this challenge 
differently. As indicated in the previous chapter, the British co-operatives from the mid- 1990s 
onwards increasingly defined themselves as community retailers focusing their food trade 
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exclusively in convenience stores and medium- sized supermarkets.349 So, rather than 
diversification, the strategy chosen by their major competitors, the co-ops sought differentiation 
in one distinct segment. As formulated by retail analyst and co-operative commentator Leigh 
Sparks, they decided to leave ‘a big market to other players and focus[ing] … on a smaller market 
segment through a particular format.’350 While the overall strategic rationale was to increase the 
profitability and competitiveness of the retail societies, the strategy unavoidably caused further 
loss of market share. And as the major competitors gradually started to move into the 
convenience segment, the competitiveness of the co-ops within this segment was also drastically 
challenged. Hence, the trend of declining market share and weakened competitiveness 
characteristic of British co-operative trade since the mid- 1950s continued. The Norwegian story 
was different. In Norway, the co-operative societies pioneered the principles of multi-format 
retailing. In the mid- 1980s, the Norwegian Co-operative Association (NKL) outlined a process 
whereby co-operative stores were to be reorganised into specified formats, targeting different 
consumer segments. By the mid- 1990s four distinct formats had been developed. These ranged 
from small, community stores, and inner city discount stores and supermarkets, to edge of town 
and out of town superstores and hypermarkets. By the turn of the millennium, three of these four 
formats were market leaders in their specific segment. The ultimate result of this development 
was that the overall market position of co-operative trade had been further secured.  
The following chapter will analyse this divergent development in more detail. It 
specifically explores why the UK co-ops ultimately chose a strategy of differentiation while the 
Norwegian movement chose a strategy of diversification into different segments. It also discusses 
how these different strategic choices may have worked to further reinforce the divergent 
economic development of the two movements.  
 
The small store problem and the development of the convenience format in the UK co-
ops  
By the beginning of the 1980s the UK co-operative movement operated a total of 6,000 food 
stores. Of these 43 were superstores or hypermarkets and 1,765 were supermarkets. In addition, 
the movement operated more than 4,000 smaller specialist food stores, including grocery self-
                                                 
349 See chapter four in the present thesis. 
350 L. Sparks, ‘Being the best? Co-operative retailing and corporate competitors’, Journal of Co-operative Studies, 35:1 
(2002), 19. 
  
 118
service stores, butcheries and greengrocers.351 The stores were owned and operated independently 
by individual retail societies. They traded under numerous different names and according to a 
diverse set of operational principles. 
This operational structure caused two major worries within the movement. The first 
concerned the continued reliance on the small store. The second was related to the dispersed 
character of the many co-operative stores, operating as they were in many different markets and 
under numerous different trading identities. These two worries came to shape how the co-
operative movement in Britain reacted to the increasing focus on segmentation and market-
orientation within the food retailing industry in the 1980s and 1990s and specifically how they 
approached the development of multi-format retailing.  
While co-operative societies had made important inroads into superstore and 
hypermarket retailing in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement remained primarily in the small 
store business. This was the case even though the movement had closed down more than 17,000 
stores since the end of the 1960s. 352 Between 1968 and 1982 on average more than four shops 
had been closed down every week day, with the result that three out of every four food stores 
closed.353 Despite this drastic reduction in the number of stores, by the beginning of the 1980s 
the movement continued to rely primarily on small stores. In 1982, 75 per cent of co-operative 
food stores were in this category. That is, they were smaller than a regular supermarket.354 Their 
main competitor Asda by comparison operated 82 outlets at this point, of which none were small 
stores. Another major competitor, Tesco, had transferred 70 per cent of their stores into the 
larger formats. As for Sainsbury’s, of the 253 stores operated, almost 90 per cent were large 
supermarkets trading at an average selling space of 17,000 square feet. 355  
The main problem with the co-op movement’s continued reliance on the smaller formats 
was simply that these stores were outperformed by the larger stores. The smaller stores traded at 
much higher relative costs and they were unable to offer competitive prices. They were also 
unable to offer the convenience of one stop shopping. As the consumers increasingly preferred 
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to shop in larger stores, the smaller units lost market share. Ultimately, the level of trade 
necessary to sustain a profitable business was no longer obtainable.  
Traditionally, the problem of the small store had been solved simply by closing it down 
and trying to transfer the remaining trade to a larger unit. As already seen, the co-ops had closed 
down a substantial number of small stores from the late 1960s onwards. But this strategy of 
closing down the smaller stores was not a viable option in the long run, especially when the trade 
was not sufficiently replaced in a larger, more efficient store catering for the same market. As had 
been noted by Co-operative Retail Services (CRS) director David Hutton in a 1978 article in the 
Co-operative Review: ‘Just to close down small shops without replacing them with a larger 
floorspace in more efficient units is the way to disaster’.356 Hence, there was an acute need to find 
an alternative strategy capable of reinvigorating the trading performance of the small co-operative 
stores.  
In the spring of 1984 a separate research unit was established within the Co-operative 
Wholesale Society’s (CWS) retail planning group to investigate the ‘small store problem’.357 The 
formation of the unit was based on a CWS board decision to investigate the so-called 
convenience store concept as ‘a possible opportunity for profitably extending the life of certain 
small Co-op stores’.358 The convenience store was a store format proving to be increasingly 
popular in the British market. It traded on a selling space of about one thousand to three 
thousand square feet. It was located in areas with a large residential population and high rate of 
traffic flow, operating on extended opening hours with a wide (but shallow) stock range of high 
quality products. The objective of the CWS group was to investigate the possibilities of 
introducing the convenience format within a co-operative context. As a pilot project, the group 
set up four trial stores in the cities of Manchester and London, named Late Late Supershops. 
After only one year of trading the stores had on average almost doubled their sales.359 The 
conclusion of the group was clear, the transfer of trade to ‘the particular type of grocery-based 
convenience store developed for this project can produce a considerable increase in trade.’360  
The CWS project clearly indicated that the convenience format held substantial economic 
potential. This was, however, not something entirely new to British co-operators. Already in 1968 
the possible viability of the format had been reported in an article in the Co-operative Review. 
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Referring to the recent success of such stores in the US, as well as ‘some recent market research’, 
the author Frank Rogers noted that ‘not all housewives want to shop in supermarkets with their 
big displays, bright lights and chromium plate. They do not even always want to save a copper or 
two here and there. What they want, more often than not, is a convenient supply point for 
popular necessities. Somewhere they can pop out for a few minutes rather than for a few 
hours.’361 On these grounds Rogers suggested that there had to be a ‘great opportunity for the 
Co-op in the smaller, more intimate local shops’. A similar attempt to spur co-operative interest 
in convenience retailing was made ten years later when the CRS national food manager, D. 
Abbotts, in article in the Co-operative Marketing and Management suggested that convenience stores 
might be the answer to the pressing need for revitalising the small shop sector.362 According to 
Abbots it was impossible for the smaller stores to compete on the price and stock range of the 
larger units. Therefore, they had to be ‘re-vamped and given a new image to meet effectively the 
other factor rated very highly by the housewife – convenience’.363 In 1982, on similar lines, 
Gordon Harrington, the marketing manager in the CWS food marketing group, had suggested 
that convenience retailing was ‘another area that must be increasingly explored’ if the small stores 
of the movement were to have a viable future.364  
But not much had come out of these assertions. Gradually, however, and as the practise 
of just closing down the smaller stores was increasingly questioned, the possibility of transferring 
small store trade to the convenience format increasingly resonated in the movement. The work of 
the CWS retail planning group was only one indication that the interest in convenience retailing 
was about to take off within the movement. Parallel attempts had also been made by existing 
retail societies. Already in 1982 the Cumbrian Society had experimented with the convenience 
format, re-launching an existing small store under the 8 till 8 banner. The store opened longer 
hours than usual and traded a wider stock range. The overall result was a considerable increase in 
sales.365 The United Co-operative Society, operating in the North West of England, had by 1986 
transferred 30 shops into their new conveniences concept named Late Shop. 366 Plans had also 
been made for the conversion of another 130 neighbourhood stores into the convenience format. 
Similarly the large Leicestershire Society had in the same period converted several stores to a 
convenience format named All Hours. In both societies, the general experience was increased 
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turnover. In United, the stores on average saw a turnover increase of 50 per cent. In the 
Leicestershire society the increase was a little less spectacular. Still, the first six stores opened 
experienced an average rise in turnover of 26 per cent.  
The experience of the CWS pilot project, as well as the positive results of the conversions 
made by independent retail societies, was evidence that the convenience format might serve as a 
possible solution to the co-operative small store problem. Overall developments in the industry 
also indicated that the future for the small store was perhaps not so bleak. The general pace of 
decline in the small store segment had in fact been reduced in the early 1980s and in 1984 sales 
through small grocers increased marginally.367 Specialised, small-scale retail groups such as Spar, 
Mace, Seven Eleven and Circle K were also about to become firmly established within the UK 
market. According to Johnston Birchall, who had investigated the prospects of small shop 
retailing within the co-op movement on behalf of the Society for Co-operative Studies, there 
were several indications that a specific market for small, conveniently located stores was about to 
develop alongside and complementary to the large scale units. 368 On these grounds, he concluded 
that the convenience segment was an untapped opportunity for solving the small store problem 
and revitalising co-operative retailing. As he put it: ‘the concept of the convenience store gives 
hope of a real revival in small shop retailing, which could ensure the pursuit of both business and 
social goals at the same time.’369 The remaining question was, however, whether the co-ops, still 
with over 3,000 small shops, would be able to ‘take advantage of the new trend, or simply 
provide more closed shops for the competition to re-open.’370  
In the years immediately following the report from Birchall, the transfer of trade to 
convenience retailing continued to proceed. By 1987, twelve retail societies were reported to have 
significant involvement in the convenience segment.371 It was estimated that, altogether, these 
societies operated an approximate of 846 convenience stores. This represented no less than 20 
per cent of the total number of food stores operated by the co-operative movement.372 Two years 
later the general report on the performance of the consumer co-operative movement, presented 
in the Yearbook of Co-operative Enterprise, noted how substantial investments had been made in the 
convenience segment and that ‘the movement’s desire to continue to serve those who perhaps 
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have neither the mobility nor the financial ability to make weekly or even monthly shopping’ had 
led to a ‘revitalisation of older smaller shops into brighter more cheerful units.’373 Overall trading 
figures also indicated that the ongoing attempts to revitalise the smaller units had indeed made 
some positive impact on the economic development of the movement. In the latter half of the 
1980s, market shares stabilised and by 1990 the profitability of the movement as a whole reached 
its minimum target of 2.5 per sent of sales.374 Reporting on these figures in a 1990 edition of the 
Journal of Co-operative Studies, A. L Cook suggested that the stabilisation of market shares was 
‘probably due to the rapid shift to “Late-Late” type trading, coupled with some investment in 
superstores’.375  
The convenience format had thus proven to be a possible solution for solving the 
challenges of the small store. Several societies had transferred parts of their grocery trade to the 
new format, and they had experienced very positive trading results. But, despite its immediate 
success, convenience retailing remained only one out of many types of food retailing operated by 
the co-ops. Indeed, an analysis of the movement’s overall store pattern in terms of square feet 
showed that in the period from 1980 to 1991, the small store’s share of total floor space was in 
fact further reduced, from 63 to 45 per cent. In 1989 alone only one out of twenty-five new 
openings was less than 2,000 square feet. In the same year six superstores exceeding 25,000 
square feet were opened. 376 It is also evident that the venture into convenience retailing remained 
fairly uncoordinated. In 1987 co-operative convenience stores were run under no less than nine 
different names, such as Late Shops, The Late Late Supershop, Stop and Shop, Early Til Late, 
Eight Til Eight, All Hours, Vista and Open Later Savers.377 As such, while the development of 
convenience retailing had given some hope that the small store problem could be solved, the 
uncoordinated approach taken when introducing the format had rather worked to reinforce the 
second major worry of the movement, namely that of its dispersed and fragmented character.  
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Towards a strategy of differentiation in the British co-operative movement 
 Co-operative commentators, leading co-operative managers and elected officials had long been 
complaining that the trading structure of the co-operative movement as a whole was too 
fragmented. For example, in a forceful presidential address to the 1984 Co-operative Congress, 
Gladys Bunn had complained that the movement was in total lack of ‘a national development 
strategy’.378 Instead, most stores had been developed ‘on an individual hit and miss basis’, where 
‘each society has had to learn for itself’, causing the creation of ‘a ridiculous variety of trading 
identities.’ Indeed, as we recall from the previous chapter, in the hypermarket and superstore 
segment, brands ranged from Rainbow, Leo, Normid, Domus, Beehive and Five Ways to 
Shopping Giant, Scotmid and Co-op Plus. And as we have just seen, in the convenience segment 
the picture was already becoming identical. Fragmentation of profile and branding was also the 
case in the other major segments where the co-ops traded. Further fragmentation was caused by 
the fact that the movement continued to operate in many different segments of the food retail 
market. While running the large majority of small corner shops in the country, the co-ops were 
also present in the supermarket, hypermarket and superstore segments. Repeated suggestions 
were made that the co-ops needed to focus their trading activities and ’identify a market niche in 
which, within their limits, they can operate.’379  
The fragmented character of co-operative trade was thus related both to the inclination of 
the retail societies to operate in many different segments of the market and the fact that co-
operative stores were run independently by each individual society and subsequently also under 
numerous trading identities. The experiments with the convenience format in the 1980s had not 
solved these problems. Rather, as the following figure illustrates, it had added to the tendency for 
the co-operative food trades to be spread across numerous different trading formats.  
 
                                                 
378 Co-operative Union, Annual report and financial statements, Congress proceedings. The 115th Annual Congress of the Co-
operative Union Ltd. held in the Opera House, Blackpool, from May 27 to 29, 1984 (Manchester: Co-operative Union, 1984), 
p. 55. 
379 T. E. Stephenson, ‘A future for Consumer Co-operation in Britain? Co-operative retailing – what next?’, The 
Society for Co-operative Studies, 46 (1982), 20-8. 
  
 124
Figure 5.1: Different stores formats’ share of total food trade, UK consumer co-operatives 
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By the late 1980s, increasing attention was on the need to seriously deal with this problem. The 
question was how. From the outset, most of the leading co-operative commentators and officials 
participating in the debate argued that the only realistic option for the co-op was to focus its food 
trade in one or a few segments. A persevering advocate of such a view was management lecturer 
and co-operative consultant Ted Stephenson. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s Stephenson 
repeatedly argued the need for the co-ops to ‘do what they’re best at’, identify a ‘target customer’ 
and ‘determine its priorities’.381 According to Stephenson it was futile to continue trying to fight 
the major retailers on their own ground. The movement needed to use its resources to be best in 
a chosen field.382 To fight the tendencies of fragmentation the movement simply needed to make 
a choice about which markets it should operate in. On similar lines, co-operative analyst 
Desmond Hopwood noted how ‘the gradual decline in co-operative grocery market share may 
continue because so many societies …tend to compete in too many distinct markets relative to 
their size: large out-of-town superstores, traditional high Street supermarkets, neighbourhood 
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supermarkets, and still also operate many small corner-shop type premises'.383 The point made by 
Hopwood was essentially that the diversified structure of stores operated by the movement was a 
major reason for the movement’s continuous decline. Rather than being the best in one or a few 
segments, the movement had ended up being mediocre players in all segments. Similar to 
Stephenson the underlying message was therefore that the movement needed to focus its trading 
activities. 
The warnings of Hopwood and others were gradually resonated in the movement. Hence, 
in the autumn of 1996 the United Northwest Society announced that they were obliged to focus 
more trade in their ‘Late Shop’ convenience chain and that there were ‘certainly no new plans to 
build any more superstores’.384 A few weeks later, the Co-operative News also reported on how the 
Portsea Island society had sold its Havant hypermarket to Asda, reasoning that the store was ‘no 
longer a central part of … [the society’s] plans for the future’.385 Indeed, following a ‘full and 
thorough strategic review’ the society, as the CEO of the society Graham Bonnets stated to the 
News, had defined their ‘strength and strategy for the future as being our presence at the 
community level.’ Then, in 1997 the largest retail society of the movement, the CWS, announced 
that, after a ‘major strategic review’, they had decided to abandon the superstore and hypermarket 
segment all together and ‘identified [their] particular strengths as being in conveniences stores 
and supermarkets.’386 The decision marked the ultimate step whereby the large majority of the 
movement were to embark on a major strategic reorientation, focusing more exclusively on the 
smaller store formats.  
In the following few years, most retail societies were to follow the examples of United, 
Portsea and the CWS. Large supermarkets, superstores and hypermarkets were sold off and trade 
was focused in the smaller segments. A few more examples may illustrate the point. In the 
autumn of 1999 the Scottish Lothian, Borders and Angus Co-operative Society exchanged its 
superstore in Galashiels for three Tesco supermarkets situated in Kirriemuir, Carnoustie and 
Dunbarwas.387 At the same time the society announced that they saw their main trading platform 
in ‘regional town centre locations from smaller premises.’388 A few months later it was announced 
that the West Midlands Co-operative Society had sold their superstore in Rookery Street, 
Wednesfield to Sainsbury’s. The transaction marked, as CEO of the society Ben Reid told the 
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News, ‘the final phase in our move away from superstores.’389 Similarly, the Ipswich and Norwich 
Co-operative Society sold their 78,000 square feet hypermarket in Sproughton Road, Ipswich to 
Wm. Morrison Supermarkets. The sale was, in the words of CEO William Brown, destined to 
enable the society ‘to concentrate on our core business of community food stores in local 
centres.’390 A little more than a year later, the Plymouth and South West Co-operative Society 
similarly announced that it had taken the final step in its move away from large store trading as it 
had sold the last remaining Plymco superstore to Tesco. Again, the announcement of the CEO 
underlined how the sale was the result of a thorough strategic review destined to provide the 
society with a more coherent trading profile: ‘Our food retail strategy is based on community 
retailing through smaller convenience stores and this sale will enable us to concentrate on that 
key objective’.391  
The tendency was clear, after having attempted to operate in all the major segments of 
the market, the British co-operative movement from the mid- 1990s onwards departed on a 
strategy of differentiation. The movement had defined convenience and medium sized 
supermarkets as their core market and more and more societies focused their food trade within 
this segment. Indeed, some societies even expanded their share of the convenience trade by 
acquiring existing, private chains. Hence, in 1997 the United Co-operative Society bought the 
entire Hanburys chain consisting of 31 convenience stores. 18 months later it was announced 
that the society had also acquired the family owned Nevins chain based in St. Helens, Merseyside. 
Altogether, in the two year period from 1996 to 1998 the society bought a total of 70 
convenience stores.392 On similar lines, the Co-operative Group – a merger between the CWS 
and the Co-operative Retail Services (CRS) – in 2002 acquired all the 630 stores operated by the 
Alldays chain.393 The acquisition turned the newly formed retail society into the largest operator 
of convenience stores in the country. 394  
By 2002 the consumer co-operative movement in the UK had more or less completely 
moved out of large- scale retailing. As figure 5.2 illustrates, superstores now accounted for less 
than 1 per cent of all stores in the movement, while more than 50 per cent of the stores operated 
were in the convenience segment. The remaining 49 per cent were supermarkets.  
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Figure 5.2: Different stores formats’ share of total food trade, UK consumer co-operatives 
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The actual effect of this development was that the movement had successfully managed to focus 
its food trading activities in fewer segments. Small stores had been closed down or transferred to 
the convenience format while the large stores had been sold off, most of them to competitors. As 
such, the strategy of differentiation had been successfully implemented. The remaining question 
was, however, whether this strategic move could restore the profitability of the movement and 
break off the trend of market decline that had hampered co-operative food retailing since the 
1950s.  
The initial impression was clearly positive. In the period from 1997 to 2002 overall 
profitability within the movement as estimated by trading profit in per cent of turnover rose from 
1.9 to 2.8.396 While this still remained below those of the major competitors, it at least indicated 
that at a positive trend had been induced. The positive experiences in convenience retailing also 
seem to have given a boost to co-operative morale and provided the movement’s representatives 
with a new sense of purpose. In 2002 The Co-operative Group was voted multiple retailer of the 
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year at the British Retail Industry Awards, according to the Co-operative News the ‘highest accolade’ 
available in the industry.397  
At the same time, by deciding to leave the dominant superstore and hypermarket formats 
to other players, the movement could not prevent the trend of declining market shares from 
continuing. Indeed, the period between 1995 and 2002 alone saw a reduction of another 20 per 
cent, from a 7.2 to a 5.8 share.398 More problematic, however, was that the competitiveness of the 
co-op in the convenience segment was soon challenged by the large multiples. The strategy of 
focusing all co-operative food trade in the smaller segments had been initiated exactly at a time 
when competing retailers started to abandon their one-sided reliance on large stores and diversify 
their operations into several different market segments. The major objective of this 
diversification strategy was to better cater for a larger proportion of the total market. Already in 
1992 Tesco had opened its first Tesco Metro store in Covent Garden, London, and gradually a 
separate, national chain of convenience stores located in the high street was developed. On 
similar lines, the smaller Tesco Express format was launched in 1994.399 The rationale behind 
both these developments was, as stated by the 1995 Tesco Annual report, ‘to suit the varied 
shopping patterns of our customers.’400 By 1999 Tesco operated six different formats, from large 
Tesco Extra stores at an average 80,600 square feet sales area, to the small Express format 
averaging 2,000 square feet of selling area.401 In a similar fashion, Sainsbury’s in 1999 launched its 
‘Local’ chain of convenience stores, while Marks and Spencer in 2001 launched its ‘Simply Food’ 
chain. Both retailers were determined to explore the potential of a multi-format strategy, 
developing their smaller convenience stores alongside the existing stores already in operation.402 
Thus, while the 1980s had seen a ‘store war’, where retailers raced to obtain the best available 
sites for out of town development, the late 1990s saw the coming of a ‘format war …with most 
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of the multiples copying (and buying up) the new convenience stores by going back to (albeit 
now much more fashionable) high street premises aimed at young single metro-livers’.403 
The format war, and especially the move into convenience retailing by multiple retailers, 
put further pressure on co-operative trade. While the co-ops had decided to focus their 
operations in one segment, the multiples soon proved able to capitalise on the advantage of being 
present in many markets. By operating the smaller units within an integrated retail organisation 
also running numerous large- scale operations, substantial gains could be made for these retailers. 
Most importantly, the buying power and subsequent price reductions created by the large- scale 
operations could also be transferred to the smaller units, vastly enhancing the efficiency potential 
of these stores. In the long term, a major question thus remains about whether the British co-ops 
will manage to run their medium sized convenience stores as efficiently as the large multiples, 
without having the same possibilities of scale in buying which comes from the parallel running of 
large hypermarkets. Returning to the development of the Norwegian co-operative movement, it 
will soon be recognised that it was exactly this possibility that was exploited as the movement 
from the mid- 1980s onwards faced the challenges of segmentation and market orientation.  
 
Developing a co-operative multi-format structure: the Norwegian development  
At the NKL congress in 1980 a feeling of insecurity was clearly evident among the delegates. In 
his opening talk, the chairman Peder Søiland concluded that ‘we live in a period with substantial 
political instability and realistically speaking the movement is in a dangerous situation.’404 The 
economic development in the three year period preceding the congress had not been satisfactory 
and, ‘dramatic shifts in the economic climate both at home and abroad’ were challenging the 
position of both the NKL and the local retail societies. 405  
The diagnosis presented by the chairman was largely to the point. The early years of the 
1980s were marked by substantial changes in Norwegian and international economy and society. 
Most importantly, however, it turned out to be the starting point of drastic structural 
transformations within the Norwegian food retail industry. While concentration was already 
substantial at the wholesale level, at the retail level, fragmentation and dominance of independent 
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units had prevailed throughout the post-war years. Apart from the co-ops, there were no national 
retail units operating stores under similar brands and according to similar operational procedures. 
Indeed, in some cities a few horizontal chains had been established.406 And the Association of 
Norwegian Grocers (NKLF) had launched a nationwide ‘chain’ through the establishment of 
what they called the “K” campaign.407 The campaign comprised a large majority of independent 
retailers. It was based on cooperation on such issues as store branding and marketing. But the 
campaign was set up under a slogan of independence. The individual stores continued to be run 
according to the superior authority of the store owner, most of the stores were of a limited size 
and they did not target a specific segment of the market. 
By the coming of the 1980s, this situation was about to change. Gradually, privately 
owned chains with national ambitions and with stores targeting distinct segments of the market 
were making their presence felt. Competition was strengthening. And while the overall structure 
of the co-operative shops were still giving them a leading position within the Norwegian market, 
the changes were soon affecting the economic results of the movement. From a historical record 
of 26 per cent in 1976, by 1984 market share was down to 23 per cent. Within the NKL, both 
sales revenues and operating profits stagnated. And within the retail societies, average profits 
were reduced to a negligible 0.9 per cent of total turnover in 1984. Within the same period, the 
number of local co-operatives running into deficits more than doubled, from 88 in 1976 to 193 in 
1984. This implied that almost one third of all retail societies were in fact running at a loss.408  
Based on these developments it may be concluded that the major worries confronting 
Norwegian co-operators at the beginning of the 1980s were both similar and dissimilar from the 
ones experienced by the UK co-operators. Throughout the entire post-war period the Norwegian 
co-operatives had managed to hold a leading position in the transfer of trade to larger units.409 By 
1982, while the co-ops controlled 25 per cent of the market, they controlled only 19 per cent of 
the stores. Hence, in contrast to the British experience, Norwegian co-operative stores were still 
trading a larger average turnover than the privately owned stores. The Norwegian co-ops also 
held a much stronger market position than their British counterparts.410 At the same time, by the 
early 1980s Norwegian co-operators were also starting to feel the competitive pressure from a 
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Vatnaland, Stability and change in the organization of industry. The chain store innovation and the transformation of American 
retailing in a comparative perspective (PhD dissertation, University of Oslo, 2007), p. 205. 
408 Figures taken from K4, 7A.4, Document presented at the NKL administration meeting, ‘Driftsmessig/økonomisk 
utvikling i S-lagene. 10 års oversikt.’ 15 January 1987; NKL, Annual Report, selected years and Coop NKL, Våre tall 
1907-2005 (Statistics compiled by Tore Kristoffersen, Coop NKL, 2006) 
409 See chapters two, three and four in the present thesis. 
410 Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Strategiplan for S-lagene og NKL 1985-1994, del 2.1.1.0 (Oslo: Norges 
Kooperative Landsforening, 1985), p. 5. 
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rapidly advancing private retail industry. Most importantly, market share was in decline and 
profitability was drastically weakened. Another similar feature was related to the structure and 
profile of the stores operated by the two movements. As in the UK, the large majority of 
Norwegian co-operative stores were operated under a general co-operative brand.411 But, 
generally, and again similar to the situation in Britain, the stores did not trade in line with any 
national standard and they operated independently of each other in terms of assortment and 
overall profile. Co-operative stores were operated under a variety of different names, and they did 
not target any specific segments of the market. Even if the severity of the situation was much 
more dramatic in the UK than in Norway, both movements were indeed experiencing economic 
challenges in the form of strengthened competition. And within both the British and Norwegian 
co-operative movements worries were increasing as to the competitiveness of a shop structure 
bearing clear signs of fragmentation and not clearly targeted towards specific segments of 
consumers.  
The solution chosen to confront these partly shared challenges turned out, however, to 
be very different. While the UK co-ops had chosen to focus their trade in one distinct segment – 
convenience – the Norwegian co-ops decided on a multi-format strategy, diversifying their stores 
in four different segments. Four distinct national store brands were developed and all co-
operative food stores were organised within the framework of these chains. As such, the 
Norwegian co-operators developed a similar structure to that of the dominant British multiples 
The development towards this co-operative, multi-format structure proceeded through 
three distinct phases of change. The first step was taken in the 1980s. While the major concern in 
the UK co-operative movement throughout this decade had been how to deal with the continued 
reliance on the small store, the Norwegian movement was specifically concerned with how to 
deal with its indistinct profile. When the recently appointed CEO of the NKL, Knut Værdal, 
took to the podium at the 1983 NKL Congress in Oslo, one of his key messages was that the 
movement needed to ‘develop a better profile’.412 Specifically, he pointed to the importance of 
developing stores targeting different segments of consumers, because, as he stated it, ‘the average 
consumer does not exist.’413 On the grounds of Værdal's strategic assertions, in the following 
years the NKL systematically sought to convince the retail societies of the need to coordinate a 
                                                 
411 In Norway this common brand was an orange S, denoting the first letter of the Norwegian word ‘samvirkelag’, 
the Norwegian word for ‘co-operative society’. 
412 Norges Kooperative Landsforening, NKLs 36. kongress Oslo, 30-9.-2.10.1983, stenografisk referat fra 
kongressforhandlingene (Oslo: Norges Kooperative Landsforening, 1983), p. 90. 
413 Norges Kooperative Landsforening, NKLs 36. kongress Oslo, 30-9.-2.10.1983, stenografisk referat fra 
kongressforhandlingene (Oslo: Norges Kooperative Landsforening, 1983), p. 89. 
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joint transfer of their existing food trade into a selected group of more distinct formats.414 All the 
major segments of the market should be covered and the different formats should be developed 
on a national scale. That is, they should hold similar names and operate on similar operational 
procedures across society structures. The basic goal, as Værdal had put it at the 1983 Oslo 
Congress, was to make sure that when consumers ‘walk around in the city of Oslo and look at a 
store, and then when they hear the same name when they visit Trondheim or Finmark/Troms, 
they … find the same store.’415  
The first step towards the realisation of this strategy had been taken already in 1982 when 
the co-op movement launched its Prix discount stores.416 The first stores were opened in 
Trondheim, Ålesund, Bodø, Sandefjord and Eidsvoll. They were all owned and operated by the 
local retail society, but they traded under a distinct, yellow profile and according to clearly 
specified operational procedures. Despite the reduced leverage provided to the local societies in 
the operation of the Prix store, several societies showed keen interest in the new concept. By the 
end of 1983 the movement operated twenty-seven Prix stores altogether. As such, it had become 
the largest chain of discount stores in the country estimated by the number of stores operated.  
On similar lines, from the mid- 1980s the movement developed a separate chain of 
supermarkets named Mega. The first store was opened in 1987, under the ownership of 
Haugesund og Omland Co-operative Society. By 1989 thirteen stores had been converted to the 
new profile. Again, both the brand, the visual profile and the main operational characteristics of 
the new store type were developed by the NKL in a coordinated effort with the retail societies, 
while the stores continued to be owned and operated locally. A similar approach was taken in the 
development of the Obs! superstores and hypermarkets. As we recall from the previous chapter, 
the Obs! chain expanded substantially during the 1980s and by the end of the decade a total of 
fifteen stores were in operation.417  
By 1990 a total of 152 stores, or roughly 12 per cent of all co-operative stores were 
operated under one of the new, national store brands developed during the 1980s. Apart from 
the fifteen Obs! stores, 118 stores traded under the Prix logo while another 19 stores traded 
under the Mega brand. Taken together, these stores controlled 28 per cent of total trade in the 
                                                 
414 Interview, Knut Værdal, 16 December 2002 
.415 Norges Kooperative Landsforening, NKLs 36. kongress Oslo, 30-9.-2.10.1983, stenografisk referat fra 
kongressforhandlingene (Oslo: Norges Kooperative Landsforening, 1983), p. 90. 
416 This and the following paragraph are largely based on E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. 
Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. Forbrukesamvirkets historie i Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006), p. 432-8 and 442-6. 
417 See chapter four in the present thesis.  
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movement.418 The development testifies to the obligation of the Norwegian co-operators to 
develop a multi-format approach to retailing and to operate stores in all the major segments of 
the market. It also illustrates the commitment of the movement to transfer its fragmented 
structure of stores into a more coherent structure, developing the same store profiles on a 
national scale and across society structures. Still, while the NKL had shown foresight and vision 
in pushing forwards these developments, lack of coordination continued to hamper the economic 
development of the new stores. While the store profiles had similar names and were established 
according to similar operational ideals, major operational functions were not coordinated. The 
stores operated very independently, the retail societies continued to hold the major responsibility 
for buying, and the development of a common assortment and national marketing remained 
limited. Hence, while the idea and practice of a segmented, multi-format strategy had been 
appreciated, its full economic potential had not been realised.  
The second step towards this goal was, however, soon to be taken. In 1989 Værdal had 
been replaced by Rolf Rønning as CEO of the NKL. While Rønning was in favour of the 
strategy of segmentation advocated by Værdal in the 1980s, he was very critical of how the 
different food profiles had been operated in practice. According to Rønning, if the movement 
was to take full advantage of its segmented structure, major organisational reforms had to be 
implemented.419 Thus, in the following years a specific focus was set on improving the 
relationship between the NKL as a wholesaler and the retail stores operated by the local retail 
societies. Gradually an encompassing structure of buying and merchandising comprising all the 
different store types was developed and the different store profiles were reorganised into fully 
integrated, standardised and centralised chain stores. In this process, the local retail societies 
continued to own and operate the stores, but their leverage in terms of buying, marketing and 
operational practises was greatly reduced.420 Alongside these developments, a fourth chain of 
local community stores was also established. It was named S-marked and comprised the smaller, 
local grocery stores, often situated in rural districts and also selling a substantial share of non-
food products. By 1995 the chain was fully operational and run in cooperation by 8 smaller 
regional chains. With 714 stores and a total turnover of NOK 7.6 billion, equal to  760 million 
in 1995, the chain immediately became the largest food chain operated by the co-op movement 
and the third largest in the country.421 The process of transferring the remaining food trade into 
                                                 
418 Figures from Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Annual report 1990. p. 6. Note that these figures include non-
food stores and non-food sales. The relative position of the three formats in the food trades alone was stronger. 
419 Interview, Rolf Rønning, 3 March 2005 and 22 June 2005. 
420 This development is more fully described in chapter eight in the present thesis.  
421 Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Annual report 1995, p. 38. 
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one of the other existing chains also intensified. By 1996 the large majority of co-operative food 
stores belonged to one of the four national food chains now operated by the co-op movement 
and these chains controlled close to 100 per cent of co-operative food sales.422  
The results of the reorganisation process of the early 1990s proved the economic 
potential of a coordinated multi-unit strategy. In an economic climate still hampered by the 
recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s and in a grocery retail market strongly affected by 
strengthened competition, operating profits were reaching levels never seen in the history of the 
consumer co-operative organisation. In 1995 the annual surplus of the NKL reached a historic 
record of half a billion NOK, equal to fifty million British pounds. Together with the local 
societies, total surplus reached NOK 1 billion, or 4.8 per cent of sales. By this point the 
movement had also regained 25 per cent market share in the food retail sector.423  
The final step in the process of creating an efficient, multi-format structure of co-
operative stores was taken in the summer of 2000 when the NKL launched a massive national 
branding campaign, introducing ‘Coop’ as a common brand for all co-operative stores and all co-
operative societies in the country. The economic rationale behind the move was to create ‘a more 
distinct identity and more efficient communication with the market and with the members’, and 
to establish Coop as a ‘competitive brand in Norwegian retailing, ensuring that our customers 
know who we are and what we stand for’. 424 Similar to retailers such as Sainsbury’s and Tesco in 
the UK, the brand names separating the different store types from each other were kept intact, 
while the new national brand, Coop, was added as a prefix. The Norwegian co-operative stores 
were from then on named Coop Prix, Coop Obs!, Coop Mega and Coop Marked. The major 
advantage with such a system was that the co-operative stores could more easily be branded 
similarly in broad national campaigns. Every food store operated by the various independent 
retail societies were linked to the Coop as one national unity. At the same time, the different 
trading names provided necessary independence and distinctiveness to the different stores types.  
The introduction of a national ‘master brand’ for all co-operative enterprises helped to 
further improve the effectiveness of the multi-format approach. By 2002 three of the four co-
operative store profiles were holding leading market positions within their respective segments. 
Hence, with a 44 per cent share of the market, the Coop Mega chain was the country’s largest 
chain of supermarkets. In the small store segment, the Coop Marked chain held the lead with a 
                                                 
422 Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Annual report 1996, pp. 20-4 and Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Annual 
report 1997, pp. 20-5. 
423 Figures estimated from Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Annual report 1995 and Coop NKL, Våre tall 1907-
2005 (Statistics compiled by Tore Kristoffersen, Coop NKL, 2006). 
424 Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Annual Report 2000, p. 46 and p. 6. 
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41 per cent share of the market, while the Coop Obs! chain totally dominated the hypermarket 
segment controlling more than 50 per cent of trade. The only segment the co-ops did not fully 
dominate was the soft discount segment. By 2002 the Coop Prix chain controlled 12 per cent of 
this market.425 
The dominant position of the different co-operative chains is evidence of the successful 
approach Norwegian co-operators had taken to the increasing segmentation and market 
orientation characteristic of the late twentieth century food retail market. While the British co-
ops, in meeting these challenges, had been more or less forced to focus their trade in the small 
store segment, with continued loss of market share as the ultimate result, the Norwegian co-
operatives managed to develop a competitive, multi-format structure comprising four distinct 
segments. They also managed to become market leaders in three of these four segments. Being 
the first retailer to introduce a multi-format strategy in the Norwegian market, the Norwegian co-
ops again proved their ability to catch up with the latest trends in the food retail industry and 
serve as innovators in their national market. As with the development of self-service, 
supermarket and hypermarket trading, this innovative capacity worked to further secure the 
position of the co-op as a leading food retailer in the Norwegian market. 
  
Conclusions 
Consumer segmentation and an increasing focus on the advantages of a market-oriented 
approach to food retailing caused many retailers in the last quarter of the 20th century to 
abandon their strict reliance on scale in selling and to develop stores of differing sizes, locations 
and operational principles. The development of this ‘multi-format’ type of retailing posed new 
and serious challenges to co-operative trade. This chapter has analysed how this challenge was 
approached by the co-operative movements in Norway and the UK. Specifically, it has explored 
why the UK co-ops ultimately chose to focus their food trading activities in one distinct market 
segment while the Norwegian movement chose a strategy of diversification into different 
segments. It has also discussed how these different strategic choices may have worked to further 
reinforce the divergent development of the two movements. 
The British co-operatives met the challenges of consumer segmentation and market 
orientation by selling off their large stores and focusing more exclusively on convenience and 
                                                 
425 All figures taken from K4, anteroom of the administration, ‘figures developed by AC Nielsen for the Boston 
Consulting Group and Coop NKL’, 24 January 2006.The fact that the soft discount segment is by far the largest 
segment within the Norwegian food retail market, controlling more than 50 per cent of total trade, explains why the 
co-op, despite their dominant positions in the other segments, controls less than 25 per cent of overall food sales.  
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medium sized supermarkets. This strategic move was the combined result of a continued reliance 
on small stores, continuous problems of weak profitability and declining market share, and a 
gradually strengthened belief in the strategic principle of differentiation. The strategic decision to 
focus trade in the smaller segment was, however, made exactly at a time when the competing 
multiples were starting to abandon their one-sided reliance on large stores and to diversify their 
operations into several different market segments. These retailers sough to capitalise on the 
advantages of a multi-format approach by operating different types of stores under centralised 
control. This approach turned out to provide the multiple retailers with further competitive 
advantages. Co-operative market share continued to decline and the competitiveness of the co-op 
in their preferred, small store segment was put under heavy pressure. 
In Norway, the story was different. Spurred by a belief in the need to develop stores with 
a more distinct profile, the co-operative movement from the mid-1980s onwards embarked on a 
strategy of purposeful diversification of the structure of their stores. Separate chains directed at 
distinct segments of the market were developed. The structure established was very different 
from the one developed by the UK co-ops, while it bore clear resemblances to the business 
models developed by the British co-ops’ major competitors Tesco and Sainsbury’s. From the 
early 1990s onwards the multi-format structure about to become established was further 
improved by introducing a centralised system of supply and developing the different store types 
into tightly integrated chains. By 2000 these chains were provided with a common ‘master brand’. 
By this point the co-operative retail societies had set up the most well-developed system of multi-
format retailing established within the Norwegian food retail market, dominating three out of the 
four segments in which they operated.  
The different approaches taken to the challenge of increasing segmentation and market 
orientation further added to the divergent post-war development of the Norwegian and British 
consumer co-operatives. The development of the self-service system, of supermarket retailing 
and ultimately the large scale superstores and hypermarkets, had created a situation where the 
British co-ops had lost a substantial share of the food retail market. The challenges created by the 
coming of multi-format retailing further added to this trend. In Norway by contrast, the co-ops 
had played a leading role in the transfer of trade to large, self-serviced units. This had helped 
them secure a dominant position in the Norwegian food retail market. By pioneering the 
development and operation of a multi-format structure within the Norwegian retail sector, this 
market position was further secured. 
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*** 
 
A 1988-article in the British Journal of Co-operative Studies concluded its analysis with the following 
statement: ‘The failure of the Co-operative societies collectively to invest in new store 
development on a comparable scale is a major factor in the decline in market share.”426 The first 
section of this thesis has dealt specifically with questions related to this statement. More precisely, 
it has explored how the British and Norwegian consumer co-operative movements managed to 
confront major transformations in the size, scope and structure of the food stores operated 
within the food retailing industry, and especially their ability to transfer their stores towards larger 
retail formats and develop a structure of shops capable of competing with the increasingly 
dominant multiple retailers.  
The analysis has formed the first step in a three-fold process aimed at explaining the 
divergent development pattern of the British and Norwegian consumer co-operative movements 
in the post-war period. At the most general level, the argument has been that an adequate 
understanding of this process simply needs to take into account the dramatic changes seen within 
the retailing industry in terms of store development. The changes analysed have been the 
transformation to self-service, the rise of the supermarket, the superstore and the hypermarket 
formats and the development among dominant retailers of a multi-format structure of shops 
destined to serve different market segments. The basic premise of the analysis has been that the 
divergent development of the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives in the post-war 
period needs to be related to differences in how the two movements approached these 
transformations. It has been shown how the Norwegian co-operatives, throughout the period 
covered, managed to hold on to a leading role in the development of new store formats, as well 
as in the strategy of running a diversified structure of shops. In contrast, the UK movement 
lagged behind their competitors. The fundamental consequence was that while the UK co-ops 
saw a dramatic loss in market share the Norwegian co-ops managed to grow and from the 1970s 
onwards stabilised their position at approximately 24 per cent of the market.  
As the previous chapters have shown, the divergent development path of the Norwegian 
and British co-ops can partly be related to differences in the competitive climate of the two 
countries' retailing sectors. Already from the early 1950s onwards the UK co-ops competed with 
large, multiple retail chains operating on an integrated platform. Norwegian co-operators by 
contrast were faced with much weaker competition. The private retail industry was hampered by 
                                                 
426 F. E. Creed, ‘Membership and Share Capital’, Journal of Co-operative Studies, 61 (1988), 16. 
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fragmentation and lack of coordination and for many years the co-op was in fact the only large- 
scale retailer operating in the Norwegian food retail market. The most obvious consequence of 
this situation was that the Norwegian co-ops could more easily take a leading role in developing 
the large- scale formats. They were also in a better position to develop a competitive multi-format 
structure of stores. The UK co-ops were more fiercely challenged in their store development 
process by large and well coordinated multiple retailers and gradually they were forced to focus 
their operations in a limited segment of the market. It is evident that the divergent post-war 
development of co-operative retailing in Britain and Norway needs, in part, to be related to these 
competitive differences.  
At the same time, the analysis has repeatedly warned against drawing a simple line of 
causation between the level of competition and the extent of progress for co-operative retailing. 
The Norwegian co-op also experienced fierce competition, especially from the 1980s onwards, 
but it still managed to defend its market share. It has also been shown how the Norwegian co-
operators not only outperformed their national competitors. In comparison with their British 
sister organisation, they also managed to take better advantage of the new and large retail formats 
and to develop a coordinated and viable approach to the many transformations occurring within 
the post- war retailing industry. Hence, in order to understand the different ability of the British 
and Norwegian co-operatives to transfer trade towards larger retail formats and to develop a 
competitive structure of stores, attention also has to be given to how the two movements actually 
approached these challenges.  
British and Norwegian co-operatives pioneered self-service trading. They also took on 
leading roles in introducing supermarket retailing into their respective home markets and they 
were among the first retailers to experiment with the large edge of town and out of town 
superstore and hypermarket formats. The UK co-ops also took an innovative role in the revival 
of convenience retailing in the 1980s and 1990s. Major differences between the two movements 
arose, however, in how this first mover advantage in the introduction of new retail formats was 
transferred into long- term competitiveness. Generally, the British co-operators tended to 
become too occupied with taking the role as innovator and holding a quantitative lead in the 
store development process, while the important task of developing the organisational structures 
necessary to create long- term economic success was too often overlooked. The process of 
developing stores with lasting competitive potential was also hampered by substantial capital 
shortages. Due to lack of capital, transfer of trade to the larger formats was typically made by way 
of cheap and simple conversion. But, while this made possible a fast transfer of trade to larger 
units, the stores soon became outdated and lost their attractiveness for the consumer. The 
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Norwegian retail societies by contrast managed to secure their first mover advantages by 
combining innovative capabilities with the adequate structural measures necessary to secure a 
more permanent competitiveness. They also managed to secure the finances necessary to develop 
large, purpose- built stores with more lasting competitive potential. The development of self-
service, supermarket and hypermarket retailing is indicative of how these differences were played 
out in practice.  
At a more general level, the UK movement seem to have been hampered in their 
development by a more conservative organisational culture and a much stronger adherence to 
broader aspects of co-operative ideology, including the value of local independence and self-
governance and the obligation to serve local communities. The debate on supermarket 
development, as referred to in chapter three, is indicative. In contrast, Norwegian co-operators 
tended to take a more pragmatic attitude to the changes occurring, advocating large- scale 
retailing as a necessary and important element in striving to modernise the Norwegian retailing 
sector. It thus generally seems that while many British co-operators fought to defend the virtues 
of traditional, small- scale retailing practises, the Norwegians advocated large- scale retailing as a 
defining feature of co-operative retailing. This may further help explain why the two movements 
approached the coming of larger retail formats so differently. 
These differences in general attitude were further amplified by a persistent failure among 
the British co-operatives to coordinate their activities and to develop stores in a concerted effort. 
Developing large-scale formats, such as superstores and hypermarkets, demanded substantial 
administrative, financial and operational skills. British retail societies, however, insisted on 
developing their stores independently and were generally very reluctant to accept any form of 
interference from the national federals. The co-ops in Norway, by contrast, developed their large 
stores in a coordinated effort, comprising both local retail societies and the national association. 
This was important to ensure that the stores were provided with well-functioning structures of 
financial and operational support. By agreeing on a common brand and mode of operation, the 
Norwegians, unlike the British, also managed to lay the ground for a profitable chain of co- 
operative superstores and hypermarkets operating on a national scale.  
By the 1990s the British co-ops were forced to abandon their large scale operations and 
focus trade in convenience stores and medium sized supermarkets. While this development was 
supported by the strategic principle of differentiation, it evidently led to further loss of market 
share. And as the competing retailers of the British food industry embarked on a strategy of 
diversification, opening stores in a variety of different segments, including convenience stores, 
the co-op’s competitiveness in their favoured segments was soon drastically challenged. On the 
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other hand, the Norwegian movement was in a better position to develop its many different 
stores into a diversified structure, operating in all the major segments of the market. A stronger 
willingness among the local retail societies to exchange local independence with the economic 
advantages offered by centralised buying and marketing also helped secure the development of 
such a structure. The ultimate result was an improved ability to defend co-operative market share 
and to secure the further profitability of co-operative stores.  
The analyses of the present section have provided important insights into the question of 
why the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives developed so differently in the post-war 
period. But, many unanswered questions still remain. To understand the issue in more depth, we 
need to look beyond the store level and take a closer look at the underlying organisational 
structures of the two movements. While some organisational issues have been touched upon in 
the previous analysis, a separate and more thorough presentation and analysis of the 
organisational characteristics of the Norwegian and UK consumer co-operative movements is 
necessary. Such an analysis will add further knowledge to the question of why the two 
movements developed so differently in the post-war period. We therefore turn to this issue in the 
next section of the thesis.  
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Section II: Organisational structure 
 
The face of food retailing changed dramatically during the post-war years. The small, counter- 
serviced neighbourhood outlet was replaced by large, well-stocked self-serviced supermarkets, 
superstores and out of town hypermarkets. These operational and visual transformations 
constitute one of the major shifts in post-war food retailing.  
A less visible, but by no means less important transformation occurred at the 
organisational level. Throughout the post- war years the size, structure and scope of the 
enterprises dominating the food retailing sector changed dramatically. In 1950 more than fifty per 
cent of the British food trade was still controlled by independent, small- scale retailers.427 In 
Norway more than 80 per cent of the trade was in the hands of such independent traders.428 
These retailers would typically operate one or a few shops. They received their supplies from a 
complex set of middlemen and operated their stores on an autonomous, non-standardised 
basis.429  
By the turn of the millennium this organisational structure had been fundamentally 
transformed. The independent retailers had mostly been replaced by large standardised, 
integrated and centralised firms. These so-called multiple retailers held several hundred branches 
under centralised control and operated them on a standardised basis. The enterprises comprised 
both retail and wholesale functions and supplies were obtained through an integrated system of 
distribution. By the turn of the century, 75 per cent of the Norwegian food retail market was 
controlled by such multiple retailers.430 In the UK, the five largest retailers controlled a similar 
proportion of the market.431  
As indicated in the previous section, the transformation towards such large- scale 
organisational structures was a development that unfolded at different periods in time in Norway 
                                                 
427 Figures are taken from J.B. Jefferys, Retail trading in Britain, 1880-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1954), p. 163 and pp. 467-73. 
428 Estimated from S. Halvorsen, ’De første resultatene fra bedriftstellingen 1953’, Forbrukeren, 10:10 (1954), 237-43. 
429 J. Vatnaland, Stability and change in the organization of industry. The chain store innovation and the transformation of American 
retailing in a comparative perspective (PhD dissertation, University of Oslo, 2007).  
430 Another 24 per cent was controlled by the co-op movement, while the remaining 1 per cent was controlled by 
independent retailers. E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. 
Forbrukesamvirkets historie i Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006), p. 517. Note, however that these figures do not include food sales 
from petrol stations, kiosks and independent speciality retailers such as butchers, bakeries and greengrocers. In 1999, 
these accounted for close to 5 per cent of total food sales (E. Røsrud, Dagligvarefobundets rolle og virke mot år 2000 
(Oslo: Handels- og Servicenæringens Hovedorganisasjon, 2003), pp. 23-9.  
431 Competition Commission, Supermarkets. A report on the supply of groceries from multiple stores in the United Kingdom, volume 
2 (Competition Commission, 2000), p. 47. 
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and the UK. While multiple retailers had already by 1960 gained a market share in the British 
retail market of close to 21 per cent, there were still no multiples in Norway.432 Apart from the 
co-op movement, the Norwegian food retailing industry was completely dominated by 
independent retailers. The development of chain store food retailing started, however, to 
accelerate in Norway from the mid-1970s onwards. And by the 1990s, the multiple form of 
retailing was in fact more dominant in the Norwegian than in the British food retail market. 
Hence, despite differences in the timing, both the UK and the Norwegian food retailing market 
ultimately came to be completely controlled by the large, integrated chains.  
The organisational principles of these large multiple retailers were similar across national 
borders and they consisted of three basic elements.433 Firstly, the multiples operated a huge 
number of branches under centralised control. All major decisions concerning the operation of 
the stores were centralized to the organisation’s headquarters and the individual store managers 
were provided with only limited leverage. Secondly, operations were completely standardised 
across the different stores. Stores operated by a chain would be marketed under the same brand, 
hold a similar assortment, and operate according to standardised procedures. Thirdly, the 
multiple stores fully controlled the supply chain, either by vertical integration or by way of 
contracting. Rather than obtaining their supplies from a mixed set of different wholesalers and 
industry salesmen, they negotiated directly with the industry. Buying was made the responsibility 
of the chain headquarters, negotiating on behalf of all the stores operated by the chain. The flow 
of goods was increasingly controlled by the retailers through the development of retailer owned 
warehouses. The chains also came to operate numerous regional distribution centres and 
developed technologically advanced systems of logistics to increase control over the flow of 
goods.434  
Operating consistently on these three basic principles – centralisation of control, 
standardisation of operational procedures and integration of the distribution function – provided 
the multiple chains with numerous competitive advantages. Most importantly, the principles lay 
                                                 
432 Figures taken from J. B Jefferys and D. Knee, Retailing in Europe. Present structure and future trends (London: 
MacMillan, 1962), p. 65. 
433 Note that this is a stylised description of the main operational characteristics of the multiples. It is employed as a 
heuristic means to facilitate a more systematic analysis. Substantial variations indeed exists between different chain 
store models. For a short overview, see Nordic Competition Authorities, Nordic Food Markets – a taste for competition, 
Report 1/2005, p. 62). The classification used here is intended to grasp some fundamental characteristics on which 
all multiples operate. It is adopted directly from J. Vatnaland, Stability and change in the organization of industry. The chain 
store innovation and the transformation of American retailing in a comparative perspective (PhD dissertation, University of Oslo, 
2007), pp. 109-16.  
434 See L. Sparks, ‘Delivering quality. The role of logistics in the post-war transformation of British food retailing’, in 
G. Jones and N. J. Morgan (eds.), Adding Value. Brands and marketing in Food and Drink (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994) and N. Wrigley and M. Lowe, Reading Retail. A geographical perspective on retailing and consumption spaces 
(London: Arnold, 2002), pp. 83-9. 
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the foundation for huge cost savings with subsequent possibilities to reduce prices. The 
organisations managed to handle huge volumes of trade at reduced costs, making way for 
dramatically increased efficiency and productivity of operations. The tremendous growth of the 
chains in the post- war period is in itself convincing evidence of the economic superiority of their 
organisational principles.  
The theme of this second section is how the consumer co-operative movement in 
Norway and the UK adapted their organisational structures in order to deal with the challenge 
from the multiple chain store model. The co-operative movement had been the first to develop 
large- scale buying and selling methods within the retailing industry.435 The co-operative way of 
trading, as it was conducted in the beginning of the 1950s, however, was far from complying with 
the basic principles of the chain store. The organisational structure was fundamentally based on 
decentralised, small- scale co-operative societies and only very limited authority was granted to 
centralised organs. The level of standardisation across society boundaries was also minimal. Even 
if all societies were part of the wider co-operative movement the retail operations were run 
according to local tradition. And while the wholesaling function was owned by the retail co-ops, 
it was not integrated with their retailing operations. The societies traded with their wholesalers on 
similar lines as they traded with other wholesalers, delivering their orders independently and 
stocking an uncoordinated variety of different products. In order to efficiently approach the 
challenge from the multiples, the co-ops had to implement drastic transformations in this 
structure. The overall challenge was how to meet the economic superiority of the integrated chain 
within the frame of a co-operative organisational form.  
Similar to the challenges coming from the radical transformations in the selling of food, 
the changes in the organisational structures of the retailing industry, represented most forcefully 
by the multiples, were approached with varying success by the British and Norwegian consumer 
co-ops. Already from the 1950s onwards, the Norwegian co-operatives started to reform their 
organisational structure to make it comply more evenly with the chain store model. The local 
societies concentrated their operations in retailing while the NKL strengthened its role as a 
wholesaler. Most NKL owned production facilities were dissolved or sold. Efforts to integrate 
were made by creating standardised ordering routines between the NKL and the local societies 
on selected products, while a new bonus system developed by the NKL provided clear incentives 
for the retail societies to increase the volume of goods bought from the NKL. The favoured 
                                                 
435 J. B. Jefferys, Retail trading in Britain 1850-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954) and E. Lange (ed.), 
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model in this early phase of development was the so-called ‘independent chain-stores’, as seen in 
the US. From the 1990s onwards this structure was further developed as the movement 
reorganised their whole system of supply into a completely integrated organisational structure. 
The system developed comprised a fusion of the federative organisational model with the 
principles of the integrated chain store. Local co-operative societies kept charge of the retail 
operations while the national federation took responsibility for headquarter functions, 
centralising the buying function, standardising assortment and coordinating an integrated chain of 
supply. The ability of the movement to radically transform its organisational structure and adapt 
the co-operative model to chain store principles was imperative in shaping its positive 
development. By the turn of the millennium the movement was still one of the leading retailers in 
the country. It had been a driving force in transforming the Norwegian food retail market from 
being one of Europe’s most fragmented to becoming one of the most centralised. Controlling 
close to one quarter of the food retail market, the co-op, together with the three largest private 
multiples, was responsible for 99 per cent of food sales in Norway.436  
The transformation of the organisational structures of the UK co-operative movement 
proved more difficult. Even if the challenges coming from the chain stores were already pertinent 
from the 1950s onwards, overall the co-op movement failed to implement the reorganisations 
necessary to restore its competitiveness. By centralising operations through amalgamations of 
societies into larger units, the movement managed to develop some successful, independent 
societies trading efficiently in their respective, regional markets. But lack of overall coordination 
of buying, limited operational standardisation across society structures and difficulties in 
implementing the necessary integration of the co-operative supply chain drastically hampered the 
movements overall competitiveness. The failure of the UK co-op movement to develop an 
organisational structure able to compete with the multiple retailers further added to the decline of 
the movement. The stores could not be operated as efficiently as the competition and the 
movement was deprived of the organisational means necessary to restore its overall 
competitiveness.  
The present section describes and analyses the divergent ability of the UK and Norwegian 
co-operative movement to approach the challenges of the retail chains. It investigates how the 
two movements struggled to transform their organisational structures and analyses how 
differences in their organisational apparatus further shaped their divergent development. The 
chapter thus moves beyond the level of the store and analyses the role of organisational factors in 
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explaining the divergent development of the Norwegian and British consumer co-op. The 
analysis proceeds through three chapters. The first (chapter six) concerns the competitive 
situation in the Norwegian and British food retail sector as it was perceived by the co-operative 
societies in the immediate post-war period. It presents the organisational measures suggested to 
approach these challenges and shows how these came to form an important backdrop for the 
two organisations' further development. The second chapter (chapter seven) shows how 
amalgamations of local retail societies into larger units in the 1960s and 1970s came to form a 
basic strategy for both the British and Norwegian co-operative movement in dealing with the 
chain store challenge. Important differences in how these structural transformations were 
approached, however, further added to the divergent development of the two movements. The 
third and final chapter (chapter eight) specifically discusses the different attempts made by co-
operative societies to better coordinate the operational procedures and overall flow of goods in 
the movement through different forms of organisational standardisation and integration.  
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Chapter 6: The coming of the chain store and the co-operative response  
 
 
By 1950 the food retail industry in Western Europe was in a state of transition. Not only was the 
introduction of self-service retailing fundamentally altering the operational and visual 
characteristics of the trade. The very organisational structure of the industry was about to be 
transformed. Traditionally, the retailing industry had been based on small, independent 
shopkeepers operating one or a few stores. These stores had a broad set of functions, they were 
deeply embedded in their local communities and they were supplied by a complex set of 
middlemen.437 From the last half of the nineteenth century, this structure had been increasingly 
challenged. Alongside the dominant, small-scale independent shopkeeper, operating one or a few 
stores, new organisational forms were developing.  
One of these challengers had been the co-operative societies. As a distinct organisational 
form, the co-op was fundamentally based on the establishment of numerous, small-scale retail 
societies operating on the principles of local governance. The retail society and the stores they 
operated were deeply embedded in local communities. As such, they did not break with the 
organisational principles and ideals of the private shopkeeper. But, some retail societies expanded 
dramatically and they started to operate numerous branches under centralised control. They also 
established large, national production and wholesale facilities and sough to exploit the advantages 
of an integrated system of distribution. By the inter-war years such retailers had obtained 
substantial shares in the food retail markets of most Western European countries.438  
An even more radical challenge to the existing structure came from the so-called multiple 
retailers. By definition, these were retail enterprises operating ten or more branches under 
centralised control.439 They based their operations on highly standardised procedures. In order to 
                                                 
437 See J. Vatnaland, Stability and change in the organization of industry. The chain store innovation and the transformation of 
American retailing in a comparative perspective (PhD dissertation, University of Oslo, 2007), pp. 65-81. 
438 J. Brazda and R. Schediwy, ‘Consumer co-operatives on the defensive. A short overview’, in J. Brazda and R. 
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Jefferys, Retail trading in Britain, 1880-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), p. 465). It has also later 
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large-scale retailing in Britain’, in J. Benson and G. Shaw (eds.), The Evolution of Retail Systems c. 1800-1914 (London: 
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reap the full potential for scale economies in buying, and to better coordinate the flow of goods 
into the large number of shops operated, they also integrated backwards into wholesaling (and in 
some instances also into production). Some of them expanded dramatically, operating stores on a 
national scale. By 1950 such multiple retailers had become major players in the retailing industry 
of most Western European countries, fundamentally challenging the position of both the co-ops 
and the independent shopkeeper.  
The present chapter investigates how the co-operative movement in the UK and Norway 
were affected by the ongoing structural transformations in the food retail industry. It explores 
how the industry developed in Norway and Britain during the first half of the twentieth century 
and presents its major structural characteristics by the coming of the 1950s. It further discusses 
how the co-op interpreted and approached the structural transformations taking place. Four basic 
questions are examined. First, what characterised the structure of the food retail industry in UK 
and Norway by the beginning of the 1950s and what role and position was held by the co-
operative movement within this structure? Secondly, what were perceived as the main challenges 
in the trading environment of the UK and Norwegian co-operative movements during this 
period? Third, what solutions were suggested to solve the challenges? And finally, to what extent 
were these suggested solutions in fact adopted by the retail societies?  
 
The structure of the food retail industry in the UK by the beginning of the 1950s 
As already indicated, the structure of the British food retail industry had been in a state of 
transition since the mid-nineteenth century. Most prominently, different types of large-scale 
retailers were increasingly replacing the traditional, independent shopkeeper. True, by 1950 such 
independent retailers still controlled more than fifty per cent of the market. But it was obvious 
for most contemporary commentators that this situation was not to last. The co-operative 
movement was by now firmly established as a major player in the retailing industry of the 
country. The organisation had taken an early lead in the introduction of the self-service 
technology. Its principles of profit sharing and democratic governance continued to attract a 
substantial membership and taken together retail societies controlled close to twenty per cent of 
all food sales in the country. Parallel to these developments the multiple retailers had also 
expanded tremendously. Large, national enterprises operating several thousand branches had 
taken a substantial market share. By 1950, there was thus little doubt that the future belonged to 
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the large- scale retailers.440 The yet unanswered question was, however, what type of large- scale 
retailing would be dominant. Was it the form of retailing practised by the private multiples or was 
co-operative retailing to gain further ground? 
The multiple retailers had seriously started to make their way into the UK retail market 
from the 1870s onwards. Among the first multiples in the grocery trade was Walton Hassel & 
Port of London.441 By 1900, the multiples’ share of the total market was estimated to be between 
3 and 4.5 per cent. In food and household the share was between 3.5 and 4.4 per cent.442 The 
main attraction of the multiple retailers was their ability to offer reduced prices, made possible by 
their higher sales volumes, rapid turnover and lower buying prices. As indicated above, the chains 
relied on radical new ways of organising retail operations. They operated several branches under 
centralised control. These branches were operated according to standardised principles and under 
standardised brands. The chains also relied on an integrated chain of distribution, taking control 
over wholesaling functions and centralising the buying for all the branches to a single buying 
point. Some multiples also integrated further backwards into production. While all these features, 
at least partly, had also been applied by the co-operative movement, the level of standardisation, 
centralisation and integration was much more radical among the multiples. They operated more 
branches than any individual retail society. The level of standardisation was also more profound, 
stretching across all stores operated. And their wholesaling and production facilities were 
organisationally integrated with their retail operations.  
While already having taken substantial market share in several trades by the end of the 
nineteenth century, the major period of expansion in multiple retailing was not set in motion 
before the inter-war years. As Peter Scott has shown, while multiples accounted for between 7 
and 10 per cent of all retail sales in 1920, by 1939 the figure had risen to between 18 and 19.5 per 
cent.443 In this period, well known retailers such as Marks and Spencer and Woolworths 
developed as national, household names. In the food trades, multiple retailers such as Tesco and 
Sainsbury’s were experiencing increasing success in the markets in which they operated. These 
retailers were still operating on a regional basis, but their overall efficiency and speed of 
expansion proved the viability of their business model. Hence, while the multiples had left their 
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441 Ibid., p. 22. 
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mark on the UK retailing scene for more than fifty years, the development in the inter-war period 
became their final breakthrough. As Gareth Shaw and colleagues have noted, the period marked 
‘the start of a reconfiguration of corporate structures and a changing relationship between 
retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers’.444  
The co-operative societies had developed an alternative form of large- scale retailing. 
Indeed, as Jefferys repeatedly noted in his study of British retailing, ‘the co-operative societies 
were the first distributive organizations to develop large-scale methods of retailing in the United 
Kingdom’.445 They were ‘the first organizations to introduce large-scale buying and selling 
methods in the food trades’, and alongside the department stores and the multiples they were 
regarded as one of the three large- scale retailers in Britain.446 The scale of the co-operative 
operations was in many ways impressive. As Alfred Chandler noted in his seminal study of the 
growth of industrial capitalism, the co-operative movement in Britain had grown rapidly 
alongside the multiples. The Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) and the Scottish Co-
operative Wholesale Society (SCWS) he writes, ‘quickly became the world’s largest distribution 
organizations’, and together with some of the largest retail societies they were ‘encouraged … to 
exploit economies of scope much more than the multiples’.447 
By the beginning of the 1950s, the co-operative movement was operating a substantial 
volume of trade. Its market position had been strengthened continuously throughout the first 
half of the century, rising from an approximate of 6.5 per cent of total retail sales in 1906 to 11 
per cent by the beginning of the 1950s.448 Considered as a group, the co-op was by far the largest 
retail unit in the country. It controlled close to twenty per cent of total food sales.449 In 1950, it 
recorded an annual retail turnover of  614 million. Of this, the sale of foodstuffs accounted for 
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73 per cent or  445 million. Taken as a whole, the movement operated close to 30,000 branches 
of which more than 24,000 were primarily selling food. By comparison, the competing multiple 
Sainsbury’s was trading an annual turnover of  16 million out of 244 food branches.450 In 
addition, the co-operatives owned 250 factories and two of the largest wholesale organisations in 
the world.451 According to the official statistics, co-operative membership figures were also seeing 
a steady rise, passing the ten million mark by 1948. While there are good reasons to believe that 
this figure was somewhat inflated, it reflected that the popular support for co-operative trade was 
still substantial among the British population.452  
By 1950, both the co-operative form of trading and the multiple retailers were seriously 
challenging the position of the independent retailer. Comparing the position of co-operative trade 
with that of the multiples, however, there were several indications that the co-operatives were on 
the defensive. First of all, while the co-ops had indeed expanded rapidly alongside the multiples, 
from the inter-war years onwards co-operative growth in the food trades had not been the result 
of any major improvements in the trading practises of the movement. Rather, as Jefferys noted, it 
had largely been the result of factors not directly related to any pre-eminence of trading 
practises.453 Firstly, the co-ops had expanded into new markets in the Midlands and the south of 
England. In 1911, these areas contained close to fifty per cent of the entire British population. 
But the share of co-operative trade held in the area was only 23 per cent of the total. By 1939 the 
share had risen to 44 per cent.454 In the same period, however, the expansion in the existing 
trading areas in the north of England and Scotland had been marginal. Secondly, the movement 
had managed to make large- scale methods of production, processing and distribution applicable 
to additional foodstuffs, notably the bread and the milk trades. In the period from 1930 to 1950 
the co-ops increased their share of the total milk trade by close to 60 per cent, from 19.9 to 31.7 
per cent of national sales. There was also a slight increase in the share of the bread, chocolate, 
sugar confectionery and ice cream trades. While this growth was important and in many ways 
impressive, the problem was that these trades, and especially the milk trade, were in steep decline 
in terms of relative importance in the total sale of foodstuffs. Adding to these problems was the 
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fact that from 1935 onwards the co-ops were outpaced by multiple retailers in all the other major 
commodity groups, including the sales of groceries and provisions.455  
A further indication of the weakened position of the co-ops compared to the multiples 
was the fact that their pace of expansion turned out to be way behind that of the major multiples. 
In the years between 1930 and 1952 the co-ops’ share of the general retail trade had increased by 
ten per cent. In the same period the multiples’ share had risen by fifty per cent. In the food and 
household segment alone, the growth of co-operative trade between 1935 and 1950 had been 
close to 9 per cent. Among the multiples the growth had been almost 14 per cent.456  
These development trends clearly indicated that it was the multiple form of trading that 
was advancing. The co-ops had not managed to keep pace with the expansion of these retailers. 
Indeed, the expansion experienced was mainly explained by factors not related to any pre-
eminence in co-operative trading practises. Rather, as Jefferys noted, ‘if in these inter-war years 
there had been no new areas into which the co-operative movement could expand, and if there 
had been no changes in production and distribution conditions making large-scale methods 
applicable to additional foodstuffs, the overall rate of progress of Co-operative trading would 
have been negligible.’457  
Why had the multiples expanded so much more rapidly than the co-ops? The simple 
answer is this: while the co-op movement taken together indeed was a large scale retailer, it had 
generally failed to take advantage of the organisational principles of centralisation, standardisation 
and integration. The actual organisational structure was still based on decentralised, small-scale 
co-operative societies. True, the level of centralisation had indeed increased from the early 1900s 
onwards, most importantly through the amalgamation and mergers of societies into larger units. 
In the period from 1901 to 1950 the number of societies had been reduced by close to 30 per 
cent, from 1,438 to 1,019.458 Despite these developments, the movement was still relying on 
numerous small societies. By 1950 almost half of the total number of societies operated less than 
ten establishments each, while ten per cent of the societies were still operating only one shop. In 
the food trades specifically, 67 per cent of the societies operated less than ten establishments 
each.459 Further, while the wholesaling functions of the CWS and the SCWS were owned by the 
retail societies, the level of integration between the two remained limited. For one, the retail 
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societies and the wholesale societies remained separate organisational units. Moreover, the 
relationship between the two was based on standard buyer/seller principles. The retail societies 
traded with their own wholesaler on a similar basis as they traded with other, private wholesalers. 
Even if the CWS and the SCWS were the major source of supply for retail co-operative societies, 
obtaining close to 75 per cent of their groceries and household stores from the federative 
wholesale organisations, the wholesalers had to compete with private suppliers for trade on a 
daily basis.460 Finally, even if all societies were part of the wider co-operative movement, the retail 
operations were controlled locally and the level of standardisation across society boundaries 
remained limited. Indeed, within societies, some standardisation had been introduced and, as 
Jefferys remarked, ‘multiple shop techniques of controlling the activities of these branches’ were 
also increasingly applied in these societies.461 But the overall picture of the movement was one of 
fragmentation, where local retail societies governed their local trading units according to their 
particular principles and traditions.   
Compared with the multiples, the level of standardisation, centralisation and integration 
was thus much less developed within the co-op movement. As Jefferys also noted, ‘in methods of 
trading, the multiple shop organisations concentrated to a much greater extent than was the case 
with either Co-operative or department store trade on economies of scale in buying, economics 
of specialisation in administration and economics of standardisation in selling.’462 It was thus also 
evident that any future growth in co-operative food retailing needed to be based on major 
improvements in the operational procedures of the movement. Again in the words of Jefferys: ‘If 
a wider market is to be gained [for co-operative trade] the appeal will have to stress efficiency and 
up-to date methods of selling the goods the consumer demands, and not only the payment of 
dividends which in any event may be so small as to offer little attraction.’463  
The overall situation in the British food trades by the coming of the 1950s was 
characterised by an expanding multiple retail industry. The independent shopkeepers were still 
holding substantial market share, but their position was increasingly threatened. While employing 
some scale advantages, the co-op movement was also a major player in the food retail market, as 
well as in some other retail trades. But its trading structure was increasingly proving to be 
uncompetitive with the economies realised by the multiples and its future development was thus 
quite insecure. Even if the multiples had not gained market leadership, by 1950 their methods of 
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trading were increasingly acknowledged as superior.464 At the same time, there was also still a 
large, untapped potential for improvement in the method of trading applied by these retailers. 
Most importantly, the possibility for fully exploiting the principles of centralisation, 
standardisation and integration had not been realised. And indeed, the organisational structures 
of the major multiples were to become substantially more sophisticated in the following decades. 
This was to pose one of the most fundamental challenges for the further growth of a co-
operative movement already struggling hard to compete with these expanding retailers.  
 
The structure of the food retail industry in Norway by the beginning of the 1950s 
In his presentation of the first national budget in 1946 the Norwegian minister of finance Erik 
Brofoss described the country’s retail sector as ‘predominantly small-scale oriented and 
technologically conservative.’465 Indeed, in contrast to the dynamic changes in the British retail 
industry characteristic of the first half of the twentieth century, the Norwegian food retail sector 
had shown a substantial degree of stability. Perhaps the most visible contrast was that by 1950 
there were still no retail chains in Norway. This had a simple explanation. Formalising a 
regulatory practice stretching back to the mid- nineteenth century, the trade law of 1907 had 
simply made it unlawful for retail organisations to operate several branches. The law was still in 
operation in 1950 and it had effectively hindered the development of multiple enterprises within 
the Norwegian retailing industry. The only exemption given had been to the co-operative 
movement. On the condition that the co-operative stores only traded with members and 
operated within the municipality of the retail society, co-operatives were allowed to operate 
several branches.466 The consequence of these trading conditions was that the Norwegian food 
retail sector was dominated by independent retailers and co-operative societies. By 1950, more 
than 80 per cent of the food trade was in the hands of independent traders, operating a single 
shop. The remaining share was controlled by co-operative societies.467  
While this structure was founded on regulatory traditions going back more than one 
hundred years, by the coming of the 1950s there was growing public and political concern about 
                                                 
464 J. Vatnaland, Stability and change in the organization of industry. The chain store innovation and the transformation of American 
retailing in a comparative perspective (PhD dissertation, University of Oslo, 2007), p. 197. 
465 Cited in E. Ekberg, E Lange and E. Merok, ‘A successful latecomer: Growth and transformation of the 
Norwegian consumer co-operatives 1920-2000’, Paper presented at the XIV International Economic History Congress, 
Helsinki, 21.-25. August 2006. 
466 E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. Forbrukesamvirkets historie i 
Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006), pp. 84-5. 
467 Figures estimated from S. Halvorsen, ’De første resultatene fra bedriftstellingen 1953’, Forbrukeren, 10:10 (1954), 
237-43. 
  
 155
the need to drastically rationalise the existing system of distribution. Hence, in 1946 a designated 
public Retail Trade Commission was established to conduct ‘a critical examination of the food 
retail industry in Norway’. 468 The commission was to evaluate the overall structure of the 
industry, its organisational characteristics and the operational costs on which it operated.469  
After three years of investigation the commission delivered an interim proposal, 
suggesting that the existing ban on branches needed to be abandoned. The proposal was soon 
adopted by the government and by April 1951 the trade law was finally changed by parliament. 
Abandoning the ban on branches was, however, only one step in the process of rationalising the 
retail industry. When the Retail Trade Commission delivered its final report in 1957, the picture 
painted was still one of a backward industry, operating on outdated structural and operational 
principles. Despite the lifting of the ban on branches six years earlier, the food distribution 
system continued to be dominated by small-scale retailers and wholesalers. The chain store 
innovations that had swiped across the retailing industries in the US, as well as in several 
European countries in the first half of the twentieth century, had not been introduced. Numerous 
small wholesalers and retailers continued to operate on an independent basis. The fragmented 
structure of the wholesalers implied that their bargaining position with producers of consumer 
goods remained very weak. Estimates made by the commission indicated that Norwegian 
wholesale activities incurred cost margins three times the level found among US wholesalers. 
Organisational integration of wholesale and retail functions was also practically non- existent. 
Rather, the distribution of consumer goods resembled a spot market where local selling agents 
would take orders from retailers on a daily basis. It was common for retailers in the Oslo region 
to conduct business with about 75 different wholesalers. Clearly, this system was a costly one.  
The fragmented pattern characteristic of the Norwegian food retail industry was also 
reflected within the co-operative movement. Even more so than the British co-operatives, the 
Norwegian co-ops continued to operate on a decentralised, non-standardised basis with only 
limited integration of the retail and wholesale levels. The large majority of retail societies were 
small, operating one or a few stores. In 1950 a total of 1,084 co-operative retail societies 
altogether operated close to 1,600 outlets.470 The societies in operation were serving a total 
population of 3.3 million. By comparison, the 1,019 societies operated by the UK co-operative 
movement served a population of close to fifty million. Standardisation across society structures 
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also remained limited, even if some common trading principles had been introduced. In practice, 
each society operated its outlets fully independent from the others and the value of local 
autonomy was repeatedly advocated. Finally, the level of integration between the retail and the 
wholesale levels remained insignificant and after the Second World War it had in fact been in 
slight decline. By 1950, the share of retail societies’ purchase in the NKL as a per cent of total 
purchase was at a negligible twenty per cent. Immediately before the war it had been close to 
thirty per cent.471 In the UK, the similar figure at this point was 61 per cent.472  
The Norwegian retail industry of the early 1950s was fragmented, dominated by 
numerous, small, independent retailers and wholesalers. The co-operative movement was equally 
based on small-scale operational procedures. Compared to the situation in the UK, the 
differences were many. Most prominently, in Britain the development of multiple retailers had 
seriously started to make its mark on the food retailing industry. Independent retailers were 
increasingly outperformed and the expansion in co-operative trade had also slowed down. In 
Norway, by contrast, the independents continued to dominate. The multiple form of trading had 
not been introduced, and even if the co-ops continued to operate on outdated organisational 
principles, their market position remained largely unchallenged.  
Approaching the post-war period the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives 
were faced with very different competitive surroundings. In the UK, the most obvious threat to 
co-operative trade came from the outside. Multiple retailers were making headway into the co-
op’s core business of food retailing and the movement as a whole was on the defensive. In 
Norway, by contrast, there was no such immediate external threat. Rather, the main challenge 
came from the inside. Co-operative trade remained extremely fragmented and administrative and 
financial challenges weakened the immediate vigour of the national association. How these 
different structural threats were perceived and interpreted by the co-ops in Norway and the UK 
came to have an important effect on their long term competitiveness and, ultimately, their market 
survival.  
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The structural weaknesses of Norwegian co-operative retailing 
As already noted, the market position of the Norwegian co-operative movement was fairly strong 
by the early 1950s. The market share in the food trades, at between 15 and 18 per cent, was 
almost equal to that of its UK sister organisation, the country of origin for co-operative trade. At 
the same time, the movement was advantaged by the still limited competition of the Norwegian 
food retail market. Multiple retailers were non- existent and at both the retail and the wholesale 
level, the industry was still dominated by small-scale enterprises. On the basis of these general 
characteristics, both the present situation and the future prospects of co-operative trade looked 
fairly promising.  
This was, however, not how the situation was perceived by the leading representatives of 
the co-op movement. Quite to the contrary, the challenges facing the movement were viewed to 
be substantial. Not only was the small-scale and fragmented nature of the movement causing 
major worry. Additional problems of internal, organisational character were also seen to radically 
weaken the movement’s future prospects. 473 The first of these was related to how the liquidity of 
the national federation had been drastically weakened in the immediate post-war years. The major 
reason was that the retail societies had started to increase their trading debt in order to finance 
expansions. As we recall from the previous section, during the 1950s many retail societies had 
transferred their trade to larger, more meticulously furbished self-serviced outlets.474 However, 
these expansions often put major strains on the society’s finances. One way of reliving the 
situation was to delay the payment for deliveries made by the NKL. In the long run this practice 
drastically weekend the financial position of the national association. In the first quarter of 1950 
alone, the retail societies’ debt to the NKL rose by NOK 5 million, equal to  250,000. In 
addition, NOK 3 million in advanced payments had been pulled out in the same period, making 
the total financial loss for the NKL NOK 8 million, or  400,000.475 At one point the situation 
became so acute that the NKL had to cancel a series of deliveries in order not to damage 
relations with its bank 
A second major problem was related to the dramatic, yet unwarranted growth in the 
number of co-operative retail societies. In the period from 1945 to 1950 alone, 300 new societies 
had been established. This implied an increase of 36 per cent. It soon turned out that many of 
these societies had been established without any realistic assessments of the existing trading 
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possibilities.476 Indeed, societies were registered who hadn’t even managed to open a single store 
and where the actual market potential was very limited. Their goal was to find support in the 
national co-operative movement and hopefully manage to get a small, single shop going. In the 
meantime they did not contribute to the economic development of the movement, but instead 
further drained the movement’s total resources. As was noted by the 1947 Annual report of the 
NKL: ‘the difficulties experienced by the new societies to get started have been substantial and 
many have not yet managed to get their business going’.477 
A final problem was related to ongoing administrative turbulence within the NKL. Since 
1920, two leaders had dominated the governance of the national association; Randolf Arnesen as 
chief secretary of the administration and Andreas Juell as full time chairman of the board. In 
1948 both these leaders had to resign as they reached retirement age and replacements had to be 
found. A substantial part of the existing NKL administration also had to be replaced, as several 
of the hired staff were charged with economic irregularities during the wartime period. The 
ultimate consequence of these developments was that the NKL was drained for operational 
energy. The national association was simply unable to take full charge and deal efficiently with the 
challenges facing the movement.  
Thus, by the coming of the 1950s the consumer co-operative movement in Norway was 
hampered by a series of internal problems. While the external threats were minimal, lack of 
coordination between the NKL and the retail societies, the small-scale nature of the retail 
societies and the administrative and financial weaknesses of the NKL caused major worry within 
the movement. For leading representatives of the movement the situation was perceived as a 
probable crisis. Indeed, as the NKL chairman Svein Dalen noted in an internal memo to the 
board of directors: ‘I find the situation to be very serious if we do not very soon take the steps 
necessary to meet the development that a little by little will make itself felt within the Norwegian 
co-operative movement.’478  
The numerous problems that hampered the co-op could indeed have generated critical 
outcomes. As it turned out, however, they helped to clear the ground for the drastic 
reorganisation of the movement’s overall organisational structures. The growing feeling of crisis 
spurred debate and a critical examination of the operational procedures of the movement. The 
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role of the national association and its relation to the retail societies came under close scrutiny 
and the very structural fabric of the movement was questioned and debated. Moreover, these 
debates were largely lead and pushed forward by representatives not bounded by traditional 
organisational practises and ideals. As a consequence of the major administrative conflicts in the 
immediate post-war years, a new generation of younger leaders entered the offices at the NKL 
headquarters. Many of them brought experiences from large- scale private enterprises. At the 
same time, they were determined to create a strong co-operative movement in which they could 
make a successful career. As such, they were also more opened- minded to change.  
Rather than leading to decline, the feeling of crisis present in the co-op movement by the 
coming of the 1950s facilitated the introduction of fundamental transformations. But, how were 
the problems experience by the co-ops to be approached? The answer from the newly appointed 
NKL leadership was simple. The problems could only be solved by pushing forward radical 
structural transformations, capable of substantially increasing the efficiency of the entire 
movement. As chairman of the board Sverre Nilsen noted to the NKL Congress in 1950:  
Our entire system of distribution needs to be rationalised and all our resources 
needs to be coordinated and consolidated. […] Within the NKL every single 
chain needs to be analysed to reduce the costs and increase the efficiency. [...] 
The first problem we have to solve with all our abilities, both in the co-operative 
societies and the NKL, is increased efficiency, from the youngest worker to the 
chief manager. Efficiency should be our watchword in the following years.479  
The focus of the NKL leadership by the coming of the 1950s was thus wholly set on the need to 
reorganise the business operations of the movement. The development of the organisational 
department within the NKL gives further evidence of this attitude.480  
In 1948, Randolf Arnesen had retired as chief secretary of the NKL. He was replaced by 
Peder Søiland, a young co-operator and former Labour Youth League (AUF) politician. As chief 
secretary of the NKL, Søiland automatically took over the leadership of the organisational 
department. Traditionally, the main responsibility of this position had been to advance the 
ideological aspects of co-operative trading. Under the almost thirty year long leadership of 
Randolf Arnesen, the department had primarily sought to increase the popular knowledge of co-
operatives as a specific and morally superior form of economic organisation. In the view of 
Arnesen, consumer co-operation was ‘the consumer’s protection against exploitation’ and in his 
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position as manager of the organisations department he had taken every opportunity to advance 
this principal view.481 Søiland, however, primarily focused on the economic challenges of the co-
operative movement. That is to say, as organisations manager he saw his primary role as 
advocating structural reforms to strengthen the economic performance of the movement. 
Specifically, he was to make his mark as a strong proponent for structural rationalisation at the 
retail level. He consistently advocated the need for the co-op movement to rationalise and 
modernise its operations and specifically to increase efficiency by way of amalgamations of 
societies into larger units. As such, Søiland personified the ongoing ideological shift in the NKL 
administration where increasing attention was given to the commercial aspects of the co-
operative enterprises, while consumer education and the obligation to spread the co-operative 
ideals of fair, honest and democratic trading were deemed less important.  
This strengthened commercialised attitude of the Norwegian co-operators was not only 
confined to the NKL leadership. These views held by the central leadership were also increasingly 
reflected among the retail societies. Hence, replying to the speech made by Sverre Nilsen at the 
1950 Congress, representative Holme from Sarpsborg provided a clear message:  
We have to stop lulling ourselves into a false sense of security thinking that the 
principle aspects of co-operation are so important for the consumer that it alone 
can secure a viable co-operative enterprise. We have to regularly remind 
ourselves that the main role of the consumer co-operative is, by way of sales and 
production, to provide the members with high quality products at a reasonable 
price. This implies that we repeatedly need to investigate the possibilities to 
increase our efficiency and productivity. 482  
The statement is indicative of the basic attitude held by most influential co-operators by the 
coming of the 1950s. The ongoing debates on how to approach the future development of the 
movement soon became largely oriented towards the business operations of the movement and 
the need to reform its basic patterns of trading. The major role of co-operation was defined as 
the ability to efficiently serve the economic needs of the consumer. In order for the co-ops to 
face the challenges ahead, it needed to devote all its energies towards rationalising its entire 
system of distribution, from production via wholesaling to retailing.  
By the beginning of the 1950s then, there existed a clear perception among leading co-
operators of the major challenges facing the movement. A new and energetic leadership had 
taken office at the NKL. The major goals set for future development were fairly clear. Internal 
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inefficiencies in both the NKL and the retail societies were hampering the future prospects of co-
operative trade. The small-scale and fragmented nature of the organisation needed to be dealt 
with. The organisation had to adopt modern forms of organising and operating retailing and 
wholesaling services. There also needed to be a more consistent relationship between the retail 
and the wholesale units to make sure that the total system of distribution was operated according 
to efficient and up- to- date practices. Taken together, these factors were fertile ground for the 
introduction of fundamental changes in the organisational structure of the movement. At the 
same time, they contrasted in important ways with the perceptions held and goals formulated by 
British co-operators in the same period.  
 
The social and moral superiority of co-operation: UK co-operators confronting the 1950s  
While the major threat towards the viability of co-operative food retailing in Norway came from 
inside the movement, in the UK the advance of the multiples was the most fundamental 
problem. The British co-ops had already for some years been unable to keep pace with the level 
of expansion experienced by the multiples and the co-operative form of retailing was increasingly 
characterised as a secondary form of large- scale retailing. It is evident, however, that these 
factual challenges were not fully recognised by the co-operators themselves.  
Looking closer at the main debates and themes discussed at the Co-op Union Congress 
and in the co-operative press in the first half of the 1950s, it is striking how the major 
competitive challenges facing the movement were given very little attention. In some instances 
they were even rejected. The presidential address held by the chairman of the Co-operative 
Union Central Board, J. W. Blower, to the 81st Co-operative Congress in Morecambe is 
indicative. While Blower recognised that there were well- known ‘deficiencies … [in the] trading 
structure’ of the co-ops, and that it seemed ‘probable that some adjustment of our traditional 
ideal will be necessary’, he saw no need to provide a thorough, critical examination of how the 
movement organised its activities.483 Quite to the contrary, Blower praised the cost efficiency of 
the co-operative system of distribution, arguing that any statements ‘made to the effect that the 
costs of distribution are too high’ were drawn ‘without any proof whatsoever’ and were 
‘completely unasserted by facts’.484 Hence, while we recall how the chairman of the board at the 
NKL Congress in 1950 had highlighted the need for the ‘entire system of distribution … to be 
                                                 
483 Co-operative Union Ltd, Report of the 81st Annual Co-operative Congress in the Winter Gardens Theatre Morecambe, May 
29th, 30th, 31st, and June 1stt, 1950 (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1950), p. 279. 
484 Ibid. 
  
 162
rationalised …coordinated and consolidated’, Blower simply concluded that ‘co-operative 
retailing … is at least as efficient as any other section of retailing for which figures of distributive 
costs are available’.485  
On these grounds it was perhaps no surprise that Blower largely neglected commercial 
issues in his presidential address, instead such things as the movement’s ‘relations with the 
Labour Party’, ‘employee relationships’ and ‘the growing indifference and attitude of our own 
members’, were highlighted as being among the movement’s ‘great problems’.486 Blower’s 
restricted focus on such non-commercial issues did, however, also reflect how British co-
operators generally tended to be much more occupied with broader ideological aspects of co-
operative retailing than their Norwegian counterparts, specifically with the need to advance 
consumer co-operation as a socially and morally superior form of economic enterprise. As 
Blower’s address finally concluded:  
Co-operation, with its economic base, is something far greater than mutual 
trading pure and simple. By and through our unique system a new social order is 
slowly but steadily and continuously being evolved in which man shall be freed 
from drudgery and want and given opportunity for the cultivation of the creative 
imaginative life without which a people spiritually perishes.487 
In the following years the co-operative congresses continued to focus primarily on broader issues 
of societal transformation and the role of the consumer co-operative movement within the new 
society evolving in the aftermath of the Second World War. Issues of trade were generally given 
less attention. Hence, in 1951 the Co-op Union reported how ‘Politics … took up a good deal of 
Congress time.488 With ‘the war in Korea and the uneasy peace in the rest of the world’ it was also 
deemed ‘natural that the Congress should take an interest in international affairs.’489  
The 1952 and 1953 congresses saw a minor reaction to this trend. In his presidential 
address to the 1952 Co-operative Congress in Margate, Lord Williams explicitly commented how 
‘for the past six years many co-operators have been preoccupied with the implications of political 
action … and … perhaps, been a little neglectful of the structure in which we as co-operators 
live’.490 He then went on to notice how the ‘relationship of the retail societies to the national 
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federations’ and specifically ‘the need for closer co-ordination of co-operative production and 
distribution’ would be essential preconditions for success in a future where the retail market will 
be increasingly dominated by multiple retailers.491 Still, all the major discussions held in the days 
following Williams’ address were on other issues than trading. As the Co-op Union’s report from 
the congress noted, lively debates had been spurred on the ‘huge sums which were spent on 
armaments’, and ‘the Congress could see no sense in the way the Tory Government had cut the 
education and health service as a way to solve the balance of payments problems.’492 In 1953, the 
president John Corina, who was famous in the movement for being one of the most influential 
characters in the introduction of self-service within the British retail market, also tried to focus 
more explicitly on issues of trade.493 Specifically, as the Co-op Union’s report from the Congress 
stated it, he ‘made a strong plea for the modern approach to retailing, urging that consumer and 
housewife of to-day is attracted by service and quality and specialisation, even more than by co-
operative dividend.’494 But Corina’s plea for an increased focus on these issues gained only limited 
attention. And at the Congress a year later, broader societal issues again took centre stage. 
Proposals were passed against the rearmament of Western Germany and against the huge sums 
being spent on armaments, while ‘the report of the … trade associations, all passed virtually 
without comment.’495 In retrospect the 1954 Congress, held in Scarborough, was in fact receiving 
‘criticism from some quarters’ for spending ‘too much time on political and international 
affairs’.496  
Thus, while trading problems were discussed by the British co-operators, they were 
seldom given the main attention. Issues of trade also tended to be framed within the broader 
picture of the general development of British society and the politics employed by government, 
and were seldom related directly to the competitive threats of the multiple retailers and the 
specific trading structures on which they operated. This is not to say that major leaders of the 
movement were not concerned with how to increase the movement’s efficiency in order to meet 
the future competitive treats of the multiples. But, these strategic considerations continued to be 
framed within a broad and diffuse goal of societal transformation. It is indicative how the 1954 
congress president H. J. Twigg, after having reported the market share of total co-operative trade 
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to stand at an approximate of ten per cent, concluded that ‘in aggregate, we are one tenth of the way 
towards socialising the consumer supplies of Britain’.497  
Hence, compared to the Norwegians, the UK co-operators remained more deeply 
indebted to the broader social and moral principles of consumer co-operation. Commercialised 
attitudes had to be squared with the obligation to advance the co-op as a superior alternative and, 
to cite a 1949 policy statement from the Co-operative Union, as a means ‘to train and influence 
human instincts in order to make co-operation between people an objective and an ideal.’498  
How can we explain these major differences between the Norwegian and British co-
operators in how they approached the immediate challenges of the post-war retailing industry? A 
few points are worth noting. First of all, it is evident that, by the coming of the 1950s, the trading 
structure of the British retail societies was much more advanced than the one operated by the 
Norwegian co-ops. Secondly, even if the competitive threats to co-operative trade were much 
more obvious in the UK than in Norway, the British co-operators remained largely satisfied with 
their trading performance. By 1954 the aggregate financial position of the retail societies was 
regarded by Co-op Union officials as ‘still one of considerable strength.’499 Declining profits and 
dividends were largely subjected to government regulations and the effect of increased prices, 
‘leading to inflated cash sales over which dividends has to be spread.’500 And while the 
organisational structures of the movement were perhaps not competitive with the multiples, the 
lead taken in introducing self-service trading at the retail level already from the mid-1940s 
onwards, spurred, as we have seen earlier, a continued feeling of ‘superiority in the retail trades’ 
among many co-operators.501 The attitudes held among major representatives of the British 
consumer co-operative movement by the beginning of the 1950s was therefore not one of crisis 
and drastic need for change. While the challenges of the multiples were recognised, the 
movement continued to hold a strong belief in the viability of its business model.  
A further factor may be related to the British co-operator’s inclination to advocate broad 
goals of co-operative advance in all spheres of society as a mainstay of its operations. 
Commercial performance was simply not the only parameter on which the co-ops should be 
evaluated. By contrast, Norwegian co-operators developed a much narrower and more clearly 
defined goal of commercialised modernisation as their main guiding principle. As a consequence, 
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they were perhaps more inclined to critically question the economic viability of their 
organisational model. Of course some Norwegian co-operators were also sceptical of the 
increased focus on rationalisation and commercial efficiency advocated by the central leadership. 
But, most attempts at formulating alternative and broader societal foundations for the enterprise 
were either ignored or had negligible influence.502 This also points to a final characteristic of the 
British situation, as opposed to the Norwegian. While a new and energetic leadership had taken 
office at the NKL headquarters and were provided with more substantial powers to initiate 
changes across the entire structure of the co-operative enterprise, the UK movement did not 
have a similar focal point for decision-making. The Co-op Union remained an advisory organ, 
with no direct influence on the trading operations of the retail societies, while the CWS was 
largely regarded as a regular trading partner, with no specific authority over the retail business of 
local co-operatives. It was thus less clear who would take responsibility to initiate and coordinate 
the changes that would be necessary to approach the increasingly real threats to the future 
economic growth of the British co-op movement. 
All these factors influenced how the Norwegian and British co-operators perceived the 
major threats of the 1950 food retail market. In turn these differences in perception came to have 
an important effect on how the two movements actually approached the challenges. The situation 
in Norway was fertile ground for fundamental changes, and throughout the 1950s leading 
representatives of the Norwegian co-operative movement pushed forward radical 
transformations in how the movement organised and operated its activities. The perceptions and 
visions of the British movement on the other hand, foresaw the continuation of the status quo. 
And, as it turned out, most attempts to reform the organisational structure of the British co-op 
movement were rejected and came to nothing.  
 
Norway: Modernisation along US ideals  
During the course of the 1950s, several important reforms were implemented by the Norwegian 
co-operators to solve the pressing challenges perceived to be facing the movement. Particular 
attention was focused on the need to modernise how the national association operated and to 
strengthen the relationship between the national wholesale and the local retail societies. The 
major source of inspiration came from the US chain store model. Leading representatives of the 
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movement made several trips to the US at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s to 
study American retailing practises. The movement also received direct guidance from 
representatives of the European Productivity Agency, who specifically provided advice on how to 
increase productivity in the overall system of co-operative distribution.  
By far the most important figure in the process of transforming how the co-operative 
movement organised its trading activities was the NKL manager, Knut Moe. Moe had been hired 
by the NKL in 1947 to run the NKL grocery department, the largest trading department in terms 
of annual turnover.503 He soon came to play a major role in transforming the operations of the 
entire movement, particularly focusing on streamlining the relationship between the NKL as a 
wholesaler and the local societies as retailers. Together with Olav Meisdalshagen, who was elected 
the new chairman of the NKL board in 1952, he also pushed forward a profound modernisation 
of the NKL storehouse facilities and advocated NKL as the movement’s sole wholesaler.  
Moe’s principle ideas for how the co-op movement should organise and operate its 
activities were taken directly from the trading practise of the US independent retail chains. A 
study trip made to the US in 1953 came to have particular importance. The experiences from the 
trip were reported in two lengthy articles in the co-operative journal Forbrukeren in 1954.504  
While many European visitors studying American retailing had been impressed by the 
dissemination of the self-service system and the size of the retail stores, Moe was more occupied 
with how the system of distribution serving the stores were operated.505 He argued that the 
important thing to be learned from the American retail industry was not the particularities of how 
the individual solutions were operated and run, but rather how the different links in the chain of 
distribution were treated as an integrated system.506 Specifically, he pointed to three factors that 
had turned ‘American wholesale business into a streamlined system of distribution’.507 These were 
the one-storey storehouses with mechanised internal transport, the specific system of placing the 
                                                 
503 In 1950 the department recorded an annual turnover of NOK 80 million, or  4 million, which represented 57 
per cent of total NKL turnover. The second largest department was the hardware department, trading an annual 
turnover of NOK 30 million, equal to  1.5 million, see Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Annual Report 1950, p. 
31. 
504 K. Moe, ’Strømlinjeformet vareomsetning. Artikkel 1. Amerikansk engroshandel i matvarebransjen’ Forbrukeren, 
10:4 (1955), pp. 83-8 and K. Moe, ’Strømlinjeformet vareomsetning. Artikkel 2. Amerikansk engroshandel i 
matvarebransjen’ Forbrukeren, 10:5-6 (1955), pp. 101-4.  
505 It is revealing how the first reports from the trip, published in Forbrukeren in December 1954, mainly concerned 
the retail level, while Moe’s articles concerned the operational practises of the chain stores, and specifically how they 
organised their system of distribution, see O. Hole, ‘Noen inntrykk fra landet med verdens mest rasjonelle og 
effektive detaljomsetningsapparat’, Forbrukeren, 9:9 (1954), pp. 212-16 and O. Hole, ‘Noen inntrykk fra landet med 
verdens mest rasjonelle og effektive detaljomsetningsapparat’, Forbrukeren, 9:10-11 (1954), pp. 235-8. 
506 E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. Forbrukesamvirkets historie i 
Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006), pp. 300-1. 
507 K. Moe, ’Strømlinjeformet vareomsetning. Artikkel 2. Amerikansk engroshandel i matvarebransjen’ Forbrukeren, 
10:5-6 (1955), p. 101.  
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merchandise in the storehouse on the basis of turnover rate, weight and volume and the 
introduction of pre-printed ordering lists. The first two factors were related to the how the 
wholesaler operated the storehouses, while the third factor concerned the relationship between 
the wholesaler and the retailer. When Moe returned from his study trip in 1953 he sought to 
transform the operations of the co-operative movement along both these major lines.  
Since before the Second World War, the NKL had operated 10 regional storehouses, 
spread across the country. But, these were technologically inadequate and insufficient to cope 
with the expansion of trade following the war. In 1954 therefore, the NKL launched a 
comprehensive 5 year investment plan in order to make possible the ‘expansion of the NKL, its 
daughter companies and the retail societies’.508 We have already seen how the retail societies, 
actively supported by the NKL, managed to take the lead in self-service and supermarket 
retailing.509 The increased investments in the retail facilities of the movement had, however, to be 
squared with a thorough modernisation of wholesale storehouses owned and operated by the 
national association. Hence, in 1954 the movement set an ambitious goal ‘to build’, and ‘in the 
course of a few years expand … [the] storehouses in 8 out of 10 places’.510 In addition, the NKL 
also sought ‘to build with an eye on making our business more rational.’511 It was not enough to 
enlarge the existing storehouses, they also had to be radically modernised in order to meet the 
requirements of a modern and up- to- date chain of distribution. As NKL director Rolf 
Semmingsen noted in his speech to the 1954 Congress: ‘it is not enough that we build and obtain 
more square metres, it is first and foremost imperative that we build the right type of 
storehouses, to make sure that we obtain the highest possible rationalisation of our operations.’512 
This basically implied that the movement sought to establish an encompassing system of ten 
regional storehouses constructed on a modern basis, with all storage space on a single floor.  
The most written about opening was in Oslo, where a completely new storehouse was 
opened at the Filipstad dock in 1957.513 But this was only one out of many new openings made in 
the 1950s and early 1960s. New or enlarged and modernised storehouses were opened all across 
the country, from Kristiansand and Stavanger in the south/southwest, Bergen, Ålesund and 
Trondheim in the western and central parts of the country, to Tromsø in the north. The many 
                                                 
508 Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Protokoll over forhandlingen på Norges kooperative Landsforenings 25. kongress i 
Stavanger 23., 24. og 25 august 1954, (Oslo: Arbeidernes Aktietrykkeri, 1955), p. 68. 
509 See chapter two and three in the present thesis.  
510 Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Protokoll over forhandlingen på Norges kooperative Landsforenings 25. kongress i 
Stavanger 23., 24. og 25 august 1954, (Oslo: Arbeidernes Aktietrykkeri, 1955), p. 82. 
511 Ibid., p. 83. 
512 Ibid. 
513 For a more elaborate description, see E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. Vatnaland, Organisert 
kjøpekraft. Forbrukesamvirkets historie i Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006), pp. 312-15. 
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openings reflected how the NKL sought to modernise the entire structure of co-operative 
storehouses according to the US system. The expansions, rebuilding and refitting, were initiated 
to make sure that the NKL could offer the retail societies the most efficient and up- to- date 
wholesale services. In addition to building the storehouses on one floor, different solutions for 
more efficiently storing and placing the different goods were developed along the lines advocated 
by Moe. Close contacts with technical consultants provided by the Marshall-aid administration 
eased the planning of the storehouses.  
In addition to reforming the wholesale storehouses, the NKL also initiated several 
reforms to improve the relationship between the national wholesale federation and the retail 
societies. The first step in this process was to reduce the retail societies’ reliance on their own 
wholesaling business. By 1950, many retail societies were still operating separate production and 
wholesaling operations. For example, the co-operative society in Oslo operated a substantial 
wholesaling business as well as separate coffee production facilities. During the 1950s and early 
1960s, however, most production facilities operated by local retail societies were disposed of and 
wholesaling was made the sole responsibility of the NKL. The basic rationale was to increase the 
general efficiency in the entire chain of distribution by introducing a clearer division of labour 
between the units responsible for production and wholesaling (the NKL) and the units 
responsible for running the retail outlets (the retail societies). The second step was to improve the 
trading relationship between these two levels. This was essential in order to reap the potential 
economies of scale of the new technological solutions.514 The major challenge was to take full 
advantage of the combined benefits of the self-service system and the new, mechanised 
storehouses. It was obvious that such an improvement in trading relations needed to involve 
some form of centralisation of purchasing decisions and some restraints on the individual retail 
society's ability to decide where and what to buy. The initial solution, persistently advocated by 
Moe, was to rationalise the ordering routines by introducing pre-printed ordering lists to be used 
by the retail societies.  
With support from technical assistants provided by the Marshall-plan administration in 
Paris, the NKL introduced its first measures along these lines in 1955. The system – named 
‘Systemkjøp’ – was implemented in all districts from 1955 to 1963 and involved a series of 
measures that radically improved efficiency at NKLs wholesale storehouses. First of all, the 
goods sold at the retail outlets should be limited to a pre-agreed list, reducing the need to hold 
                                                 
514 This and the following paragraph based on E. Ekberg, E. Lange and E. Merok, ‘A successful latecomer: Growth 
and transformation of the Norwegian consumer co-operatives 1920-2000’ Paper presented at the XIV International 
Economic History Congress, Helsinki, 21.-25. August 2006.  
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numerous brands within the same product line. Secondly, separate transportation routines were 
introduced that greatly reduced the number of orders put to the wholesale storehouses. And 
thirdly, the system committed co-operatives to buy a certain percentage of their goods from the 
NKL wholesale operation. The participating retail societies were given generous rebates in order 
to stimulate large orders and to enhance loyalty a set of bonuses were set up giving the local 
societies an incentive to increase the share of goods bought from the NKL.  
The distribution system established shared many similarities with the independent chain-
stores Moe had studied in the US. By rationalising the storehouse operations of the national 
federation, centralising all wholesaling to the NKL and simplifying the co-operation between the 
NKL and the retail societies, it was believed that the co-operative movement had found a system 
that allowed them to reap the benefits from chain store organisations, without altering the 
federative characteristics of the organisation. While the system fell short of completely 
centralising purchasing decisions, it none the less allowed for NKL to significantly increase its 
share of volume sold at local co-operatives. As figure 6.1 shows, after the system had been 
implemented in 1955 the Co-operative societies’ purchase from the NKL in per cent of total 
purchase gradually started to improve.  
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Figure 6.1: Co-operative societies’ purchase from the NKL in per cent of total purchase, 
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By 1960 a series of radical changes in the organisational structure and operational procedures of 
the co-operative movement had been introduced. These were largely inspired by US models of 
retail distribution and primarily introduced as a means to increase the overall productivity of the 
movement. At the same time, they came to form the model for other retailers still operating on 
outdated organisational principles. This is not to say that important rationalisations were not 
made on initiatives from private enterprises. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s drastic structural 
changes within the country’s wholesale industry reduced the number of wholesalers dramatically. 
Gradually, the industry came to be dominated by three large wholesalers, in addition to the 
NKL.516 These large wholesalers, the most prominent being the Oslo based company Joh. 
Johannson, also took an active part in rationalising and streamlining storehouse operations. In 
1958 Joh. Johannson opened their first one- story storehouse, situated alongside the NKL 
storehouse at the Filipstad dock. A year later it introduced the so called ‘Joh-systemet’, an 
equivalent to the co-operative ‘Systemkjøp’. The major goal was to rationalise operations by 
focusing on fewer and larger customers. The system also sought to function as an inducement for 
                                                 
515 Adopted from E. Ekberg, E. Lange and E. Merok, ‘A successful latecomer: Growth and transformation of the 
Norwegian consumer co-operatives 1920-2000’ Paper presented at the XIV International Economic History Congress, 
Helsinki, 21.-25. August 2006. The estimation is based on NKLs annual reports for the period 1918 to 1980. Full 
references to statistical tables and figures can be found in E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. 
Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. Forbrukesamvirkets historie i Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006).  
516 A. Strand, Dagligvarekjøpmennene og samfunnet 1958-1988 (Oslo: Norges Dagligvarehandels Forbund, 1988), p. 30. 
See also D. Bredal, Kampen om ditt daglige brød. Bak kulissene i dagligvarebransjen (Oslo: Schibsted, 1996). 
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retailers to focus their buying at Joh. Johannson as their prime wholesaler. The company was also 
first in introducing computerised logistic systems in 1964.  
The introduction of these measures led to profound savings. By 1962 the National 
Association of Grocers reported that overall wholesale costs in the industry had been reduced 
from twelve to seven and a half per cent.517 The overall structure of the industry, however, 
remained fragmented. Most prominently, while the wholesalers rationalised, they failed to create 
efficient, integrated structures comprising both retail and wholesale functions.518  
The overall situation by the 1960s was thus that the co-op movement was leading the way 
in introducing the principles of chain store organisation into the Norwegian food retail market. 
The movement had experienced a state of internal crisis in the early 1950s. Alongside the 
development of new and more modern retail outlets, the movement sought to redeem the crisis 
by rationalising the system of distribution serving the retail stores. This process of modernising 
and rationalising was gradually defined as the core objective of the co-operative enterprise. The 
overall goal was simply to increase the welfare of the population, by way of building a more 
efficient system of distribution on co-operative lines. And while the private retail industry 
remained fragmented, the co-op movement became a driving force in the ongoing attempt to 
modernise the overall system of distribution within the Norwegian context.  
 
UK: reluctance to change  
The immediate post-war years had seen a rapid strengthening in the position of multiple retailers 
in the UK. The co-ops, by contrast, had stagnated. Despite these real development trends, the 
co-operative movement had showed only limited interest in discussing how the challenges facing 
them best could be handled. Rather, issues of trade had largely been ignored at co-operative 
congresses – the main arena for debate on issues of importance for the co-operative retail 
societies – and the movement had not made any serious attempts to reform its organisational 
structures. It may thus seem surprising that at the 1955 Co-operative Congress, held at Usher 
Hall Edinburgh, a large majority voted in support of a resolution to establish an independent 
inquiry commission, with the ‘responsibility of surveying the whole field of co-operative 
                                                 
517 E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. Forbrukesamvirkets historie i 
Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006), p. 321. 
518 For a full account, see J. Vatnaland, Stability and change in the organization of industry. The chain store innovation and the 
transformation of American retailing in a comparative perspective (PhD dissertation, University of Oslo, 2007), pp. 204-5. 
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production and marketing, both wholesale and retail.’519 The commission, later termed the 
Independent Commission, was appointed to ‘prepare and submit … a report and 
recommendations designed to secure the greatest possible advantage to the movement from its 
manufacturing, wholesale and retail resources and to propose to the Central Executive such 
methods and organisation as may be thought best suited to achieve this.’520  
The establishment of the Independent Commission was the first sign that the British co-
operators were seriously considering addressing some of the trading challenges that were facing 
the movement. It seemed that the movement was gradually becoming more aware of the 
challenges represented by the immense growth of the multiples. The fact that the commission 
was set up as an independent inquiry, involving several high-ranking members from outside the 
co-operative sphere also indicated that the movement was seriously reconsidering its self-assured 
image.521 However, when looking closer at why the commission was established and how its 
findings and suggestions were actually received, it is the established picture of an organisation 
reluctant to introduce substantial changes in their organisational model that is confirmed.  
Even though the Independent Commission was to be among the most extensive 
evaluations of co-operative trade ever made, it was not rooted in any fear of the future viability of 
co-operative trading. 522 The launch of the commission at the 1955 congress was not the result of 
some acute feeling of crisis in the movement. Rather, as the Co-op Union chairman John Corina 
underlined in his presentation of the proposal to form the inquiry: ‘Let us make no mistake about 
it; this proposal is not due to any weakness in our resources or in our financial or economic 
position, but merely to a desire to adjust our economy to bring it into line with modern trends.’523  
The commission was set-up to bring the co-operative form of trading ‘into line with 
modern trends’.524 What did this imply? What is clear from the outset is that the report focused 
solely on issues of trade. It was, in the words of British historian Peter Gurney, a report 
brusquely dispensing with ‘any utopian aspirations’.525 The analysis and major suggestions of the 
                                                 
519 Co-operative Union Ltd, Report of the 86th Annual Co-operative Congress in the Usher Hall Edinburgh May 30th, 31st, June 
1st and 2nd, 1955 (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1955), p. 331. 
520 Ibid., p. 331. 
521 Among the most distinguished members were the commission’s leader, Labour MP and party leader Hugh 
Gaitskell, the socialist theorist and former Labour MP Anthony Crosland and the retail analysist Dr. James Jefferys,  
522 According to William Richardson, writing on the history of the CWS, the commission report was ‘undoubtedly 
the most exhaustive and probably statistically the best documented investigation in the Movement's long history., see 
W. Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited, 1977), pp. 
213. 
523 Co-operative Union Ltd, Report of the 86th Annual Co-operative Congress in the Usher Hall Edinburgh May 30th, 31st, June 
1st and 2nd, 1955 (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1955), p. 332. 
524 Ibid. 
525 P. Gurney, ’The Battle of the Consumer in Postwar Britain’, The Journal of Modern History, 77 (December 2005), 
983. 
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commission were more or less completely focused on how the prospects of co-operative trading 
could be improved. The final report of more than 300 pages ended in a list of no less than 51 
specific recommendations.526 These were directed partly to the retail societies, partly to the Co-
operative Union and partly to the wholesale units. They varied from the very detailed to the more 
general and fundamental. Hence, at the more detailed end, the movement and its retail societies 
were advised to ‘be more willing than (they have) been in the past to recruit from grammar 
schools and Universities’, to ‘adopt a more generous attitude towards salaries’ and to ‘be more 
ready to dismiss officials for slackness or incompetence’.527 The more groundbreaking and 
fundamental recommendations were of three distinct types.  
The first concerned the governing structure of the two wholesale societies, the Co-
operative Wholesale Society and the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society. Traditionally these 
organisations had been governed by a democratically elected lay Board that also held full-time 
managerial responsibilities. According to the Commission this policy seemed both ‘somewhat 
surprising’ and ‘distinctly unorthodox by either Co-operative or outside, commercial standards.’, 
as the normal practice within retail societies was for the elected board to have only part- time 
appointments and confine the basic managerial functions to professional officials.528 
Traditionally, however, this had not been viewed as a sufficiently democratic form of control by 
the wholesalers. But, as the Commission saw it, the existing structure was ‘not, under present–day 
conditions, appropriate’.529 It was viewed neither as efficient nor capable of fulfilling the essential 
requirements for democratic control and it needed to be replaced by a more modern governance 
model. In the suggested new model, the elected board should still have ultimate control of the 
enterprise, but principally restrict itself to supervision and control. The daily management of the 
business should be entrusted to a full time managerial board chosen solely for their professional 
ability. It was believed that such a reform, demarcating more clearly ‘between the function of 
management and that of democratic control’, would ‘be in the interests both of democracy and 
business efficiency.’530  
The second major suggestion of the commission was more directly related to the 
competitive challenges coming from the multiple chains. It specifically concerned the dramatic 
weakening of the co-operative dry-goods business and the need to drastically alter the way the 
movement operated within this type of trade. Specifically the Commission suggested that the 
                                                 
526 See Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Independent Commission Report (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 
1958). 
527 Ibid., p. 241.  
528 Ibid., p. 218 
529 Ibid. 
530 Ibid., p. 220. 
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movement should establish a group of national dry goods chains responsible for developing the 
co-operative dry-goods business: ‘We have … decided that a clear case exists for the creation of 
national specialist bodies to develop particular sections of the Co-operative dry goods trade on 
multiple shop lines’.531 The chains should be owned and controlled by the retail societies but at 
the same time provide substantial leverage in their day- to- day operations. 
The commission’s third major suggestion addressed the challenge of how to more 
efficiently coordinate the retail operations of the movement on a national scale. In the view of 
the Commission, a major challenge for the co-op movement was the lack of an efficient, central 
unit capable of steering the development of all retail societies in a more positive direction. The 
national bodies operated by the Co-op Union and the CWS had proven incapable of solving this 
task satisfactorily. Therefore, the suggestion was made to establish a separate, national retail body 
– the Co-operative Retail Development Society – to ‘provide leadership and co-ordination of a 
kind which can only come from a national body.’532 The organisation should be operated under 
the joint control of the Co-operative Union and the two wholesalers. Its major tasks should be to 
provide guidance on operational services such as buying and selling techniques, accountancy 
methods, office organisation, efficiency audits and so forth. It was also to provide advice on 
capital development, study trends in the retail industry and take charge of the development of 
national organisations in the retail field, most prominently the establishment of national dry 
goods chains.533 By way of establishing such a national body, accepting ‘the responsibility for 
providing advice and initiating new ventures in the retail field’, it was believed that ‘the 
movement should be thoroughly equipped to meet the increasingly militant competition of 
private enterprise.’534  
The report of the Independent Commission was first presented at the 1958 Co-operative 
Congress in Scarborough. It was then thoroughly discussed at a special national congress held 
half a year later. The special congress decided that all recommendations made by the commission 
directly affecting the operations of the wholesalers should be referred to the boards and 
shareholding societies of these organisations. This simply implied that the suggestions related to 
the governance structure of the CWS and the SCWS were to be decided upon by these 
organisations themselves. The other main suggestions were to be further discussed by a special 
                                                 
531 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Independent Commission Report (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1958), p. 
110. 
532 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Independent Commission Report (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1958), p. 
117. 
533 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Independent Commission Report (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1958), pp. 
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534 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Independent Commission Report (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1958), pp. 
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negotiating committee and finally decided upon at the 1960 Co-op Union Congress, to be held in 
Blackpool.  
It soon turned out that the scepticism towards the Commission’s suggestions was 
profound. The first suggestion was debated by the member societies of the CWS and the SCWS 
at several meetings during the autumn and winter of 1957 and 1958.535 The final vote of the CWS 
was taken at a special general meeting on the seventh and fourteenth of March, and by 7,887 to 
6,136 votes the suggestion was rejected. The second and third major suggestions, those of 
establishing national chains governed by the retail societies and of creating a separate co-
operative retail development society, were finally considered at the 1960 Blackpool congress. 
Both the Commission’s suggestions were rejected. The congress decided against the setting up of 
chains under the control of retail societies. It also dismissed the proposal of establishing a new, 
separate national retail development unit. Instead, it was decided to give some similar functions 
intended to be performed by the suggested new unit to a department within the Co-op union, 
controlled by a special committee.536  
The 1960 Congress was in retrospect described by the Co-op Union as ‘an epoch in the 
history of the Movement … generator of fresh spirit of unity and of renewed determination’.537 
The truth of the matter is that all the major suggestions made by the Independent Commission 
had been rejected by the movement and that very few radical changes in the structure of the 
movement had in fact been implemented. As Gurney has remarked, ‘the commissions finding’s 
was hotly debated in cooperative circles, then duly ignored.’538 The co-operators simply remained 
reluctant to accept that their trading position was under any direct attack and that their specific 
form of organising needed to be re-evaluated. Even if the figures clearly showed that the 
movement’s economic progress had stagnated throughout the post-war period and from the mid 
1950s onwards it was in fact in decline, leading co-operative managers continued to characterise 
any talk of decline as ‘complete and utter nonsense’.539 Instead reference was repeatedly made to 
                                                 
535 See W. Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited, 
1977), pp. 217-23. 
536 Co-operative Union Ltd, Report of the 91st Annual Co-operative Congress in the Winter Gardens Blackpool, June 6th, 7th, 
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the ‘inner strengths of the movement’, and optimism remained about the future competitiveness 
of the traditional form of co-operative trading.540  
 
Conclusions  
The 1950s had been decade of fundamental transition. After the immediate challenges of post-
war shortages and rationing had been overcome, both the Norwegian and the British consumer 
co-operative movements were faced with the need to drastically reorganise their basic trading 
structure. In the UK, multiple food retailers challenged the competitive strength of the co-op. 
The growth in market share stagnated and from the mid- 1950s it was in fact declining. In 
Norway, internal problems formed the main challenge. Private wholesalers regrouped, formed 
larger enterprises and sought to establish closer co-operation with selected retailers. But multiple 
retailing was still non-existent in Norway by the late 1950s.541 Hence, the market position of the 
Norwegian co-ops was not seriously threatened from outside competitors. It was the internal 
challenges that worried the Norwegian co-operators  
Throughout the 1950s the Norwegian movement was to take several major steps in 
transforming its organisational and operational structure. A new and energetic leadership took 
office at the NKL, determined to secure a bright future for co-operative trading. Attention was 
fully focused on the need to increase the overall economic efficiency of the co-operative system 
of distribution, while the moral and democratic aspects of co-operative trading were increasingly 
ignored. The movement rationalised and modernised its entire wholesaling apparatus and 
introduced new and more efficient ways of operating the trade between the local retail societies 
and their national wholesalers. By the coming of the 1960s the feeling of crisis and acute need for 
change characterising the situation in 1950 had been replaced by a qualified optimism. The 
movement had taken the lead in the ongoing process of rationalising the country’s distribution 
system. And while there were still important steps to be taken, the competitive position of the co-
op was secure and sound.  
In the UK, while the external challenges facing the movement were much more obvious 
than in Norway, the perception of the main threats and the approach taken to confront them did 
not seem to be dealt with in a serious manner. Despite the consistent rise of the multiples, by the 
                                                 
540 In the expression of the general Secretary of the Co-Operative Union, Roberts Southern, in a BBC radio 
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trading rivals – the multiple stores (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1960), p. 10. 
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coming of the 1950s there was no apparent feeling of crisis in the British co-op movement. As 
late as in 1960, leading representatives of the movement denied that the movement was in decline 
and the need for a drastic reorganisation in the movement’s trading structure was not deemed 
apparent. Based on the existing trade statistics it was evident that it was the multiple retailers and 
not the co-ops that were leading the way in British retailing. Despite these developments, the co-
operators repeatedly advocated their belief in the economic viability of co-operative trading and 
the movement continued to uphold a broad vision of transforming the entire structure of the 
retail industry towards a co-operative commonwealth.  
The coming of the 1960s put further pressure on the competitiveness of co-operative 
trade. Most importantly, the increasing size of the multiples made possible further increases in 
the economies of scale realised by these retailers. Gradually, the competitive threats of the 
multiples and the superiority of their organisational model could no longer be ignored. To 
approach the challenge the co-ops needed to radically increase the size of their retail societies and 
gather a larger proportion of co-operative trade under centralised control. How this process 
unfolded in Norway and the UK and what consequences it generated for the further 
development of co-operative retailing in these two countries is the theme of the next chapter.  
 
  
 178
  
 179
 
Chapter 7: Centralisation  
 
 
The 1950s had been a period of transition and insecurity within the food trades. By the 1960s, 
however, the overall direction of development was becoming increasingly clear. A new, mass 
consumer society was taking shape. The competitive situation within the food trades was 
becoming more apparent and the demands for efficient retailing more clearly recognised. Most 
importantly, across Western Europe the rise of the multiple retailers intensified along well- 
known lines. They continued to expand the level of trade under centralised control, to 
standardise the operational principles of their different stores and to take further control over the 
system of distribution by internalising the wholesaling function. While the timing and pace of the 
multiples' expansion varied between countries, the economic viability of their organisational 
model was becoming more and more obvious. The direction was set, the remaining question was 
how to approach it. 
The Norwegian and the British consumer co-operatives had taken different approaches to 
the challenges of the 1950s. In Norway, while multiple retailers had made virtually no progress, 
the principles of chain store food retailing had been recognised and embraced by leading co-
operators. Indeed, the co-op movement had taken the lead in introducing the organisational and 
operational principles of the chain store within the Norwegian market. In contrast, the British co-
ops had remained reluctant to make radical changes in their organisational structure. Leading 
British co-operators continued to advocate the pre-eminence of traditional co-operative trading 
principles and upheld a broad vision of transforming the retail trade on co-operative lines.  
By 1960, however, the advance of the multiples could no longer be ignored. What 
particularly gained attention was the increasing size of their operations and the economies of 
scale they managed to realise.542 Co-operative societies had also been renowned for their ability to 
take advantage of scale economies. Many retail societies operated several branches. By 
                                                 
542 Even if the actual dissemination of the multiple form varied, the principles on which they traded were recognised 
also in those countries where their actual market penetration remained limited. Hence, the economic potential of the 
chain store and its massive expansion in the immediate post-war period was also broadly acknowledged in Norway. 
The most obvious proof of this is the report of the public Retail Trade Commission, published in 1957, directly 
stating how ‘the greatest possibilities for structural rationalisation in distribution are to be found in better 
cooperation between the activities of the wholesale and retail levels’, cited in J. Vatnaland, Stability and change in the 
organization of industry. The chain store innovation and the transformation of American retailing in a comparative perspective (PhD 
dissertation, University of Oslo, 2007), pp. 203-4. See also chapter six in the present thesis.  
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establishing national wholesaling organisations they had also taken advantage of scale in buying. 
Indeed, by 1960 the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) was still among the largest 
enterprises in the UK.543 In Norway, the largest retail societies operated larger stores and more 
branches than any private retailer had managed to establish. Still, on a general basis the scale 
advantages of the largest and most efficient multiple retailers radically outperformed most co-
operative endeavours. 
Hence, by the coming of the 1960s awareness gradually gained momentum among co-
operators that the structure of their movement was inadequate to meet the future challenges of 
multiple retailing. While scale economies had been obtained in some areas and by some societies, 
the core organisational feature of the movement was still its numerous, small, independent retail 
societies operating one or a few branches. The view held was increasingly that the competitive 
threats of the multiples needed to be approached by way of substantially expanding the average 
size of the retail societies. It was simply deemed necessary to organise a larger proportion of co-
operative trade under fewer units.  
From the 1960s onwards, centralisation was on the main agenda among consumer co-
operative societies across Western Europe. The International Co-operative Alliance held 
numerous conferences on the subject and within most national co-operative movements the need 
for the retail societies to join forces in larger trading units was widely debated – and recognised.544 
Radical processes of centralisation were soon initiated. These came to take three major forms. 
The most widely used approach consisted of merging small, local societies into larger regional 
units. A second strategy was to develop retailing business under the centralised control of the 
national federative organisations, typically the national wholesale federation. Finally, a more 
radical approach consisted of merging all independent societies, as well as the national federative 
organisations, into one single national co-operative enterprise. Different national co-ops chose 
different overall strategies. From a situation where most co-operative enterprises were organised 
along fairly similar lines, the centralisation process starting in full from the early 1960s onwards 
                                                 
543 After the merger between CWS and the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society in 1973, the company was in fact 
among the biggest ten enterprises in the UK, see F. Müller, ‘The consumer co-operatives in Great Britain’, in J. 
Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva: International Co-operative 
Alliance, 1989), p. 104. 
544 Evidence to support this statement can be found in the numerous articles on ongoing processes of centralisation 
and amalgamations in different countries, presented in national and international co-operative journals. Some 
examples include, C. C. Hilditch, ‘The British Amalgamation Survey’, Review of International Co-operation, 54:5 (1961), 
112-17; T. Odhe, ‘Swedish cooperation in a world of changing structures’, Review of International Co-operation 52:7/8 
(1959), 197-203; O. Riis, ‘Danish consumer co-operation’, Review of International Co-operation 59:3(1966), 139-41; A. 
Vukovich, ‘The Austrian consumer co-operatives’, Review of International Co-operation 59:5 (1966), 225-30; H. L. 
Jennings, ‘Denmark in transition’, Co-operative Review 41:1 (1967), 2 and A. Peter, ‘New forms of collaboration 
between Consumer Co-operatives in the Federal Republic of Germany’, Review of International Co-operation 66:4 (1973), 
134-37. 
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caused the creation of a variety of structural models. Dependent on the main strategy chosen, 
three basic forms developed. The standard federative model was upheld in countries focusing 
exclusively on merging societies into larger units. In these countries the national federation stayed 
out of retailing and the traditional division of labour between local retail units and national 
wholesale and manufacturing associations was largely upheld. A second, hybrid federative model 
developed in countries focusing both on merging societies into larger units and developing 
retailing units under the centralised control of the national wholesaler. In these countries the 
existing operations of the retail societies were supplemented with a fully integrated national 
retail/wholesale enterprise operating alongside the federative structure. Finally, a third non-
federative model was the result in countries where the national co-operative movement merged all its 
activities into one, national organisation. In such instances the federative structure was 
abandoned altogether to be replaced by a fully integrated national co-operative enterprise.  
This chapter investigate how the Norwegian and the British co-operative movements 
approached the increasing pressure to centralise their operations. Specifically, it explores how the 
two movements came to develop different overall models of co-operative organisation, and 
discusses how these differences worked to shape their overall development.  
 
Structural reforms in the UK consumer co-operative movement  
Centralisation as a means to strengthen the competitiveness of co-operative trade was seriously 
on the agenda among British co-operators from 1960 onwards. Amalgamations, mergers and the 
development of centralised retailing operations by the national wholesalers was, however, not 
something entirely new to the UK co-operative movement. Indeed, already since 1901 the 
number of retail societies had been in decline, after a peak of more than 1,400 societies had been 
reached. 545 Repeated commissions and reports had also been raised questioning the viability of 
the organisational structure on which the consumer co-ops operated. Hence, the 1893 Co-
operative Congress had already discussed ‘the waste of capital and effort’ arising from societies 
trading in close proximity to each other and advocated amalgamation as one possible means to 
                                                 
545 Figures taken from Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative statistics, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1950). 
Some disagreements do exist on when the number of retail societies actually peaked. Hence according to C. C. 
Hilditch the peak year was 1903, with 1,455 societies, see C. C. Hilditch, ‘The British Amalgamation Survey’, Review of 
International Co-operation, 54:5 (1961), 112. According to a recent study on the development of co-operative retailing in 
Britain, basing its estimates on figures from the reports of the chief registrar of friendly societies, the peak year was 
1911, with a total of 1,770 retail societies. These estimates probably include also those co-operative retail societies 
not affiliated with the Co-operative Union, see M. Purvis, ‘Co-operative retailing in Britain’, in J. Benson and G. 
Shaw (eds), The Evolution of Retail Systems c. 1800-1914 (London: Leicester University Press, 1992), p. 113. 
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solve the problem.546 From this point onwards, the advantages of centralisation had repeatedly 
been advocated by leading co-operative officials. The chief secretary of the co-operative union J. 
C. Grace, in his presidential address to the 1906 Co-operative Congress in Birmingham, went so 
far as to suggest a total amalgamation of all independent retail societies into one national co-
operative society. While his suggestions received only limited support, the proposition clearly 
indicated how the advantages of scale in the operation of a retailing business were by now 
receiving substantial attention. Calls to increase the average size of the retail societies were again 
repeated by the large General Economic Survey Report presented to the 1919-1920 Co-operative 
Congress, specifically advocating amalgamation as a means to ‘secure the greatest economy of 
administration’.547  
Increased centralisation of the co-operative retail operations had also been advocated by 
the national wholesalers. Already in 1914 the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society (SCWS) 
had opened their first retail branch. It was believed that such forward integration was necessary 
to strengthen the dissemination of co-operative trade in Scotland.548 On similar lines the CWS in 
1934 had established their own retailing organisation.549 The overall goal was to expand co-
operative trade into new markets and to secure the future for existing co-operative trade by 
taking over the engagements of ailing societies. While the immediate effect of these wholesale 
controlled retailing engagements were limited, they worked to further push forward ongoing 
processes of centralisation within co-operative trade.  
By the coming of the 1960s the question of structural transformation and centralisation 
of trade into larger units had thus been repeatedly discussed and advocated by the co-op 
movement. The number of retail societies was already in a slow, but steady decline, while 
wholesale controlled retail operations had started to develop, further increasing the overall level 
of centralisation within the movement. However, from the 1960s onwards the pressure to 
increase the pace of these developments radically intensified. The quest to centralise co-operative 
operations developed along all the three main lines mentioned. The Co-operative Union 
intensified its pressure on the retail co-ops to take part in mergers and increase the average size 
of their societies. Plans, commissions and inquiries were repeatedly initiated to investigate the 
economic advantages of creating larger retail units and to suggest the most rational paths of 
                                                 
546 This according to Co-operative Union Ltd, Regional Plan for Co-operative Societies in England, Wales, and Ireland 
(Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1968), p. 1. 
547 Co-operative Union Ltd, Regional Plan for Co-operative Societies in England, Wales, and Ireland (Manchester: Co-
operative Union Ltd, 1968), p. 1. 
548 J. Kinlock and J. Butt, History of the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd (Glasgow: Co-operative Wholesale 
Society Ltd, 1981). 
549 W. Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited, 1977). 
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development. Wholesaler- owned retail co-ops, as well as separate retail branches within the 
SCWS and the CWS, also started to grow dramatically in size, taking over a substantial 
proportion of total co-operative trade. Finally, the overall federative structure was repeatedly 
scrutinised and the development towards a single national co-operative society was strongly 
advocated by co-operative managers and elected officials alike.  
The first concrete step to push forward drastic centralisations was taken by the 
Independent Commission. In a separate chapter on ‘the size and number of retail societies’, the 
Commission had specifically discussed the need for structural reform.550 The chapter pointed 
directly to how ‘recent decades have seen a steady trend towards larger organisations even in 
retailing’ and that the need was acute for the co-op movement to drastically reduce the number 
of retail societies through mergers and amalgamations.551 In the view of the Commission, ‘the 
present large number and diverse size of Co-operative retail societies places the movement under 
a severe handicap in competing with the multiple shop organisations.’552 While reductions in the 
number of societies had been made steadily throughout the first half of the century, the speed of 
centralisation had been slow. In the period from 1901 to 1950, a total of 419 societies had been 
wound up, merged or taken over by the retail unit of the CWS, the Co-operative Retail services 
(CRS). This implied a relative reduction of 29 per cent over a fifty year period.553 In the wake of 
the intensified rise of the multiple retailers, it was deemed necessary to drastically increase the 
pace of these structural rationalisations. As stated by the Commission: ‘At the rate of progress of 
the last five years, we should be well into the 21st Century before the number of societies is 
reduced to 250. Progress in the private trade may not be quite so leisurely.’554  
Following the recommendations from the Independent Commission, the Co-operative 
Union immediately initiated a separate survey on the subject of centralisation, the so-called 
National Amalgamation Survey. The survey was intended to work as ‘a long term basic plan for the 
concentration of societies into autonomous units of sufficient size to allow the efficient and 
economic operation and development of retail co-operative outlets.’555 It was finally completed by 
the early autumn of 1960.556 The proposals it put forward were quite radical. Most importantly, 
the plan suggested that the number of societies should be more than halved, from the present 
                                                 
550 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Independent Commission Report (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1958), pp. 
78-106. 
551 Ibid., p. 82. 
552 Ibid., p. 241. 
553 Figures taken from Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative statistics, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1950). 
554 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Independent Commission Report (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1958), p. 
98. 
555 Co-operative Union Ltd, National Amalgamation Survey (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1960), p. 7. 
556 A lengthy description of the work conducted by the survey committee is provided by C. C. Hilditch, ‘The British 
Amalgamation Survey’, Review of International Co-operation, 54:5 (1961), 112-117. 
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figure of 875 to approximately 300.557 This was in line with the suggestions made by the 
Independent Commission, who had recommended ‘that retail societies should accept the view 
that the “ideal” number of societies is in the region of 200-300’.558  
The immediate effect of the plan in terms of mergers, however, remained limited. As co-
operative historian William Richardson noted, the recommendation of the survey ‘was honoured 
by obeisance but little action.’559 In the five year period preceding the publication of the survey 
the number of societies had been reduced by 11 per cent. In the five years immediately following 
the survey, the reduction was 18 per cent.560 It seems evident that the retail societies were not yet 
ready to accept the Co-op Union’s premise that there was an urgent need to increase the size of 
their operations by merging with other societies. As was repeatedly noted in the previous chapter, 
by the coming of the 1960s there was no perceived need for radical changes among British retail 
societies. It is also revealing that the National Amalgamation Survey made no direct link between 
the need for radical amalgamation and the increasingly difficult economic position of co-
operative trade. In fact, presenting the survey to the international co-operative public in the 
Review of International Co-operation, the assistant general secretary of the Co-op Union, C. C. 
Hilditch, specifically underlined that, ‘while amalgamation is a vital topic for action, it is not to be 
thought that the British Movement is in decline.’561 Indeed, as he continued, ‘the great majority of 
British co-operators are already linked with large progressive societies which have tremendous 
potential for the future.’562 On the basis of such reassurances from a senior Union representative, 
it was perhaps no surprise that immediate action on behalf of the smaller societies had to be 
waited for.  
The lack of urgency given to the survey’s recommendations was also reflected in how it 
was dealt with when finally presented at the 1961 congress in Scarborough. There was no 
separate discussion of the survey. It was not put up for a vote or made subject to any binding 
resolutions and only six representatives took to the podium to comment on the report.563 Six 
                                                 
557 Co-operative Union Ltd, National Amalgamation Survey (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1960), p. 5.  
558 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Independent Commission Report (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1958), p. 
242. 
559 W. Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited, 1977), 
p. 258. 
560 Figures estimated from Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative statistics, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 
selected years). 
561 C. C. Hilditch, ‘The British Amalgamation Survey’, Review of International Co-operation, 54:5 (1961), 117. 
562 Ibid. 
563 See Co-operative Union Ltd, Report of the 92nd Annual Co-operative Congress in the Spa Grand Hall Scarborough, May 
22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th, 1961 (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1961). 
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years after the survey had been launched close to 700 independent societies were still in 
operation.564 In order to reach the survey’s goals, this figure had to be more than halved.  
In 1967 a new initiative was taken by the central executive of the Co-op Union to increase 
the speed of co-operative amalgamations. A new major study was initiated and in 1968 the Union 
presented its Regional Plan for Co-operative Societies in England, Wales, and Ireland to the co-operative 
Congress, again held in Scarborough. The suggestions of the plan were much more radical that 
those of the National Amalgamation Survey.565 Its basic proposition was to reorganise the retail 
societies into a regional structure consisting of no more than fifty separate societies. The plan 
also linked much more explicitly the need for change with the pressing competitive challenges 
facing the movement. As was noted in the introductory part:  
This regional plan … arises out of concern for the future of the Movement 
under conditions of unprecedented difficulty. […] the lack of favourable reaction 
by too many societies to the declared policies of the Movement in past years has 
produced a situation in which the inheritance of unresolved problems is making 
it all the more difficult for the Movement to meet and overcome the difficulties 
created by the economic pressures of the present time.566 
The grave warnings presented seem to have had their effect. In the two year period immediately 
following the publication of the plan, the number of societies was reduced by a little more than a 
third, from 539 to 357.567 In 1970 alone, the reduction had been almost 25 per cent.  
The radical effect of the plan soon faltered. Already by the mid-1970s the reduction in the 
number of societies was back to the pace seen in the late 1950s, with yearly decreases of between 
2 and 4 per cent.568 As an attempt to give yet another boost to the centralisation process a Regional 
Plan 2 was presented at the 1974 Co-op Union Congress. This time, however, while the proposal 
was provided with overwhelming support from the congress participants, little happened in the 
following years in terms of mergers and amalgamations.  
                                                 
564 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative statistics, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1967). 
565 See Co-operative Union Ltd, Regional Plan for Co-operative Societies in England, Wales, and Ireland (Manchester: Co-
operative Union Ltd, 1968). A separate plan was set up for Scotland and published in March 1971. It envisaged the 
creation of five societies covering the whole country, out of the 84 that existed by the end of that year, see D. L. 
Wilkinson, ‘Regional Plan – A Review’, Co-operative Review, 46:1 (1972), 1. 
566 Co-operative Union Ltd, Regional Plan for Co-operative Societies in England, Wales, and Ireland (Manchester: Co-
operative Union Ltd, 1968), p. 1. 
567 Figures estimated from Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative statistics, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 
selected years). A major part of this reduction was related to the formation of the North-Eastern society, by itself 
embracing thirty independent retail societies, see D. L. Wilkinson, ‘Regional Plan – A Review’, Co-operative Review, 
46:1 (1972), 1.  
568 Figures estimated from Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative statistics, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 
selected years). 
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By 1980 there were still a total of 206 independent co-operative retail societies in the UK. 
The goal set by the 1960 National Amalgamation Survey had been reached, but the movement 
was far from the stated goals of either of the two regional plans. Moreover, while the 
centralisation process had been initiated as a means to meet the competitive challenges from the 
multiple retailers, very little had been gained in terms of increased competitiveness. Apart from a 
revival in the mid- 1970s, the market position of the movement continued to be one of steady 
decline.569 In terms of profits, the co-ops were also drastically outperformed by their major 
competitors. To take one example, while the food retailer Tesco had increased its profits by 1,200 
per cent in real terms in the period from 1960-1970, the overall result for the co-operative sector 
was a fall in real profits of nearly two-thirds.570 In 1970 alone, Tesco had recorded a total profit of 
16 million out of a total turnover of  238 million. The same year the retail societies taken 
together managed to produce a profit double to that of Tesco, on a total turnover nearly five 
times higher.571 Ten years later the figures were even more alarming, with overall co-operative 
profitability reaching record lows of 0.8 per cent in 1980, 0.0 per cent in 1981 and minus 0.1 per 
cent in 1982.572  
In the wake of these dramatic figures, yet another regionalisation plan was drawn up in 
1982, ‘encouraging mergers with a view to reducing the number of retail societies to 25 within 
two years.573 This time, the effect was again substantial. While the development remained far 
from the goals set, by 1990 the number of societies had been reduced to seventy-seven, making 
for a relative reduction of 63 per cent in the preceding decade. This implied that the 1980s had 
seen the most substantial, relative decrease in the number of societies in the entire history of the 
co-op movement. The development continued into the 1990s and by 2002 the number of 
societies was down to forty-two, a relative reduction of another 46 per cent.574 While it had taken 
more than 25 years to reach the goals of the 1968 regional plan and in 2002 the goals set in 1982 
                                                 
569 In 1975 the movement’s turnover increase was in fact exceeding that of the multiples by 2 percentage points, 
causing the Financial Times to declare that ‘the Co-op ... does genuinely appear to be on the way up again’. But this 
was to become a short-term revival only. Figures and citation taken from J. Bamfield, ‘Rationalization and the 
Problems of Re-positioning: UK Co-operatives Caught in the Middle, in Gerry Johnson (ed.), Business Strategy and 
Retailing (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1987), p. 162. 
570 This according to J. Hughes, ‘The Co-operative Movement: A perspective for the 1970’s’, The Society for Co-operative 
Studies Bulletin, 16 (1972), 14-19. 
571 Figures estimated from Ibid., 15. 
572 Profitability here estimated as total profit in per cent of total turnover, figures taken from J. Bamfield, 
‘Rationalization and the Problems of Re-positioning: UK Co-operatives Caught in the Middle, in Gerry Johnson 
(ed.), Business Strategy and Retailing (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1987), p. 162. See also Co-operative Union Ltd, 
Co-operative statistics, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, selected years). 
573 Co-operative Union Ltd, The 113th Annual Congress of the Co-operative Union Ltd held in the Dome, Brighton, from May 31 
to June 2, 1982 (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1982), p. 76. See also F. Müller, ‘The consumer co-operatives 
in Great Britain’, in J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva: 
International Co-operative Alliance, 1989). 
574 All figures from Co-operative statistics, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, selected years). 
  
 187
were still far from being accomplished, the process of centralisation had been quite substantial 
throughout the post-war period. By merging retail societies into larger, regional units substantial 
centralisation of co-operative trade had been accomplished.  
The plans and surveys developed to increase the level of structural centralisation within 
the co-op movement had all been based on the strategy of merging existing retail societies into 
larger units. They solely concerned the retail level and did not involve any principle alterations in 
the trading relationship between the retail societies and the national wholesalers. The retail 
societies became radically larger but they continued operating primarily as retailers. The national 
wholesalers for their part were not principally affected by the ongoing rationalisations, other than 
having to deal with fewer and larger customers. As such, the amalgamation surveys and regional 
plans did not break with the traditional federative principles on which the co-op movement had 
long been established, operating a clear division of labour between the retailing operations of the 
retail societies and the wholesaling operations of the national wholesalers.  
Looking closer at how the post-war centralisation process actually unfolded, however, 
reveals that a substantial part of the reduction in the number of retail societies did not come from 
amalgamations of two or more retail societies into a larger unit. A second strategy was also 
adopted, namely the development of co-operative retailing operations under the centralised 
control of the national wholesalers. And following these developments, the 1906 suggestion of J. 
C. Grace to gather all trade in a single, national cooperative society also gradually received more 
attention and support.  
 
Forward integration and the development of a hybrid federative model  
In 1928, the Co-operative Congress in Hartlepool had passed a controversial motion, allowing 
for the CWS to establish and operate their own, separate retail units. By passing the motion the 
congress broke with a long held co-operative tradition, that of keeping the retail operations of the 
local societies and the wholesaling and production activities of the national wholesalers strictly 
separate. By the end of the 1920s, however, it was believed that radical steps were necessary for 
the movement to be able to forcefully expand its retailing operations into new areas. As 
formulated in the motion: ‘This congress expresses the view that the time is now opportune for 
the Co-operative Wholesale society to undertake retail trade in areas were there are insufficient 
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facilities for same, and request the Co-operative Wholesale Society to take steps to this end, in 
consultation with the Union.’575  
The CWS Retail Co-operative Society Limited (CRS) was finally formed in 1934.576 
Following the original intentions of the 1928 congress, the new retail unit was primarily set up to 
expand co-operative trade into areas where such trade was still limited, the so-called co-operative 
deserts. In the course of planning the establishment of the society, the CWS board had also 
formulated a second main objective, stating that the society was to ‘embrace … some, if not all, 
of the existing societies who have fallen in evil days and who can neither hope to rehabilitate 
themselves by their own efforts nor to solve their difficulties by amalgamating their interests with 
neighbouring societies.’577 Hence, in addition to the original intention, the society was encouraged 
to take the role of a co-operative ‘ambulance service’, taking over engagements of failing societies 
in order to secure the future persistence of co-operative trade in the area were these originally 
had operated .578  
The formulation of this second objective proved vital for the future development of the 
new society, as well as for the overall organisational structure of the co-operative movement. As 
it turned out, the CRS primarily grew by taking over ailing retail co-ops. Already in 1936 the first 
retail society transferred its engagements to the CRS. This was the Cardiff society. It was 
followed by Bangor in 1938 and the Hastings and Penart societies in 1939. By 1945, nineteen 
more had joined, of which twelve joined in 1943 alone.579 The growth continued steadily 
throughout the post-war years, with a boom between 1969 and 1971, the years immediately 
following the publication of the first regional plan. By now, the CRS had become by far the 
largest retail society in the entire movement. In 1981, the engagements of the failing London 
society were transferred to the CRS. The transfer implied a merger of the country’s two largest 
                                                 
575 Cited in B. J. Rose, Co-operative retail Services – A: Descriptive note’, The Society for Co-operative Studies Bulletin, 24 
(1975), 13 
576 The society changed its name to Co-operative Retail Services in 1957 and was from then on known under the 
CRS name.  
577 Cited in W. Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-operative Wholesale Society 
Limited, 1977), pp. 225-6. 
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579 This according to W. Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-operative Wholesale 
Society Limited, 1977), p. 229. 
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retail societies, turning the CRS into a retail giant. 580 By 1985, a total of 172 retail societies had 
transferred their engagements to the CRS. And with a turnover of  900 million the society 
accounted for one fifth of total co-operative trade in Britain.581  
Expanding largely by taking over ailing societies, the CRS had thus been a major force in 
the ongoing process of centralisation within the British co-op movement. The CRS expansion 
had developed alongside the ongoing mergers and implied that even if the number of societies 
operating in the movement still remained above the goals set by congress, the actual level of 
centralisation had been substantial. This process of centralisation had been supported and 
advocated by leading co-operators and it was seen as a vital strategic move in the day- to- day 
competitive race with the multiple retailers. The massive growth of the CRS, as well as the 
development of other, large regional societies did, however, induce new types of challenges to co-
operative trade. Most importantly the ability to efficiently coordinate the many large societies into 
a coherent national strategy turned out to be a massive challenge.  
The CRS had originally been formed by the CWS. It was partly owned by the wholesaler 
and half of the CRS board members were appointed by the CWS, including the chairman. The 
CWS also held a formal commitment to subscribe up to 50 per cent of the share capital of the 
CRS. As such, the relationship between the two societies was formally quite close knit. But, as the 
CRS grew in size and importance, the relationship with the founding wholesaler was gradually 
becoming one of increasing tensions and divergent organisational cultures. The co-operation 
between the two was becoming more and more limited. As more and more trade was gathered in 
the CRS, this implied a major challenge to the overall unity of the movement. These tensions 
became even more pronounced as the CWS from the early 1970s onwards decided to develop 
their own retail branch. Growing according to the CRS formulae of taking over ailing retail 
societies, the CWS retail branch soon developed as a major contender to the CRS position of 
being the largest co-operative retailer in the UK. The expansion started in Scotland where 
numerous retail branches were acquired during the 1970s.582 Then, in the course of a few years 
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A chapter in The Making of a Successful Co-operative Business. The Co-operative Wholesale Society 1973-2001 (Manchester: 
Zebra Publishing, 2002). 
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during the early 1980s, the society took control of the troubled Belfast Co-operative Society, 
followed by the large London based South Suburban (1984) and Royal Arsenal Co-operative 
Societies (1985).583 By 1985 CWS had become the second largest co-operative retailer in the UK. 
The strategic focus of the CWS management was gradually more and more directed at 
establishing the CWS as a co-operative multiple in its own right, operating both retail and 
wholesale functions within the boundaries of one single organisation.  
The expansion continued during the 1990s. In 1990 CWS took over the responsibility of 
the financially strong North-Eastern society, one of few mergers made by strength. Four more 
societies were transferred in 1992, including the Greater Nottingham society.584 By now, the 
former wholesaler and merchandiser had in fact passed the CRS as the largest retailer in the 
movement, controlling close to 27 per cent of the movement’s retail trade.585 Parallel to these 
developments, large regional societies had also been established controlling a substantial 
proportion of co-operative trade. While these developments implied a massive centralisation of 
control over co-operative trade they had the unintended effect of challenging the overall 
coherence of the movement. As already indicated, the large retail societies, most prominently the 
CRS, were less inclined to cooperate with the CWS as their national wholesaler. The large 
regionalised societies also tended to develop on separate strategic paths, counteracting any 
attempt to develop an overarching national co-operative unity. It is illustrative that by 1995 the 
movement operated two separate buying organisations competing for support from the retail co-
ops.586 While the growth of the CRS, the increasing regionalisation of co-operative trade and the 
development of the CWS retail businesses played a major role in the process of centralising co-
operative trade, the process failed to create the necessary unity and cooperation necessary to 
competent efficiently with the nationally integrated, fully standardised and centralised multiples.  
The lack of national unity still marking the co-op movement by the mid- 1990s was made 
the subject of several internal debates. Repeatedly, the suggestion was made that the only viable 
                                                 
583 F. Müller, ‘The consumer co-operatives in Great Britain’. In J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives 
in a changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989), p. 123. 
584 This according to D. Hopwood, ‘The new society?’, Journal of Co-operative Studies, 82 (1994), 23-6; Co-operative 
Union Ltd, Co-operative statistics, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1990/1991), p. 2 and Co-operative Union Ltd, 
Co-operative statistics, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1991/1992), p. 2. 
585 This also placed the CWS among the largest retail co-operative societies in the world. It has not been possible to 
obtain accurate comparative figures, but throughout the 1970s and 1980s the CRS was repeatedly announced in 
British co-operative publications as the world’s largest, or among the world’s largest retail co-operatives (see B. J. 
Rose, ‘Co-operative retail Services – A: Descriptive note’, The Society for Co-operative Studies Bulletin, 24 (1975), 13; W. 
Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited, 1977), p. 224 
and R. L. Marshall, ‘CWS/CRS restructuring. Foreword’, The Society for Co-operative Studies Bulletin, 50 (1984), 45). As 
the CWS passed the CRS in total turnover, it also captured the position of being among the worlds leading co-
operative retailers.  
586 See chapter eight in the present thesis for a more elaborate presentation of these two buying groups.  
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option was to promote a full merger of all co-operative trade into one, national co-operative 
enterprise. To be sure, after this idea had been launched by J. C. Grace in 1906, it had repeatedly 
been singled out as the only viable path for solving the trading problems of the co-op movement. 
Already in 1957 colonel S. J. L Hardie, in his separate minority report to the Independent 
Commission, had suggested the creation of ‘a complete integrated retail wholesale manufacturing 
organisation under one body in Scotland …, and one body in England and Wales.587 A similar 
suggestion had been re-launched by the Co-op Union chairman Howard Perrow, in his 
presidential address to the 1979 Co-operative Congress in Eastbourne.588 But, as was noted in 
retrospect by the then Chief Executive of the CWS David Skinner in an article in the Journal of Co-
operative Studies, ‘this plan … generated as many words and as little productive action as the earlier 
versions.’589 During the 1990s several attempts were made to re-invigorate the idea of creating a 
Co-op Great Britain. Most concretely, the 1994 Co-operative Congress passed a separate 
resolution giving general approval to the objective of creating a single national society. But, as the 
congress could make no binding resolutions, the years passed without any major moves being 
made towards the realisation of such a society.  
On 2 April 2000, however, a major step towards this goal was taken when the CRS and 
the CWS decided to merge and form one single co-operative society, the Co-operative Group. 
The new society alone came to account for almost two thirds of total co-operative trade in the 
UK.590 The merger also implied that all co-operative buying was gradually concentrated in one 
single buying point. While not being framed within such a perspective, in practice, the merger 
brought the movement one major step closer towards realising the more than hundred year old 
idea of creating a single national society responsible for all co-operative trade in the country. A 
third society, the United Co-operative Society, at this point controlled another 12 per cent of 
trade.591 From a situation where trade had been dispersed between more than a thousand retail 
societies, fifty years later three quarters of all co-operative trade had been concentrated in two 
large societies.  
                                                 
587 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Independent Commission Report (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1958), p. 
280. 
588 Co-operative Union Ltd, The 110th Annual Congress of the Co-operative union Ltd. held in the Congress Theatre, Eastbourne 
on May 28th, 29th and 30th, 1979 (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1979). 
589 D. Skinner, ‘Master plans and after’, Journal of Co-operative Studies, 81 (1994), 13. 
590 Co-operatives UK, Consumer Co-operatives Performance Review 2003 (Manchester: Co-operatives UK, 2004). This also 
made the Group the world’s largest consumer co-operative in terms of total assets (the largest in terms of turnover 
being the Swiss Migros chain), see International Co-operative Alliance, Global 300: The world’s major co-operative and 
mutual businesses (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 2006). See also ‘Group stands tall in top 300 co-ops 
list’, Co-operative News, (November 14-26 2006). 
591 Co-operatives UK, Consumer Co-operatives Performance Review 2003 (Manchester: Co-operatives UK, 2004). 
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Overall the post-war years had witnessed a massive centralisation of co-operative trade 
into a few large units. This was a strategy strongly advocated by leading co-operative managers 
and elected officials alike. It was also one of the strategies that was relatively successfully applied 
by the co-operative movement. Still, the massive centralisations of trade could not stop the 
decline in co-operative trade from continuing. Alongside the failure to develop a competitive 
structure of retail shops discussed in the previous main section, the movement also seem to have 
failed to create an overall organisational structure capable of securing an efficient and competitive 
approach to the massive challenges of the food retail industry. As this sub-chapter specifically has 
shown, throughout the post-war years, most prominently during the 1980s and 1990s, the 
massive growth of the CRS and the CWS retail branch created substantial dissension within the 
movement. This was not solved before the two societies, after a series of failed attempts, finally 
merged in 2000. Despite this merger, numerous challenges in the organisational structure of the 
movement still remained. The movement still consisted of forty- seven independent retail 
societies. Of these, thirty- six were members of the national federation the Co-operative Union.592 
The former national wholesale society, now the Co-operative Group, drew more than half of its 
total trade from retailing operations. At the same time, the society continued to offer buying, 
marketing and distribution services to other co-operative societies. It also supplied the Co-op 
brand range of own label products to all co-operative societies. The organisation was partly 
owned by individual members and partly by so-called corporate members. These were in essence 
the remains of the original CWS member societies, still upholding their independence from the 
wholesaler.593 What had been formed in this drawn out process of structural transformation was a 
hybrid federative model. It was partly built on the traditional division of labour between local 
retail societies and national wholesaling and partly on the principle of total centralisation, as 
represented by the CWS/CRS retail- wholesale operations. While the model had largely fulfilled 
the demands for massive centralisation of trade, the overall organisational structure of the 
movement was still extremely complex and the efficient governance of the enterprise remained a 
massive challenge.  
The complex structure of the British retail co-operative movement contrasts quite sharply 
with the development seen in the Norwegian movement. In Norway, structural transformation 
towards larger units followed a single strategy of amalgamation. The national association has 
stayed out of retailing and the federative model has remained intact as the basic organisational 
                                                 
592 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative statistics, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 2000/2001). 
593 Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd., Annual report, 1998; Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd., Annual report and 
accounts, 1999. 
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structure framing the movement’s business operations. We turn to this development in the 
following.   
 
Rationalising the Norwegian society structure: the primacy of the federative model  
In contrast to the British experience, by the coming of the post-war period the Norwegian co-op 
movement had paid only limited attention to the advantages of increasing the scale of its 
operations. The number of retail societies was still rising and the large majority of the societies in 
operation remained small, operating one or a few stores. True, the movement had since the late 
nineteenth century persistently advocated the abandonment of the ban on branches, as this was 
seen to hinder the realisation of the obvious scale advantages in operating numerous outlets 
under centralised control. In the 1930s, chief administrative secretary of the Norwegian Co-
operative association (NKL), Randolf Arnesen had also published some general 
recommendations to increase the size of retail societies.594 But, while the development in the UK 
society structure from the early 1900s onwards had been one of contraction and concentration, 
the number of Norwegian societies was still expanding. There had not been any initiatives made 
by the NKL to develop their own retailing operations and there was no talk of abandoning the 
federative model in order to create one national co-operative society.  
Throughout the post-war years, however, increasing attention was focused on the need 
for structural reform within the Norwegian movement also. But, while the UK co-ops had 
approached this challenge along different lines, the Norwegian movement came to follow a single 
strategy of amalgamation. Any talk of creating one national co-operative enterprise was soon 
rejected by local co-operators and leading NKL managers alike. And apart from some short lived 
and largely unsuccessful attempts to move into non-food retailing, the NKL remained dedicated 
to its role as the retail societies’ wholesaler and manufacturer.  
By 1960, the structure of the Norwegian co-operative movement was still extremely 
fragmented. The movement consisted of 1,129 retail societies, as compared to the UK figure of 
859. While not such a big difference in absolute terms, in relative terms it was substantial. While 
the more than a thousand Norwegian societies were serving a total population of three and a half 
million, the less than 900 British societies in operation served a population of more than fifty 
million. Moreover, while the average membership of a Norwegian retail society in 1960 was 273, 
                                                 
594 R. Arnesen, ‘Store eller små samvirkelag’, (Oslo: Norges Kooperative Landsforening, 1933). 
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the similar figure in the UK was approximately 15,000.595 During the same year the average 
annual trade of a British consumer co-op was  1.2 million. By comparison, an average 
Norwegian retail society recorded a yearly trade of no more than  60,000. Finally, looking at the 
average number of branches operated by each retail society, we find that the Norwegian figure in 
1960 was two. In the UK it was thirty-four.596 
The fragmented and small scale character of the Norwegian consumer co-op had been 
one of the major worries of the new NKL leadership taking office after the Second World War. 
Already in 1946 Peder Søiland, the newly appointed staff member in the organisational 
department and later elected secretary of the NKL board, had initiated a major debate in the co-
operative journal Forbrukeren on how to deal with the fragmented nature of the movement. The 
debate ended in the creation of a separate research committee to investigate the overall structure 
of the retail societies. The recommendations of the committee, presented to the NKL board of 
representatives in 1950, remained very general in character, however, and largely came to 
nothing. Indeed, throughout the early and mid-1950s the number of co-operative retail societies 
continued to increase. The explosive growth seen in the immediate post-war years had slowed 
down, but a gradual yearly increase implied that by 1956 a total number of 1,165 co-operative 
societies had been established.597 Consequently while the potential problems inherent in the 
small-scale nature of the co-op movement had immediately been recognised by the new NKL 
leadership, the attitudes held at NKL headquarters still had only a limited dissemination at the 
local level.  
Nevertheless, gradually attitudes were changing. From 1956 onwards, more than fifty 
years after the trend had been reversed in the UK, the number of societies started to decline. 
Four years later the NKL congress in Narvik unanimously passed a resolution calling for 
increased ’concentration of our forces’ as a necessary tool to meet future challenges.598 The 
resolution was based on a broad investigation of the Current challenges in the co-operative retail trade, 
initiated by the NKL board and conducted throughout the preceding year.599 In presenting the 
                                                 
595 This according to the official statistics as presented in Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative statistics, (Manchester: 
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chapter 6 in the present thesis.  
596 All figures estimated from Coop NKL, Våre tall 1907-2005 (Statistics compiled by Tore Kristoffersen, Coop 
NKL, 2006); Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative statistics, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1950) and A. 
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compiled by Tore Kristoffersen, Coop NKL, 2006). 
598 Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Protokoll over forhandlingen på Norges kooperative Landsforenings 28. kongress i 
Narvik 1960 (Oslo: Aktietrykkeriet, 1960), p. 137. 
599 K4, 4A.3.4, Sekretariatet 1962, ’Aktuelle problemer vedrørende den kooperative detaljomsetning: innstilling fra 
det utvalg N.K.L satte ned den 24. januar 1959. 
  
 195
investigation’s major findings to the Narvik congress, head of the NKL organisations department 
Reidar Haugen noted how, while the movement had ‘made substantial progress in rationalising 
and making our stores more efficient’ the trade was still ‘organised in small units which with 
certainty are … highly irrational’.600 On these grounds it was deemed necessary by Haugen and 
the research committee he headed to achieve ‘a more substantial interplay between co-operators 
in the large cities and regions and the surrounding district areas’.601 Simply speaking, what was 
needed was ‘concentration in larger units’.602 
The Narvik congress was to become a turning point in the process of restructuring in the 
Norwegian co-operative movement. While the previous decade had seen a reduction in the 
number of societies of 0.3 per cent, in the period from 1960 to 1970, a total of 374, or 33 per 
cent of all societies were either amalgamated into larger units or wound up.603 Compared to the 
UK development, which experienced a disappearance of more than 50 per cent of all societies 
during the 1960s, the decrease was not very impressive. Considering that the structure of the 
Norwegian movement had been much more fragmented from the start, the development actually 
implied that the difference between the two movements, in terms of the level of centralisation, 
was becoming even more pronounced. Leading NKL managers and elected officials, also 
repeatedly complained about the lack of progress made in the field of structural transformation.  
An obvious challenge for Søiland and his fellow advocates of structural reform was to 
convince the local societies that the creation of larger units was in fact necessary. 604 
Fragmentation and small-scale operations continued to mark the private retail sector and the 
future competitiveness of co-operative trade was not directly threatened. The feeling of economic 
crisis which finally caused drastic amalgamations in the UK by the end of the 1960s, was simply 
not present in the Norwegian context. After about a third of all societies had been involved in 
some form of structural rationalisation during the 1960s, the 1970s saw only limited progress in 
the field. At the NKL Congress in Stavanger in 1980 Peder Søiland had to admit that ‘during the 
last decade we have not achieved much as regards to an improvement in our way of 
cooperating’.605 In fact, 653 independent retail societies were still operating in the movement in 
1980, which meant that during the 1970s the total number of societies had only been reduced by 
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601 Ibid., p. 91. 
602 Ibid. 
603 72 societies were wound up and 302 amalgamated, figures adopted from Norges Kooperative Landsforening, 
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a hundred or 13 per cent. During the following two decades the pace increased quite markedly. 
Hence, the 1980s saw an overall decrease in the number of societies of thirty per cent, while the 
1990s alone saw a reduction of close to fifty per cent of all retail societies. Still, by 2002 a total of 
239 independent retail societies were still in operation within the co-op movement. These were 
responsible for a total retail trade of close to NOK 30 billion, equal to  2.5 billion. 606 By 
comparison, the 42 retail co-ops operating within the British co-op movement by this point 
traded an annual turnover of  12.5 billion, of which roughly half came from retailing alone.607  
As an overall trend, the differences between the Norwegian and the British consumer co-
ops in terms of their level of centralisation had become even more pronounced throughout the 
post-war years. As we recall, in the 1960s the average number of outlets per Norwegian co-
operative society had been two, while the similar figure for UK retail co-ops had been thirty-four 
or seventeen times higher. In 2002 Norwegian retail societies operated an average of six outlets. 
The similar figure for UK co-ops was 132 or twenty-two times higher. The major reason for this 
marked difference was that the Norwegian retail co-ops had been less willing to merge their 
operations into larger units than the British retail co-ops. Further adding to this difference was 
also the fact that that the NKL had not integrated forward into food retailing. Apart from some 
unsuccessful and short-lived attempts to expand into the dry goods trade, the NKL remained 
dedicated to its role as the retail societies’ wholesaler.608 The strategy of increasing centralisation 
by way of forward integration by the wholesaler had therefore not been adopted by the 
Norwegian co-operators. As opposed to the experience in the UK movement, there was thus 
only a limited pull from the national wholesaler to increase the speed and extent of 
centralisations. Food retailing remained the sole responsibility of the retail societies, who also 
fully controlled the pace of the ongoing amalgamations. The development reflected a consistent 
attitude among the retail societies on the value of local independence and for maintaining a clear 
division of labour between the retail societies and the wholesale unit.  
This attitude was also reflected in the fact that the Norwegian movement never seriously 
debated the possibility of creating a single national co-operative movement. While the UK 
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movement had discussed this possibility on numerous occasions, such a debate was never 
officially launched within the Norwegian movement. The NKL chairman Peder Søiland had 
privately been supportive of the idea of a single Norwegian Co-operative Society.609 But 
opposition to such a development was so fierce that Søiland could not promote and officially 
defend his private view without risking his position as chairman. Both the majority of retail 
societies and leading NKL managers defended the federative model. For example, Knut Moe, the 
leading administrative manager in the NKL, rejected the idea of a single national society as 
unrealistic.610 Moe’s main ideal was still to develop a co-operative, voluntary chain where local 
retail societies and national wholesaling was kept separate. To achieve this goal neither forward 
integration by the wholesale nor complete centralisation of all the movement’s operating units 
were regarded as appropriate means.  
The traditional federative model thus persisted as a defining feature of the Norwegian co-
operative movement throughout the second half of the twentieth century. While the NKL 
repeatedly advocated amalgamations and the establishment of larger units, the movement 
continued to rely on numerous independent retail societies, with the NKL as their main 
wholesale provider as well as manufacturer of some selected products.611 The level of 
centralisation therefore remained much less pronounced in the Norwegian than in the British 
movement. However, this development did not hinder the further advance of the Norwegian co-
ops.  
 
Conclusion  
Structural rationalisation through the creation of larger retail societies represented one of the 
major steps taken by consumer co-operative movements across Western Europe from the 1960s 
onwards. The major objective of such centralisation was to increase the effectiveness of the co-
operative trading operations in order to better confront the competitive pressures from the 
multiple retailers. Three major strategies were chosen. Small societies were merged to form larger 
regional units. Further, in some countries, national wholesaling organisation integrated forward 
and developed separate retail branches operating under centralised control. This was either done 
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by taking over the engagements of ailing retail societies, by expanding organically, or by acquiring 
existing, privately owned retail operations. Finally and most radically, total amalgamation of all 
independent retail societies, as well as their national federative organisations, was discussed, 
deliberated upon and also introduced in some countries.  
As the above presentation has shown, the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives 
approached the quest for structural reform differently. In both countries the advantages of 
centralisation were duly recognised. And from the 1960s onwards a major process of structural 
rationalisation through the amalgamation of societies into larger units began. The speed and 
extent of the process, however, varied between the countries. The number of societies decreased 
more substantially in the UK than in Norway. And the size of the Norwegian retail societies 
remained on average much smaller than the British.  
The major cause of this difference was related to how the UK movement in addition to 
amalgamations chose a strategy of forward integration by the wholesalers. To increase the speed 
and the extent of the centralisation process it abandoned the strict federative structure and 
adopted a hybrid model where the national federation took on both retail and wholesale 
functions. By contrast, in Norway the federative structure was defended. The NKL largely stayed 
out of retailing and the traditional division of labour between the national wholesaler and the 
local retail societies was upheld.  
How did these differences shape the development of the two movements? The question 
can not be given a straightforward answer. However, it is evident that despite the more radical 
levels of centralisation seen in the UK, it was the Norwegian movement that advanced 
economically. The strategy of centralisation had been pushed forward by the belief that larger 
retail units operating more branches under centralised control would be able to compete more 
efficiently. But, as it turned out, high degrees of centralisation alone could not stop the 
deteriorating market position of the British co-ops. Quite to the contrary, despite the fact that the 
level of centralisation in the Norwegian movement remained limited and that it continued to rely 
on an organisational separation of the retail and wholesale units, it managed to strengthen and 
stabilise its market share. Thus, it seems evident that centralisation by itself could not solve the 
organisational challenges confronting post-war consumer co-operative societies.  
The process of centralisation carried out in the British movement caused the 
establishment of what we have termed a ‘hybrid federative model’. In Norway the end result was 
the continuation of a ‘standard federative model’. While the British model implied a higher 
degree of centralisation it also created some fundamental organisational challenges. Most 
prominently, it weakened the national coherence of the movement and hindered an efficient, 
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national coordination of co-operative trading. The long-term conflict between the CRS and the 
CWS is indicative. Large regional societies also developed their own store formats, practised 
separate marketing schemes and operated independent distribution and wholesaling facilities. It is 
revealing how the British movement was not alone in experiencing these challenges. Indeed, in 
France problems of coordinating the activities of regional, co-operative strongholds and agreeing 
on a common, national strategy were regarded as major reasons for the total collapse of the 
country’s consumer co-operative movement during the mid-1980s.612  
In the UK, further problems were created by the hybrid structure developed as the CWS 
moved into retailing and sought to combine its role as a national wholesaler with that of a regular 
retailer. The end result of this development was an overall organisational structure where 
responsibilities, managerial authority and democratic governance were mixed together in an 
extremely confusing and over-complex structure. Similar stories can be told about the recent 
history of the Swedish and Danish co-operative movements. In both these countries the national 
co-operative wholesalers integrated forward into retailing as a means to counter the lack of 
progress experienced by the co-operators during the 1970s and 1980s. But in these countries also 
the resultant complexity of their organisational structures caused a further weakening of their 
position. In Sweden the co-op movement lost 15 per cent of its entire market share during the 
1990s.613 In Denmark while market shares largely remained unchanged, financial weaknesses had 
almost caused the collapse of the entire movement before it was saved by a merger of the 
Scandinavian national co-operative associations in 2002.614 Consequently, in all these countries, 
while forward integration by the wholesalers increased the level of centralised control over the 
retailing function, the ability to efficiently coordinate the overall co-op movement and develop a 
coherent and unifying national strategy remained a major challenge.  
The decision to merge the CRS and the CWS may have solved some of the conflicts and 
challenges hampering the movement’s progress. But, as we have seen, both the overall 
operational pattern and the governance structure of the movement remained highly complex. 
Moreover, if the strategy of creating a single, fully integrated, national co-operative enterprise is 
to finally become realised, available comparative evidence does not provide any reassurance as to 
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the economic viability of such a model. Both the Austrian and the German co-op movement 
collapsed shortly after national co-operative societies had been established in these countries.615 
And in Finland the so-called ‘E co-operatives’, the smaller half of the two-pieced Finnish 
consumer co-operative movement, were close to collapse in 1995, after having merged twelve 
years earlier to form one, integrated national society, the EKA co-operative.616  
Massive centralisation of trade was a necessary strategic step for co-operative movements 
facing the increasing size and strength of the multiple retailers from the 1960s onwards. But, it 
was not a sufficient solution. The centralisation process had to be accompanied by a clear strategy 
for how to coordinate the increasingly large and strong co-operative societies into a coherent 
national unity. In instances where the centralisation process was pushed forward by national 
wholesaling organisations integrating forward into retailing, the demands for such coordination 
became even more pronounced. The example of the Norwegian co-op movement thus 
represents an interesting contrast to the developments taking place in many other countries. In 
the Norwegian movement, centralisation of trade remained less pronounced. The more modest, 
average size of the retail societies facilitated a gradual increase in the overall, national 
coordination of co-operative trade. Similar store formats were adopted across society structures 
and national marketing campaigns were embraced by all societies. And while many of largest 
societies were inclined to trade independently of their national wholesaler, throughout the post-
war years the NKL managed to steadily increase the overall trading loyalty of the movement and 
also to sustain the general support from the largest societies.617 The movement also upheld a 
strict division of labour between the national wholesaler and the local retail societies. The NKL 
stayed out of retailing while at the same time taking full responsibility for distribution and 
wholesaling. The overall governance structure therefore remained comparatively simple and 
straightforward. Taken together it seems clear that these factors were decisive in creating the 
sustained competitiveness of Norwegian co-operative trade throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  
Comparative evidence is again revealing. After having been on a more or less continuous 
decline throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the market share of the Finnish S consumer co-
                                                 
615 For the development in Austria, see R. Blaich, ‘The consumer co-operatives in Austria’, in J. Brazda and R. 
Schediwy (eds.), Consumer co-operatives in a changing world, vol. 2 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989); 
K.P. Kornholz, ‘Konsum Austria is launched. National co-operative history and make-up’, Co-operative Marketing and 
Management 4. (1978), 6-12 and R. Schediwy, ‘The decline and fall of Konsum Austria, Review of International Co-
operation 89 (1996), pp. 62-8. For the development in Germany, see R. Schediwy, ‘The consumer co-operatives in 
Germany’, in J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds.), Consumer co-operatives in a changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva: International 
Co-operative Alliance, 1989). 
616 R. Schediwy, ‘The consumer co-operatives in Finland’, in In J. Brazda and R. Schediwy (eds.), Consumer co-operatives 
in a changing world, vol. 2 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989). 
617 For a more elaborate analysis of these developments, see chapters five and eight in the present thesis.  
  
 201
operative rose from about 16 per cent in 1990 to more than 31 per cent in 2002.618 Throughout 
this process of expansion, a genuine federative structure was kept intact, consisting in 2002 of 23 
regional co-operatives and 20 local co-ops, with the SOK as their national wholesaler.619 The 
division of labour between the regional and local retail societies on the one hand and the national 
wholesaling unit on the other was upheld and SOK could more efficiently lead and develop the 
entire movement in a coordinated fashion.620  
Existing comparative evidence thus tends to suggest that centralisation as a strategy to 
increase the competitiveness of co-operative retailers, in order to be successful, had to be squared 
with the ability to coordinate the activities of the retail and wholesale units in a consistent, 
national strategy. Centralisation of co-operative trade was intended as a means to fight off 
competition from the multiples. But as we recall, the major recipe of these retailers consisted of 
more than just increased centralisation of control. It also relied on standardisation and 
integration. For any structural model to be successful, it had to be accompanied by a tight 
operational integration between the retail and the wholesale levels and a high degree of 
standardisation across the boundaries of the different retail units. Centralisation was not enough; 
it had to be supplemented by standardisation and integration. What the present analysis has 
indicated is essentially that while the UK movement managed to centralise its operations into 
larger units at a more substantial scale than the Norwegian co-ops, the strategies applied to obtain 
the desired level of centralisation hampered the movement’s ability to standardise operations and 
integrate the chain of distribution. The Norwegian movement by contrast, with its more limited 
level of centralisation and stricter division of labour between the retail and the wholesale level, 
was in a better position to align the demands for centralised operations with those of 
standardisation and integration. Different responses to the quest for centralisation and structural 
reform thus fundamentally shaped the two movements’ abilities to implement and capitalise on 
the other features shown to be essential in the development of an efficient and competitive food 
retailing business, namely those of standardisation and integration. How these differences 
unfolded and made themselves felt in practice will be the subject of the next chapter.  
                                                 
618 SOK Annual report, 1997 and SOK Annual report, 2002.  
619 SOK Annual Report, 2002. In 2005 the numbers were 22 regional co-operatives and 19 local co-operatives. (SOK 
Annual report, 2005). 
620 The SOK also took on some business operations on its own, primarily the Sokos department stores, some 
speciality stores, Sokos hotels, a group of restaurant chains and Agrimarkets. In 2003 this activity accounted for 18 
per cent of total sales in the group, see SOK Annual report 2003. 
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Chapter 8: Integration and standardisation  
 
 
The transformation of food retailing in the post-war era was at its most visible at the retail level. 
The growth in the size of the stores and the transfer to self-service outlets changed the very 
outlook of the food retailing business dramatically. The increasing size of the dominant retailers 
in terms of the number of stores operated was also an important aspect of the changes taking 
place. Indeed, from the very outset, the development of the multiple form of retailing was 
fundamentally connected to the economic rationale of operating more than one store under 
centralised control. As we recall, the very definition of the multiple retailer was related to the 
number of stores they operated. ‘Multiple shop organisations’ are, as retail analysis James Jefferys 
and Derek Knee noted in their 1962 study of Retailing in Europe, ‘firms operating ten or more 
retail branches’.621 The ability to operate numerous branches under centralised control and to 
reap the economies of scale inherent in such an organisational model was an essential feature in 
the advance of the multiple retailer.  
The co-op movement struggled hard to compete with these operational and 
organisational features. As has been shown in the previous chapters, the ability to confront the 
challenges of the new retail formats and the increasing size of the multiples was fundamental in 
shaping the growth and competitiveness of co-operative trade. We have seen how the Norwegian 
and British consumer co-operative movements dealt with these challenges and how differences in 
approach subsequently shaped their divergent development. Still, while organisational 
centralisation and the parallel ability to develop competitive retail formats were important 
features in the multiples' success formula, these retailers also operated with other advantages. 
Most prominently, they capitalised on their ability to operate their many different stores at a low 
cost and to serve these stores more efficiently than their competitors. By standardising the 
operational procedures and by making the wholesaling function an integrated part of the retailing 
enterprise, they managed to reap the full economic benefit of operating numerous branches 
under centralised control. As retail researcher Leigh Sparks has noted in terms of distribution, ‘As 
retailers began to grow larger and as they operationally began to change their outlets …, so their 
                                                 
621 J. B Jefferys and D. Knee, Retailing in Europe. Present structure and future trends (London: MacMillan, 1962), p. 53. 
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physical distribution demands altered. In particular retailers began to integrate the distribution 
mix elements by internalizing the wholesaling function'.622  
To compete efficiently in the post-war food retailing market it was thus not enough to 
operate a huge number of (large) stores under centralised control. In order to fully exploit the 
economic advantages of operating several branches, the stores had to be operated on a 
standardised and coordinated basis. While the possible advantages of such organisational 
integration and standardisation had been recognised and partly practised by many food retailers 
by the end of the Second World War, it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that the true 
economies of this advantage began to be fully utilised.623 A major challenge for the co-operative 
societies, intensifying in both Norway and the UK from this period onwards, was how to 
efficiently coordinate their operations and develop their system of distribution to confront the 
increasing level of organisational standardisation and integration applied by the multiple retailers.  
On the one hand, the existing organisational structure of the co-ops gave them some 
natural advantages in this respect. Since its early beginnings, co-operative retail societies had 
relied on bulk buying and dedicated distribution from their own federal wholesaling unit.624 As 
such, the wholesaling and retailing functions were already integrated by way of ownership. On 
the other hand, however, while the retail societies and the wholesale federals continued to exist as 
autonomous units, the basic rationale of the integrated chain store was to eradicate the 
organisational borders between the retail and the wholesale function. The outlook of the stores, 
the assortment held and the operational procedures on which they traded were controlled by 
company headquarters and standardised across the numerous branches. Buying, distribution and 
selling was a carefully integrated process where the central unit had the upper hand and the retail 
managers had to comply with the demands and specifications set by this unit.  
Compared to the standardised and integrated enterprise, the ownership model of the co-
ops was based on an inverted structure. In the traditional federative co-operative model the small, 
local retail units owned and controlled the larger wholesaling unit. To fully take advantage of the 
integrated and standardised model, this control structure had to be reconsidered. In one way or 
other, the retail societies had to renounce some of their trading autonomy and decisions 
concerning fundamental trading policies of each individual society had to be centralised to the 
national federal. Such a transfer of responsibilities from the local to the national level would, 
                                                 
622 L. Sparks, ‘Delivering quality. The role of logistics in the post-war transformation of British food retailing’, in G. 
Jones and N. J. Morgan (eds), Adding Value. Brands and marketing in Food and Drink (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994), p. 297. 
623 See N. Wrigley and M. Lowe, Reading Retail. A geographical perspective on retailing and consumption spaces (London: 
Arnold, 2002), pp. 83-9. 
624 For a short description, see chapter six in the present thesis.  
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however, also imply disconnecting substantial trading issues from local democratic procedures. 
Along similar lines as centralisation into larger trading units, the development of a truly 
standardised and integrated retail chain challenged fundamental aspects of the co-operative 
enterprise, namely that of its basic reliance on local, autonomous, democratic decision-making 
units.  
This chapter investigates how the challenge of integration and standardisation was 
approached by the UK and Norwegian consumer co-operative movements. Specifically, it 
investigates to what degree standardisation and integration were regarded as important means to 
meet the challenge of the multiples. It further seeks to show how the co-operative movements in 
Norway and the UK managed to realign the democratic demands for local autonomy with the 
economic demands for national standardisation and integration.  
 
Attitudes towards integration among UK co-operators 
Organisational integration was not the main focus of British co-operators in the immediate post-
war years. As we have seen in previous chapters, throughout the 1950s and 1960s the movement 
remained preoccupied with reforming its retail outlets. Gradually, increasing attention was also 
given to the need to reform the overall structure of the movement by increasing the size of the 
retail societies through amalgamations and transfer of engagements to the CRS. In terms of 
distribution, however, the attitude was largely that the existing co-operative system was 
competitive.  
The lack of strategic focus on the possible advantages of reforming the co-operative 
system of distribution was in many ways understandable. First of all, it is evident that by the 
coming of the 1950s the co-operative retail societies and their national wholesalers already 
cooperated closely. As figures from the Independent Commission had shown, retail societies on 
average received close to 75 per cent of their total supplies of groceries from the national 
wholesale societies.625 This may also explain why the Commission only indirectly concerned itself 
with distribution. While presenting numerous different recommendations to the movement, few 
were related to the possibility of increasing the overall competitiveness by more closely 
integrating the retail operations of co-operative societies with the wholesaling operations of the 
Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) and the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society (SCWS). 
                                                 
625 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Independent Commission Report (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1958), p. 
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As co-operative historian William Richardson also noted, ‘the independent commission … 
tackled the problem primarily from the retail side’626  
A second factor may be related to how, by the mid- to- late 1950s, the actual economic 
advantages of more closely integrating the distribution function were not fully recognised by the 
multiple retailers. Also among these retailers, most attention remained on expanding the size of 
the retail outlets and on adopting the self-service and supermarket method of trading. There was 
thus limited pull from the competitors to seriously reconsider the system of distribution operated 
by the co-ops.  
On the basis of such and similar considerations, a widely held attitude among UK co-
operators by the coming of the 1960s was that the system of distribution operated by the co-ops 
was not in immediate need of reform. Rather, the focus of attention was on the need to 
modernise the co-operative retail outlets and gradually also on reforming the organisational 
structure of the movement by way of amalgamations. As the food trades officer of the Co-
operative Union H. L. Jennings noted in the 1961 Congress debate on the report of the Grocery 
and Provisions Trade Association: ‘Nobody will deny that good buying is essential, but the heart 
of the problem which faces us today is to start trading in units in which our costs of retailing, our 
operating costs, are low. […] It is a problem of retail selling, of reorganising our selling methods 
and not primarily one of buying.’627 
While these attitudes were partly understandable, the premises on which they rested soon 
had to be revised. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the large multiple retailers were to pay 
increasing attention to the economic potential in reforming the system of distribution on which 
they traded. Indeed, some of the major food retailers had already developed a wide-ranging and 
carefully planned system of distribution.628 As Sparks has shown, however, it was from the 1960s 
and 1970s onwards that the process seriously began and that the ‘multiple retailers progressed 
from being the innocent recipients of manufacturers’ transport and storage whims, to controlling 
and organizing the supply chain, almost in its entirety.’629 The reasons behind this development 
were numerous. As competition intensified, distribution costs gradually started to become a 
major target for change. Retailers established their own regional distribution centres to better 
                                                 
626 W. Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited, 1977), 
p. 259. 
627 Co-operative Union Ltd, Report of the 92nd Annual Co-operative Congress in the Spa Grand Hall Scarborough May 22nd-
25th, 1961, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1961), p. 336. 
628 The case of Sainsbury’s is indicative, see B. Williams, The Best Butter in the World. A History of Sainsbury’s (London: 
Ebury Press, 1994).  
629 L. Sparks, ‘Delivering quality. The role of logistics in the post-war transformation of British food retailing’, in G. 
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control the flow of goods into the stores. By integrating the wholesaling function, uniform stock 
control methods could be applied throughout the organisation. Buying was made the sole 
responsibility of a centralised buying unit and store managers were increasingly forced to adhere 
to a centrally decided, restrictive stocking range. The result was huge savings caused by reduced 
overall stock holding and increased frequency of stock turnover.630 Hence, from a period where 
the development of new retailing techniques, of increasing the average size of the stores and 
adding more branches was the major focus, supply and the need to rationalise the existing system 
of distribution gained increasing attention. As Powell has remarked in the case of Tesco, ‘the 
company recognised that it was as much in the business of distribution as of retailing.’631 
As the multiple retailers developed their distribution system into fully integrated 
structures comprising both retail and wholesale functions, the distribution system operated by the 
co-ops was gradually looking more and more old- fashioned. Despite the fact that the co-op 
movement had developed a fairly tight integration of the retail and wholesale functions in terms 
of overall buying, actual coordination between the two levels remained negligible. The retail 
societies did indeed buy a substantial proportion of their total supplies from the CWS. But the 
overall system of distribution was hampered by fragmentation. First of all, the different societies’ 
buying policies remained highly uncoordinated. Each and every society bought their supplies 
from the wholesale on a fully independent and uncoordinated basis. As was noted in a Co-op 
Union Trade Advisory Bulletin on the subject of coordinated buying: ‘the overwhelming volume of 
regular buying for the needs of societies … remains… in the hands of the buyers of the 
individual societies.’632 As the movement still consisted of a large number of independent retail 
units, the end result of this trading policy was a proliferation of orders over many suppliers. As 
an example, a study made by the CWS of twenty-four shops operated by sixteen different 
societies in the Newcastle district showed that these stores altogether stocked 11,812 separate 
lines. These lines were drawn from no less than 1,200 suppliers. Only fifty-one lines were stocked 
by all stores.633  
This total lack of coordination between the different societies’ buying policies was further 
complicated by the limited coordination between the retail and the wholesale levels. While the 
CWS and the SCWS accounted for a substantial share of the retail societies’ total purchase, the 
trading relationship between the two wholesalers and the retail organisations continued to be 
                                                 
630 See Powell for an enthusiastic description of how this development unfolded in Tesco from the late 1970s 
onwards, D. Powell, Counter revolution. The Tesco Story (London: GraftonBooks, 1991), pp. 182-94. 
631 Ibid., p. 184.  
632 Co-operative Union Ltd, ‘Group activity in grocery’, Trade Advisory Bulletin, 8 (1963), 1. 
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based on a traditional buyer-seller association. The CWS was not in position to plan the stock 
held by independent retail societies. Quite to the contrary, the wholesaler was fully dependent on 
the willingness of the retail societies to continue trading with them and had to compete for this 
trade with other suppliers. As a consequence it was impossible for the wholesalers to rationally 
plan their stock holdings.  
Despite the ongoing changes among the multiples and the subsequent impression that the 
existing co-operative system of distribution was becoming old fashioned, British co-operators 
remained preoccupied with developing its retail outlets and with reforming its overall structure. 
The 1960 amalgamation survey had been wholly directed at reducing the number of retail 
societies through amalgamation. It exclusively concerned itself with the structure of the retail 
societies. Two years later a separate National Federation Negotiating Committee (NFNC) was set 
up to investigate the possibilities of merging the CWS, the SCWS, the Co-operative Union and 
the Co-operative Productive Federation into a single national federation.634 This time, however, 
the focus was exclusively on the overall structure of the federative organisations, while the 
trading relationship between the federal wholesale societies and the retail societies was given only 
limited attention. As the co-operative historian William Richardson noted, while the Independent 
Commission (as well as the National Amalgamation survey) had ‘tackled the problem primarily 
from the retail side’, the approach of the NFNC ‘was from the side of the national federations.’635 
True, the NFNC report did highlight the importance of reconsidering the trading relationship 
between the wholesale and the retail level, noting how retail societies had to be ‘called upon to 
accept greater obligation to the new federal organisation than is the present case between them 
and the federals’.636 It also underlined how ‘the federation should … be expected to act as the 
movement’s producing/buying agency so that maximum benefits of large-scale operations may 
be obtained’ and that ‘the present fragmentation with its resultant loss to the movement as a 
whole must be replaced.’637 But principally, the report was concerned with reforming the federal 
structure of the movement.  
Hence, by the mid-1960s no serious debate had been sparked on the need to reform the 
co-operative system of distribution. The few remarks made by the NFNC came to nothing as the 
major suggestion of the report – that of merging the CWS, the SCWS, the Co-operative Union 
and the Co-operative Productive Federation – was rejected by the SCWS. As a consequence, 
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however, another separate CWS commission was set up to discuss the future development of the 
English wholesalers. The so-called Joint Reorganisation Committee (JRC), published in 1965, was 
the first co-operative report explicitly discussing the need to create a more tightly integrated 
system of co-operative distribution.638  
 
Attempts to integrate: the report of the Joint Reorganisation Committee  
The Joint Reorganisation Committee was formally established in the autumn of 1964. It was 
initiated by CWS member societies, set up by the CWS board of directors and consisted of five 
people from the CWS board and five people representing the different districts of the society. 
The committee’s general assignment was to ‘review the changing patterns of trade … and the 
progress of the C.W.S and the retail co-operative societies in England and Wales in relation 
thereto’.639 On the basis of the findings made, one of the major objectives of the committee was 
to come up with ‘recommendations for the strengthening of the link between the C.W.S. and the 
retail co-operative societies.’640  
The JRC report was thus directly addressing questions concerning the relationship 
between the retail and the wholesale units of the co-op movement. It particularly concerned itself 
with the challenge of strengthening the coordination between the two levels in order to establish 
a more rational retail/wholesale structure. As the report complained: ‘Trading relationships 
between retail societies and the C.W.S. have developed along traditional lines of 
wholesale/retailer relations. The C.W.S buys and holds stock more or less speculatively; 
competes with other suppliers for business on a day-to-day basis; and fixes its prices on the 
principle of charging what the trade will bear.’641 The major goal of the JRC-report was to 
convince the retail societies of the need to radically reform this structure and to create a more 
integrated organisation where the CWS was ‘no longer forced to act as an independent 
organisation competing for society’s trade on a day-to-day basis.’642 Such integration of retail and 
wholesale functions formed, according to the report, the principal advantage of the multiple 
retailers. These retailers had managed ‘to create an integrated streamlined organisation embracing 
                                                 
638 See Ibid., pp. 271-90. 
639 Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd., Report of the Joint Reorganisation Committee (Manchester: Co-operative 
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642 Ibid., p. 22.  
  
 210
both supplies and sales’ and thus managed to better ‘co-ordinate… buying and selling policies.’643 
On these grounds it was simply deemed detrimental that ‘if the CWS is to play a full part in the 
future progress of the movement, steps must be taken to replace the outmoded buyer-seller 
association with retail societies by a new relationship enabling CWS activities to reflect a common 
interest and purpose.’644  
The recommendations of the JRC report were approved by a decisive majority of the 
CWS members. But the report’s recommendations largely failed to materialise in practise. The 
reasons for this were numerous. For one, soon after the JRC report had been presented by the 
CWS, the Co-operative Union had launched its Regional Plan.645 Not only was the launching of the 
plan in itself drawing attention away from the JRC recommendations. By focusing exclusively on 
the size of the retail societies, it also totally failed to reconcile the principle JRC arguments with 
the arguments for a regional society structure. Commenting on the possible contributions of the 
regional plan in a 1972 edition of The Society for Co-operative Studies Bulletin, vice principal of the 
Ruskin College John Hughes noted how the major ideas of the plan were ‘so confined to the 
traditional autonomy that the reference to scale economies “in the purchase” of goods does not 
even explicitly link with the J.R.C. programme of integration of retail/wholesale functions’646 The 
Co-op Union’s Regional Plan simply failed to relate to the need to radically increase the size of the 
retail societies with the parallel need to radically transform the trading relationship between the 
retail and the wholesale units.  
This failure was closely related to a second problem. It concerned how existing 
experience clearly suggested that growth in the size of the retail societies would make a stronger 
integration with the wholesaling unit more, not less difficult. As noted in the previous chapter, 
there was a clear tendency for large societies to be less willing to hand over buying and 
distribution responsibilities to the national wholesaler. 647 The JRC had explicitly noted this 
problem when arguing that there was ‘an inherent tendency for retail societies, as they increase in 
size, to grow away from the C.W.S. and to seek to perform for themselves functions at one time 
undertaken by the wholesaler.’648 In their food operations, these larger societies would typically be 
‘bigger than most wholesalers’, they would increasingly want to ‘run their own warehouses’ and 
‘employ several specialist department managers or buyers who tend to feel independent of the 
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C.W.S.’649 Hence, as the development towards a regional society structure was advocated and 
unfolded it simply became more difficult to gain acceptance for the type of integration suggested 
by the JRC. And indeed, as the JRC report had warned, throughout the 1970s and 1980s large 
retail societies increasingly departed on a path of backwards integration, opening their own 
warehouses and strengthening their own buying function.650 Further weakening of the 
relationship was the result when these large societies also established loosely organised regional 
buying groups, comprising independent retail societies seeking better terms by way of voluntary 
co-operation. Rather than increased integration between the CWS and the retail societies the 
main tendency throughout the post-war years was thus one of decreased loyalty between the two. 
The problems created by this situation were plainly described by the 1980 Co-operative Congress 
president H. Baily, in his presidential address: 
For many years now I have been told that the reason for our non-
competitiveness in the market place is because the CWS does not buy correctly. 
It charges too much. Retails have to take a higher price because of profit 
retention, etc. Has the movement, via its officials, thought about the reasons for 
the successes of ASDA, Tesco, Marks and Spencer, Sainsbury’s, etc? Has it 
examined the common denominator amongst these organisations? It is the 
simple phrase Central Procurement. Not for them the spectacle of having buyers 
in every section of their activity. Their managers are sales managers. Someone at 
Head Office buys for their units and the managers have to sell. In our movement 
we rarely describe our job as to sell out, it is instead a matter of buying in. We 
will never meet the competition of the high street with our outmoded ancient 
system of fragmented buying and no amount of tinkering with the constitution 
will solve the problem of lack of modern organisation in buying.651  
A little later, he continued:   
What do I propose therefore? I suggest that all buyers in the movement should 
become sales managers with no diminution of status and that all procurement be 
made by the Federal – the CWS. I suggest that societies accept discipline and 
commitment regarding this sort of procurement and that the buying agency 
accepts responsibility for any bad buys so that the retails are not put at risk. 
Revolutionary! Nonsense – I would prefer to call it common sense. When we are 
in the race of the High Street, we have to put ourselves on the same 
procurement level as our competitors.652  
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As indicated by these statements, there was no lack of appreciation by leading co-operators of the 
importance and possibilities in increasing the level of coordination and integration within the 
movement. The main problem was that the resentment towards such measures remained 
pronounced among the retail societies. The retail societies continued to uphold the ideal of local 
autonomy. Particular reluctance was expressed towards the idea of renouncing governance over 
the societies’ supplies. Retail societies could very well buy the large majority of their supplies 
from the CWS. But they wanted freedom to decide to buy elsewhere if that better served their 
immediate interests. The attitude expressed by the chief executive officer of Colchester and East 
Essex Co-operative Society, Mr F. L Round, speaking at a 1983 meeting of the Metropolitan and 
Southern Regions of the Society for Co-operative Studies, is illustrative. As Round saw it, ‘in the 
world of retailing flexibility and freedom of access to alternative sources of supply is an 
imperative ingredient of survival, let alone success.’ In the view of Round, the calls for vertical 
integration as represented most distinctively by the JRC report, were thus to be treated as nothing 
but a ‘noxious disease.’653 
The growth in the size of the retail societies worked as a direct hindrance to the necessary 
integration of the national co-op movement. Despite repeated calls from leading co-operative 
managers and elected officials for the need to radically increase the level of integration between 
the wholesale and the retail level, the system of distribution operated by the co-ops remained 
highly fragmented. On similar accounts, national standardisation also largely failed. The 
increasingly large retail societies continued to operate, brand and market their stores separately 
and standardisation of the co-operative outlets remained negligible. As a follow-up to the JRC 
report, the CWS in 1968 had made a forceful attempt to counter this tendency of fragmentation 
at the store level, by initiating what, according to the Co-operative News, was probably ‘the largest 
promotion scheme ever launched by the society’.654 The scheme involved, as reported in the News 
‘continuous advertising campaigns throughout the year, starting with provisions and then in mid-
March swinging into more general advertising for C.W.S and other brand leaders in the food 
field.’655 An important part of the campaign was the launching of a new co-op logo. The logo was 
to appear on all CWS own-products as well as on all co-operative stores. The campaign was 
embraced by most societies and the co-op brand was adopted widely, covering most co-operative 
stores across the country. But the long term effect on the day-to-day operational procedures of 
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the co-op societies remained limited. Despite some progress in terms of common branding and 
nationwide marketing, the level of standardisation did not improve substantially. As we recall 
from previous chapters, societies continued to develop their stores independently of each other, 
operating them under numerous different trading identities and according to a variety of 
operational principles.656 
The end result of these developments was that by the 1980s little had been gained in 
terms of standardising operational procedures and integrating the co-operative chain of 
distribution. And, as we have seen earlier, gradually the CWS saw no other option than to move 
into retailing themselves. The attempts made to integrate and standardise along federative lines 
had not produced the required results. And while retail societies had integrated backwards and 
started to co-operate in voluntary buying groups, the CWS strategy became to integrate forwards 
to create a separate, wholesaler controlled retailing business. While this provided the CWS with 
renewed possibilities of growth, the overall effect on the movement’s progress was less 
encouraging. For one it tended to add force to a ‘continuing mutual suspicion between large retail 
societies and the CWS.’657 It also worked to further reduce the large societies’ loyalty to the CWS 
as their sole provider, the end result being increased rather than reduced fragmentation in the 
overall system of distribution responsible for supplying the co-operative stores.  
 
Integration and standardisation within the Norwegian co-operative movement  
In the immediate post-war years the Norwegian co-op movement had taken on a leading role in 
introducing the principles of chain store organisation in the country’s food retail market. 
Warehousing was rationalised, modernised and centralised to the Norwegian Co-operative 
Association (NKL). Important initial steps to closer integrate the operations of the NKL and the 
retail societies were also taken through the gradual introduction of standardised ordering 
routines. These processes of integration and standardisation of the co-operative distribution 
chain continued throughout the 1960s. 658 Alongside the attention given to centralisation and the 
need to increase the size of the retail societies, the NKL continued to advocate the importance of 
improving the overall system of distribution operated by the co-op movement. The process of 
amalgamation was paralleled with continuous efforts to strengthen the link between the retail and 
the wholesale level.  
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The 1960s and 1970s saw a slow but gradual improvement in the system of distribution 
operated by the Norwegian co-operators. Warehouses were further rationalised and enlarged. 
More societies joined the system of standardised ordering and their overall loyalty to the NKL 
improved gradually. While radical and strenuous, yet largely unsuccessful attempts had been 
made by the CWS to reform the system of distribution operated by the British co-op movement, 
the Norwegian development showed a slow but steady improvement.  
Attempts to increase the standardisation of store operations were also implemented, as 
the NKL in close cooperation with the retail societies launching a nationwide marketing 
campaign in 1967.659 On similar lines as the UK co-ops, the Norwegian movement launched a 
common brand, an orange S, to clearly demarcate co-operative stores from competing retailers.660 
To participate in the scheme, retail societies had to sign a special agreement where they obliged 
themselves to actively use and promote the S-logo ‘following the guiding principles approved of 
in the S-arrangement’.661 The scheme was an immediate success. Soon the orange S came to cover 
all co-operative stores as well as the uniforms of the store workers, letter-heads, carrier bags, etc. 
It became a defining feature of the co-operative stores, separating them clearly from the outlets 
of the private retailers  
This is not to say that the failure to integrate and standardise operations that had 
hampered the economic development of the UK consumer co-ops did not cause trouble within 
the Norwegian movement. Despite national marketing and common branding, the actual 
operational standardisation across society structures remained limited also among Norwegian co-
operators. While the Norwegian retail societies, unlike their British sister organisations, refrained 
from establishing wholly separate trading names for their stores, the S-brand largely remained a 
common fascia for co-operative stores. Its effect on the actual operation of the stores remained 
limited. As in the UK, safeguarding of local autonomy within the co-operative societies also 
hindered the NKL led drive towards a stronger integration of business operations. Debating the 
future challenges for the movement at the 1980 NKL congress in Stavanger, major worries were 
expressed as to the actual competitiveness of the existing co-operative system of distribution. By 
now, Norwegian private retailers had seriously started to experiment with the multiple’s recipe of 
standardising the retail outlets and tightly coordinating the retail and wholesale functions. The 
main worry among the co-operators was whether the existing structure of the co-operative 
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enterprise was able to handle the upcoming challenges from these retailers. As the CEO of the 
NKL Knut Moe warned the congress participants:  
The small corner-shop grocer … is about to disappear, and we are now 
competing with steadily stronger chain stores… and gradually we recognise that 
there is no longer a separate wholesale unit and a separate retail unit. The chain 
has melted these together into one unit. And under these conditions it is obvious 
that our system is no longer up-to-date and that we need to work to create a level 
of integration which is effective.662  
 
The fact of the matter was that by 1984, the co-operative movement still consisted of 595 
independent retail societies. These were running more than 1,600 shops, of which only about 22 
per cent were organised into some form of centrally coordinated store format. Although the local 
societies had more than doubled their purchase in the NKL since 1950, as a percentage of total 
purchase, by the mid-1980s the share was still below 50 per cent.663  
Hence, despite the fact that the NKL throughout the post-war years had consistently 
advocated the advantages of closer integration and standardisation, by the 1980s the actual 
coordination of buying and assortment still remained fairly limited. Under the administrative 
leadership of Knut Moe, the national association had managed to strengthen the retail societies’ 
loyalty to the NKL as their supplier. Moe had also managed to convince the retail societies of the 
advantages of centralising all warehousing to the NKL. But the societies continued to decide for 
themselves what products to hold in the stores. Buying remained the responsibility of the 
individual societies and the stores were supplied from an uncoordinated mix of regional NKL 
owned storehouses, private wholesalers and industry salesmen. A further problem was that the 
regional NKL warehouses had gradually developed a substantial independence of their own. In 
many instances, these warehouses would have a stronger commitment to the retail societies 
operating in the region in which they traded than to the NKL headquarters in Oslo.  
Rather than being efficiently addressed, many of these problems were further reinforced 
during the 1980s. As we recall, the early 1980s saw a change of leadership in the NKL. The 
former Trondos manager Knut Værdal replaced Knut Moe as CEO of the national association.664 
Building on his experiences as a retailer, Værdal had soon made substantial alterations in the main 
strategic focus of the NKL. Most prominently, the very role of the NKL in the co-operative 
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system of distribution was redefined. Knut Moe had been fully determined to rationalise the co-
operative system of distribution. In his view, the main role of the NKL was to secure an efficient 
flow of goods serving the many stores operated by the retail societies. Værdal, by contrast, was 
primarily focused on the retail side of the co-operative operations. He saw the main role of the 
NKL as one of helping the retail societies strengthen their retail operations, while the wholesaling 
function was deemed less important. Presenting his visions for the future development of the 
movement at the 1986 NKL congress in Trondheim, Værdal explicitly launched this major shift 
in focus.  
Our main strategy … is: to focus fully on our businesses at the retail level. … We 
want to provide our members and customers with a broader range of offerings at 
the retail end. [...] We also have a substantial wholesale business and this we will 
continue to develop. But … our wholesaling and manufacturing operations will 
remain second to our main objective and the ventures we plan for the 1990s.665 
On the basis of these visions, and as presented in earlier chapters, the NKL took the initiative of 
a massive expansion in the movement’s hypermarket and superstore business. It also initiated a 
full reorganisation of the retail operations into a selected set of carefully planned and distinct 
store formats.666 These formats were to be operated similarly across society structures and they 
targeted different consumer segments. As such, Værdal’s change of direction implied that the 
advantages of standardisation continued to be recognised. He was, however, much less attentive 
to the advantages of integrating the distribution function. Quite to the contrary, control over 
NKL warehousing was decentralised and the advantages of radically strengthening the retail 
societies trading loyalty towards their national wholesale, repeatedly advocated since the 1950s, 
were given only minor attention.  
The picture painted by the post-war efforts to integrate and standardise the operations of 
the Norwegian co-operative movement is therefore a mixed one. The immediate post-war period 
had seen a gradual move towards increased integration and standardisation of the Norwegian co-
operative system of distribution. The NKL developed as the movement’s sole wholesaler, 
modernised its warehouses and also managed to increase the retail societies’ loyalty to the 
national wholesaler. Systems of standardised ordering were tried out and gradually implemented. 
A national marketing scheme was also launched, increasing the level of standardisation of co-
operative stores. By 1980, important, initial steps had thus been taken in the quest to integrate 
and standardise the operations of the co-operative movement. Throughout the 1980s, further 
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initiatives were taken to increase the level of standardisation across society structures. But apart 
from the launching of separate brands for the different stores operated by the co-op, the actual 
operational standardisation of the stores remained limited. In terms of integration, the 1980s 
represented a step backwards. The wholesaling function of the NKL was largely neglected. The 
regional NKL owned warehouses were granted substantial individual powers and the process of 
increasing co-operation between the retail and the wholesale level came to a standstill. In the 
period from 1980 to 1990, the retail societies’ purchase in the NKL as a per cent of total 
purchase rose by a negligible one percentage point.667 By the end of the decade there existed a 
substantial untapped potential in tightening the supply chain and standardising the operations of 
the co-operative stores. 
 
Federative integration and standardisation: Norwegian co-ops in the 1990s 
As we recall from a previous chapter, the coming of the 1990s marked the beginning of yet 
another process of fundamental reorganisation in the Norwegian co-operative movement.668 In 
1989 Værdal had been replaced by Rolf Rønning as CEO of the NKL. Together with a new team 
of senior managers Rønning soon initiated a series of changes set to radically strengthen the 
competitiveness of the co-op movement. While Rønning had been supportive of Værdal’s 
strategy of segmentation, he was sceptical of how the stores were operated and especially of how 
the system of distribution serving the stores was constructed. On these grounds he found that 
there was an acute need to increase the level of standardisation of the co-operative stores and to 
transform the existing system of distribution into a fully integrated structure.669 The co-op 
movement had simply not taken full advantage of the possibilities to integrate and standardise its 
operations. As noted in the first major strategy document developed by Rønning and his 
colleagues presented at the NKL congress in Tromsø in 1990:  
The outside world views the consumer co-operative as an integrated chain with a 
dominating market position and scale advantages. Today, this is only partially 
true. We still have a huge potential to improve our total competitiveness by 
realising a good and binding interplay in central areas. It should suffice to 
mention buying, flow of goods, store development, marketing, training.670  
The first step taken to redeem this situation was directed at the distribution function. The 
regional warehousing structure of the NKL was rationalised and all NKL buying was centralised 
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to the Oslo headquarters. In the course of a few years, two of the ten regional storehouses were 
closed down and storage of all main non-food products was centralised to two separate non-food 
storehouses, one in Oslo and one in Trondheim. Moreover, the regional warehouse managers 
were relieved of all buying responsibilities and buying was made the sole responsibility of the 
NKL administration in Oslo. Hence, while buying responsibilities had been decentralised to the 
regional NKL warehouses during the Værdal period, they were now becoming fully centralised to 
NKL headquarters.  
The second step was even more radical.671 Not only were NKL headquarters to control 
their regional warehouses. This fully centralised wholesaling unit was also to negotiate on behalf 
of all the retail societies on all major lines sold in the local grocery stores. Buying was simply no 
longer to be the responsibility of the retail societies, but made the sole responsibility of the 
national association. The retail societies were to focus fully on their role as retailers. To gain 
acceptance for such a radical transformation in the relationship between the NKL and the local 
retail societies, the NKL had to take partial steps and develop their new system of distribution in 
close cooperation with the development of the different retail chains. Hence, in the autumn of 
1989 a trial project was initiated for the Prix group of stores.672 Local societies operating Prix 
stores were invited to join the project where the NKL centrally negotiated for all major lines sold 
in the stores. All thirty-seven societies operating a Prix store signed the agreement and in the 
winter of 1989-90 centralised negotiations were held on behalf of a total of seventy-seven stores. 
The results were remarkable. Initial reports presented in the spring of 1990 suggested that all 
participating societies had experienced an average improvement in prices of no less than 10 per 
cent. The success increased the interest of retail societies for joining the Prix chain, and by the 
end of the year a total of 117 stores were in operation. The first initial attempts made to centralise 
buying to the NKL had been a success. The economic potential of the strategy had been proven 
and more and more societies sought to join to take advantage of the savings offered. But the 
NKL management was not satisfied. They wanted to take control over all co-operative buying.  
Soon after the viability of the Prix chain store model had been proven, both the Obs! 
group of stores and the Mega supermarkets were reorganised on similar lines. Together with the 
retail societies, the NKL established separate chain boards to develop and govern the basic 
trading principles of the different chains. A special negotiating committee, consisting of 
representative from the NKL and the largest retail societies, was also set up to carry out the 
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actual negotiations with the suppliers. By including representatives of the largest societies in the 
actual negotiations, it became easier for the NKL to convince these societies that fully centralised 
negotiations led to better terms than could be gained by individual negotiations.  
To guide the co-operative negotiators, a carefully planned standardised assortment 
structure was also developed. The structure was built of four different assortment types. A so-
called ‘basic assortment’ was developed first. This consisted of products to be sold in all the 
different chains. To provide distinctiveness for the different formats the basic assortment was 
supplemented with another three assortment types; a ‘supplementary assortment’, an ‘edge 
assortment’ and a specific ‘Obs! assortment’.  
Standardising the assortment of all the different chains implied that the leverage of the 
retail societies to decide what products to hold in their own stores was drastically reduced. While 
this implied a fundamental break with the co-operative ideal of local governance and autonomy, 
the economic gains to be made by such a standardised system proved so obvious that all societies 
soon joined voluntarily. Hence, already in the winter of 1991/1992 the NKL, for the first time in 
history, carried out negotiations with the industry on behalf of all member societies on all 
groceries sold in the movement.673  
The principle economic advantages of the model developed were fairly simple. The 
standardised assortment structure made possible a substantial reduction in the number of lines 
and suppliers, while large volumes could be concentrated at a limited set of carefully selected 
suppliers. The prices offered by the industry could thus be substantially reduced. In its first year 
of operation the new scheme of centralised purchasing led to an average price cut of 
approximately 7 per cent.674 
Further, as all the different chains held the same basic assortment, some also shared 
similar supplementary and edge assortments, they would obtain the same price on a given 
product, irrespective of the volume sold in the specific chain. It was the totality of sales that 
counted and that were the starting point in the negotiations with the industry. This also implied 
that retail societies primarily operating smaller stores under the Prix discount profile or the small, 
local S Marked format, in principle, would receive their supplies at the same price as the societies 
operating large Obs! Stores. As Rønning also noted in a retrospective internal strategy note: ‘it 
was first and foremost the smallest societies that obtained substantial improvements, while the 
large societies, which already had their own ‘special deals’ with the industry, gained relatively 
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smaller improvements, despite providing the most substantial volumes.’675 The basic achievement 
of the model, however, as Rønning went on to note, was that ‘a unified action made possible a 
substantial transfer of competitive powers from the industry to the consumer co-operative 
movement.’676 
A final obvious advantage was that by reorganising all co-operative food stores into four 
integrated chains holding a standardise assortment and operated on standardised principles across 
the country, huge gains could be secured in marketing and other operational expenses. National 
marketing campaigns could be developed and financed centrally, providing substantial ‘free 
marketing’ for the retail societies. 
 The immediate economic achievements of the new structure were thus a major reason for 
the societies to join and stay loyal to the chain store model developed. However, it soon 
transpired that the largest societies also tried to gain additional advantages alongside the 
centralised negotiations. It remained a continuous challenge for the NKL to keep the retail 
societies dedicated to the new model. As a means to help sustain the necessary loyalty and 
discipline, the NKL gradually developed an internal system of economic incentives. At the centre 
of the model lay a clear delineation between the different parts of the distribution chain, from 
production via wholesaling and retailing to the consumer.677 The basic principle on which the 
model rested was that every link in the chain had to be competitive and produce a profit. The 
profit produced by each link should then be used to actively steer the conduct of the next link in 
the chain. Improved productivity at the retail level was to stimulate member loyalty and increased 
influx of members by way of paying a more substantial dividend and by offering other 
membership advantages. On similar lines, improved surplus at the wholesale level was to be 
repaid to the retail societies in the form of an increased dividend on purchase, as well as by 
different types of discounts. These were aimed at encouraging specific types of conduct among 
the retail societies. So-called ‘society discounts’ were developed to stimulate mergers among the 
societies, ‘chain discounts’ were introduced to enhance the attraction of joining a chain, 
‘investment discounts’ were given to stimulate growth and renewal in the structure of the shops 
and ‘shop discounts’ should stimulate a transfer to larger shops.  
The economic incentive system developed by the NKL proved vital in ensuring that the 
federative structure was kept tightly integrated and that all societies adhered to the standardised 
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operational procedures developed. As such, it simply made possible the efficient operation of 
four fully integrated, standardised and centralised food chains within an overall federative 
organisational model.  
The economic reorganisation of the 1990s was decisive in securing the competitive 
strength of the Norwegian consumer co-operatives. Indeed, when Rønning and his management 
colleagues initiated the principles of the integrated chain store for the retail societies, the co-op 
movement was again proving its innovative potential. As we recall, the Norwegian food retail 
market had long remained fragmented. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s independent retailers 
dominated the market and the establishment and success of multiple chains remained negligible. 
From the 1970s and early 1980s onwards some attempts had been made by private retailers and 
wholesalers to establish vertically integrated structures. But the main focus remained on 
standardisation of outlets and centralisation of control. Retailers primarily sought to increase their 
market share and improve their profits by adding to the number of stores operated under 
centralised control. Vertical integration remained limited. Hence, the two fastest growing private 
retail chains in the 1980s, the soft-discounters Rema 1000 and Rimi, had not integrated 
backwards into retailing. When the co-op in 1990-91 managed to fully introduce and take 
advantage of the principles of the integrated chain store, negotiating centrally with the industry 
on behalf of all the retail outlets in the movement, it caused complete astonishment in the food 
retail industry. In a 1993 interview with the daily business newspaper Dagens Næringsliv, the CEO 
of the country’s largest private wholesaler Joh. Johannson, openly expressed admiration for what 
the co-ops had achieved: ‘If we had managed to co-operate with the retailers we could have been 
in a totally different negotiating position. Just look at what the co-operative retail societies have 
achieved by congregating in the NKL’.678  
Soon after the co-op had taken the first step, however, the private retailers followed. Both 
the Rema and the Rimi chain integrated backwards, each taking control over large wholesaling 
businesses. And in 1994 Joh. Johannson managed to gather a substantial group of the remaining 
independent retailers in a voluntary chain, Norgesgruppen. From 2000 the chain was turned into 
a fully integrated retail/wholesale unit controlling more than thirty per cent of the Norwegian 
food retail market.679  
The ultimate effect of the co-op movement’s introduction of an integrated organisational 
model was thus a fundamental transformation in the structure of the Norwegian food retail 
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market. In a period of no more than four years, this market developed from being among the 
most fragmented to become one of the most centralised and competitive in Western Europe. 
The following table shows the development in market shares of the leading food retailers. 
 
Table 8.1: Market shares in the Norwegian food retail market 1990-2000  
(per cent)680 
 
 Rimi/ ICA  
Rema 
1000 Co-op  
Norges-
Gruppen Others
1990 10,2 5,7 22,8 7,1 54,2 
1992 16,8 11,0 23,0 16,5 32,7 
1994 24,0 11,3 24,4 37,1 3,2 
1995 27,7 11,8 24,9 32,7 2,9 
1996 28,6 11,8 25,2 32,1 2,3 
1997 28,3 12,5 25,2 32,6 1,4 
1998 28,0 13,2 24,9 32,7 1,0 
1999 27,7 13,7 25,2 33,2 0,2 
2000 26,4 14,3 24,7 33,8 0,7 
 
 
As the table reveals, the consumer co-ops managed to retain their market share at approximately 
24-25 per cent throughout this period of massive change. A decisive factor in securing this 
competitiveness was the successful restructuring of the entire co-operative system of distribution, 
beginning in 1989-90. The strategy had comprised a successful blending of the well known 
potential for economies of scale immanent in the integrated chain model, with an adapted version 
of the federative organisational form. The Norwegian co-operators had simply managed to find a 
way to fight off the competition by realigning the principles of the federative model with the 
commercial advantages of the integrated, standardised and centralised chain store model. 
Comparing this successful development with the experiences of the British co-operators during 
the last decade of the twentieth century again reveals interesting differences of approach and 
ultimately also in results.  
 
Partial integration: UK co-ops in the 1990s  
The post-war challenge of standardising operations and integrating the system of distribution had 
been met differently by the Norwegian and UK co-ops. While the Norwegians had developed on 
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a path of gradual integration and standardisation within the framework of a federative 
organisational model, the British largely chose a strategy of forward and backward integration. 
Large regional retail societies integrated backwards, strengthening their wholesaling operations by 
building new warehouses and developing organisational capabilities in buying and merchandising. 
In parallel, the CWS integrated forwards, developing its own retail branch alongside its existing 
wholesaling and manufacturing operations.681 
This difference of approach continued into the 1980s and 1990s. Based on four national 
food retail chains, the Norwegians developed their federative organisational model into a fully 
integrated and standardised structure. Local retail societies continued to hold the economic 
responsibility for the retail operations, while all decisions concerning buying, assortment, 
branding and overall strategy were centralised to the federative level. In the UK by contrast, retail 
societies continued to focus on increasing their size by way of amalgamation. They continued to 
develop their own warehousing and their own systems of distribution. Decisions on branding, 
operational principles and assortment in the stores also remained fully in the hands of the 
different societies, the result being an abundance of different store fascias, logo's and marketing 
strategies. The end result was, as a 1992 report on the future prospects of co-operative trade 
concluded, that ‘full scale buying and distribution benefits’ were ‘yet to be obtained’. 682  
In January 1993 a major step was taken to rectify some of these problems, when the CWS 
together with three other retail societies formed the Co-operative Retail Trading Group 
(CRTG).683 The CRTG was to function as a joint buying group for the member societies, with the 
goal of improving buying conditions, reducing the duplication of lines carried in co-op stores, 
increasing the share of own label commodities and to generally rationalise the system of co-
operative grocery distribution.684 The organisation, later characterised as ‘the most disciplined 
buying group the Co-op had ever seen’, was based on complete centralisation of the member 
societies’ buying.685 Existing buying departments operated by member societies were closed 
down. The organisation also developed comprehensive national marketing programmes, 
including national advertising and regular promotions.686  
The overall goal of the CRTG establishment was to develop a centralised buying unit 
comprising the totality of UK consumer co-operative trade. As such, it sought to take on some of 
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the same responsibilities as that of the NKL within the Norwegian movement. But, the 
movement’s overall problems of fragmentation and lack of national coordination were made 
clearly visible, when a group of regional societies, only a year after the formation of the CRTG, 
established a separate buying group, the Consortium of Independent Co-operatives (CIC).687 
While the member societies of this alternative buying organisation were supportive of the basic 
CRTG idea of making co-operative buying more disciplined, they were reluctant to accept its 
centralised decision-making structure. Hence, they created the CIC as an alternative buying 
organisation. It was intended to work as a less centralised type of joint buying, relying, as noted in 
an article in the Co-op News, ‘on the experiences and services of existing buyers in its member 
societies.’688  
Throughout the 1990s, the CIC and the CRTG developed as separate buying agencies, 
competing for support from the retail societies. By 1995 another eleven societies had joined the 
CRTG. The organisation now controlled approximately 65 per cent of total grocery trade.689 
Later in the same year it was announced that the Co-operative Retail Services (CRS) had decided 
to join the CIC. As we recall, the CRS had originally been established by the CWS. While 
developing independently from the wholesale federative, the CWS had also, until recently, 
appointed half of the CRS’ board members. The two societies had also been in several close 
negotiations to merge, the last having finally collapsed in the spring of 1995. It was thus a 
revealing sign of the movement’s continued failure to cooperate and coordinate its activities 
when the CRS decided to join the CIC and not the CRTG. While the co-operative press 
celebrated the decision as an ‘important step forward’ in ‘the Co-operative movement’s collective 
buying arrangements’, the decision could just as well be regarded as yet another indication of the 
movement’s major problem, namely the failure to establish a truly integrated system of 
distribution encompassing the totality of co-operative trade.690 As a 1996 external report on the 
prospects of co-operative trading – evocatively sub-titled ‘Combined purchasing or further 
fragmentation?’ – concluded: ‘it can only be seen as unfortunate that the Co-op has two major 
buying groups rather than one‘691  
                                                 
687 Ibid. The original member societies were the United Northwest, Portsea Island, Tamworth, Leicestershire and 
Brighton societies, see ’Co-ops form 2bn buying group’, Co-operative News (7 November 1995). 
688 ’Co-ops form 2bn buying group’, Co-operative News (7 November 1995). See also Insight Research, Co-op 96. 
Combined purchasing or further fragmentation? (London: Insight Research, 1996), p. 5. The original member societies were 
United Northwest, Portsea Island, Tamworth, Leicestershire and Brighton Co-operative Society.  
689 See ‘3bn worth of buying power’ Co-operative News (22 August 1995). The new societies joining were the 
Sheffield, Leeds, Chesterfield, West Midlands, Lothian and Borders, East Angus, Channel Islands, Ipswich and 
Norwich, Lincoln, Colchester and East Essex and Chelmsford Star Co-operative Society . 
690 ’Co-ops form 2bn buying group’, Co-operative News (7 November 1995).  
691 Insight Research, Co-op 96. Combined purchasing or further fragmentation? (London: Insight Research, 1996), p. 5. As it 
turned out, in the immediate years following its establishment, the CIC also experienced several problems of 
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Further disintegration was the result as the CRS, in addition to joining the CIC, launched 
its own, separate logo and decided to develop an independent own label as an alternative to the 
traditional co-op label.692 The new ‘co-operative’ logo was announced as a part of the society’s 
‘creation of a new identity’ and was intended to reflect the ‘transformation of its focus, culture 
and commercial performance.’693 The move was indicative of the movement’s long-lasting 
problems of standardising its operations across society structures. After the launching of a 
common co-op logo in 1968 had provided some unity, developments throughout the 1970s and 
1980s had dispersed co-operative stores into a multitude of fascias and store types.694 This 
process continued throughout the early 1990s and the CRS decision to exchange the traditional 
co-op brand with a separate logo was only a continuation of this trend. The CRS also separated 
itself from the rest of the movement by holding on to a multi-format strategy in a period where 
more and more societies gradually came to focus trading in the convenience segment.695 Hence, 
by the mid-1990s the fact of the matter was that close to one fifth of total co-operative trade in 
the UK was controlled by a society operating on a completely separate path from the rest of the 
movement.  
By the turn of the millennium, however, a new major step was taken to improve the 
overall coherence of the movement as the CRS and the CWS merger was launched.696 The merger 
brought together under one unit a large amount of the co-op movement’s total turnover. At the 
same time, it implied a substantial concentration of co-operative buying and merchandising. With 
the CRS merging with the CWS and subsequently also becoming a part of the CRTG buying 
group, remaining independent societies were soon to follow. Hence, by the beginning of 2002, 
100 per cent of co-op food buying was, for the first time in the history of the British co-op 
movement, controlled from one single buying point.697 
The development of the CRTG has been characterised as ‘one of the major success 
stories of the Co-operative Movement in the last decade.’698 And indeed, it was an important step 
in the quest to confront the continuous competitive challenges of the multiple food retailers. In 
particular, it worked as an important means to develop a more integrated system of distribution, 
                                                                                                                                                        
disloyalty from its member societies. And in 1998, the two largest member societies, the CRS and the United 
Northwest Co-operative Society decided to return to independent buying, leaving the CIC ‘dead in the water’ as an 
editorial in the Co-operative News phrased it, see ‘Life after CIC’, Co-operative News (15 September 1998). 
692 See ‘CRS goes it alone’ Co-operative News (30 May 1995) and ’Signs of the times – CRS unveils new logo’, Co-
operative News (28 May 1996). 
693 ’Signs of the times – CRS unveils new logo’, Co-operative News (28 May 1996). 
694 See chapter five in the present thesis. 
695 ’Rivals on the rope’, Co-operative News (18 April 1995). See also chapter five in the present thesis. 
696 See chapter seven in the present thesis.  
697 See The Co-operative Group, Annual report and accounts, 2001. 
698 Co-operative Commission, cited in The Co-operative Group, Annual report and accounts, 2001, p. 15. 
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comprising the totality of the co-operative food trades. While buying was centralised, the overall 
functioning of the distribution system remained quite fragmented. The distribution function was 
not integrated on a common, electronic platform. The authority of the CRTG to develop 
standardised assortment policies across society structures also remained limited. Co-operative 
stores continued to be operated independently by individual societies. And while some societies 
(or more precisely, one society) had become increasingly large, encompassing the majority of co-
operative trade, the number of different co-operative food chains operated across the country 
still remained substantial.  
These features stand in contrast to the experiences of the Norwegian co-operative 
movement. In Norway the centralisation of buying was intrinsically linked to the establishment of 
four national food chains, operating on a carefully planned and standardised assortment policy. 
Assortment was standardised across the different chains and the retail societies operated their 
food stores according to the strict operational principles of the different chains. The structure 
also made possible national marketing of the co-op, the co-op stores and their daily, weekly or 
monthly offers. While not being integrated organisationally, the functional integration of the 
Norwegian co-ops by the end of the 20th century remained more substantial than that achieved 
in its British sister organisation.  
 
Conclusions 
Transformations in the dominant organisational patterns of the post-war food retailing industry 
fundamentally challenged basic features of the traditional, consumer co-operative model. 
Standardisation of operational procedures and integration of the distribution function were 
among the most prominent features in this process. The development of these organisational 
features, from the 1970s and 1980s onwards, challenged long-lasting co-operative principles of 
local autonomy and democratic decision-making. To compete efficiently with the advancing 
multiple retailers, co-operative stores had to be standardised across the boundaries of the 
independent societies and the system of distribution serving the co-operative stores had to be 
integrated and coordinated by a centralised unit.  
The present chapter has analysed how the British and the Norwegian consumer co-
operative dealt with this challenge. It has shown that it was approached differently and discussed 
how this divergence ultimately shaped the development of the two movements. In the UK, 
despite the fact that the advantages of standardisation and integration were openly acknowledged 
by several leading co-operators, both the existing co-operative retail operations and the system of 
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distribution supplying these enterprises remained highly fragmented. While the JRC report, 
presented to British co-operators as early as 1966, provided many of the answers that could have 
strengthened the competitiveness of co-operative trade, the report’s recommendations on issues 
of trade organisation were never fully implemented. While some integration and standardisation 
was accomplished through a strategy of forward integration by the wholesalers, overall 
coordination of co-operative trade remained limited. By the turn of the millennium, the co-
operative food retail business was still operated under numerous different brands and with only 
very limited levels of standardisation across the different formats, not to mention across the 
independent societies. Substantial progress had been made in buying. But the level of integration 
and standardisation in the total system of co-operative distribution remained limited.  
The Norwegian story was different. Already from the 1950s onwards a gradual process of 
centralisation, integration and standardisation had begun. While centralisation in terms of 
mergers and amalgamations remained limited compared to the British experience, the 
Norwegians developed on a parallel path of integration and standardisation of the retail and 
wholesale operations. Local retail societies continued to control and own the retail operations. 
But the national wholesaler was provided with substantial leverage in buying, overall planning of 
assortment and marketing. Operational procedures, branding, assortment and marketing of the 
co-operative stores could thus be standardised across the different societies. And as the buying 
function was fully integrated and centralised to NKL headquarters, substantial scale economies in 
buying could be realised. The basic elements of this structure developed gradually throughout the 
post-war years, with the most radical steps taken from the 1990s onwards. It formed a major 
element in the continued competitiveness of co-operative trade in the Norwegian market and 
helped secure the substantial market share the movement had gradually obtained throughout the 
post-war years.  
 
*** 
 
To approach the post-war competitive challenges of the multiple retailers, co-operative societies 
across Western Europe were forced to radically transform their organisational structures. To 
handle the superior organisational efficiencies advanced by the large retail chains, control over 
co-operative trade had to be centralised, operational procedures had to be standardised and the 
chain of distribution between retail and wholesale levels had to be fully integrated. The second 
main section of this thesis has described and analysed how this challenge was approached by the 
consumer co-operative movement in Norway and the UK.  
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The analysis has constituted the second step in a three-fold process aimed at explaining 
the divergent development pattern of the British and Norwegian consumer co-operative 
movements in the post-war period. It has been based on the simple premise that the 
development pattern of consumer co-operative enterprises in the post-war period was 
intrinsically linked to how the different movements confronted the challenge of reorganising their 
overall trading structure. At the most general level it has been argued that those movements that 
were capable of reorganising their organisational structure along the lines of a centralised, 
standardised and integrated model were generally advantaged, while those who failed to do so 
began to lag behind their competitors.   
The case of the Norwegian and British consumer co-operative development provides 
ample evidence of such reasoning. Throughout the post-war years the Norwegian co-ops 
experienced a steady strengthening of their market position. And as multiple retailers started to 
seriously advance into the Norwegian food retail market, the co-ops proved to be competitive. 
The movement defended its market share and produced steady profits. In the UK by contrast, 
market share in the food retail market evaporated steadily throughout the period, from being 
close to twenty per cent in the mid-1950s to about six per cent at the turn of the millennium. In 
terms of profitability levels the co-ops also remained way behind that of their major competitors. 
The first main section of the thesis analysed how differences in the way the co-operative 
movements in Norway and the UK approached major transformations in size, scope and 
structure of the food stores operating within the food retailing industry, contributed to this 
divergent development. This second section focused on the role of organisational factors and 
analysed how the ability to confront the superior organisational efficiencies of the multiple 
retailers shaped the divergent development pattern of the Norwegian and the British consumer 
co-operatives.  
The analysis has shown that from the 1950s onwards Norwegian and British co-operators 
held very different views on the major challenges facing the future development of co-operative 
trade. In Norway, a new and energetic leadership in the NKL defined the need to radically 
rationalise and reorganise the operational practises of the entire co-op movement as the major 
challenge ahead. While the movement was not faced with any serious competitive treats, it still 
strongly advocated the need to rationalise the entire system of distribution on which it operated. 
The British, by contrast, continued to express confidence in the overall organisational model on 
which they based their trading activities. And while the competitive threats of the rapidly 
expanding multiples were recognised, few active steps were taken to confront the challenges. In 
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fact, as we recall from the analyses of the work of the Independent Commission, all the major 
suggestions put forward by this commission were rejected by the British co-operators.  
By the coming of the 1960s, the challenges facing co-operative trade were starting to 
become more explicitly recognised by British co-operators. But while the increasingly successful 
organisational recipe of the multiples was based on the combination of centralised control, 
standardised operational procedures and integration of retail and wholesale functions, the co-ops 
primarily came to focus on centralisation. The number of retail societies was drastically reduced 
and the leading retail co-ops, most prominently the CRS and later the CWS, developed to 
become among the largest retail co-operatives in the world. In some areas, regional societies 
managed to develop as local and regional strongholds, producing stable profits and fiercely 
defending their market share. The overall tendency, however, was of continuing market decline  
The major problem experienced by the British was simply that the process of 
centralisation failed to be supplemented with effective strategies of standardisation and 
integration. Local and regional societies continued to defend their local autonomy and the 
national wholesalers failed to gain support for the need to better coordinate the trading activities 
of the entire movement. The overall organisational structure of the co-op movement remained 
fragmented and it failed to take full advantage of its immense, potential buying power.  
 In Norway centralisation of co-operative trade into larger units was also strongly 
advocated. But at the same time, with the NKL taking a leading role, the movement managed to 
gradually find support for the need to implement parallel processes of standardisation and 
integration. The development was slow and the movement’s continued competitiveness was 
obviously helped by the fact that the country’s food retail market, as late as the 1980s, was still 
very fragmented. But already from the 1950s and throughout the 1960s and 1970s gradual 
processes of increased standardisation and increased integration unfolded. The ideal during this 
period was the voluntary chains operating in the US. The NKL leadership systematically 
propounded the need for the co-op movement to adapt their organisational structures along the 
lines of the principles operated by these retailers. The 1980s saw a change of leadership and focus 
was temporarily diverted away from the overall organisational strategies. From the 1990s 
onwards, however, new and radical steps were taken to increase profitability and competitiveness. 
By now, Norwegian private retailers had seriously started to adopt the chain store model and 
competition in the food retail market radically intensified. To approach these developments, the 
NKL in close collaboration with the retail societies, developed and implemented an innovative 
organisational model combining the advantages of a federative organisational structure with 
further adoption of the trading recipe of standardisation, centralisation and integration. The 
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model proved competitive and despite the radical transformations of the Norwegian food retail 
industry during the 1990s, the co-ops managed to defend their market share and sustain their 
profits.  
The ability to adapt the co-operative organisational model to the organisational principles 
operated by the multiple retailers was fundamental in shaping the economic survival of post-war 
co-operative enterprises. The chapters in this second section of the thesis have shown how the 
divergent development of the Norwegian and British consumer co-operative movement was 
fundamentally connected to such different abilities. Earlier we saw how the development of post-
war consumer co-operative organisations was shaped by how well they adapted to radical 
transformations in the size, scope and structure of the food stores operated within the food 
retailing industry. Together, these two factors are decisive elements in explaining the post-war 
development of consumer co-operative organisations. However, a third factor also needs to be 
addressed. Competitive as well as societal developments during the post-war period not only 
challenged the operational and organisational characteristics of the consumer co-ops. The very 
ideological foundation on which the co-op based its alternative form of enterprise also came 
under close scrutiny. In order to secure a steady influx of new members, an attractive profile and 
a positive market development, the co-op movement had to adapt its basic mission and 
ideological profile to these competitive and societal changes. How this challenge was approached 
by the British and Norwegian consumer co-ops and how it shaped their development is the 
major theme of the third and final section of the analysis.  
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Section III: Ideology 
 
A realistic and thoroughgoing examination of the Consumers’ Co-operative 
Movement, from the standpoint of the underlying social changes which have 
occurred in recent decades, is just as necessary as the enquiry of the Independent 
Commission into the structure of the consumers’ economic organisation.699  
 
The above citation is adopted from a 1959 article in the international co-operative journal Review 
of International Co-operation, authored by J. M. Back, a professor of business economics at the 
University of Erlangen, Germany. The article dealt with the future challenges of co-operative 
trade in light of ongoing societal and competitive transformation and following the work of the 
British Independent Commission. It captures the main task of the final section of this thesis, 
namely to move attention away from the operational practises and organisational structures of 
co-operative trade towards its broader social and ideological goals and profile.  
The post-war development of larger retail formats and the increasing dominance of chain 
store organisations within the retailing business fundamentally challenged the position of co-
operative trade. In several Western European countries, including Britain, market share was lost 
and the consumer co-ops failed to implement the structural reforms necessary to secure their 
competitiveness. The revolutionary changes within the retailing industry, based as they were on 
large-scale operations and the development of centralised, standardised and integrated 
organisational structures, contrasted directly with fundamental features of the co-op as an 
alternative form of economic organisation. For the co-ops to survive, dramatic changes in their 
operational procedures and organisational structures had to be implemented. As the two previous 
sections have shown, the challenge of implementing these changes was met with differing success 
within the UK and Norwegian consumer co-operative movements. It has been argued that these 
differences were important in shaping the two organisations' divergent developments  
The dramatic post-war transformations of the Western European food retailing industry, 
however, not only challenged the operational and organisational characteristics of the consumer 
co-ops. They also put pressure on fundamental ideological features of the co-op as an alternative 
                                                 
699 J. M. Back, ‘Cooperative economic organisation on trial’, Review of International Cooperation, 52:7/8 (1959), 172 
(emphasis in original). 
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form of business organisation. These challenges were further intensified by ongoing societal 
transformations developing alongside the massive transformations in the retailing industry.  
The original motivation for establishing co-operative enterprises in the field of retailing 
had been to counter the dominant position of the private shopkeeper, to promote self-
governance, morality and fairness of trade and to integrate workers and farmers in the emerging 
consumer society. As such, the co-ops had been established as a means for the members to 
counter intolerable shortcomings in the existing retailing industry.700 The steady growth in market 
share and membership experienced in the last half of the nineteenth and first half of the 
twentieth century gave the impression that the co-operative organisational model had indeed 
succeeded in creating an important alternative to capitalist enterprises.  
During the post-war years, however, all the fundamental premises of co-operative trade 
were challenged. The democratic governance of local retail societies became less attractive as 
local autonomy and democratic control by lay members gradually had to be replaced by 
standardisation across society structures, integrated operations and centralised governance. The 
actual interest among consumers to participate in the democratic governance of retail societies 
was also declining, further weakening the day-to-day democratic governance of the movement. 
Furthermore, the co-op’s legitimacy as a consumer movement was under question. Most 
importantly, the establishment of numerous public and voluntary consumer associations 
gradually made the co-operative claim of being the most efficient representative of consumer 
interests less and less convincing. Finally, increasing affluence and intensified competitive 
pressure challenged the co-op’s ability to offer true economic advantages for their members. The 
economic attractiveness of the traditional co-operative dividend on purchase faltered and the 
question was increasingly what actual economic benefits a co-operative membership could offer.  
The main consequence of these developments was that the very relevance of the co-op as 
an alternative form of business enterprise was questioned. The feeling was growing that the co-
operative organisational form was a remnant of the past. Most of the original purposes the co-
ops had been set-up to serve had been achieved. And where there still was work to be done, 
other types of organisations were viewed as better suited to do the job. For many, the logical 
conclusion was that there was no longer any need for the co-operative alternative. As was noted 
in the 1959 article by J. M. Back:  
                                                 
700 See M. Purvis, ‘Co-operative retailing in Britain’, in J. Benson and G. Shaw (eds.), The Evolution of Retail Systems c. 
1800-1914 (London: Leicester University Press, 1992) and E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. 
Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. Forbrukesamvirkets historie i Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006).  
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Starting from the assumption that modern Cooperative Societies have arisen as 
“children of poverty”, and that their essential task is to enable poverty-stricken 
people to improve their position through mutual self-help, we can well reach the 
opinion that this objective is out-of-date, and that in the European states, with 
few exceptions, social economic development have outgrown the Cooperative 
Movement.701 
A fundamental post-war challenge for co-operative enterprises wanting to survive and develop in 
the second half of the twentieth century, was to convince existing and possible future members 
of the continued relevance of the co-operative alternative. At the most general level, this implied 
a reformulation of the basic goals and profile of the co-op. In order to secure future survival, the 
ideological basis on which the movement rested had to be rephrased and adapted to the new 
competitive and societal environment. As was concluded by Back: ‘Without a revision of the 
traditional time-honoured objectives of Co-operation, a renaissance of the Co-operative 
Movement is not conceivable.’702  
The theme of this third section is how the consumer co-operative movement in Norway 
and the UK interpreted the increasing pressure on the relevance of the co-op as an alternative 
form of economic organisation and how they sought to adapt their goals and profile to the new 
social and economic environment of the post-war years. Specifically, it will show how the two 
movements struggled to maintain a legitimate role for co-operative trade and to what extent they 
managed to sustain popular support for the co-operative enterprise. Both the adoption of new 
operational practises and the development of a more centralised, standardised and integrated 
organisational structure had challenged fundamental features of the co-operative as an alternative 
form of business enterprise. To remain competitive in the marketplace it was not enough to 
operate numerous large stores in an efficient manner. Retailers also had to develop and sustain a 
positive image among consumers. The fundamental goals of the retail enterprise had to be clearly 
formulated and a consistent and attractive profile had to be established. As the traditional virtues 
and principles of co-operative trade were becoming increasingly questioned and deemed less 
relevant throughout the post-war years, it became necessary to actively re-evaluate and re-state 
these principles. To be regarded an attractive provider of retail services among post-war affluent 
consumers, it was necessary for the co-operators to reconsider the basic premises on which their 
alternative form of enterprise had been established.  
Again, this turned out to be a challenge that was handled differently by the British and the 
Norwegian consumer co-operative movements. In the UK, the fragmented and conservative 
                                                 
701 J. M. Back, ‘Cooperative economic organisation on trial’, Review of International Cooperation, 52:7/8 (1959), p. 172.  
702 Ibid., p. 173. 
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approach characteristic of the co-op’s handling of the operational and organisational challenges 
facing them during the post-war years, was also reflected in how they tackled the challenges to 
their ideological profile. Throughout the period covered, the British co-operators remained 
reluctant to accept the public devaluation of their role as a true consumer movement and 
continued to advocate the virtues of democratic participation by the members. Attempts to 
revitalise the economic advantages of co-operative membership again turned out to be 
fragmented and lacking in overall coordination. Independent societies developed fully 
independent schemes based on very different operational logics and technological solutions. 
Their approach thus added to the fragmented nature of the movement seen both in the 
development of store formats and in the overall organisational structure of the movement. 
The Norwegians by contrast, were from the very beginning more inclined to accept a 
more limited role and already from the 1950s they had come to focus much more specifically 
than their British counterparts on the task of rationalising the co-operative system of distribution 
and retailing. Issues of consumer protection and membership participation were given less 
attention and largely applied as a means to strengthen the day to day commercial performance of 
the movement. Developing their system of economic membership advantages the Norwegians 
also managed, much more than the British, to approach the task in a coherent and coordinated 
manner. Alongside the ability to defend its market share at 24-25 per cent of the total and to 
produce steady profits, the end result of these developments was a massive rise in membership, 
doubling in the ten year period from 1990 to 2000 alone. 
The purpose of this third and final section is to present these divergent approaches and 
analyse how they came to effect the overall development of the co-ops. It thus adds to the 
preceding analysis by focusing more exclusively on how the two movements struggled to reshape 
not only their operational and organisational structures, but also their underlying ideological 
orientation. The analysis proceeds through two distinct chapters. The first chapter (chapter nine) 
deals with two distinct questions. It presents and analyses how the co-operatives in UK and 
Norway tackled the increasing questioning of their traditional role as a consumer movement. It 
further explores how the two organisations perceived and interpreted the weakened popular 
enthusiasm for their democratic governance structure and shows the practical steps taken to 
approach this development. The second chapter (chapter ten) focuses on the traditional 
economic advantages offered by the co-operative enterprise, most prominently the dividend. It 
specifically explores how the Norwegian and British consumer co-operative movements worked 
to revive and improve the economic principle of the dividend in order to make it relevant and 
economically attractive for the post-war affluent consumer. 
  
 235
 
Chapter 9: Co-operative democracy and consumer politics 
 
 
Consumer co-operatives were among the first organisations to recognise that consumers 
operating independently in the market place were a vulnerable group in need of organised 
protection and support. From its early beginnings it set forth, as retail historian Martin Purvis has 
shown, to supply the consumer with ‘basic goods of decent quality and full weight at fair 
prices’.703 The co-ops were intended to work as a guarantee to the consumer that trade was 
conducted on a fair and honest basis. As such the co-op was from the beginning an organisation 
set to secure the interests of the consumers; it was a consumer’s association. At the same time, 
consumer co-operative societies were also democratic movements, determined to increase 
ordinary citizen’s influence over the system of supply on which they were dependent. The co-op 
was to be governed on the basis of democratic decision-making procedures and the principle of 
one member, one vote. As such, the societies were formed as an integral part of a more general 
democratic uprising. The late nineteenth century saw a substantial strengthening in the number 
and dissemination of popular associations and the co-op was a natural part of this political 
development.704 Establishing retail stores controlled democratically by the consumer was regarded 
as one way of strengthening democratic control over everyday life. As consumption was 
becoming an integral part of people’s daily lives and shopping for food took up a large 
proportion of the consumers daily spending, controlling the local retail store by democratic 
means remained an attractive possibility.  
From the outset, consumer co-operative societies sought to take on a broad set of 
functions. Alongside the practical task of operating retail stores, they were determined to operate 
as a guarantee for fair and honest treatment of the general consumer and promote the value of 
increased democratic control over the existing system of supply. The post-war years 
fundamentally challenged the relevance of these alternative, non-economic aspects of the co-
operative enterprise. The role and functioning of the co-op as the prime protector of consumer 
interests came under close scrutiny. At the same time, the very idea of operating retail enterprises 
governed on strict democratic ideals was increasingly questioned. Not only was it deemed an 
                                                 
703 M. Purvis, ‘Co-operative retailing in Britain’, in J. Benson and G. Shaw (eds.), The Evolution of Retail Systems c. 1800-
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704 For a short account, see for example P. Nord, ‘Introduction’, in N. Bermeo and P. Nord (eds), Civil society before 
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inefficient form of economic organisation. Consumers increasingly saw no need to control their 
preferred retail stores by democratic means. The ultimate effect of these developments was that 
the political and democratic aspects of the co-operative alternative were losing popular support.  
To secure a continued influx of members and a persistent loyalty to the co-operative 
stores there was a clear need for the co-ops to reconsider their position as a natural defender of 
the consumer interest and at the same time find new ways of dealing with the declining popularity 
of their democratic decision-making structure. This chapter deals specifically with how the co-op 
movements in Norway and the UK dealt with these challenges. Two major questions are 
discussed. The first relates to how the co-op movements in the UK and Norway tackled the 
public devaluation of their role as a consumer movement. The second relates to the democratic 
challenges the organisations experienced as the popular enthusiasm and general legitimacy of 
democratic governance of retail enterprises began to wane. It specifically explores how the 
Norwegian and British consumer co-operative interpreted these challenges and examines the 
practical steps taken to address them.  
 
The co-op and the rise of the consumer  
The immediate post-war years saw a dramatic increase in awareness of the consumer as a political 
subject. Consumers were incorporated into the political process and the interests and needs of 
the consumer were given a more prominent role in political discourse. Specifically, as the British 
historian Matthew Hilton has shown, increasing political concern was mounted on the possibility 
that the ‘expansion of the economy was leaving the consumer defenceless against powerful 
commercial forces’.705  
The increased awareness of the need to protect the interest of the consumer could have 
been a chance for the co-op movement to further strengthen its position as an alternative form 
of economic enterprise. As it turned out, however, the movement was no longer alone in wanting 
to become the leading representative of consumer interests. Rather, as historian Peter Gurney has 
argued in the case of the UK: ‘the 1950s witnessed a protracted struggle across the culture and 
polity over the body of the consumer – that is, over which group most accurately represented the 
consumer and could therefore speak on their behalf.’706 Similar developments were seen in 
Norway, where debates over price regulations and the establishment of a state sponsored 
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consumer council launched major debates on how the interests of the consumer could be best 
protected.707  
What these debates really reflected was how the long-held position of the co-ops as the 
natural protector of consumer interests was no longer immediately accepted by the larger public. 
Leading politicians in both the UK and Norway were reluctant to recognize the co-op as a 
legitimate and relevant organ for efficient consumer protection. Several alternative private and 
public organisations for consumer protection were also established on the premise that the co-op 
was primarily a business organisation and that an efficient association for the protection of the 
consumer was still missing. Rather than a strengthening of its broader societal role, the post-war 
years thus came to challenge one of the principle ideological motives for co-operative trade, its 
claim to be the most efficient representative of the consumer in the retail market. A major 
question for the co-ops during the post-war period was how this challenge should be 
approached. Should, and if so, how should the movement reclaim its position as a relevant and 
legitimate protector of consumer interests? The challenge came to be approached quite 
differently by the Norwegian and the British consumer co-ops  
In Norway, the first serious questioning of the co-op’s long held claim to be the most 
efficient and best suited defender of consumer interest came already in the early 1950s. The 
ruling Labour party had traditionally been a keen supporter of co-operative trade. In the view of 
prominent party figures, including the Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen, the co-op provided the 
organisational means and capabilities by which to modernise and streamline the existing retail 
industry. At the same time, they offered the possibility of a well functioning economic 
democracy. On these grounds, the co-operative form of trading was, as noted in the 1947 
national budget, regarded as ‘a more rational section of Norwegian retailing than private trade’.708 
Supported by these assertions, the co-op movement had taken on a leading role in the process of 
modernising and rationalising the Norwegian retailing industry, as we have described in earlier 
chapters. 
The Labour party was, however, less enthusiastic about the co-op movement’s ability to 
serve broader, societal functions. A first sign of this attitude may be found in Labour’s reluctance 
to accept the consumer co-operative’s self-appointed role of being the most efficient guarantee 
for the setting of fair retail prices. In both the meat and milk trades national federations of 
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farming co-operatives had been given the role of price regulators. 709 When the Labour 
government presented its suggestions for a separate price control act to the Parliament in the 
spring of 1952, it was, however, not even considering providing the consumer co-ops with a 
similar role in the retail market. Instead, when the act was finally passed in 1953, it was the public 
price directorate, originally a product of the First World War, that was given the prominent 
role.710 
A more direct attack on the co-ops broader societal mission came in 1953, with the 
establishment of a state-sponsored consumer council. 711 The council was set-up to combine the 
role of advisory organ towards public price regulators with quality control and consumer 
education. For many co-operators, this was already a function well handled by the co-operative 
retail societies. The view held among dominant public officials was, however, different. When the 
council was finally established in 1953 it was completely dominated by the housewives 
organisations, which held six of the ten designated seats on the board.712 Of these six seats, one 
was to be held by the co-operative women’s guild, while the NKL was offered one of the 
remaining four seats.713 The model for consumer protection and retail price regulation advanced 
by the social democratic regime thus left only limited room for the consumer co-operative 
movement. Regulation of consumer prices, representation of consumers and consumer 
information – all traditional elements of the basic co-operative ideology – were from now on to 
be handled by government agencies where the NKL played only a minor role.  
The story in Britain was in many ways similar. By the coming of the post-war years, the 
British consumer co-operative movement also had to accept that their claim to the position of 
being the most efficient protector of consumer interests was under question. And as in Norway, 
the British Labour party quite clearly disapproved of the potential of the co-op to function as an 
efficient consumer’s movement. Indeed, as Peter Gurney has shown, the co-ops were ‘completely 
overlooked’ by the political establishment when questions of creating a national consumer 
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protection body were discussed.714 The movement simply failed to gain political support for its 
suggestion to create a separate consumer ministry. Instead, the private, non-profit Consumers 
Association (CA), established in 1956, came to take the leading role as the national consumer’s 
movement in Britain.715  
The establishment of the CA was supported by many Labour affiliates. This was in itself 
another clear indication that the existing co-op movement, claiming at the time to hold close to 
thirteen million members, was not viewed as a relevant organisation to take on the role as the 
nations prime consumer movement. The major mission and mode of operation of the CA was, in 
the words of Gurney, to ‘educate consumers and help them negotiate their way through the 
world of consumer goods, mainly by means of the monthly publication, Which? magazine’.716 The 
fist issue of this magazine was published in 1957. Primarily it offered tests and meticulous 
investigations of consumer goods and services. The first issue for example, according to one of 
the organisation’s first directors, Caspar Brook, contained ‘a report on ten named electric kettles 
... another report on sunglasses and one on the ten named brands of aspirin’.717 The launching of 
the magazine soon turned the CA into a substantial force in the task of protecting consumer 
interests. At the end of the magazine’s first year, 47,000 members had registered, paying an 
annual subscription of 10s.718 After another year in operation, the number of members had risen 
to 150,000.719  
A second prominent organisation established to protect the interest of the consumer was 
the Consumer Advisory Council (CAC) of the British Standards Institution (BSI). The BSI was a 
voluntary organisation. It had been set up in 1901 by a group of companies concerned with 
standards in manufacturing. After the Second World War, however, the organisation increasingly 
involved itself with distribution and consumer goods. In 1955 it set up the CAC. The 
organisation was, in the words of Hilton, ‘to be a source of information and advice firstly to 
industry about the consumer’s needs ... and secondly to the public about safeguards, in the way of 
standards and other facilities, available to them.’720 In 1957 CAC launched Britain’s first 
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comparative testing magazine, Shopper’s Guide. Three years later the organisation had more than 
50,000 associates.  
By the early 1960s, the CA and the CAC were, again in the words of Hilton, ‘firmly 
established as the leading consumerist ethos groups’ in Britain, with the policy of the co-
operative movement appearing only ‘as a reflection of their agendas.’721 Soon, the importance of 
the CAC faltered. But the Consumers Association remained the most well-acknowledged 
consumer organisation in Britain well into the 21st century, regarded as a ‘national institution’ 
and ‘celebrated for its comparative testing of the value for money of different branded goods’.722 
The development and massive success of the CA was a huge blow to the assertions repeatedly 
made by co-operators of being the most prominent protector of consumer rights. The fact of the 
matter was that the co-ops had completely lost out in the initial race to become the most 
respected and popular consumer movement in Britain. Or, in the words of the active co-
operative commentator and renowned economic historian Sidney Pollard, the co-ops simply 
‘missed the bus in the present boom of consumers’ organisations’.723 
Both in Britain and in Norway the immediate post-war years saw an increasing awareness 
of the need to provide consumers with a stronger voice in economic and political life. 
Traditionally, consumer co-ops had claimed to be the most efficient and well-developed 
protector of consumer interests in the market place. However, in the reformulation and 
implementation of post-war consumer politics the co-ops were sidelined. Instead, new 
organisations were established to take on this role. In Norway, the state sponsored consumer 
council was established as the country’s main protector of consumer interests, while the private, 
non-profit CA gradually claimed a similar position in Britain. The question remained: how would 
the co-op react to this drastic devaluation of the organisation’s role as a consumer movement?  
 
The approach of the Norwegian co-ops: Towards a commercialised consumerism 
While the Norwegian co-operators had been largely overlooked in the Labour-led reformulation 
and implementation of post-war consumer politics, they had not been completely passed over. As 
it turned out, both the price control act and the establishment of a separate consumer council 
were cautiously supported by the NKL.724 In the debates over the price control act, the NKL 
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board of representatives finally concluded on a supportive vote. While on the one hand public 
price regulations implied direct interference in the co-ops day-to-day business, the intention of 
the act was regarded as e in line with the basic goals held by the co-operatives. Hence, in the view 
of the representative board, ‘the consumer co-operatives in reality work towards the same goals 
as the price control act, if by other means.’725  
 The establishment of the state-led consumer council was also eventually supported by 
the co-operators. In the initial phases of planning the council, the NKL had expressed scepticism 
towards the dominate position given to the housewife’s organisations. But when the council was 
finally set to become established, the NKL’s basic attitude was one of support and acclamation. 
The ultimate acceptance and support for the council, however, bore clear signs of being a 
compromise. As we recall, Labour had openly expressed massive support for the co-operative 
form of enterprise and described it as the most rational type of economic organisation. At the 
same time, they had renounced the movement’s broader societal role. Both Labour and 
prominent co-operators seem, however, to have been satisfied with a solution where the 
politicians could take control over consumer politics while the co-operators took charge of the 
retail industry. By handing over responsibility for consumer protection to the state, that is, to the 
Labour party, the co-operatives could concentrate more fully on their business operations.  
With a new and more open-minded leadership at NKL headquarters, such a division of 
labour could easily be accepted.726 But it also seems to have found support among co-operators at 
large. The Norwegian co-operative movement was not primarily a workers movement. By the 
1950s, farmers made up approximately 40 per cent of total co-operative membership.727 These 
members were often also producers and thus less inclined to provide any primacy to consumer 
interests. Typically, their support for the consumer co-operative form of trading was largely 
related to the co-operative aspects and not the consumer aspect. A development where the 
movement handed over the main responsibility for consumer protection to the state and focused 
on developing its co-operative trading structure was therefore largely in line with the dominant 
attitudes held by these members. Such a development could, however, also be accepted by the 
majority of the members more directly affiliated to the urban, working class. Co-operative 
sympathisers tied to this segment of the population tended to be less radical than, say, their 
British counterparts. The class structure was less pronounced within Norwegian society and the 
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rights of the workers had been better served. It is also evident that, apart from a few local retail 
societies controlled by radical leftists, the co-ops were largely managed by Labour sympathisers 
leaning to the reformist side of the political spectrum.  
The Norwegian co-ops thus seem to have been governed and operated by managers and 
members believing in the primacy of co-operative trade. The continued role of the co-op as 
protector of consumer interests was not directly repudiated, but simply not given the same 
attention as the co-ops commercial role. And whenever new initiatives were taken by NKL 
affiliates or local co-operators to reinvigorate the political role of the co-op, these were either 
ignored or gradually incorporated into the commercialised rhetoric dominating the movement’s 
leading circles. A few examples may illustrate this final point.  
In 1945 a separate housewife unit had been established by the NKL.728 The main purpose 
was to provide practical guidance to consumers in areas such as efficient fitting of kitchens and 
the use of kitchen tools, to develop consumer education programmes and to conduct different 
types of product demonstrations. The unit established a separate demonstration kitchen to take 
care of product testing and product demonstrations. Results were reported in the magazine of the 
Co-operative Women’s Guild, Mellom Oss. Alongside these initiatives, the movement also offered 
different types of consumer information in courses held at the co-operative college, established in 
1946. Issues of consumer protection were discussed in study circles and alongside the consumer 
tests reported in the Mellom Oss magazine, the broader co-operative press continued to contain 
numerous articles on consumer issues.  
A general problem with these different initiatives was that they lacked overall 
coordination. There was no superior unit within the NKL charged with coordinating the 
different activities. In 1961 a separate ‘committee for co-operation and culture’ was established, 
partly as a means to overcome these problems.729 The main purpose of the organisation was, 
however, to help increase the co-operative member’s consciousness of style and good taste. But 
while the launching of the committee had met with substantial enthusiasm, it soon proved 
difficult to gain attention and resources from the NKL management and governing board for the 
different activities it propounded. Meetings held by the committee were hampered by limited 
enthusiasm and substantial absence among the appointed members. And only a year after it had 
been officially established the committee was gradually dissolved.  
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The attempts made to reinvigorate the co-op as a viable consumer movement in the 
1950s and 1960s thus turned out to be a limited success. The movement remained focused on 
commercial modernisation while broader aspects of the co-operative ideology, apart from some 
scattered initiatives, failed to attract the necessary attention and interest. Initiatives that were 
enthusiastically launched often ended up being ignored as soon as the immediate public attention 
given to them had been taken advantage of. And while a few NKL managers and elected officials 
truly held a keen interest in reinvigorating the NKL’s role as a consumer movement, the large 
majority of the NKL management remained preoccupied with the task of modernising the 
movement’s trading activities. The end result was, as concluded by a study specifically devoted to 
the operations of the NKL organisational department during the 1950s, that most of the plans 
and strategies developed in the field of consumer protection and consumer education ended up 
being ‘used commercially as a means to strengthen the NKL and the co-operative movement in 
Norway.’730 Rather than developing as an independent part of the movement, consumer advocacy 
was integrated into the commercial strategies of the movement.  
A new attempt to bolster a separate role as a consumer’s movement was launched at the 
beginning of the 1970s. In 1969 a separate council had been established within the NKL in order 
to strengthen the movement’s consumer education. The local retail societies were also set to 
establish their own units for consumer education. By 1973 such units had been created in more 
than half of the existing retail societies and a series of initiatives aimed at educating consumers on 
issues such as nutrition, consumer rights and product quality control were launched.731 A year 
later, at the 1974 NKL Congress, a separate ‘co-operative consumer programme’ was presented 
and debated. The programme had been instigated at the 1971 NKL Congress and was intended 
as a ‘programme for consumer influence and for the development of the consumer co-operative 
movement’.732 The launch and implementation of the programme would suggest that a renewed 
commitment had been born within the NKL to re-invigorate its role as a consumer movement. 
It soon turned out, however, that the increased attention given to consumer politics was 
to be a short-lived affair. Nor did it imply a departure from the basic commercial attitudes 
dominating the Norwegian co-op management throughout the post-war period. The NKL and 
the local retail societies continued to invest heavily in new warehouses, in developing large 
department stores and hypermarkets accommodating new consumer trends and generally in 
                                                 
730 H. Sund, Mellom kommersielle krav og ideelle formål. Organisasjonsvirksomheten i NKL 1945-1959 (Ma thesis, University 
of Oslo, 2005), p. 133. 
731 G. C. Aakvaag, Mellom sosialdemokratisk modernisering og nyliberal individualisering. En studie av Forbrukersamvirket og 
medlemmene fra 1970 til 2003 (Oslo: Institute for social research, 2004). 
732 Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Fobrukersamvirket i Norge. Opplegg til debatt om et forbrukerprogram (Oslo: Haakon 
Arnesens Boktrykkeri, 1971), p. 3. 
  
 244
renewing the existing structure of the co-operative outlets. And while consumer information was 
strengthened, the basic strategy of the NKL management remained to integrate the consumer 
political goals with the day-to-day commercial activities of the movement. As emphasized by the 
chairman of the NKL board Peder Søiland when presenting the consumer program to the 1971 
congress: ‘For those of us working within the realms of the consumer co-operative movement it 
should remain a basic goal to raise issues of consumer protection and to discuss the problems 
experienced by consumers in such a way that it remains closely linked to our day-to-day 
operations.’733 In practise this mostly implied that consumer information and product testing was 
to be directly tied to the business operations of the retail societies. Indeed, Peder Søiland, at a 
meeting held in the newly established education council in 1971, had openly expressed that he 
had ‘been somewhat sceptical of consumer education, but that he had been convinced that this 
had substantial PR-value’.734 
On these grounds, the major focus of the consumer programme remained on factors 
such as the commercial importance of offering matter-of-fact product information, the need to 
develop a socially acceptable selection of products and a clear policy of responsible marketing. It 
is also revealing that perhaps the most successful strategy implemented within the frame of the 
movement’s renewed consumer political awareness, was the launch of a separate group of simple, 
non-branded products, the so-called ‘blå-hvite varer’. These products were officially launched as a 
protest against the abundance of choice and the increasingly sophisticated strategies of 
commercial marketing. They were given a permanent, low price and were not part of any sales 
marketing campaigns. Only one variant of each product was produced and they were all given 
very simple packaging. While the moral and consumer-friendly aspects of the products were 
persistently advocated in public, among the NKL managers the commercial rationale remained 
their main justification. As NKL manager Svein Stokke argued in an internal memo, ‘the main 
goal of the launch has to be to create goodwill towards the co-operative movement and that the 
product series becomes so interesting that it draws new customers to the co-operative 
societies.’735  
The general picture is thus that, despite the new initiatives of the 1970s, the commercial 
goals of the movement continued to outshine the movement’s role as consumer movement. The 
initial enthusiasm for the co-operative consumer programme soon waned. The ‘blå-hvite varer’ 
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primarily served commercial functions, while the effect on the movement’s standing as a 
consumer movement remained negligible.736 Leading officials and managers in the NKL 
continued to view consumer education as secondary to commercial operations. Alternatively, 
such activities were regarded purely as a means to secure commercial success. This 
commercialised rhetoric also framed the initiatives taken towards consumer politics during the 
1980s and 1990s. Hence the 1990 NKL Annual report openly stated that, apart from the 
advantages related to the integrated, centralised and standardised organisational structure about 
to be developed, ‘further competitive advantage lies in our commitment to other consumer interests 
such as buying safety, thorough product information and the assurance that our products, as far 
as possible, take care of both health and the environment.’737  
The popular perception of the consumer co-op as primarily a regular business 
organisation was thus firmly entrenched throughout the post-war years. The co-ops did indeed 
launch a series of initiatives set to serve and advantage the consumer, but these were not 
provided with any autonomous value or status. Rather, they were all framed within a commercial 
rhetoric and used actively as a means in the day-to-day competitive struggle against the regular, 
private retailers. Hence, while the approach of the co-ops to the issues of consumer policy may 
have strengthened their commercial performance, it did little to improve their legitimacy as a 
viable consumer movement.  
 
Co-operative consumerism: the reactions of the British co-operators  
The legitimacy of co-operative retailers as truly dedicated and efficient protectors of consumer 
interests came under attack during the immediate post-war years. In Norway, the response from 
the co-operators had largely been to accept the criticism. Cautious support was given to the 
newly established consumer council while consumer education and consumer advocacy were 
gradually and more openly turned into plain marketing tools for the retail operations. A division 
of responsibilities, where the state took care of consumer issues and the co-ops concentrated on 
the need to rationalise the Norwegian retailing industry was more-or-less openly established.  
The UK co-operators were more reluctant to accept that they had no role to play in 
protecting the country’s consumers. They were ignored by Labour in their attempt to establish a 
separate consumer’s ministry and soon bypassed by the Consumers Association as the (popularly 
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held) most renowned and trustworthy organisation for the protection of consumer interests. Still, 
they continued to hang on to their historic role and repeatedly advocated that they, as a co-op, 
represented the original and most reliable protector of the true consumer interest.  
Why were the co-operators so reluctant to accept the entrance of new consumer 
movements and the increasing neglect of what they themselves could offer in the field of 
consumer protection? The reasons are numerous. First of all, they simply argued that the new 
consumer movements had failed to recognise and acknowledge the historic and the 
contemporary importance of the co-op as a consumer movement. A 1965 editorial in the official 
Co-operative Union journal, the Co-operative Review, paints a telling picture. While the article 
recognised the positive achievements of the CA, it also, cautiously but firmly, noted how the CA 
needed to be aware of its still limited experience as a consumer organisation: ‘The progress of the 
Consumer’s Association (founded 1957) has been watched with a friendly eye by the Co-
operative Movement (circa 1844) which sees the C.A. as another useful force in the struggle to 
protect the consumer’. 738 The article further went on to note that, ‘while the Consumer’s 
Association in the few years of its existence, has achieved much in making a name for itself, it is 
still a mere “adolescent” in age compared with the Co-operative movement, which has more than 
a century of experience in consumer protection.’739 The Review editor also expressed offence 
about the CA asserting ‘itself as the one and only consumer champion’ while ignoring ‘the 
achievements of an “old hand” like the Co-operative movement.’740 
The co-operative scepticism was not limited to the young age of the CA and its reluctance 
to accept the Co-op movement as a true defender of consumer rights. A major argument against 
the new types of consumer movements was also related to how these organisations failed to offer 
an alternative to capitalism and rather sought only to help consumers navigate within the 
capitalist system of distribution and consumption. Indeed, as Hilton has noted, while the so-
called ‘Best Buy’ articles, featured regularly in the CA’s Which? magazine, were largely ‘reflecting 
consumers’ desires to participate in … the modern market place’, the co-op on the other hand, 
would typically offer schemes such as ‘Buyer beware’, to warn against the abuses of certain 
manufacturers.741 This attitude reveals one of the most striking differences between the 
Norwegian and the British consumer co-operatives. The Norwegian co-operators of the 
immediate post-war period were not in any sense opposed to the existing capitalist society. Ideals 
of creating a co-operative commonwealth were long gone and the major challenge was defined as 
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one of rationalising and making more efficient the existing system of distribution. Pragmatist 
attitudes of commercial modernisation dominated the Norwegian co-operators. By contrast, the 
British co-operators continued to uphold their broad mission of societal transformation way into 
the 1950s and 60s. They continued to advance the view that co-operation was an alternative and 
morally more advanced system of retailing to that of capitalism and they envisaged a future 
development whereby the co-operative alternative would replace the existing capitalist system. As 
we have seen earlier, these attitudes shaped the British co-operators reluctant adoption of more 
modern forms of retailing practises.742 It also explains why they remained unwilling to accept that 
they had been completely sidelined in the ongoing struggle to be defined as the prime protector 
of consumer interest. It is revealing, as Hilton has noted, that the general attitude of the British 
co-operators towards consumerism remained ‘a negative critique of business’, rather than a 
‘positive embrace of market intervention’.743  
In extension of such and similar assertions, the co-ops also targeted the new consumer 
movements for being largely middle class projects which failed to efficiently represent the large 
number of poorer, working class consumers. As opposed to the Norwegian co-ops, the British 
co-operative movement remained an organisation of the working classes dedicated to serving the 
interests of the working class population. This not only made them sceptical of capitalism per se. 
More specifically, it made them instinctively sceptical of the new consumer movements tending, 
as the co-operators saw it, to focus solely on the interests of the middle classes. When a separate 
public Consumer Council was established in 1963, it was bluntly described by Max Wood of the 
Co-op Union as merely a ‘bunch of middle-class intellectuals.’744 A more detailed critique was 
provided by the active co-operative commentator and renowned economic historian Sidney 
Pollard, in a 1965 article in the co-operative Journal Agenda: 
the defence organisations, particularly the Consumers’ Association, are largely 
middle class ventures. The middle classes have always known how to defend 
their interests, and in this case the amazing successes of the association which 
began tentatively only a few years ago have been a tribute to its power of 
organisation. However, its methods and its approach are such as to exclude a 
large majority of the population, the working classes, from its orbit … thus the 
reports of the C.A. have tended to concentrate on the grievances of the 
purchases of houses, motorcars, washing machines or encyclopaedias sold door-
to-door, and have been notably weak in dealing with such problems as rented 
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dwellings, increases in bus fares or the more obnoxious forms of credit trading 
found in working class areas.745  
Pollards critique is revealing. It shows that the British co-operators saw a continued need to 
defend the working classes as a marginalised social group within British society, still shut out 
from the comforts of affluence and mass consumption. It thus also offers further explanation of 
why they were reluctant to hand over the responsibilities of consumer protection to other, non 
co-operative organisation.  
A final related factor is that the British co-operators, unlike the Norwegian co-operators 
were not offered an alternative path of expansion by their Labour affiliates. As we recall, in 
Norway Labour had actively stimulated the co-operators to take the lead in the necessary process 
of rationalising the country’s retailing industry.746 In Britain by contrast, and as Gurney has 
remarked, ‘relations between the cooperative movement and the Labour Party [were] strained to 
the limit, [and] co-operators had to face alone the challenges posed by the spread of consumer 
capitalism’.747 In this situation the answer became to hold on to old virtues and try to convince 
the modern consumer of the continued relevance of the co-operative alternative, within the 
economic sphere, within the sphere of consumer protection and as we shall see shortly, also 
within the sphere of democratic participation  
On the grounds of these general attitudes, the British co-op movement, throughout the 
entire post-war period, continued to claim a prime role as defender of the interest of the British 
(working class) consumer. This claim, however, largely remained expressed by way of a critique 
of the new consumer movements arising. Practical initiatives in the field of consumer protection 
capable of attracting the attention of the affluent post-war consumer were much less visible. 
Most prominently the movement seems to have failed to integrate their consumer-political 
enthusiasm with the day-to-day business operations of the retail stores. While it's true that many 
retail societies operated educational facilities, provided consumer information and consumer 
testing, they largely failed to develop the practical means necessary to attract the support from 
post-war consumers. As Mathew Hilton also concludes, while the co-ops in the post-war decades 
‘struggled to take the lead in the politics of consumer affluence … [they] provided few dynamic 
responses to consumer interests’.748 The consequence was that gradually the organisation’s 
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influence, as well as the acknowledgment of the co-operative as a consumer movement, waned 
alongside a steadily deteriorating market position.  
The approaches taken by the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives in the quest 
to restate their role as relevant consumer movements shared many similar features. Most 
prominently, neither of the two movements managed to regain a legitimate role as a true 
protector of consumer rights. Nor did they manage to shape a more consumer-friendly profile 
for their retailing activities, compared to that of their competitors. As such, both organisations 
were increasingly regarded like any other business, with no special claim to be a particularly 
consumer-friendly food retailer. The major difference between the two is that the UK movement 
seemed more reluctant to abandon the idea that the co-ops offered a true alternative and superior 
form of consumer protection. The Norwegians more easily accepted and indeed embraced their 
more limited role. Their initiatives were soon framed within a commercialised rhetoric, while the 
British, at least in official statements and publications, continued to relate their initiatives to more 
fundamental goals of societal transformation. While such attitudes may have been more in 
keeping with the true ideology of co-operative business, they failed to attract the enthusiasm and 
support necessary to strengthen the overall position of co-operative trade. A similar overall 
difference in approach may be detected when looking at the second area where co-operative 
ideology was challenged by post-war societal and competitive developments, namely the field of 
co-operative democracy.  
 
Co-operative democracy under pressure  
In September 1969 the twenty-fourth Congress of the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) 
was to be held in Hamburg. The major theme of discussion was ‘Contemporary Cooperative 
Democracy.’ A background paper was prepared for the keynote speakers, and excerpts from this 
were presented in an article in the Review of International Co-operation in March.749 The article 
summarised the essence of the contemporary problem of co-operative democracy: 
Cooperatives everywhere have always found it difficult to retain the full vigour 
of their democratic base. In recent years, however, sweeping changes in 
cooperative structure … have greatly increased the proportions of the problem. 
These changes in cooperative structure involve: concentration of recourses; 
larger, more integrated operational units; standardisation; centralisation of 
services and management; and conformity to universally binding development 
plans. The major effect, in the context of democracy, has been to widen the gap 
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between members and management and to remove decision-making from the 
local base which have long been considered the foundations of democratic 
control. This emasculation of democracy can and does manifest itself in diverse 
ways: in member apathy, low attendance at meetings, weakening of traditional 
cooperative loyalty, inability to attract young people, difficulties in recruiting 
staff, loss of the sense of belonging and of exerting influence and rigidity – and 
even sometimes in blurring of the end purposes of cooperation, namely, to serve 
the interest of the members. 750  
The objective of the ICA conference was not primarily to oppose or reverse the development 
trends creating these democratic problems. Rather, it sought to put forward and to discuss 
proposals capable of reviving co-operative democracy and to adapt the existing system of co-
operative decision-making to present-day challenges. Indeed, a fundamental premise of the 
discussions held was that all measures suggested should be ‘intended to reconcile democratic 
control with maximum efficiency’, and that no suggestions that ‘solve the dilemma by opting for 
lesser efficiency’ were to be considered.751 The process of centralisation, concentration, 
integration and standardisation pointed to in the paper was thus taken as given. The question was 
how co-operative democracy could be developed within the framework of such structures. 
As we have seen earlier, both the Norwegian and the British consumer co-operatives were 
strongly affected by the development trends the ICA report presented. 752 In both countries, the 
recipe of integration, standardisation and centralisation had been adopted to approach the 
competitive challenges of the multiple chains. Parallel to these developments, both organisations 
had experienced increasing problems of member participation and member involvement. For 
both the Norwegian and the British co-op movement, the problem of how to reconcile 
commercial necessities with demands for truly democratic governance by the members was 
increasingly felt. Once again, however, the responses to the challenge presented turned out quite 
different.  
 
Democracy in the British movement 
In the UK movement concern for the decline in democratic participation was a recurring issue of 
debate in the post-war years. From the mid-1950s onwards the Co-op Union took the initiative 
to study a wide variety of aspects related to the governance of co-operative retail societies as well 
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as their federals. 753 The issues investigated included the actual ‘state’ of co-operative democracy, 
the formal structure of the existing co-operative system of democracy, the process of decision-
making and the internal system of governance operated by retail societies, i.e. the division of 
labour and responsibilities of the board of directors and the general management.  
The studies conducted were partly organised as internal commissions and partly as 
external academic surveys and broader research projects. Typically the more independent 
academic surveys would in one way or another be assisted and supported by the Co-op Union. 
Publication of results appeared in co-operative journals and some of the studies were also 
published by the Co-operative College. As the Swedish historian Katarina Friberg has noted, 
there was ‘no sharp demarcation line between internal organisational discussions and academic 
inquiry.’754 
In any case, if the findings of trade reports such as the Independent Commission had 
been alarming, the research into co-operative democracy hardly provided any reassurance. It 
showed quite clearly that not only was the trading position of the co-op under severe pressure; 
the functioning of the co-operative system of democracy was similarly weak. Even if it was hard 
to argue the case for a specific historical trend, the contemporary figures alone were critical. Most 
prominently, figures on proportions of members attending meetings and voting at general 
elections showed that only a very limited share of the total number of members were in fact 
participating in the democratic processes of the co-op. A study in 1955 for example, showed that 
on average, only 0.5 per cent of the members were attending business meetings, while 1.7 per 
cent were using their democratic right to vote at board elections. In 1960, the comparable figures 
were 0.2 and 1.4 per cent respectively.755 True, participation varied considerably between 
societies, being generally lower in the larger than in the smaller societies, but the general trend 
was one of very limited participation.  
The findings sparked major worries in the movement over the fate of co-operative 
democracy; a worry clearly reflected in the persistent reluctance among British co-operators to 
adopt radical strategies of trade rationalisation. As we recall, major trade reports presented to the 
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co-operators in the 1950s and 1960s, most prominently the Independent Commission, had 
largely failed to produce any substantial changes in how the co-ops ran and organised their 
activities. 756 A major reason was simply massive fear among the co-operators that the democratic 
decision-making apparatus of their enterprise would be further weakened. While many co-
operators accepted the main diagnosis presented in the trade reports, the scepticism towards the 
solutions they suggested remained pronounced. Commenting on the report of the Independent 
Commission in a 1958 issue of Agenda, the president of the small Rushden society, Harry Baily, 
noted the following:  
One of the alarming things inherent in the report is its endeavour to make 
capitalists of us all. The comparisons with our competitors and the corollaries 
adduced there from can only mean that we too must advance by the same 
methods that our competitors use… The minority report if anything is more 
honest in its recommendations because it quite clearly sets the movement up as a 
national multiple organisation … Any reference to democracy and democratic 
control of policy is mere padding and that applies to the Majority Report too  
Similar scepticism was expressed about the many different commissions and rationalisation plans 
presented to the co-operators throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Many active co-operators 
continued to regarded democratic governance as the ultimate defining feature of the co-op as an 
alternative business model. A demise of democratic governance would, in the view of these 
representatives, imply a demise of the very reason for upholding co-operation as an alternative to 
private business. As was noted by Edgar Evans in a critical article on consumer co-operative 
democracy in a 1969 issue of the Co-operative Review: ‘I am concerned at the growing lack of 
interest on the part of the movement’s vast membership. Without a substantial lay involvement 
the whole concept of Co-operative endeavour in all its aspects is pointless and utterly without 
purpose.’757 On similar lines, Jean Stensfield of the London Co-operative Society argued 
forcefully in an article in the Review a couple of years later how ‘winning member-interest’ was ‘a 
burning question for the movement’. 758 Typically, representatives of such attitudes would also 
relate weakened democratic participation to the trading problems experienced by most retail 
societies. As Evans rhetorically noted in his 1969 article: ‘Strangely enough, the loss of trade 
coincides with the falling off in lay participation and interest and the starving of funds for those 
activities within the Movement which stimulate member involvement.’759 Similar views were held 
by Stanfield who argued that ‘although it is not recognised as such, member participation is a 
                                                 
756 See section two in the present thesis for an analysis.  
757 E. Evans, ‘Democratic control – can it survive?’, Co-operative Review, 43:1 (1969), 3. 
758 J. Stansfield, The Consumer and the Member, Co-operative Review, 46:6 (1972), 2. 
759 E. Evans, ‘Democratic control – can it survive?’, Co-operative Review, 43:1 (1969), 3. 
  
 253
powerful weapon in the battle of the Co-operatives against the multiples. Member-participation is 
usually accompanied by great loyalty to the Co-op shop and so means more trade.’760  
Worries over the lack of member participation and a diminishing co-operative democracy 
were also repeatedly reported during the 1980s. It was, however, becoming increasingly clear that, 
apart from a persistent reluctance to accept the suggested reforms of trade rationalisation, the 
worries largely failed to produce any significant action on part of the retail societies. As in the 
case of consumer protection, the co-op’s role as a democratic association was largely treated in 
separation from issues of trade and commercial performance. The co-operative congresses in 
1982, 1986 and 1987 all held major discussions on democracy and how ‘an active and informed 
membership [was] … essential to the future well-being and development of consumer co-
operation.’761 Indeed, at the 1987 congress in Harrogate, membership participation and member 
benefits was made the subject of the main debate. Together with the London region of the CRS 
the Central Executive of the Co-op Union had prepared a separate report on the subject. 
Presenting the report to congress Mrs. G. Bunn of the Central Executive exclaimed that ‘we 
should all be as concerned as the Executive is in realising that very few societies have a clear 
policy on the matter of member involvement and generally they do very little to interest their 
membership in becoming more closely involved.’762 At the same time, Bunn had to admit that she 
was not the first to advocate the need to increase the democratic participation among the 
members. Indeed, as she told congress:  
the more we looked at the problem, the more we recognised we were exploring 
the same ground as other colleagues who produced five similar reports in the 
first years of the 1980s. The contents of all of them were taken into our 
considerations and that was the first of our conclusions. It had all been done 
before, and one wag on the sub-committee was heard to declare that if there was 
an Olympic event for preparing reports on one subject, we would certainly be 
out there amongst the “Golds”.763 
The general conclusion seemed to be that while worries over the democratic ‘state’ of the British 
co-op movement were numerous, the movement had had little success in finding ways to solve 
the problems. Participation remained negligible throughout the post-war years. At the same time, 
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the worries seem to have nurtured many co-operators’ reluctance to introduce basic reforms in 
their existing trading structure. Amalgamations, stronger adherence to standardised modes of 
operation and a tighter integration of the co-operative distribution chain continued to be rejected 
by many retail societies, referring to how such reforms would be detrimental to the democratic 
decision-making structure of the society. The ultimate consequence was, however, that both in 
terms of trade and in terms of member participation, the decline continued. The movement 
simply failed to find solutions that would effectively solve the initial challenge set by the 1965 
ICA conference, ‘to reconcile democratic control with maximum operational efficiency’.764  
 
Democracy and member participation in the Norwegian co-ops 
When comparing the UK co-operators' attitudes and discussions on co-operative democracy with 
that of Norwegian co-operators some interesting differences are revealed. Indeed, initially the 
similarities are perhaps the most striking. During the post-war period, both the Norwegian and 
the British consumer co-operative movements saw the legitimacy of their democratic decision-
making structure questioned as increased centralisation, standardisation and integration were 
adopted as the dominant competitive formulae. And similar to the British experience, Norwegian 
co-operators also expressed repeated worries about the lack of interest among many co-operative 
members for participating in the democratic processes of the local retail societies. Already in 
1950 the editor of the Forbrukeren Christoffer Røhne expressed his worries over the perceived 
problem that ‘the attitude among the large majority of members today is similar to that held by 
the customer of any type of retail store.’765  
But, as in the case of consumer protection, these worried voices did not manage to take a 
central position in the movement’s dominant discourse. And soon, questions of democratic 
participation were linked to the commercial activities of the movement. Hence, member 
recruitment was deemed important primarily as a means to secure an influx of capital while 
member participation was primarily related to such activities as increased buying, increased 
savings and increased loyalty to the co-op stores and not to actual participation in the democratic 
decision-making process of the retail society.  
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Knut Moe of the NKL management, together with Peder Søiland was, as noted earlier, 
among the keenest proponents of a commercialised modernisation of co-operative trade.766 While 
both these leaders were dedicated co-operators, their basic understanding of co-operative 
ideology did not place day-to-day member democracy at the forefront. Rather, Moe advocated 
forcefully the need to integrate the operations of the retail and wholesale units, and thus the 
substitution of ‘decision-making from the local base’ with ‘conformity to universally binding 
development plans’, to paraphrase the ICA article earlier cited.767 On similar lines, Søiland, a 
prominent ICA figure, consistently promoted the need to rationalise the structure of co-operative 
societies and the creation of larger units. While such developments would necessarily ‘widen the 
gap between members and management’ and thus threaten the dynamism of co-operative 
democracy, Søiland was of the conviction that radical rationalisation at the society level was 
necessary to secure the very survival of co-operative trade.768  
As opposed to the UK experience, where major studies into the problems of co-operative 
democracy were undertaken, it is thus no surprise that the lack of democratic participation by 
members was given only limited attention by Norwegian co-operators. Indeed, this may be partly 
explained by the fact that actual participation at meetings was deemed quite satisfactory. The co-
operative newspaper Vårt Blad in 1965 reported how it had received notifications from different 
parts of the country of a ‘lively meeting activity … organised by co-operative societies.’ 769 The 
editor further noticed that ‘the activity is so substantial and the attendance at meetings so large 
that it puts the usual comments of meeting fatigue to shame.’770 A study published in 1984, 
investigating participation at the co-operative retail society’s annual meetings showed that close to 
12 per cent of the members had participated, on average.771 As we recall, as early as 1960 the 
attendance at general business meetings in UK retail co-operatives was less than half a per cent.  
Such reports were actively used by the NKL management to gain further support for 
their strategies of increasing standardisation, integration and centralisation. Hence, when Peder 
Søiland in a 1970 interview with Forbrukeren held that ‘the co-operative movement continues to 
have a substantial attendance at its meetings, especially the yearly assemblies’, and thus that the 
co-op was ‘not affected by the same problems with member passivity as some other 
organisations’, it needs to be viewed in relation to Søiland’s position as NKL chairman and his 
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basic attitude towards the need for structural rationalisation and concentration of co-operative 
trade in larger units.772 The principal objection towards the developments Søiland advocated was 
that they deprived the societies of autonomy and reduced the possibilities for active and 
meaningful membership participation. Søiland's basic attitude was, however, that these problems 
were not relevant in the Norwegian case: ‘there is nothing that supports the assertion that the 
amalgamated societies represent a threat to democracy in the Norwegian consumer co-operative 
movement.’773  
In any case, the attention given to the democratic ‘state’ of the co-operative movement 
seems to have been much more limited in Norway than in the UK. Instead, as in the case of 
consumer protection, member involvement was typically related to issues of economic 
performance and framed within an overall commercial rhetoric. As early as 1956, an editorial in 
Forbrukeren noted how increased membership recruitment was important simply because it would 
provide ‘increased sales and increased earnings in the retail stores’.774 It was further noticed how 
an increased membership would ‘create immediate effects in the form of … increased access to 
capital servicing the business operations’.775  
 Questions of membership involvement were also increasingly related to and measured by 
the level of economic involvement in the retail societies and not participation in the democratic 
decision–making process. Perhaps the most telling difference between how the Norwegian and 
the British consumer co-ops developed their relationship with their members in the post-war 
years relates to differences in their members economic involvement. In close connection to the 
recruitment campaigns of the 1950s the NKL also launched campaigns to increase the level of 
member savings in the societies. As we saw earlier, this campaign proved a huge success, 
increasing dramatically the average capital held by members in co-operative societies. In the 
period from 1950 to 1980, members’ savings grew eightfold in fixed prices. In a similar period, 
the share capital of British co-operative members declined by 95 per cent in real terms. 776 
Norwegian retail societies also managed to dramatically enhance the average sales per member. 
General estimates show that from 1945 to 1960 alone, average sales per member in fixed prices 
increased by a dramatic 170 per cent.777 In the UK, the similar figure saw a reduction of about 
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twenty per cent.778 It thus seem clear that, in comparison to the British movement, the 
Norwegian co-operators managed to create a positive spiral of increased membership and 
increased loyalty alongside a fairly positive democratic participation. While the actual day-to-day 
functioning of the democratic decision-making structure was not convincing in terms of the 
actual levels of participation, the co-operators managed to create a positive link between the 
members, their participation and the economic performance of the movement. They also largely 
managed to bring to fruition the positive circle advanced by the 1965 editorial in Forbrukeren, 
stating the overall goal of the ongoing membership recruitment campaigns: 
Increased member activity creates a new atmosphere in the society. More 
conscious co-operators, increased buying, increased profit, increased possibility 
to retain capital for further expansions with advantages for both new and older 
member, increased optimism and belief in the future, increased trust and 
increased availability for further capital and so on and so forth.779 
The answer of the Norwegian co-operators to the problems of engaging members actively in the 
democratic decision-making of the retail societies was thus primarily solved by focusing more 
exclusively on other types of participation than the purely democratic. And while one obviously 
may question the actual workings of the co-operative democracy, this seems not to have 
bothered the many new members joining the organisation in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.780 A 
similar approach to membership and democracy was consistently held throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. Hence, when the membership department of the NKL, in its 2000 Annual report, for 
purposes of statistical analysis was to define an ‘active member’, the definition was simply all 
those ‘making 60% of their daily household consumption in the consumer co-operative’.781 Such 
an approach to membership seems to have been widely accepted. And while voices were raised 
expressing concern over the lack of actual membership participation in the decision-making 
processes of the co-op societies, they remained marginal in their impact. As long as the formal 
democratic structures remained intact and democratic participation was viewed as acceptable, the 
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organisation seemed confident with how it had approached the ICA challenge of reconciling 
‘democratic control with maximum operational efficiency’.782  
 
Conclusions 
Consumer co-operative enterprises were established on the basis of a broad ideological mission. 
Apart from operating retail stores in a cost efficient manner and offering their members a share 
of the surplus, they sought to operate as a guarantee for fair and honest trading and to promote 
the value of increased democratic control over the existing system of supply. The post-war years 
fundamentally challenged the relevance of these alternative, non-economic aspects of the co-
operative enterprise. The legitimacy of the consumer co-ops as an efficient protector of 
consumer interests was questioned and the democratic decision-making structure the co-ops 
offered gradually came to be regarded as unviable.  
This chapter has described and analysed how these transformations were approached by 
the consumer co-operatives in Norway and the UK. The basic finding has been that while the 
British throughout the period covered were reluctant to accept the public devaluation of their 
role as a true consumer movement and continued to advocate the virtues of democratic 
participation by the members, the Norwegians were more inclined to accept a limited role and to 
focus on the economic, rather than the democratic participation of their members. Issues of 
consumer protection and membership participation were framed within a commercialised logic 
and developed in direct relation to the day-to-day business operations of the movement. In the 
UK by contrast, the consumer protection and democratic aspects of the organisation tended to 
be debated and advocated fully detached from the commercial activities.  
The actual effects of these differences in terms of survival and overall development can 
not easily be determined. Generally, however, the findings add to the impression that whereas the 
Norwegian co-operators succeeded in developing their operations according to a quite coherent 
and focused strategy, the British approach remained fragmented and lacked a simple, overall plan. 
Furthermore it seems clear that the more commercialised attitudes and strategies advocated by 
Norwegian co-operators gave them an advantage both economically and in terms of membership 
support. For most influential Norwegian co-operators consumer politics soon became a means to 
the end of strengthening the movement’s commercial performance. While some British co-
operators may have held a similar view, others continued to promote broader goals of societal 
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transformation and the need to advocate consumer protection as a parallel goal of the consumer 
co-operative enterprise. And while Norwegian co-operators generally took a more pragmatic 
stance on the traditional principles of democratic governance and were more willing to adapt the 
organisation to present-day commercial challenges, the British were more reluctant to abandon 
what they regarded as principle aspects of the co-operative alternative. Their unwillingness to 
accept alternative forms of consumer organisation such as the CA and their repeated, yet 
unsuccessful attempts to reinvigorate membership participation in the democratic decision-
making process of the retail societies is indicative of this attitude. While this may have made the 
British movement more ‘co-operative’ in the traditional sense of the word, it hardly made their 
business operations more efficient and competitive. Neither did their idealistic, yet conservative 
attitudes manage to convince modern consumers of the attractiveness of joining the co-operative 
movement. In Norway, the formal democratic structures were kept intact and the consumer's 
political role was upheld primarily by advocating general principles of fair trade, an 
environmentally sound business operation, healthy eating and so forth. Basic features of the co-
operative model were kept intact, but they were adapted and used more strategically in the day-
to-day struggle to secure competitiveness and market progress.  
A similar impression is created when looking closer at how the Norwegians approached 
the challenge of reinvigorating the economic advantages of co-operation. Alongside the challenge 
to restate their role as political consumer advocates and advance the democratic decision-making 
structure on which the co-operative alternative was built, societal and competitive development 
of the post-war years increasingly put into question the actual economic advantages of co-op 
membership. The attractiveness of the traditional dividend principle was under heavy scrutiny 
and in order to remain an attractive membership organisation the co-operative societies had to 
reinvigorate the economic advantages of being a co-op member. The following chapter 
investigates how this challenge was approached by the consumer co-operative movements in 
Norway and the UK.  
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Chapter 10: The economic advantages of consumer co-operation  
 
 
While consumer co-operative enterprises were originally formed on the basis of a broad set of 
ideological foundations, for the members joining the organisation, the economic advantages 
offered soon gained prime importance. The principle of sharing the profits on the basis of each 
member's use implied that any member with a limited investment was liable to receive a regular 
repayment from their local co-op to supplement their household budget.783 This so-called 
dividend principle –or ‘the divi’ as it was commonly phrased in the UK – was the major 
economic advantage offered by the consumer co-operatives. The practice and importance of the 
dividend principle varied between societies and also between countries. But it remained a 
common feature for most retail co-operative societies and it is generally acknowledged that it 
attracted many members to join their local co-op.784  
During the post-war years the dividend principle was put under pressure. The attitude 
was increasingly that the dividend had outlived its role. As standards of living rose, the actual 
economic rewards offered by the dividend were becoming more and more limited. And as 
discounted prices increased in importance as a competitive tool in food retailing, the co-operative 
principle of offering fair prices and a subsequent surplus distribution was gradually deemed less 
attractive.  
This increasing questioning of the dividend implied that yet another fundamental feature 
of the consumer co-operative enterprise was put under pressure. The principle idea behind the 
divi was that surplus produced in the co-operative enterprise was not to be retained by a few 
capital owners, but rather distributed to the members on the basis of their use of the enterprise. 
When this principle lost its appeal among the general consumer and was increasingly abandoned 
altogether by many co-ops, yet another fundamental feature of the co-operative alternative was 
about to be lost. Hence, not only were the co-op’s consumer protective role and its democratic 
decision-making procedures losing legitimacy and attractiveness. Its fundamental and distinctive 
principle of sharing the profits on the basis of use was also about to lose its long-held appeal.  
                                                 
783 Typically on a yearly or half yearly basis.  
784 See for example P. Gurney, Co-operative culture and the politics of consumption in England, 1870-1930 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1996).  
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Consequently, another major challenge for the co-operative enterprises of the post-war 
years was how to deal with this challenge. Should the dividend principle be defended, and if so, 
how should it be defended? If the divi was to strengthen its appeal among the post-war affluent 
consumers it had to be made more relevant and economically attractive. The major theme of this 
chapter is how this challenge was approached by the consumer co-operatives in Norway and the 
UK. It investigates how the two movements dealt with the declining appeal of the dividend 
principle and explores the different steps taken to redeem the situation.  
 
The origin and development of the dividend principle 
Historically, the major economic advantage offered by co-op membership was the dividend on 
purchase. The ‘divi’, or ‘buyers profit’ as was the Norwegian phrase, had played an important role 
in most early co-operative endeavours.785 Hence, the twenty-second of the original thirty-four 
rules of the Rochdale society stated that: ‘the amount of profits realized by the society … shall be 
divided thus; - interest at the rate of 3 ½ per cent, per annum shall be paid upon all shares paid 
up previous to the quarter’s commencement; the remaining profits shall be paid to each member in 
proportion to the amount of money expended at the store.’786 The principle of the divi was not invented by 
the Rochdale pioneers. But the rules of the society formed the basis for the formation of 
numerous co-operative societies around Western Europe. And the principle of dividend on 
purchase soon materialised as a defining feature of the co-operative organisational form per se.  
The principle of the divi was originally an important means for attracting trade. It also 
worked as a savings tool for many members. For the societies, retained dividend was an 
important source of capital. Finally, as a specific principle of profit distribution, the dividend on 
purchase was regarded as a more just model than dividend on capital. Hence, the divi principle 
worked as a signalling device, demarcating the co-op morally from private business. By serving all 
these different functions, the dividend played an important part in the expansion of co-operative 
trade in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. As was remarked by B. T. Parry of the 
Blackburn Co-operative Society in a 1963 article in the British co-operative journal Agenda: ‘it 
must be conceded that the dividend was a major factor in the success of nineteenth and early 
twentieth century co-operative effort’.787  
                                                 
785 In Norwegian, ‘kjøpsutbytte’. 
786 Laws and Objects of the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers (Rochdale: Jesse Hall, 1844), (emphasis added). 
787 B. T. Parry, ‘The dividends of change’, Agenda, September (1963), p. 5. 
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From the post-war years onwards the relevance and viability of the divi was, however, 
increasingly questioned. True, in Britain the practice and principle of the dividend had been 
repeatedly discussed also in the years preceding the war. Already the eighth Co-operative 
Congress in Glasgow, held in 1876, had sparked a lengthy discussion on ‘The policy of paying 
high dividends’.788 Similar discussions were repeatedly initiated at co-operative congresses in the 
following years. Hence, as was noted by J. A. Hough in his 1936 study of the co-operative 
dividend ‘the question of surpluses and dividends is one that has been giving the Co-operative 
Movement a great deal of concern, almost from the time that it began to make headway based on 
the “Rochdale Plan”’.789 Still, as Hough continued, ‘during very recent years … and more 
particularly during the last two or three years the question has come into prominence more than 
ever before.’790  
There were several reasons behind this increased, critical questioning of the dividend on 
purchase principle. The most prominent was an increased attendance to reduced prices as the 
prime advantage for consumers. As Hough noted in his 1936 study, ‘it is becoming increasingly 
urged that any benefit resulting from co-operative trading should be passed on to the purchaser 
through lower prices rather than through high dividends.’791 Developments in the post-war years 
further added to this notion. The rise of the multiple retailers increased the competitive pressures 
on prices. Discounting became a more widely adopted competitive strategy and price conscious 
consumers started to question the actual savings the co-op dividend offered. The problem was 
reinforced by societies – pressured by the increasing competition – who failed to produce the 
necessary profit to keep dividend rates at an acceptable level. Post-war price policies also pushed 
trading margins downwards, reducing the overall profit on which dividends should be paid. 
Further adding to this development was the improved living standards of the post-war years. 
Increasing affluence simply decreased the importance of the divi in the day-to-day household 
economy of the co-op members. As income levels rose and prices fell the average consumer was 
provided with much more leverage in their daily spending. As the British retail researcher Leigh 
Sparks has noted, consumers were ‘no longer forced to spend every last penny to survive or to 
eat, to be warm and clothed, but rather … [got] real discretion in their spending.’792 The end 
result was that the divi was becoming less attractive as a competitive tool. The situation was 
                                                 
788 J. A. Hough, Dividend on Co-operative Purchases. A study of dividend on purchases as element in co-operative trading with special 
reference to the British consumers’ co-operative movement (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1936), p. 20. 
789 Ibid., p. 29. 
790 Ibid., p. 30. 
791 Ibid. 
792 L. Sparks, ‘Consumer co-operation in the United Kingdom 1945-1993: Review – and Prospects’, Journal of Co-
operative Studies 79 (1994), 5. 
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clearly summarised in a 1962 Review of International Cooperation article on the problems experienced 
by the co-operative movement in recreating an appealing image:  
To some extent the dividend used to provide the impetus … But the symbol has 
been tarnished and has lost its magnetism. This is partly because in most cases 
dividends are so low, that they no longer make much of a difference to the 
consumer’s budget. Even more it is because of the prevalence of competitive 
price cutting among the newer forms of retailing … and the resulting growth of 
price-conscious consumers.793 
The question was how the Norwegian and British co-operators should approach this 
development. Again it turned out that the strategic choices taken pushed the two movements in 
different directions.  
 
UK: The divi under scrutiny 
In the UK co-operative movement the increasing pressure on the viability and relevance of the 
dividend spurred major debate. Already in the years preceding the war the actual payment of a 
dividend to members had started to decline. The attractiveness of the traditional dividend on 
purchase among post-war consumers was also starting to be questioned. It was an increasingly 
held view among retail societies that something had to be done with how the dividend principle 
was practised. As a consequence, throughout the post-war period numerous alternative forms of 
profit distribution to that of the traditional dividend on purchase were suggested and introduced.  
In 1954 the Central Executive of the Co-operative Union submitted a report to the 
congress on dividend policy, basically recommending that the traditional policy of a flat rate of 
dividend on purchases should be reiterated. The recommendations were the direct result of retail 
societies starting to experiment with alternative forms of dividend payment. One of the first such 
alternatives had been to offer differential rates of dividend. This practise typically implied that the 
less profitable types of trade were provided with no dividend while larger dividends were paid on 
the more profitable types. The Co-op Union remained sceptical to such practises, something 
which the 1954 recommendation clearly testifies. But the local experiments could not be stopped. 
And in the following years, more societies started to abandon the practice of flat dividend. More 
radical types of dividend replacements were also initiated and explored. One was to abolish 
dividend altogether, typically in selected stores, and instead offer price cuts or an ‘instant 
                                                 
793 L. Stettner. ‘The consumer and the cooperative image’ Review of International Cooperation, 55:12 (1962), p. 308 
(emphasis in original). 
  
 265
dividend’ as it was often called. The major objective was to compete better and more directly 
with the price levels of the multiple stores.  
The first society experimenting with such a strategy was the Hetton Downs Co-operative 
Society. In 1960 they opened the first co-operative store in the country not offering a dividend.794 
Competition was strengthening and retailers were increasingly seeking to attract trade by offering 
price cuts. The idea of the Hetton general manager David Hughes was to compete directly with 
these retailers by opening one store providing cut prices only and ‘no Credit, Delivery or 
Dividend’.795 The store was an immediate success. As was recalled in retrospect by Hughes: ‘the 
trade built up minute by minute, people were queuing to get into the shop, and buses stopped 
outside to produce customers from Murton, Easington, Houghton and other districts. In the first 
three days the sales were equal to the previous three months.796  
The success of the Hetton branch made other societies follow suit. Soon, non-dividend 
stores had been established in places such as Leicester, Dartford and Norwich.797 Substantial 
variation developed, however, in terms of how the non-dividend principle was practised. Hence, 
the Hetton Downs Society gradually introduced a principle where the dividend on food was 
abolished altogether while it was doubled on non-food.798 Other societies would open non-
dividend subsidiaries such as discount stores, garages and car show rooms and use the net surplus 
to supplement the dividend in food.  
The numerous experiments stimulated major debate in the movement. On the one hand 
there were those who fully defended the continued advantages of the divi. In his presidential 
address to the 1961 Co-op Union Congress, J. H. Jaques for example argued that, while he was 
supportive of the practice of operating non-dividend subsidiaries and using the net yield to 
supplement the general dividend paid by the society, dividend levels had to be sustained at an 
acceptable level. The principle was, according to Jaques, still a major attractor of trade, and it also 
distinguished the co-op from other traders:  
The return of profits to customers by way of dividend upon purchase is the only 
thing the Movement can do that its competitors cannot do. They might indeed 
make a return to customers by way of imitation, but they are in the business to 
make a profit for their shareholders, not a surplus for their customers. Dividend 
is the movement’s greatest attraction and subject to satisfactory service and 
                                                 
794 For a lively description, see D. Hughes, A Journey to Remember (Durham: County Durham Books, 2000), pp. 95-9.  
795 Ibid., p. 96 
796 Ibid., p. 97. 
797 See Co-operative Union Ltd, Report of the 93rd Annual Co-operative Congress in the Winter Gardens Blackpool June 11th, 
12th, 13th and 14th, 1962, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd., 1962), p. 301. 
798 D. Hughes, A Journey to Remember (Durham: County Durham Books, 2000), p. 98. 
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reasonable prices a society’s efficiency in the public mind is measured by the rate 
of dividend it pays.799  
At the Blackpool congress a year later, the dividend was again the subject of major debate. Some 
supported the development taking place arguing that ‘an important element in the future trading 
development of the movement will be the Co-operative Store offering benefits in the form of 
lower prices rather than a dividend on purchase’800 But it turned out that the majority of the 
congress representatives were reluctant to accept such a development. Many still believed that the 
members wanted the dividend and not discounted prices. Some also argued that the substitution 
of the dividend with price cuts would simply be an ‘escape route for inefficiency’.801 Finally, 
several representatives pointed to how the abandonment of the divi would imply losing one of 
the most defining features of the co-op as an alternative business organisation. As was stated by 
A. S. Shelton of the Nottingham Co-operative Society:  
What is our main purpose? To become mere trading organisations with an 
approach not differing from that of our competitors? There is a very big 
difference between us in what happens to profits, and if that difference is not 
maintained we might just as well pack up. We do not pay interest on shares 
arising out of our profits and [sic] our competitors do; they pay their 
shareholders. You have every one of you undertaken to carry out the principles 
of the Co-operative Movement, and an inherent principle is that when you have 
done all you can efficiently you hand over your surplus to your members.802 
Despite the many principle objections raised by congress, throughout the 1960s more and more 
societies abandoned, either partly or fully, the principle of paying dividend. A study conducted by 
Ted Stephenson for the Co-operative Union and published in 1966 showed that close to 50 per 
cent of the societies had stopped paying full dividend on all sales. 10 per cent of the societies in 
the sample had experimented with non-dividend stores. Not only were societies abandoning the 
divi, they replaced it with numerous alternative forms of surplus distribution. Hence, from a 
situation where all co-operative societies embraced the principle of dividend on surplus, an 
abundance of different methods started to develop. A review of Stephenson’s study, presented in 
the Co-operative Review, concluded that while many different experiments had been made, ‘no one 
pattern of divergence from pooled dividend is finding general favour.’803 Indeed, so many 
                                                 
799 Co-operative Union Ltd, Report of the 92nd Annual Co-operative Congress in the Spa Grand Hall Scarborough May 22nd-
25th, 1961, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd., 1961), p. 236. 
800 Co-operative Union Ltd, Report of the 93rd Annual Co-operative Congress in the Winter Gardens Blackpool June 11th, 12th, 
13th and 14th, 1962, (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd., 1962), p. 302. 
801 Ibid., p. 303. 
802 Ibid., p. 306.  
803 H. L. J., ‘Aspects of dividend’, Co-operative Review, 40:3 (1966), 4. 
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different experiments had been made that the reviewer found reason to remind the readers that 
‘it remains true that the most fruitful objective of co-operative endeavour is to increase the 
surplus rather than to play about with its distribution.’804   
At this point societies had also already started experimenting with a third main type of 
alternative dividend payment, namely that of stamp trading. Trading stamps was originally a sales 
promotional technique developed by American retailers to increase customer loyalty. The scheme 
basically consisted of small paper coupons, or stamps, that were handed out to the consumers 
whenever they made a purchase. The stamps had no value individually, but they could be 
collected in specific stamp books. Whenever the customer had managed to save up a certain 
number of stamps, they could be exchanged for different types of merchandise. The first of such 
schemes were adopted by American retailers as early as the late nineteenth century and their 
popularity exploded from the early 1900s onwards. Separate trading stamp companies developed 
with the sole purpose of organising the schemes. They offered stamps to retailers and held the 
merchandise that was to be distributed to the consumers in exchange for stamps.805  
Throughout the 1960s similar schemes also started to be adopted by British retailers. 
They soon became popular among consumers. The question therefore soon arose of how the co-
op movement was to deal with the practise of offering trading stamps. Initially, both the Co-
operative Union and the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) advised the societies against 
joining such schemes.806 It was believed that the system did not confer any benefit to the 
consumer that could not be secured more economically by other means and maintained that the 
co-op dividend remained the most economically beneficial for the shopper. As a method for 
distributing surplus, the stamp scheme was indeed a controversial one. As with the so-called 
‘instant dividend’ system, which basically was nothing else than offering a discount, the trading 
stamp was essentially not a distribution of surplus. Similar to discounts, stamp offerings were 
made before the surplus had been recorded. It was, at best, a dividend in advance. As an editorial 
on the Co-operative News stated, writing sympathetically on the new system: ‘Dividend stamps 
anticipate the traditional process’807 Understandably, much of the scepticism from the Union 
                                                 
804 Ibid. 
805 For an account, see e.g. S. Strasser, Satisfaction guaranteed. The making of the American mass market (New York: 
Pantheon books, 1989), pp. 242-6. See also W. Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-
operative Wholesale Society Limited, 1977), pp. 333-5. 
806 W. Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited, 1977), 
pp. 333-5. 
807 ‘Dividend Stamps’, Co-operative News (30 March 1968), (emphasis in original) 
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towards the stamp scheme was related to how the system in practise was more of a sales gimmick 
than an alternative method of dividend payment.808  
Despite the pronounced scepticism from the national federals, many retail societies were, 
however, keen to adopt the new system. Already by 1963, three retail societies had adopted stamp 
schemes and as Richardson put it: ‘others were known to be considering the idea.’809  
Slowly but surely the many sceptical attitudes also waned. Stamps were popular among the 
consumers and many societies were looking for a more cost efficient way of paying out their 
dividend. Pushed forward by retail societies urging it to adopt the system, the CWS gradually 
began to reconsider its view. At a CWS board meeting held on 6 March 1968 trading stamps were 
officially accepted as an alternative to the dividend by the CWS. True, the resolution bore the 
clear mark of being a compromise. The CWS still refrained from advocating the transfer to stamp 
trading, but they accepted the development of a uniform, national scheme for dividend stamps 
and making this scheme available on a national scale. 810  
This national scheme was launched at the end of March. An initial order of no less than 
three million stamp books was sent to the web offset division of the co-operative press, while an 
order of 10,000 stamps was sent to specialist stamp printers.811 And even if the CWS did not 
actively advocate the scheme, the interest to join soon proved substantial. Less than a month 
after it had been announced, on 22 April, the Doncaster Society became the first retail society to 
join the scheme.812 On 1 May the Morely society followed.813 From 6 May the South East 
Lancashire region of the Co-operative retail services (CRS) also took on the system offered by 
the CWS. By mid-July, five CRS branches and yet another six retail societies had put the scheme 
into operation.814 From then on, the interest exploded. Alternative schemes to that of the CWS 
were also developed and by 1974 close to 82 per cent of total dividends distributed were by the 
means of stamps.815 The height of the scheme was reached a year later when stamps accounted 
for  30 million, or 87 per cent of all dividends.816 By now societies representing more than 90 
per cent of the movement’s total trade were giving stamps.817  
                                                 
808 See ‘Union and C.W.S meet on dividend stamps’, Co-operative News (20 April 1968) 
809 W. Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited, 1977), 
p. 333. 
810 W. Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited, 1977). 
811 ‘Divi stamp Books: 3,000,000 launch. Huge print order for new scheme’, Co-operative News (30 March 1968). 
812 ‘Movement on brink of “divi” switch’, Co-operative News (6 April 1968). 
813 ‘Gearing up for dividend stamp scheme’, Co-operative News (6 April 1968). 
814 ‘Divi Schemes – national or local?’, Co-operative News (13 July 1968). 
815 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Statistics (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1974), p. 2. 
816 B. Cross, ‘They still take some licking!’, Co-operative Marketing and Management, 10:9 (1985), 7-9 
817 W. Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited, 1977), 
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As it turned out, however, while the adoption of stamp trading was substantial, it did little 
to address the problems it was meant to solve. As we have seen earlier, apart form a short period 
of consolidation in the mid-1970s, market share and profitability continued to fall throughout the 
1960s and 1970s. The stamps did not manage to attract the support of new members. On the 
contrary, membership, officially having been in decline from 1964 onwards, continued to fall. 
And while stamps had been introduced as a more modern scheme of securing membership 
support, there are reasons to believe that it rather had the effect of further reducing the 
attractiveness of membership. At least this was what the statisticians at the Co-operative Union 
argued when they, in the report of the 1972 figures, noted the following: ‘For the sixth 
consecutive year membership fell … To some extent the continued decline is due to the growing 
number of societies changing over to dividend stamps.818 As was also later argued by N. C. 
Wijayaratna of the Co-operative College, while the dividend stamps had been valuable as a 
‘promotional device and an effective method of distributing the small surpluses available’, they 
did not attract any new members.819  
Gradually there was increasing doubt about the actual advantages of stamp trading. It 
evidently did not provide the co-ops with more trade. Nor did it increase the level of 
membership. The most substantial blow to the trading stamp system came, however, in 1977 
when major competitor Tesco decided to abandon their trading stamp scheme and replace it with 
substantial price reductions.820 The stamp scheme offered by Tesco had been a costly one and 
when it was abandoned substantial price-cuts could be made. The move meant a further 
tightening of the competitive knot. Gradually more and more retail co-operatives had to accept 
that the dividend stamp had not been the success they thought it would be and increasingly they 
started winding up the schemes altogether.  
The end result of these developments was that by the beginning of the 1980s many 
societies neither offered cash dividend, nor dividend by way of stamps. Not only had the 
movement lost its position as the leading consumer organisation, but also its legitimacy as a truly 
democratic member’s business. The economic advantages offered by co-operatives were also 
becoming less and less visible. It was increasingly the case that the co-op was not offering any 
                                                 
818 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Statistics (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1972), p. 2. 
819 N. C. Wijayaratna, ‘Benefit schemes have to be sold’, Co-operative Marketing and Management, 11:1 (1985), 32. 
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advantages to the consumer that private (multiple or independent) retailers could not equally 
deliver.  
 
UK: The return of 'the divi' 
Through the course of the 1980s and 1990s numerous attempts were made to redeem this 
situation. Typically, this was done on the initiative of local retail societies who sought to come up 
with new types of schemes that offered their customers and members some form of economic 
advantage. But, while the creativity and enthusiasm among the retail co-ops was considerable, 
none of the schemes did much to differentiate the co-operative form of trading from other types 
of retailers. Moreover, as most initiatives were taken locally and coordination across society 
structures remained negligible, the end result was an abundance of different schemes and 
distribution principles. Hence, in 1988 the co-operative statistics could report a clear ‘trend away 
from dividend stamps’, while societies increasingly were offering ‘a variety of member benefit 
schemes including monthly offers, dividend cards, shareholder cards – often on a differential 
basis’.821 A few examples of this development may illustrate the point.  
In an initial phase many retail societies, having abandoned stamps, sought to replace them 
with a new type of dividend in the form of a so-called ‘membership benefit scheme’.822 This was 
essentially a set of discount vouchers offered to co-op members only. Members were registered 
and issued with a plastic card. This entitled the holder to purchase certain special offers at a 
discount, as well as giving him or her discounts on a wide variety of goods and services offered 
by businesses and organisations other than the society in which they were members. The scheme 
was initially developed by the CWS but soon took many different forms as it was adopted on an 
individual basis by local retail societies.  
In 1987 the Central Midlands Co-operative Society launched a customer card as an 
alternative to dividend stamps, which came to be known as the ‘plus privilege card’.823 The card 
was offered to all customers, who were given the opportunity to collect a bonus on every 
transaction made with the society. The bonus paid was normally 1 per cent of the transaction 
value. Collected bonuses were paid every six months in the form of vouchers redeemable at the 
co-op stores where the bonus had been collected. Besides increasing overall customer loyalty, the 
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principal commercial catch of the system was that when the customers returned to cash in on 
their bonus earnings, they would ‘spend more than the value of the vouchers.’824  
But again, as with trading stamps, this was a benefit scheme offered to all customers and 
not only to the co-op members. Therefore it did not provide enough of an impetus to attract new 
members. An attempt to solve some of these problems was made by the Barnsley region of the 
CRS when, at the 1988 Co-operative Congress in Brighton, they submitted the following 
proposal: ‘Congress affirms that the essential elements of retail co-operation must include 
benefits for, and democratic participation of, the members who trade with the society. Congress 
recognises that there is a crucial need to reactivate and develop these essential elements in the 
retail societies’.825 One of the main suggestions propounded on these grounds was ‘the re-
introduction of a meaningful dividend to encourage trading and membership, such a dividend to 
be delivered by a means that is both economically realistic for the society and of real value to the 
member.’826 While the debate following the proposal indicated a substantial agreement with its 
main intentions, few were willing to accept anything but local solutions. And while there were 
many examples of quite successful and innovative schemes set-up to attract customer loyalty and 
increase membership, concerted action on behalf of the movement as a whole to develop 
schemes capable of offering all co-op members exclusive and genuine economic advantages 
largely failed to appear. Indeed, as was noted a few years later in the annual statistical report of 
the Co-op Union, ‘individual society results reveal wide differences on policy’.827  
The 1990s saw the further introduction of numerous different types of membership and 
customer benefits schemes. In 1989 the CRS trialled the introduction of a shareholder’s card in 
two traditional departmental stores in Huddersfield and Swansea.828 By 1992 the card was offered 
in all CRS non-food stores. It recorded member purchase and dividends were credited to each 
members share account at the end of each financial year. The card was only offered to members 
holding a minimum £50 invested in their CRS share account. Later, the CRS extended the 
program by launching a ‘Pioneer plus points card’ in its new Pioneer food store in Cardiff. The 
scheme was based on a bonus and voucher system. After having collected 1,000 bonus points, 
customers holding a card would see a £10 voucher redeemed from their next shopping bill. The 
scheme was also later to be launched in other CRS Pioneer stores.  
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By now, the West Midlands Co-operative Society had launched its own ‘privilege loyalty 
club’.829 The scheme provided members with access to a voucher dispensing unit situated at the 
entrance of the store. By inserting the membership card, customers were yielded four offer 
vouchers that could be used in the store. Commenting on the introduction of the scheme to the 
Retail Marketing and Management journal, service controller in the West Midlands Society David 
Pinton noted how the society had ‘been looking for ways to determine the Co-op difference and 
to reward membership’ and that ‘the Privilege shopper scheme … provided the vehicle to do 
this’. According to Pinton, the scheme had ‘a dual value – it can be used as a Member benefit and 
as part of a marketing campaign for the Food Division.’830 
A final example may be provided by the smaller Chelmsford Star Co-operative Society 
who launched their own retail loyalty scheme – the so-called ‘starcards’ – in all their twenty-seven 
retail and service outlets.831 This system was based on the ‘smart-card’ technology and the society 
claimed to be the first retailer to have adapted the technology to a loyalty scheme. The system 
rewarded the card owner with a dividend on every £5 spent in a single transaction. Earned 
dividend could be spent in any of the society’s outlets. 
While all these different projects were largely reported as having a positive effect on 
customer and membership loyalty, they were all based on very different logics and procedures. 
Some schemes provided payment in cash, others in vouchers. Some schemes were provided to 
members only, while others were offered to all customers irrespective of co-op membership. 
Finally, some of the card schemes were based on magnetic stripe technology; others adopted the 
smart card system. A further problem was that none of the schemes managed to capture the 
specific co-operative character of the enterprise offering them. It simply remained unclear to 
what extent the schemes represented an actual distribution of surplus on the basis of purchase, as 
envisaged in the co-op principles or if they were in fact sales promotional tools to be recorded as 
marketing expenses. As noted by Co-op Union statistician P. Roscoe, many co-operators tended 
to regard the different schemes ‘not as a distribution but as a sales promotional tool’ and 
different types of customer incentives programmes thus tended to be ‘lumped together with “true 
dividend”’. 832 The varied and fragmented character of the approach was also reflected in 
substantial confusion among the co-operative statisticians on how to report the different 
schemes. As was noted in the Co-op Union statistical report from the financial year 1994/1995: 
                                                 
829 ‘Building powerful customer links’, Retail Marketing and Management, 20:1 (1994), 4-5. 
830 Ibid. 
831 See ’Chelmsford launches new hi-tech ”divi” system for members’, Co-operative News (18 April 1995). 
832 P. Roscoe, ‘The British Consumer Co-operative Movement’, Yearbook of Co-operative Enterprise (1992), 193. 
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following confusion in recent years concerning the various methods of 
presentation of customer benefits – associated with societies’ typically 
fragmented approach to the issue – it was decided that, for Co-operative 
statistical presentation, only dividend where the rate is dependent upon the level 
of surplus for the year will be shown as a distribution of that surplus. All other 
schemes where the rates are predetermined, and which might be construed as 
discounts, will be shown as trading expenses. An analysis of all customer benefits 
continues to be displayed, however, in order to positively identify the “Co-
operative difference”.833 
Frustration and fragmentation was indeed widespread surrounding the approach to the subject of 
customer benefits. An attempt to deal with the issue was made by the south-east retail branch of 
the CWS when, at the 1995 Congress, it moved a special resolution calling all societies to return 
to the practise of paying direct financial dividends to members in proportion of purchases 
made.834 The plea was repeated at congress a year later when two separate resolutions were 
submitted specifically stressing the importance of bringing back the traditional dividend.835  
As an attempt to take on this challenge, the CWS in the autumn of 1995 launched a trial 
swipe-card traditional divi scheme in nine stores in Scotland and South-East England.836 In the 
spring of 1996 the scheme was extended to all stores in Northern Ireland. In 1997 it was 
introduced in Scotland and by 1998 it had been launched in all CWS regions.837 Initially, card-
holders were offered a five per cent dividend on the full co-op brand range, while non co-op 
brands were not included. Later a ’3 and 1’ principle’ was introduced where card holders received 
3 per cent dividend on co-op brand and 1 per cent on all other groceries.838 Payments were made 
to cardholders twice a year. Alongside the individual re-payments, the system also embraced a 
community dividend scheme. All divi repayments were made in pounds only. Any odd pence on 
the entitlement could either be forwarded to the next payment or donated to the community 
dividend programme. The cash raised by the programme was again donated to different types of 
community projects. 
The new CWS dividend scheme was an immediate success. In Northern Ireland only, 
more than 80,000 cardholders were registered in the first two weeks of operation.839 By the end 
of 1996 close to 140,000, or about one-in-four families in the whole of Northern Ireland held a 
                                                 
833 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Statistics (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1994/1995), p. 2. 
834 ‘Call to bring back the divi’, Co-operative News (6 June 1995). See also ‘Shoppers’ save our “divi” please’, Co-operative 
News (1 August 1995). 
835 ‘Variety of motions for Harrogate. Bring back co-op divi, congress to be urged’, Co-operative News (2 April 1996). 
836 The stores were placed in Addlestone, Heathfield, Shotts, Oban, Dalry, Larkhall, Beith , Stonehouse and Galston, 
see ‘Pilot schemes in selected stores. Divi card takes off’, Co-operative News (24 October 1995). 
837 These regions were the North Eastern and Cumbria, Greater Nottingham, the South Midlands and the South 
East, see Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd, Annual Report 1998, p. 12-13. 
838 The Co-operative Group, Annual report & accounts 2002, p. 26. 
839 ’Divi card comes up trumps’, Co-operative News (11 June 1996). 
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CWS dividend card.840 In Scotland, 34,000 people signed up for the card in the first three months. 
At the half-year re-payment point in the summer of 1997, a total of £25 million was handed out 
to cardholders. In addition £ 90,000 was handed over to the community dividend programme.841  
While the figures were repeatedly celebrated in the co-operative press, the scheme 
adopted by the CWS, as well as most other schemes adopted by the smaller retail societies still 
failed to fully embrace the true principles of the co-operative dividend. Most importantly, under 
most schemes, non-members could also hold dividend cards. As was noted by a 2003 study into 
co-operative membership: ‘In the 1990s, in response to other supermarket loyalty cards, 
“dividend cards” were introduced but again these were often available to all customers rather 
than just the members.’842 Rather than a specific co-operative endeavour offering a true 
membership benefit, the dividend card was thus primarily a customer benefit card. Further, as in 
the case of the CWS scheme, the repayment made was not a true distribution of the full surplus. 
The rate was declared in advance and estimated from the purchase of a selected group of 
products. As remarked in the CWS Annual report and accounts for the year 2001: ‘popular though 
the Dividend Card is, it is not a true dividend, in that the rate is declared in advance and it is 
therefore not a distribution. In addition, it only applies to food purchases.’843  
Still, the introduction of the CWS dividend card, as well as similar loyalty schemes, 
managed to give a new boost to co-operative membership. After declining figures throughout the 
post-war period, which stabilised in the 1980s and early 1990s, a period of renewed growth 
started from 1995 onwards. While the figures are difficult to interpret, the official statistics show 
a quite considerable increase in the number of members.844 There are also clear indications that 
this growth was closely related to the reinvigorated membership schemes of the second half of 
the 1990s. As the statisticians at the Co-operative Union explained, commenting on the 
                                                 
840 ’Divi days are here again’, Co-operative News (25 March 1997). 
841 ’Shoppers cash in on £ 2.5m dividend windfall’, Co-operative News (29 July 1997). 
842 M. Wilson and T. Woodin, ‘Recruiting and developing active members in co-operatives’, in M. Wilson, T. 
Woodin, R. Simmons and J. Birchall, Getting Involved. Studies of member participation in co-operatives across the West Midlands 
(Manchester: The Co-operative College, 2003), p. 3.  
843 The Co-operative Group, Annual report & accounts 2001, p. 9. 
844 If we are to believe the figures, in the period from 1993 to 2002 an approximate average of 170,000 people joined 
the movement every year, causing the first substantial rise in membership since the mid-1960s. If we are, however, to 
believe a large co-operative study – the so called Co-operative Commission – published in 2001, noting that ‘current 
estimates of membership … is a substantial over estimate’, and that ‘the true membership figure may be less than 2 
million’, the figures reported in the statistics seem unlikely (The Co-operative Commission, The co-operative advantage. 
Creating a successful family of co-operative businesses (Manchester: The Co-operative Commission, 2001), p. 41). If they were 
accurate, they would indicate that the co-op movement hardly had any members in 1993. What probably is correct is 
that there was a rise in membership during the 1990s, but that it was less spectacular than the statistics indicate. See 
also chapter one in the present thesis for a discussion on the accuracy of the British membership figures 
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1998/1999 co-op statistics: ‘Membership increased by a further 188,000, again influenced by the 
introduction of new dividend schemes and loyalty chards.’845  
It thus generally seems that in the last half of the 1990s, the UK movement managed to 
re-establish some popular confidence in the ability of the co-op to create true economic 
advantages for the general consumer. The rise in membership, however, failed to address the 
problems of market decline hampering the movement throughout the post-war period. The types 
of loyalty schemes adopted were also largely unsuited to clarifying how co-operative societies 
offered an alternative approach to food retailing. Most of the schemes adopted were very similar 
to those of the multiple retailers. Moreover, the different societies' schemes were based on very 
different practical solutions, thus failing to create a unified image across society structures. The 
schemes therefore added to the fragmented nature of the movement, as seen both in the 
development of store formats and in the overall organisational structure of the movement.  
 
Reinvigorating the divi: The Norwegian case  
The dividend was a hotly discussed issue among British co-operators in the immediate post-war 
years. Internationally, the co-op movement also held principle discussions on the practice of 
repaying surplus on the basis of purchase. As was noted in a 1951 article in the Review of 
International Co-operation: ‘Debates on the price and dividend policy are a recurrent phenomenon in 
the co-operative movement. In times of economic change especially it comes up for review and it 
is not surprising, therefore, that lately the co-operative press in several countries has again taken 
up this subject.’846  
This general diagnosis was, however, not representative for the situation in Norway. Sure, 
some remarks were made once in a while by Norwegian co-operators on the problems created 
when societies paid out a too substantial dividend. And the National Co-operative Association 
(NKL) consistently urged societies to give priority to modernisation and expansion of the co-
operative stores, rather than substantial dividend payments. But no suggestions were made on the 
possibility of substituting the dividend with reduced prices or otherwise altering the principle of 
dividend payment. The reasons for this were numerous.  
First, as opposed to the British movement, payment of a dividend had never attracted the 
same attention and importance in Norway. Historically, the British were renowned for a 
                                                 
845 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Statistics (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1998/1999), p. 1 
846 V. N, ‘Still topical: dividend policy!’, Review of International Co-operation 44:4 (1951), 83. 
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particularly strong attachment to the dividend principle as well as for their generous divi levels.847 
In Norway by contrast, payment of the divi seems generally to have remained at a stable, yet 
fairly limited level. At its peak level in 1935, the average rate of dividend reached 3 per cent of 
turnover.848 In 1950 it was 1.4 per cent. By comparison, the median payment in the UK co-ops in 
1932 was nine per cent. By 1950, the overall average was 6.6 per cent.849 The size and importance 
of the dividend was simply much less pronounced in Norway and this may help explain why the 
principle was so seldom debated, at least compared to the many heated debates seen in Britain.  
Another reason may be the fact that the Norwegian movement simply did not experience 
the same problems in keeping up dividend levels as the British did. The co-ops continued to 
produce stable profits and surplus for distribution was thus readily available. Apart from a 
reduction during the war, there was simply no downward trend in dividend payments to be 
worried about. In fact, after a temporary low had been reached in 1955, the average payment of 
dividend in relation to turnover slowly started to increase. And as the below figures show, by the 
mid-1970s the Norwegians had in fact passed the British in average dividend payments.  
                                                 
847 As was remarked in a 1951 article in the Review of International Co-operation: ‘in Europe … the dividend has never 
acquired the importance it has in Britain. … Although dividends in Great Britain have come down in the course of 
years, the resistance to losing this buying incentive and savings device is still very great’. (V. N, ‘Still topical: dividend 
policy!’, Review of International Co-operation 44:4 (1951), 83).  
848 This is still the highest rate recorded by the Norwegian co-ops. Figures are estimated from Coop NKL, Våre tall 
1907-2005 (Statistics compiled by Tore Kristoffersen, Coop NKL, 2006).  
849 Note that the median and the overall average are not fully comparable estimates. They still reflect the general 
trend fairly accurate. Figures are estimated from J. A. Hough, Dividend on Co-operative Purchases. A study of dividend on 
purchases as element in co-operative trading with special reference to the British consumers’ co-operative movement (Manchester: Co-
operative Union Ltd, 1936), p. 82 and Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Statistics (Manchester: Co-operative Union 
Ltd, 1950). In 1932, the majority of societies paid an average dividend of between one shilling, six and a quarter 
pennies to two shillings in the pound, which roughly represents a median divi rate of 9 per cent. 
  
 277
 
Figure 10.1: Average dividend in per cent of turnover, British and Norwegian consumer 
co-operatives, 1950-1999850 
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A final factor that needs to be considered is the competitive situation in the Norwegian food 
retail market. As we have repeatedly seen, Norwegian private retailers long refrained from 
implementing the principles of chain store organisations. The structure of the food retail industry 
remained fragmented and the market situation of the co-ops was not seriously threatened before 
the 1970s, at the earliest. Discounting as a competitive tool also remained of limited importance 
throughout this period and the principle discussion of whether consumers preferred low prices or 
dividend was thus never seriously raised. Nor did the private food retailers introduce alternative 
forms of consumer loyalty schemes, such as trading stamps. 
The general impression is that the dividend on purchase was a principle adopted in a 
limited yet stable fashion by the Norwegian co-operative retail societies throughout the 
immediate post-war years. While its importance for the consumer may have gradually declined as 
general income levels grew, the dividend continued to form a natural part of co-operative trading 
and the viability of the principle was never really questioned. 
The 1980s saw a temporary halt to this stable trend. As the above figure shows, average 
dividend levels were more than halved during this decade. And behind the average figures, 
                                                 
850 Figures estimated from Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Statistics (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 
selected years) and Coop NKL, Våre tall 1907-2005 (Statistics compiled by Tore Kristoffersen, Coop NKL, 2006). 
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substantial variations in the practise of paying the dividend were also revealed. In 1988 it was 
reported that out of a total 506 societies only 191 were actually paying their members a 
dividend.851 Two years later, retail societies’ divi reached a record low, at 0.4 per cent of total 
turnover. 
This development was largely caused by the weakened economic situation of co-operative 
trade during the eighties. As we recall from previous chapters, the early eighties had seen a 
substantial weakening in both market share and profits. From a record 26 per cent in 1976, by 
1984 market share was down to 23 per cent. During the same period, the number of local co-
operatives running into deficits more than doubled and average profits among the retail societies 
ended at a negligible 0.9 per cent of total turnover.852 While market share soon stabilised, by the 
end of the decade average profits continued to fall. Indeed, in 1987 the NKL ran a deficit for the 
first time in the history of the organisation.853 And even if the number of societies running a 
deficit had been reduced since the early 1980s, the total amount of losses were rising dramatically, 
reaching a peak of 164 million NOK in 1988.854 In the same year, average surplus within the local 
co-operatives reached a historic low, at 0.3 per cent of total turnover.855 Actual surplus available 
for distribution was consequently very limited. 
The decline in dividend levels during the 1980s did also reflect how the new NKL 
management and particularly the CEO Knut Værdal, were increasingly reluctant to advise 
societies to treat members differently from other customers. It was believed that this would limit 
the possibilities of expansion into new markets. The dominant attitude was rather to develop co-
operative businesses along similar lines as private retailers and to play down the principle 
differences distinguishing the co-operative form of enterprise from other organisational forms. 
The decline in dividend levels was thus largely a sought after development, or at least, it did not 
cause any major worry among the leading NKL managers. It is revealing that neither dividend 
payments nor membership figures were reported in the NKL annual reports during this period.  
The coming of the 1990s was, however, to completely reverse this trend. As we have seen 
earlier, the late 1980s had seen another change of leadership in the NKL, subsequently leading to 
major strategic reorientations. Led by the new CEO, Rolf Rønning, the NKL had pushed ahead 
with a full reorganisation in the structures of co-operative retail stores and they gradually 
                                                 
851 Coop NKL, Våre tall 1907-2005 (Statistics compiled by Tore Kristoffersen, Coop NKL, 2006). 
852 See chapter five in the present thesis. 
853 NKL, Annual Report 1987. 
854 K4, 3A.2, Document presented at the NKL board meeting, ‘S-lagene 1989’, 6 July 1990; K4.3A.1, Document 
presented at the NKL board meeting, ‘Tapssituasjonen i S-lagene. Tiltak for å redusere NKLs tap på krav’, 24 May 
1989. 
855 All figures estimated from Coop NKL, Våre tall 1907-2005 (Statistics compiled by Tore Kristoffersen, Coop 
NKL, 2006). 
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developed the co-operative system of distribution into a fully integrated, standardised and 
centralised model.856 Alongside these reforms, however, the NKL management also initiated 
substantial changes in how the movement approached its members. Most prominently, the 
economic advantage of the dividend was re-launched and actively marketed as a distinctive co-
operative feature. Hence, after membership and co-operative distinctiveness had been 
deliberately neglected during the 1980s, it was now to be given a prime role. As the 1991 NKL 
Annual Report stated: ‘The consumer co-operative movement is a membership organisation where 
the economic surplus is redistributed to the members. This is the co-operative movement’s 
distinctive character. The strategy for the 90s is to make this distinctiveness more visible and to 
exploit it as a competitive tool.’857  
With this major goal as an overall guidance, the movement set in motion a complete 
revision of its membership scheme, focusing more or less exclusively on the economic 
advantages of being a co-operator. The dividend was given a prime role in this process. It was 
explicitly stated as the primary advantage of co-operative membership and a common goal was 
agreed that the co-operative societies within a five year period should produce a joint average 
dividend of 3 per cent on all purchases. Moreover, as the first retailer in Norway and three years 
before Tesco launched its Clubcard, an electronic membership card was issued for all co-
operative members in 1991. In 1994 the scheme was made national, enabling the collection of 
dividend in all co-operative stores across the country. The ultimate result of these strategic 
changes, as revealed by the above figures, was that the decline in dividend payments seen through 
the late 1970s and 1980s was reversed. 
The electronic membership card also facilitated the simple collection of a diverse set of 
economic membership advantages other than dividend, such as special rebates and offers issued 
for members only. Various discount schemes were also negotiated with external suppliers of 
goods and services that the co-ops themselves didn’t offer. Hence, rebates on such diverse 
products and services as petrol, hotel stays, clothing, telephone services and talking books were 
offered to all members holding a co-op membership card. In 2000 such membership rebates 
totalled more than NOK 70 million, equal to  5.5 million. This implied that 16 per cent of total 
membership advantages were in the form of such rebates.858  
The strategic reorientation of the 1990s cleared the ground for a remarkable 
strengthening of co-operative membership. In the period from 1990 to 2002 membership more 
                                                 
856 See especially chapter five and chapter eight in the present thesis.  
857 Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Annual Report 1990, p. 16. 
858 Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Annual Report 2000, p. 43. 
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than doubled, from 400,000 to 920,000. This implied that twenty per cent of the population or 
close to half of the total number of Norwegian households, held a co-operative membership.859 
True, the drastic rise in membership did not result in a corresponding growth in market share. As 
we recall, market share figures remained fairly stable at 24-25 per cent during the 1990s.860 The 
prime effect of the reinvigorated membership scheme was to convince existing customers of the 
advantages of becoming a co-op member and not to attract new consumers to shop at co-
operative stores. Still, the strengthened membership figures implied that a dramatically increased 
number of consumers had made a stronger attachment to the co-op as their primary supplier of 
groceries. The development thus helped to further secure and stabilise the position of co-
operative trade in the Norwegian food retail market.  
 
The economic advantage of membership: The British and Norwegian consumer co-ops 
compared  
The revised membership scheme launched by the Norwegian co-op in the early 1990s was a 
substantial success. It focused on offering tangible economic benefits exclusively to members. 
The launch of the scheme immediately led to a large increase in the number of members. While it 
had taken almost 90 years to attract 400,000 members to the co-operative movement, it took only 
ten more years to attract another 400,000. The development indicates that the Norwegian co-ops 
had found an effective recipe for attracting consumers to the co-op movement. While most 
Western European consumer co-ops, including the British, struggled to sustain their 
attractiveness among increasingly affluent and individualised post-war consumers, the 
Norwegians saw a stable and gradual increase in membership throughout the post-war years. And 
from the 1990s onwards the number of members joining the movement literally exploded. The 
British movement also saw an increase in membership during the late 1990s. But the growth was 
not as marked as the developments seen in Norway. It also followed a period of unbroken 
decline in membership figures stretching back to at least the 1960s. The question remains how 
these marked differences may be understood. Why did the attractiveness of joining a co-op vary 
so substantially between the Norwegian and the British movements? 
The straightforward answer would be that the differences are related to differences in 
market development. Hence, as the Norwegian co-ops throughout the post-war years were 
                                                 
859 See E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. Forbrukesamvirkets historie 
i Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006), p. 609. 
860 See chapter eight in the present thesis.  
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gradually able to serve a larger and larger proportion of the market, they also managed to 
gradually increase their membership. In Britain, by contrast, co-operative market share was 
steadily lost from the 1950s onwards. And as co-operative stores served a smaller and smaller 
proportion of the market, the customer base from which to recruit new members also gradually 
evaporated.  
This explanation obviously provides an important answer to the question posed. But it 
fails to account for the substantial growth in the membership figures experienced by the 
Norwegian co-ops during the 1990s. In this period, the market share of co-operative retail trade 
remained stable. Moreover, as the present chapter has revealed, the strategic approach taken by 
the Norwegian and British consumer to the challenge of reinvigorating the economic advantages 
of membership was marked by several important differences. These differences also need to be 
taken into account if a full understanding of the developments taking place is to be provided. 
Most prominently, while UK co-operators throughout the post-war years experimented with a 
number of different economic benefit schemes, the Norwegians stayed loyal to a traditional, flat 
dividend on purchase. Gradually the Norwegians also managed to develop a coherent and 
national plan for their membership recruitment, focusing in full on the individual economic 
benefits of co-operative membership. They also introduced electronic membership cards, made 
these valid across society structures and managed to demarcate their membership scheme from 
the customer loyalty programs of competing food retailers. It is revealing that all of these 
strategic features were recognised, debated and to some extent also partly implemented by the 
British co-operators. The problem was, however, that they never managed to coordinate the 
different strategies into a coherent national plan.  
A few final examples may help illustrate this point. The first relates to the exclusive focus 
on tangible economic benefits advocated by the Norwegian co-ops from the early 1990s 
onwards. Comparing this strategy with major strategic debates initiated in the British co-op 
movement, it soon becomes clear that similar suggestions to focus more actively on concrete 
economic benefits had been launched by British co-operators for many years already. For 
example, at the beginning of the 1970s, the need to focus on individual economic gains had been 
advocated in the British co-operative press. In an article printed in a 1972 edition of the Co-
operative Review, J. Bingham f argued for the need to offer a more comprehensive set of economic 
advantages to the members: 
Truly, we are living in affluent times, drastically different from twenty years ago 
when owning a Co-op share was considered a prudent investment and even 
represented a certain status symbol to a goodly portion of the public. Nowadays 
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the membership approach has to be tempered to appeal to the modern demand: 
“What is in it for me?” and they will not be interested in talk on co-operative 
principles! … Why not allow monthly credit facilities? Give special discounts on 
selected goods to members? Allow preview of Sale goods? Perhaps occasional 
late night shopping sprees to members only … Lots of ideas come readily to 
mind when one begins to get keen on the potentials possible in boosting the 
shareholder image.’861  
Similar initiatives were taken by independent retail societies. In 1982, for example, the 
Bristol/Bath region of the CRS submitted a separate proposal to the Co-operative Congress on 
the importance of examining ‘what can be done to make membership, individual membership 
more meaningful.’862 Moving the proposal, E. W. Evans noted how ‘this movement is dependent 
on membership and will be more dependent upon membership in the years to come …but it 
needs to have demonstrable benefits. It needs to have easily recognisable benefits to add to the 
verbal idealism which is so often expressed from places such as this rostrum.’863 He went on to 
specify some possible benefits that could be offered: ‘I do not think it is too much to ask that we 
should have some discounts on travel, that we should have some discounts on holidays, that we 
should be able to make available a broad range of super-benefits because people have chosen to 
attach themselves to the co-operative movement.’864  
But, none of these suggestions led to any concrete changes in how the co-op movement 
approached its members on a national scale. It is also revealing how the different schemes 
actually developed during the 1980s and 1990s to reinvigorate the economic advantages of 
becoming a co-op member, often turned out confusing and over-complex. In many instances, the 
true economic advantage remained difficult to see. The economic rewards offered also varied 
considerably. The rules for collecting them were often quite complex, as was also the case with 
how the rewards actually could be made use of. The 1995 return to the traditional cash dividend 
helped address some of these complexities. And as we have seen, these schemes became 
extremely popular. But as they continued to be offered to all consumers and not only members, 
they were not really a tool suitable for advocating a distinct co-operative advantage and for 
recruiting new members. They simply remained a customer loyalty scheme like any other. 
Complexity also remained a defining feature of many of the cash dividend schemes adopted. The 
principles of dividend payment operated by the Channel Island Co-operative Society as recently 
as in the summer of 2007, provide an illustrative example. As the rules stated on the society’s 
                                                 
861 J. Bingham, ‘Share Number Please!’, Co-operative Review, 46:8 (1972), 7.  
862 Co-operative Union Ltd, The 113th Annual Congress of the Co-operative Union Ltd held in the Dome Brighton, from May 31 
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website explain: ‘Dividend is paid on almost all purchases, with double dividend available in 
Locale and Grand Marché food stores on Tuesdays and Wednesdays.’865  
A major advantage of the Norwegian membership scheme, as opposed to the different 
principles adopted by UK co-operators, was that it was simple and straightforward- offering a 
cash dividend on all purchases in all co-op stores. In addition, it also offered a varied set of other 
economic advantages, many similar to those E. W. Evans had pleaded for at the 1982 Co-op 
Union Congress.  
A second example may be found in how the introduction of electronic membership cards 
was approached by the two movements. In Norway, the membership card immediately worked 
as an invaluable means to simplify and broaden the possibilities of earning a dividend. It 
presupposed a thorough clearing up of old membership lists and facilitated an easy, efficient and 
modern form of membership registration. The card soon proved to be a decisive mechanism in 
the search for new members. A 1999 investigation of existing co-op members showed that nearly 
50 per cent of them would not have joined had it not been for ‘the membership card with 
membership letters and the advantages tied up to this.’866  
 The British co-operators were also early in adopting electronic card technology. Already 
at the 1980 Co-op Union congress a proposal had been submitted by the South Suburban Society 
requesting the central executive ‘to commission a study on the viability of issuing computerised 
membership cards to members for the purpose of recording their purchases.’ 867 In the words of 
the society's representative D. Jackson such a scheme could provide ‘a constructive and uniform 
cost efficient way of paying dividend to members, members who we directly require for the 
success of this movement.’ 868 But, again little happened in terms of a concerted effort to advance 
such technology across the borders of the different retail societies. Rather, while many societies 
invested heavily in adopting computerised membership cards, the approach to the new 
technology remained fragmented. Different societies chose radically different technological 
solutions. In addition, the many different cards were provided with an abundance of different 
names and none of them were easily recognisable as a co-op membership card.  
A third example relates to the national and well coordinated character of the Norwegian 
membership program, as opposed to the fragmented and local character of the British schemes. 
                                                 
865 Taken from the website of The Channel Island Co-operative Society, www.ci-cooperative.com, accessed 5 July 
2008. 
866 Cited in E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. Forbrukesamvirkets 
historie i Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006), p. 533. 
867 Co-operative Union Ltd, The 111th Annual Congress of the Co-operative Union Ltd. (Manchester, Co-operative Union 
Ltd, 1980), p.148. 
868 Ibid. 
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The Norwegian membership card was launched in six separate retail societies during the winter 
of 1990. By 1994 the scheme was made national. From then on membership cards could be used 
in all co-op stores across the country and a dividend could be collected on all co-operative 
purchases.869 A separate membership department was developed within the NKL administration 
to coordinate the activities.  
Again, similar strategic moves had been suggested and attempted by the British co-
operators. Indeed, already in 1949 a national membership programme had been launched and 
implemented in the UK co-op movement.870 But not all societies chose to join and the system 
gradually broke down as the movement could not come to a common agreement on how the 
collection of dividends across society structures could be efficiently and fairly organised. The end 
result was that any further attempt to attract and reward members was made locally and the 
obvious potential in offering a coordinated national scheme was never exploited.  
The final example concerns the ability of the Norwegian co-ops to develop a membership 
scheme capable of demarcating itself and efficiently competing with the schemes adopted by 
other retailers. As we have seen, Norwegian co-operators pioneered the introduction of 
electronic membership cards. And when competitors introduced their loyalty programs in 1997, 
the co-op soon found ways of countering these challenges. Indeed, of the two major competing 
cards launched, only one survived.  
In the UK the story was different. While many co-op societies had experimented with 
different types of loyalty cards it was the 1994 launch of the Tesco Clubcard that marked the true 
beginning of customer loyalty schemes in the UK retail market. Again, the impression is given 
that the co-op was primarily copying its competitors and not capable of developing and 
advocating a true, alternative competitive advantage. Indeed, as the Co-operative News reported, the 
1995 vote taken by the Co-op Union Congress to return to a cash dividend was explicitly related 
to the ‘customer loyalty inducements being offered by a competitor.’871 And despite the return to 
a cash dividend, throughout the 1990s the feeling remained that in the operation of customer 
cards the co-ops remained second to those of the private multiples. 
 
                                                 
869 For a description, see E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. 
Forbrukesamvirkets historie i Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006), pp. 525-31. 
870 For a description, see R. Southern, ‘National co-operative membership in Great Britain’, Review of International Co-
operation, 43:1 (1950), 67-69. See also, Co-operative Union Ltd, Report of the 81st Annual Co-operative Congress in the 
Winter Gardens Theatre Morecambe May 29th, 30th, 31st, and June 1st, 1950 (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1950), 
pp. 54-5. 
871 ‘Call to bring back the divi’, Co-operative News (6 June 1995). See also ‘Shoppers’ save our “divi” please’, Co-operative 
News (1 August 1995). 
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Conclusions 
During the post-war period, the actual economic advantages offered by co-operative trade came 
under close scrutiny. The question was increasingly whether the co-op actually offered any 
advantages that could not be similarly met by other retailers. Traditionally, the principle economic 
advantage of being a co-op member and shopping regularly at the co-op store had been related to 
how this made the consumer liable to a share of the co-op’s profit. The yearly or half yearly 
payments of this dividend made an important contribution to the daily household economy of 
many families. As standards of living rose, competition strengthened and dividend levels sank 
(largely due to increased competition), the impression was increasingly that the dividend was no 
longer an attractive feature capable of attracting trade and recruiting new members. A major 
challenge for the co-ops during the post-war period was how to handle this devaluation of one of 
the key features of their alternative business model and to convince consumers of the continued 
economic attractiveness of joining and staying loyal to the co-operative retailer. 
This chapter has shown how the challenge was approached by the co-op movements in 
Norway and the UK. The general finding has been that while the British co-operators debated, 
questioned and largely substituted the dividend with a variety of different benefit schemes, the 
Norwegians continued to practise the principle of dividend on purchase. Payments remained 
limited, yet quite stable and the overall viability of the principle was never really questioned. In 
terms of popular support, the Norwegian approach continued to attract new members. Hence in 
the period from 1950 to 1990 the number of co-operative members rose from 270,000 to roughly 
400,000 or by 68 per cent.872 In the UK the same period saw a decline in membership of 23 per 
cent.873  
During the 1990s this tendency continued. With the launch of a revised membership 
scheme, the Norwegian movement laid the foundations for the further strengthening of their 
membership base. By developing an innovative, simple, economically rewarding scheme and 
making this available across society structures, they managed to attract a substantial number of 
consumers to join the co-op. In the ten year period from 1990, membership figures doubled. The 
British for their part advocated many of the same advantages. But they failed to turn these ideas 
                                                 
872 Coop NKL, Våre tall 1907-2005 (Statistics compiled by Tore Kristoffersen, Coop NKL, 2006). Note that the 
membership figure for 1990 reported in the official statistics is 487,625, but this is probably an overestimate. As in 
the UK, the Norwegian membership statistics were not satisfactory updated during the 1980s. As was noted by the 
NKL chairman Jarle Benum in his address to the 1990 NKL Congress, ‘ongoing work with our membership register 
… shows that it is very incomplete, and I think we have to admit that we do not have more than 400,000 active 
members in our organisation.’ Norges Kooperative Landsforening, NKLs 38 kongress Tromsø, 28.-30. september 1990. 
Stenografisk referat fra kongressforhandlingene (Oslo: Norges Kooperative Landsforening, 1990), p. 61. 
873 Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Statistics (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, selected years).  
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into concerted action on a national scale. And while some growth in membership was 
experienced in the last half of the 1990s, no national membership strategy had been developed 
and the true and distinct economic advantages of co-operative membership remained unclear 
behind the many different types of schemes still in operation. The end result was that the co-ops, 
as in other areas, were simply outperformed by their main competitors in the introduction and 
efficient operation of loyalty schemes. 
 
*** 
 
Originally, the co-operative form of retailing had based its distinctive character on three major 
aspects. It was established to serve the interest of the consumer by providing retail services on a 
fair and honest basis. The operations were to be controlled democratically by the members and 
any distribution of surplus was to be made on the basis of each member’s use of the enterprise. 
As such the co-ops sought to offer their members three parallel advantages; the political 
advantage of being a member of a consumer organisation, the advantage of self-governance and 
the economic advantage of being liable to a share of the profits produced in the enterprise. 
During the post-war period all these initial advantages of consumer co-operation were 
increasingly scrutinised and questioned. New consumer movements established during the 
immediate post-war years refused to accept that the co-op could effectively fulfil its role as a true 
consumer movement. The democratic governance structure of the co-operative enterprise was 
also gradually losing its legitimacy, as the size of the retail societies grew and they had to 
standardise and integrate their operations in order to achieve the necessary efficiency and 
profitability. The viability and vigour of the co-ops democratic decision-making structure was 
also challenged by the decline in popular involvement and decreasing civic engagement 
characteristic of the second half of the twentieth century. Finally, the economic advantages of co-
operative membership were also increasingly challenged during this period. As dividend levels 
sank, competition intensified and standards of living rose, the question was increasingly what 
actual economic advantages the co-op could offer that couldn’t equally be offered by other 
retailers. The end result of all these developments was that the very relevance of the co-op as an 
alternative form of business enterprise was in question. 
During the post-war period, the co-ops were faced with numerous different challenges. 
They had to adopt new forms of retailing practises and they had to radically reform their 
organisational structures. In addition, they also had to actively reconsider all the fundamental 
premises on which their specific form of trading was based. This third main section of the thesis 
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has explored and discussed how the Norwegian and British consumer co-ops dealt with this final 
challenge. The analysis has formed the last step in a three-fold process aimed at explaining the 
divergent development of the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives in the post-war 
period. The basic argument is that the divergent development paths of the two movements were 
closely related to, not only how they adapted their operational practises and organisational 
structures, but also to how they reformulated and redeveloped their overall goals and profile to 
meet with the societal and competitive transformations of the post-war period. The analysis has 
exposed this link by analysing the different approaches taken by the Norwegian and British 
consumer co-ops when dealing with these challenges.  
During the immediate post-war years, both the British and the Norwegian co-operatives 
were faced with a direct attack on their long held claim to be the natural and most efficient 
protector of the consumer interest in the retail market. In Norway this attack was launched by 
the establishment of the state sponsored Consumer Council, in the UK by the establishment and 
immediate success of the private, non-profit Consumers Association (CA). The attacks were, 
however, handled very differently by the two movements. In Norway, the co-ops came to 
cautiously support the establishment of the new Consumer Council, largely accepting that their 
role as a consumer movement had to be supplemented by a state-led organ. Gradually, a more or 
less openly negotiated division of labour between the co-ops and the State, represented by the 
ruling Labour party, was developed. The co-ops were encouraged to focus their attention on the 
task of rationalising the existing retail industry, while handing over the main responsibility for 
consumer protection to the State. The development was largely in line with the strategic visions 
of the new NKL management, taking office in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It was soon also 
adopted by local co-operators, who tended to be more concerned with defending the day-to-day 
business operations of their local co-op than upholding broad visions of consumer protection. In 
subsequent years, most initiatives taken by the co-ops in the field of consumer protection were 
framed within a commercialised rhetoric. It primarily became a means to attract trade and not an 
obligation in itself.  
In contrast, UK co-operatives were less willing to accept the denunciation of their role as 
a viable consumer movement. While the Norwegian co-ops soon recognised the Consumer 
Council as an acceptable organisation well-suited to protect consumer interests, the British were 
reluctant to accept the CA’s claim to represent the interests of the general consumer. Most 
prominently, the CA was accused of being a middle-class venture incapable of representing the 
broad interest of the working class consumer. This attitude reflects the more radical and broader 
societal visions of British co-operators as opposed to the more pragmatic and commercialised 
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attitudes of the Norwegians. It also reflects the fact that, for many UK co-operators, British 
society remained fundamentally class-based. In Norway the importance of class remained less 
pronounced and the need for a radical alternative within the field of consumer politics was not 
considered relevant. The British co-operators, however, continued to argue that they had a role 
to play in the field of consumer politics, especially as an organisation specifically taking care of 
the interests of the working class consumer. But, their general analysis seems not to have been 
shared by these consumers. Despite their many broad visions, the co-ops also failed to come up 
with effective and convincing strategies and, as was concluded in the previous chapter, they 
‘provided few dynamic responses to consumer interests’.874 Moreover, as the British co-
operative’s approach to consumer politics largely remained an activity operating alongside their 
day-to-day trading activities, they also failed to take commercial advantage of their self-imposed 
image of being a consumer friendly retailer. Indeed, in many instances competing retailers 
managed to better capitalise on the economic potential of such an image.  
The approach taken by the Norwegian and British consumer co-op to the challenge of 
declining democratic participation followed much the same pattern. Again, the Norwegian co-
operators seem to have accepted more readily than the British that the democratic decision-
making structure on which their enterprises were built was losing its attractiveness among 
consumers. Moreover, issues of membership, membership recruitment and membership 
involvement were also increasingly framed within a commercialised rhetoric. Growth in 
membership was viewed as important primarily as a means to increase trade and improve the 
general availability of capital. On similar lines, membership participation was largely defined in 
terms of increased buying, increased savings and increased loyalty to the co-op stores and not to 
actual participation in the democratic decision-making process of the retail society. While the 
ultimate effect of this approach was a continued decline in actual democratic participation, 
economic involvement of members in the co-op remained substantial.  
The British, by contrast, continued to treat democratic participation as among the most 
important virtues of co-operative trading. But this ideological commitment also remained an 
appendage to the day-to-day trading activities and ongoing trade reforms. There was little talk of 
alternative forms of participation, of how to increase a member’s average purchase or how to 
successfully increase member savings.875 Moreover, while co-operators repeatedly advocated the 
                                                 
874 M. Hilton, Consumerism in 20th Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 176. 
875 True, the problem of how to secure the necessary capital for expansion was repeatedly raised. But these debates 
often remained technical in character. They also tended to be marked by a sense of resignation and they were seldom 
paralleled with debates on membership, membership participation or membership recruitment. Some examples 
include, R. G. Hancock, ‘More capital for expansion. From members, reserve funds and rented property’, The Co-
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need for increased participatory democracy, parallel processes of structural transformation 
resulted in a situation where the large majority of co-operative trade was centralised to a few very 
large societies. These societies had also often been established through protracted and complex 
processes of both organic and inorganic growth. As a consequence, the governance structure of 
these societies often turned out extremely intricate and over-complex. Hence, while members of 
the movement talked much about the virtues of democratic participation, parallel processes of 
structural transformation directly counteracted the possibility of creating a viable and efficient 
consumer democracy. The end result was that the movement neither managed to increase the 
member’s economic participation nor to reinvigorate their democratic enthusiasm.  
The major economic attraction of the co-operative form of retailing had been its principle 
of redistributing profits on the basis of use, the so-called dividend on purchase principle or 
‘buyers profit’ as the Norwegians put it. The final challenge that needed to be approached by the 
British and Norwegian consumer co-ops in order to sustain a distinctive and attractive profile 
throughout the post-war period was the increasing questioning of this fundamental co-operative 
principle. This challenge was also approached differently. From the 1950s onwards British co-
operators increasingly began to lose confidence in the ability of the dividend principle to attract 
trade and recruit new members. They subsequently introduced a series of alternative forms of 
surplus distribution. Most of these schemes were developed locally, leading to an abundance of 
different schemes and distribution principles. From the mid-1990s onwards some form of 
concurrence was attained as the need to return to a regular cash dividend was commonly agreed 
upon. But schemes continued to be developed locally. By now, private retailers had also started 
to develop their own types of customer loyalty programs. And instead of marking themselves 
clearly off from these schemes, the co-ops largely began to copy them. Instead of a distinctive 
element in co-operative trading, the co-operative membership scheme soon became yet another 
loyalty program among many others. 
Again, the Norwegian approach was different. The dividend remained the prime 
economic advantage offered and during the 1950s and 1960s limited yet stable dividends were 
upheld. After a temporary decline in dividend payments from the late 1970s onwards, the 
dividend principle was given a new boost from 1990 onwards. A coordinated, national 
membership program was developed comprising the large majority of the existing retail societies. 
                                                                                                                                                        
operative Review, 29:1 (1955), 7-9; K. A. Noble, ‘Co-operative capital. The present position and future needs’, Agenda, 
March (1964), 3-16; Co-operative Union Ltd., ‘Capital accumulation’, Trade Advisory Bulletin, 27 (1966); Unknown 
author, ‘Capital for expansion – how it might be found’, Co-operative Management and Marketing, 1:3 (1968), 7-14; Co-
operative Union Ltd., ‘Capital accumulation’, Trade Advisory Bulletin, 41 (1969) and K. A. Noble, ‘Co-operative capital 
problems: their magnitude and some new approaches’ The Society for Co-operative Studies, 12 (1971), 15-18. 
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Full focus was set on offering the members simple and tangible benefits, primarily in the form of 
a dividend on purchase. By launching its electronic membership card in 1991 the movement also 
became the first retailer in Norway to offer a national membership scheme based on an electronic 
platform. The scheme soon developed into by far the most popular membership programme in 
the Norwegian food retail market, engaging more than one million members or close to half of 
the total number of Norwegian households. 
The post-war attacks on the actual relevance of the co-op as an alternative form of 
retailing organisation came to have a major effect on both the Norwegian and the British 
consumer co-ops. Both movements had to deal with the rise of new consumer movements 
questioning the viability of the co-op as a true protector of consumer interest. They had to deal 
with declining membership participation and repeated claims that the co-op democracy was 
outdated and inefficient. Finally, they had to face accusations that the actual economic rewards 
offered by the co-ops were negligible and that consumers seeking economic rewards might as 
well do their daily or weekly shopping at another retailer. The challenges were, however, 
approached differently and the end result marked yet another step in the process whereby the 
two movements departed on divergent development paths. The British co-operators were highly 
reluctant to accept that the principles on which they traded were outdated or in need of drastic 
reform. They thus continued to defend both their continued importance as a consumer 
movement and the viability of their participatory democracy. In doing so the British co-operators 
held high the broader ideological goals and profile of the co-operative enterprise. The problem 
was that these attitudes failed to be transferred into viable, practical strategies. The ultimate 
consequence was that, throughout the post-war years, the co-op movements’ legitimacy as a true 
consumer movement, the actual democratic participation within the movement and the economic 
rewards offered in the form of dividend on purchase continued to decline along with declining 
profits and deteriorating market position.  
The Norwegians, by contrast, tended to accept more easily the many attacks directed at 
their co-operative distinctiveness. And instead of vigorously defending principles they found to 
have only limited resonance among the general consumer, they sought to integrate them in the 
day-to-day trading operations of the co-operative enterprise. And while this implied that the co-
op lost some of its distinctiveness as an alternative type of retailer, the strategy was successful in 
attracting popular support in the form of increased membership, increased savings and strong 
customer loyalty. Ultimately this also helped to secure and stabilise their overall trading 
performance. At the same time, the democratic-decision making structure was kept formally 
intact. Indeed, compared to the British, the size of the Norwegian retail societies remained 
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limited and the possibilities for members to have an actual a say in their co-op was therefore 
better taken care of. The Norwegian movement also continued to distribute a substantial 
proportion of the surplus as dividend, practising in full the alternative capital flow characteristic 
of co-operative trade. By the turn of the millennium, more than 60 per cent of total surplus was 
redistributed in the form of dividend on purchase. The equivalent figure in the UK was 25 per 
cent.876 Thus, in practice, the Norwegian consumer co-operatives of the new millennium in many 
respects operate their businesses more closely attuned to traditional co-operative principles than 
the British consumer co-operatives.  
                                                 
876 Figures estimated from Coop NKL, Våre tall 1907-2005 (Statistics compiled by Tore Kristoffersen, Coop NKL, 
2006) and Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Statistics (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, selected years). 
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Chapter 11: Conclusions 
The present thesis set out to explore a single, yet complex question: how the Norwegian 
consumer co-operative movement throughout the post-war period managed to strengthen and 
sustain its market share and increase its membership while the British movement in the same 
period lost substantial market share and saw its membership figures decline dramatically. In 
analysing this question I have also tried to provide new insight into the more general 
phenomenon of post-war success and decline among consumer co-operative organisations.  
This concluding chapter summarises and discusses the main findings. First, it recapitulates 
the analytical framework of the analysis. Secondly, it outlines a broad historical explanation of the 
divergent development of the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives. Thirdly, it 
discusses how this explanation relates to existing accounts of post-war consumer co-operative 
development. Finally, some possible avenues for future research are suggested.  
 
The analytical framework 
A fundamental premise of the present analysis has been that any explanation of the divergent 
economic development of consumer co-operative enterprises during the post-war period needs 
to explore the relationship between the internal dynamics of the co-operative organisations and 
their societal and competitive environment. The analysis of the divergent post-war development 
of the British and Norwegian consumer co-ops has thus focused on how these two organisations 
approached major economic and societal transformations during this period.  
Three processes were explored. First, we analysed how the transformation of the retail 
industry towards larger self-service supermarkets, superstores and hypermarkets and the 
subsequent development among dominant retailers of a multi-format structure of stores, 
challenged the traditional operational principles of the co-operative societies. In order to survive, 
these principles had to be drastically transformed. The analysis showed how this challenge was 
approached differently by the Norwegian and the British consumer co-operatives and how this 
shaped their development. Throughout the period covered, the Norwegian co-ops managed to 
hold on to a leading role in the development of new store formats, as well as in the strategy of 
running a diversified structure of shops. Co-operative food outlets, on average, remained larger 
than those run by private retailers and the Norwegian co-operators also managed to implement 
an efficient multi-format structure of stores. By the turn of the millennium, co-operative stores 
were market leaders in three of the four segments in which they operated. The UK movement by 
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contrast, lagged behind their competitors. After having pioneered self-service trading in the 
British market, the co-ops were surpassed by private retailers in the development of the larger 
supermarket, superstore and hypermarket formats. Moreover, while most major retailers from the 
1990s onwards started to diversify the r structure of their stores in order to compete in different 
market segments, the co-ops went against the current and chose to concentrate their operations 
in one, specialised segment.  
The ultimate consequence of these developments was that the Norwegian co-ops 
managed to defend and even strengthen their share of the food retail market. From the mid 
1970s onwards, their market share in the food trade was stabilised at approximately 24 per cent. 
In the UK by contrast, the market share of co-operative trade was slowly but steadily reduced. By 
the turn of the millennium the co-operative societies’ share of the food retail market had been 
reduced to 5 per cent, a quarter of its peak level of approximately 20 per cent in 1955.  
 The second major transformation analysed was the development and breakthrough of 
the multiple form of enterprise within the food retailing businesses. The growth of these retailers 
implied a radical transformation in the dominant organisational order of the food retail 
industry.877 From a structure dominated by small independent retailers operating one or a few 
stores, the industry was increasingly controlled by large multiple retailers operating several 
hundred branches under centralised control. The many stores controlled by these retailers were 
operated on a standardised basis and served by an integrated system of distribution. The superior 
economies realised by the centralised, standardised and integrated organisational structures 
operated by the multiple retailers implied another fundamental challenge to co-operative trade. In 
order to meet the challenge, substantial transformations in how the co-ops organised their 
retailing operations had to be implemented. Again, the analysis showed how this was a challenge 
approached differently by the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives. Already from the 
1950s onwards, the Norwegian co-operatives had started to reform their operational structure to 
make it more equal to the chain store model. And while the private retail industry remained 
fragmented and tied to outmoded organisational structures, the co-op movement took the lead in 
promoting and introducing the chain store principles of organising within the Norwegian food 
retail market. The most radical steps were taken from the early 1990s onwards, when the 
movement reorganised its total system of supply into a completely integrated organisational 
structure. The ultimate effect was that the movement remained among the leading food retailers 
                                                 
877 The expression ’dominant organisational order’ is adopted from J. Vatnaland, Stability and change in the organization of 
industry. The chain store innovation and the transformation of American retailing in a comparative perspective (PhD dissertation, 
University of Oslo, 2007). 
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in the country and a driving force in transforming the Norwegian food retail market, from one of 
Europe’s most fragmented to being one of the most centralised.  
The UK story was different. By centralising operations through amalgamations of 
societies into larger units, the movement managed to develop some successful, independent 
societies trading efficiently in their respective, regional markets. But lack of overall coordination 
of buying, limited operational standardisation across society structures and difficulties in 
implementing the necessary integration of the co-operative supply chain, drastically hampered the 
movements overall competitiveness throughout the post-war years. The effect was further 
decline.  
The final transformation analysed was how distinct competitive and societal 
transformations of the post-war era put into question the ideological role and profile of the co-
operative form of enterprise and how these processes affected and were handled by the 
Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives. Again, it was shown that these challenges were 
approached differently by the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives and it was revealed 
how these differences further added to their divergent developments. In the UK, co-operators 
remained reluctant to accept the public devaluation of their viability as a true consumer 
movement. They also continued to advocate the virtues of democratic participation by the 
members. As such, the British co-operators continued to hold in high regard the broader 
ideological goals of the co-operative enterprise. The problem was, however, that none of theses 
virtues were efficiently transferred into practical strategies capable of attracting new members or 
increasing customer loyalty. In their approach to the need for revitalising the economic 
advantages of co-operative membership, they tended to copy the schemes of their competitors, 
first by adopting stamp trading, secondly by developing customer loyalty cards without any 
distinct co-operative character. The ultimate consequence was that, throughout the post-war 
years, both the co-op movements’ legitimacy as a true consumer movement, the actual 
democratic participation within the movement and the economic rewards offered in the form of 
a dividend on purchase continued to decline along with the declining profits and deteriorating 
market position.  
The Norwegians by contrast tended to accept more easily the many attacks directed at 
their co-operative distinctiveness. Instead of vigorously defending principles they found to have 
only limited resonance among the general consumer, they sought to integrate them in the day-to-
day trading operations of the co-operative enterprise. Issues of consumer protection and 
membership participation were increasingly applied as a means to strengthen the day-to-day 
commercial performance of the movement. At the same time, they remained loyal to the 
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dividend as the prime economic advantage of co-operative membership and also gradually 
managed to develop a highly successful national membership scheme. While the general 
approach of the Norwegian co-operators implied that the co-op lost some of its distinctiveness as 
an alternative type of retailer, the strategy was successful in attracting popular support in the form 
of increased membership, increased savings and strong customer loyalty. Ultimately this also 
helped to secure and stabilise their overall trading performance.  
By way of the three-fold analysis just outlined, the previous chapters have provided a 
broad presentation and discussion of how the post-war divergent developments of the British 
and Norwegian consumer co-operatives unfolded. The analysis has shown how the two 
movements approached three major transformative processes and discussed how important 
differences in approach shaped the two movements' divergent economic developments.  
What remains, however, is an analysis of why the two movements approached these 
transformative processes so differently. The previous chapters have each sought to indicate some 
of the reasons. But there is still a need to develop a summarising analysis of the major reasons 
that led the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives to approach the major 
transformations of the post-war period so differently. This will be the task of the next two sub-
chapters.  
 
The contextual factors 
The question of why the British and the Norwegian consumer co-operative movements 
developed so differently during the post-war period does not have a simple, straightforward 
answer. As the previous analysis should have made abundantly clear, a combination of numerous 
factors caused the divergent developments observed. This and the following sub-chapter seek to 
summarise the major factors in operation. Both discuss how these factors affected the two 
movements' ability to confront the operational, organisational and ideological challenges of the 
post-war period and thus also ultimately why the two movements developed so differently. The 
present sub-chapter will focus on what I have termed the contextual factors, while the next 
moves its attention to internal factors in the Norwegian and British co-operative enterprises.  
The contextual factors are of two main kinds. The first relates to the level of competition 
within the Norwegian and British food retail market. The second concerns the demographic and 
geographical preconditions for trade within Norway and Great Britain.  
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Competitive differences 
The Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives operated in different markets with different 
levels of competition. This contextual difference shaped their divergent developments.  
As was noted repeatedly throughout the study, the competitive climate of the food retail 
industry in which the Norwegian and British co-ops operated varied markedly. Already from the 
early 1950s onwards the UK co-ops competed with large, multiple retail chains operating on an 
integrated platform. By 1960 these retailers controlled twenty per cent of total retail sales in the 
British market.878 In food retailing specifically, major retailers such as Sainsbury’s, Tesco and 
Asda, Argyll/Safeway and Somerfield advanced markedly throughout the post-war years and by 
the end of the 1990s these five multiple retailers controlled more than half of the total British 
food retail market.879 Many of these retailers were ranked among the worlds most efficient.880 The 
competition which faced the British consumer co-operatives throughout the post-war period was 
thus substantial. The situation in Norway was different. Here, multiple retailers made virtually no 
progress in the first three decades of the post-war period. By 1960 independent retailers 
controlled more than 80 per cent of the retail market.881 The co-ops controlled the rest. At this 
point there were still no multiple retailers in operation and the co-op movement remained the 
only large scale retailer within the food retail market. This fragmented character persisted way 
into the 1980s. Hence, while the British retail industry was increasingly dominated by large scale 
multiple retailers creating a climate of fierce competition already from the 1950s onwards, the 
Norwegian retail industry remained fragmented and ultimately less competitive.  
These differences played an important role in shaping the developments of the consumer 
co-operatives in UK and Norway. With limited competition, the Norwegian co-ops could more 
easily sustain their pioneering role in self-service retailing and remain among the leading 
operators of large-scale retail outlets. They could also spend more time developing their 
organisational structure and adapting it more carefully to the federative model. And when 
competition finally intensified from the 1980s onwards, many of the vital structures needed to 
fight off this competition had been established. The movement had managed to establish 
numerous large and dominant food stores, easing the challenge of defending the co-operative 
market share. A clear division of labour between the national wholesale and the local retail 
                                                 
878 Figures taken from J. B Jefferys and D. Knee, Retailing in Europe. Present structure and future trends (London: 
MacMillan, 1962), p. 65. 
879 N. Wrigley and M. Lowe, Reading Retail. A Geographical Perspective on Retailing and Consumption Spaces (London: 
Arnold, 2002), p. 33. 
880 See S. Burt and L. Sparks, ‘Performance in Food Retailing: A Cross-national Consideration and Comparison of 
Retail Margins’, British Journal of Management 8:2 (1997), 133-50. 
881 J. B Jefferys and D. Knee, Retailing in Europe. Present structure and future trends (London: MacMillan, 1962), p. 65. 
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societies had also been established. Finally, the movement was well ahead in reorganising the 
structure of their stores into more clearly defined segments. The limited competition 
characteristic of the Norwegian food retail market in the first three decades of the post-war 
period thus helped to ease the continued expansion of co-operative trade during this period. It 
also laid the foundations for continued competitiveness into the 1990s and 2000s.  
The exact opposite was experienced by the British co-operators. Faced with rapidly 
advancing multiple retailers from the 1950s onwards, they had to accept much harder 
competition in the race to remain the leading operator of self-service stores. They soon also had 
to recognise that their competitors better managed to exploit the advantages of supermarket and 
hypermarket retailing. The superior efficiencies of the multiples also implied that drastic 
transformations in the organisational structures of the co-op had to be made in order to reach the 
same level of profitability as these retailers. Lack of reform immediately implied that the co-ops 
lost out in the competitive race, they remained less efficient than their competitors and ultimately 
failed to offer competitive prices. There was simply not the same possibility for gradual adoption 
of an integrated, centralised and standardised model in Britain, as there had been in Norway. As 
such, the uneven competition ultimately seems to have played an important role in shaping the 
two movements' divergent developments.  
 
Geographical and demographic differences  
The geographical and demographic preconditions for trade were different in Norway and the 
UK. These differences shaped the divergent development of co-operative trade, both directly and 
indirectly. While these factors were seldom touched upon in the preceding analysis, they form an 
important backdrop for the development described.  
Great Britain and Norway have different geographies. While Britain stretches over 94,526 
sq miles, the size of Norway totals 125,182 square miles.882 Moreover, extending 1,089 miles or 
1,752 km in the direction NNE-SSW, Norway has the greatest length of any European country.883 
A substantial part of the country is covered by mountains. Numerous fjords penetrate the 
mainland, mostly along the western coast but also in the east. These geographical conditions have 
facilitated the development of numerous small, scarcely populated and often quite isolated 
communities. Indeed, in 1950 approximately 50 per cent of the population lived in rural districts. 
                                                 
882 Equal to 240,000 and 324,000 square kilometres respectively. 
883 When no other source is mentioned, all figures in the present paragraph are adopted from U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 2000: United Kingdom., at www.cia.gov/redirects/factbookredirect.html; 
www.nationsencyclopedia.com and Statistics Norway, at www.ssb.no, all accessed 31 January 2008. 
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In Britain the similar figure was 22.5 per cent.884 Unlike Norway, the British geographical 
landscape is dominated by rugged hills and low mountains, with rolling plains in the east and 
southeast. As such, the different parts of the country are much more accessible. The British 
population is also much larger than the Norwegian and the country is much more densely 
populated. With an estimated population in 2007 of roughly 60 million, the population density 
equalled 652 persons per square mile. The similar figures for Norway were 4.7 million inhabitants 
and a population density of 38 persons per square mile. 885  
The dominance of small, often quite isolated communities within Norwegian society has 
facilitated the survival of small scale consumer co-operative enterprises. In many local 
communities there was only room for one store. Often this turned out to be a co-op store. These 
retail stores and the societies that operated them could more easily survive without radically 
altering the small scale structure on which they traded. They often held a local monopoly or they 
operated in an environment where trade was more or less equally shared between the co-op and a 
private shopkeeper. The different stores had their regular customers and they didn’t really 
compete for trade on a day-to-day basis. 
Also, at the regional level the Norwegian markets remained of limited size. Compared to 
Britain, the number of people living within a natural region for co-operative trade was simply 
much smaller in Norway and the maximum trade that could be obtained was thus naturally 
restricted. This implied that even the largest societies operating within the Norwegian co-op 
movement, at least compared to the largest societies in Britain, remained medium sized.886  
This dominance of small and medium sized retail societies increased the need, as well as 
the advantages of close collaboration between the retail units and national wholesaler. Most retail 
societies simply lacked the resources necessary to take care of such functions as production and 
wholesaling. Moreover, when trading with a national wholesaler they could take advantage of the 
substantial price improvements created by bulk buying. True, as was shown in chapter eight, it 
was primarily the smaller societies that were advantaged when the co-op movement, in the early 
1990s, centralised all buying to the National Co-operative Association (NKL). But the regional 
                                                 
884 That is, outside of cities. Figures adopted from United Nations, Population division, Departement of Economic 
and Social affairs, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 revision, Table A.3, Urban population at mid-year by major 
area, region and country, 1950-2030 and A. Maddison, The world economy. Volume 1: A millennial perspective /Volume 2: 
Historical statistics (Paris: OECD, 2006). 
885 Equal to 252 and 15 persons per square kilometre respectively.  
886 And this difference has remained until the present day. As an example only, as late as in 2005 the two largest 
regional and independent British retail societies (the United Co-op and Midlands) traded an annual turnover of  2.1 
billion and 757 million respectively. In the same year the two largest Norwegian retail societies (Coop Øst and 
Trondos) recorded an annual trade of 298 million and  222 million. Figures adopted from Coop Øst, Årsberetning 
2005, Trondos, Årsberetning 2006 and Co-operatives UK, Performance and statistical review 2005 (Manchester: Co-
operatives UK, 2006) 
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units also saw advantages in the centralised and integrated structure, when they were finally 
convinced that it created better buying terms than they could obtain themselves. As such, the 
dominance of small and medium sized retail societies facilitated the clear division of labour 
characteristic of the movement and also increased co-operation and coordination between the 
retail and the wholesale level.  
The geographical and demographic characteristics of the Norwegian society thus seem to 
have facilitated an easier survival for co-operative trade. At the local level, small societies could 
more easily prosper without having to participate in large mergers. That is, the need was less 
acute in Norway than in many other countries, including Britain, to centralise trade into larger 
units. At the national level, dominance of small and medium sized societies facilitated a clear 
division of labour and a stronger integration of the retail and the wholesale units.  
In Britain the situation was different. Here, most co-ops traded in more densely 
populated regional markets, with more mobility among the consumer and easier access to 
competing retailers. As the markets were larger there was more to be gained by increasing the size 
of the operations and thus also a stronger pressure to take advantage of such size. These trading 
conditions, in large part created by the geographical and demographic characteristics of the 
British society, created two parallel challenges for co-operative trade. First, the many small-scale 
societies on which the co-operative movement had traditionally been built were more easily 
outperformed. There were few local monopolies from which these co-operative societies could 
take advantage and the regional markets often held numerous fierce competitors. Secondly, the 
dominance of such large regional markets caused the gradual development within the co-op 
movement of a few, very large regional retail societies. In contrast to the smaller Norwegian retail 
co-ops, these societies were more inclined to take on all kinds of functions. Hence, rather than 
cooperating in a co-operative chain of distribution, ‘outsourcing’ such functions as wholesaling 
and buying to the national wholesaler, they sough to integrate all these functions within the 
boundaries of their own retail societies. The end result was, as we have seen in previous chapters, 
much costly duplication of functions and a general inability to take full advantage of national, 
bulk buying. And while some of the large regional societies competed well, the movement’s 
overall survival at the national level suffered because of these large societies’ reluctance to 
cooperate.  
On these grounds it may be argued that the geographical and demographic conditions in 
Norway facilitated a further growth of co-operative trade also into the second half of the 
twentieth century. In Britain, by contrast, the geographical and demographic conditions impeded 
the further growth of such retailing. The geographical positioning of co-ops in densely populated 
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regional markets, with easy entry for new competitors, as well as easy exit opportunities for the 
consumers, simply became too challenging a task to handle for the British co-operators. In 
Norway, by contrast, the demographic and geographical conditions seem to have favoured the 
co-operative form of trade. By itself, it decreased the level of competition in local markets. By 
facilitating the persistence of many small and medium sized retail societies, it also indirectly 
pushed forward increased coordination and cooperation within the co-operative movement. 
Combined with the limited progress of multiple retailers characteristic of the first three decades 
of the post-war period, the demographic and geographical context thus had a positive effect on 
the post-war success of co-operative trade in the Norwegian market.  
Competition, geography and demography were important contextual factors in shaping 
post-war development of co-operative trade. They affected the co-operators directly by shaping 
the markets in which they operated. They also worked indirectly by facilitating specific types of 
organisational choice. The small co-ops of the many small and rural Norwegian communities 
were more inclined to cooperate with the national wholesaler. Large regional British retail 
societies, competing in large regional markets, were less inclined to cooperate nationally and 
tended instead to develop their own wholesaling function and sustain a separate buying 
department, all within the boundaries of their own retail organisation. But still, it remains both 
superficial and unsatisfactory to relate the divergent developments of the Norwegian and British 
consumer co-ops purely to factors outside the realms of the co-operative organisations 
themselves. As was repeatedly noted in the empirical analysis, competitive differences between 
the Norwegian and the British retail markets can only account for some of the divergent 
developments observed. And while the demographic and geographical environments of 
Norwegian and British society were important preconditions for the two movements’ 
developments, these factors only account for part of the picture observed. Hence, while the 
contextual factors just presented form an important element in the general historical explanation 
outlined here, they have to be supplemented with factors internal to the co-operative 
organisations themselves.  
 
The internal factors 
Alongside the contextual factors discussed above, the divergent development of the British and 
Norwegian consumer co-ops was fundamentally shaped by a series of internal differences 
between the two movements. These internal factors directly affected the two movements’ ability 
to adapt adequately to the operational, organisational and ideological challenges they were facing 
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during the post-war years. Ultimately, they also strongly influenced the two movements overall 
economic developments. The internal factors are of four major kinds.  
 
Political ambitions and ideological profile  
The Norwegian and British consumer co-operative held different political ambitions and had 
different ideological profiles. These differences shaped their economic development.  
Largely, the Norwegian co-operators managed to stay independent from the class struggle 
logic of socialism and maintained their legitimacy as independent organisations comprising not 
only workers but also, farmers and fishermen. As shown in a previous chapter, by 1950 farmers 
made up approximately 40 per cent of total co-operative membership.887 The Norwegian co-ops 
also managed to sustain broad political support, with not only Labour but also the Liberal party 
and the Farmer’s party being in favour of the co-operative organisational form. The situation in 
the UK was very different. The British co-ops remained an urban movement, strongly enmeshed 
in the culture of the working-class. Public support for co-operative trade was thus primarily 
limited to one fraction of society – the industrial workers. The British co-operators didn't 
develop the same broad political support as the Norwegians. The relationship with the Labour 
party, not least with other political parties, was much more troubled. The continued existence of 
a separate Co-operative Party also suggested that the co-operators still had separate political 
ambitions. Even if the party most often operated in concurrence with the Labour Party, its very 
existence implied that there was an institutionalised divergence between the co-operators on the 
one hand and the political wing of the labour movement on the other. 
These political differences reflected a different ideological profile. The Norwegian co-
operators repeatedly advocated the principle of political neutrality. By 1950, their main political 
ambitions were also long gone and the movement was primarily dedicated to improving its 
commercial performance. In cases where political statements had to be made, the co-operative 
leadership remained moderate. This neutral, commercialised and moderate ideological profile 
helped create a broad public and political support for co-operative trade. The situation in Britain 
was different. Political sympathies were more directly expressed towards the interests of the 
working class. British co-operators also continued to uphold broad political visions of societal 
transformation on co-operative lines. Finally, they tended to be much more radical in their 
political stance.  
These differences in political ambitions and ideological profiles influenced the survival of 
co-operative trade in various ways. Even if substantial hostilities towards the co-op store existed 
                                                 
887 See chapter nine in the present thesis.  
  
 303
among some Norwegian conservatives and right-wing liberals, the moderate and balanced 
political viewpoints expressed by leading co-operators implied that they could draw support from 
large consumer segments. The broad political support expressed for co-operative trade also 
reflected a feeling of shared interest and common values between co-operators and national and 
local political leaders. This in turn may have made it more acceptable for the co-operators to 
hand over traditional co-operative responsibilities, such as consumer protection, to the political 
authorities, while focusing their own operations more on commercial rationalisation. The broad 
political and public support offered to the Norwegian consumer co-ops thus laid the foundations 
both for increased support in the form of increased trade and increased membership and it 
facilitated the development of a more commercially oriented co-operative enterprises. Both these 
factors were important in sustaining the growth of the co-operative trade in the second half of 
the twentieth century.  
In Britain by contrast, the co-ops more or less exclusively focused on serving the interests 
of the industrial working class. This implied that they had a more limited base from which to 
draw their members and customers. These problems became particularly pronounced as the 
coming of post-industrial society broke up working-class communities and gradually turned large 
groups of the population into middle-class employees in the service sector. Moreover, the British 
co-ops also had a harder time accepting that traditional co-operative responsibilities were to be 
taken over by alternative public or private agencies. Rather than seeing these as collaborators, 
these agencies often ended up being regarded as rivals. The reluctance to accept the Consumers 
Association (CA) as an acceptable replacement of co-operative consumer protection is a case in 
point. The end result was that the co-ops continued to advocate broad and often vague ideals of 
consumer protection, without relating these clearly to their day-to-day trading operations.  
 
Organisational culture  
In addition to differences in the political ambitions and ideological profile, the divergent 
development of the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives was also shaped by 
differences in the overall values and belief systems dominating the two organisations. That is, the 
development was fundamentally affected by differences in organisational culture. An 
organisational culture may be defined as a ‘stable set of taken for granted assumptions, shared 
beliefs, meanings and values that form a kind of backdrop for action.’888 Despite their similarity as 
                                                 
888 L. Smircich, ‘Is the concept of culture a paradigm for understanding organisations and ourselves’, in P. J. Frost, L. 
F. More, M. Reis Louis, C. C. Lundberg and J. Martin (eds), Organizational culture (Beverly Hills CA: Sage, 1985), cited 
in W. R. Scott, Organizations. Rational, Natural and Open Systems (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998 4th ed), p. 312. 
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co-operative organisations, the Norwegian and British consumer co-ops were often governed by 
very different belief systems and taken- for- granted assumptions.  
The Norwegians more easily accepted the need for change. They were more willing to 
adopt new types of retailing and wholesaling technology and they accepted that traditional co-
operative virtues had to be adapted and sometimes abandoned if the co-operative form of 
retailing was to survive. As such, they were pragmatists. They also tended to be dedicated 
primarily to the commercial aspects of consumer co-operation, focusing on the co-operative 
aspect of their specific form of retailing, while consumer advocacy and the principle of 
democratic governance by the members were given less attention. Throughout the course of the 
post-war period they came to define the goal of the consumer co-operative movement largely as 
one of rationalising the Norwegian retailing industry along co-operative lines. Indicative of these 
basic ‘beliefs, meanings and values’ that seem to have enmeshed the organisational culture of the 
Norwegian co-operative movement is the answer provided by the leading NKL manager Knut 
Moe, when he in retrospect was asked what he saw as the essence of the consumer co-operative 
organisational form: ‘I mean that co-operation represented a simplification of buying, distribution 
and the setting of prices.’889  
The prime reasons for these dominant pragmatic and commercially oriented values seem 
to be of two major kinds. Firstly, a large proportion of the co-operative members and leading 
officials were small farmers. They were politically liberal and they were more inclined to focus on 
the commercial needs of the local co-op to which they belonged.890 Moreover, members and 
officials with more direct relation to the Labour movement also tended to be politically 
moderate. Hence, the leading NKL official Peder Søiland was typically a right wing social-
democrat. While Knut Moe, according to himself, was ‘not a member of any party’.891 Secondly, 
co-operative leaders were more often than not recruited from outside the movement. While they 
were less trained in the traditional virtues of consumer co-operation, they carried with them 
important experience from other industries and other forms of enterprises.892  
In Britain, other basic assumptions and values dominated. Indeed, some British co-
operators showed much the same eagerness to take on leading roles in their national retail market 
                                                 
889 Interview, Knut Moe, 19 December 2002. 
890 The prime example of such a co-operative leader is perhaps Jarle Benum, serving on the NKL board from 1962 
to 1992, the last six as chairman. Benum was a farmer from the region of Værdal, in Northern Trøndealg. He was a 
leader with highly developed commercial skills, among other things breeding pigs and fur-bearing animals (blue fox), 
with substantial commercial success. And, he was a member of the Liberal party, serving twelve years as a deputy to 
the Norwegian Parliament (the Storting) (Interview, Jarle Benum, 12 December 2002). 
891 Interview, Knut Moe, 19 December 2002. 
892 Prominent examples of such managers and officials include Knut Moe, the NKL NKL chairman from 1952 
onwards Olav Meisdalshagen, the NKL CEO in the period 1989-2000 Rolf Rønning and the NKL chairman from 
1994-2000, Arnfin Hofstad.  
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as Norwegian co-operators. As we recall, British co-operators pioneered both self-service, 
supermarkets and to some extent also hypermarket retailing in the British market. As such, some 
of them were highly innovative. But these scattered innovative fibres never managed to permeate 
the co-operative culture as a whole. Rather, most co-operators tended to be quite reluctant to 
change and the dominant type of shared values seem to have been that of conservatism. 
Moreover, leading British co-operators long continued to advocate the social and moral 
superiority of the consumer co-operative form of trade. Even if multiple retailers had overhauled 
the market position of co-operative trade, co-operative managers continued to advocate utopian 
missions of societal transformation along co-operative lines.  
Hence, while the organisational culture of the Norwegian co-operators was defined 
largely by an open minded, commercial pragmatism, the culture of the British co-operators 
remained more of a conservative utopianism. British co-operators simply did not seem to possess 
the same commercial flair that many Norwegian co-operators did. Their strong working class 
affiliations and radical political attitudes implied that co-operation for a long time was viewed as a 
means to replace capitalism and not just an alternative form of trading, operating alongside the 
capitalist market system. The British also tended to recruit their managers and officials largely 
from the inside, or to cite British retail analyst Leigh ‘from a comparatively restricted and diluted 
pool of talent, … often relatively “in-bred”’.893 This practise may be seen to have hindered the 
diffusion of new and more pragmatic ideas and cemented traditional views and ideals  
 We have already indicated how these differences in the overall organisational cultures of 
the Norwegian and British consumer co-ops may have affected the development of the two 
movements. It is evident that the more pragmatist and commercially oriented views of the 
Norwegian co-operators helped secure their early lead in self-service and supermarket retailing. 
Large scale retailing was adopted fast and with substantial enthusiasm, while many British retail 
societies continued to rely on their small-scale operations and expressed substantial reluctance 
towards the larger formats. In reforming their ideological profile, the Norwegians were also more 
inclined than the British to tone down ideological aspects in favour of purely economic ones. 
This helped them secure a more focused approach to the retail challenges of the late twentieth 
century and it also caused a massive rise in co-operative membership, further stabilising the 
market position of co-operative trade.  
 
 
 
                                                 
893 L. Sparks, ‘Consumer Co-operation in the United Kingdom 1945-1993’, Journal of Co-operative Studies, 79 (1994), 41. 
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Leadership 
A third internal difference to be noted is how the Norwegian co-ops generally have been 
advantaged in their development by holding a stable and visionary national leadership with the 
ability to unite the movement on a national scale and to push forward fundamental processes of 
reform in the total system of co-operative distribution. The British by contrast, have neither had 
a similar stability in leadership, nor a similar ability to develop leadership at a national scale 
capable of uniting the many dispersed retail societies on a common commercial and ideological 
platform. It is revealing how the success of the Norwegian consumer co-operative may be 
directly tied to the strategies and visions of a few prominent managers and elected officials, while 
the British development can not equally be related to one or a few prominent leaders. 
In the Norwegian case, the contents of a stable, visionary and effective co-operative 
leadership is represented most forcefully by Knut Moe and Rolf Rønning. Moe was hired to run 
the NKL grocery division in 1947 and he stayed in the organisation for thirty-five years, from 
1965 as the organisation’s CEO. Rønning, on the other hand, was hired in the winter of 1989 and 
retired by the summer of 2000. Even if Moe was not appointed CEO of the NKL before 1965, 
as manager of the dominant grocery division he had been the prime commercial leader in the 
NKL from when he was hired in the late 1940s. Hence, apart from six years in the mid-1980s 
when the NKL was led by the former Trondos manager Knut Værdal, throughout the entire 
post-war period, the national co-operative association in Norway was managed and dominated by 
two leaders.894  
Moreover, these two leaders operated according to similar visions and commercial ideals. 
Both were outsiders to the co-operative movement.895 They were also both primarily dedicated to 
improving the commercial performance of the co-op movement. They were determined to show 
that the co-operative system of organising food retailing could be made as efficient as other 
forms of retailing if one was able to take full advantage of its specific organisational features. To 
achieve this end both advocated the need to strengthen the link between the national wholesaler 
and the local retail units and to develop a coherent, nationally integrated system of buying, 
distribution and selling.  
It is difficult to find leaders with similar importance in the UK movement. True, there 
have been many excellent leaders at the local level playing vital roles in the development and 
                                                 
894 In the period from 2000 to 2002 the NKL was managed by Svein Skorstad, a former manager of the Norwegian 
production co-operative Gilde Norsk Kjøtt. 
895 True, Moe was married to the daughter of a co-operative manager and he had worked a few years in the NKL 
before the war. But apart from that, he had no former relation to the co-operative movement. As a former vice- 
executive of the production co-operative Bøndenes Salgslag, Rønning had some co-operative experience, but he was 
a newcomer to the consumer co-operative movement.  
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growth of their local societies. Of the early post-war period John Corina of the London society 
spring to mind as one such leader, among other things he was a major force in introducing self-
service retailing in the British food retail market.896 Another example is the more contemporary 
Martin Beaumont, who managed the United Norwest (later United Co-operatives) during the 
1990s with substantial success and later was appointed chief executive of the Co-operative 
Group. But neither of these leaders came even close to directly influencing the development of 
consumer co-operation as a national movement like Moe and Rønning did. They were first and 
foremost excellent managers of their local retail societies and thus simply not in a position to 
initiate and implement any radical reforms in how the retail societies operated nationally. Philip 
Thomas of the CWS could have become such a character. He came in as an outsider and took 
the position as chief executive of the CWS in 1967, just after the national wholesale federation 
had accepted a reorganisation of its management structure to allow for greater powers to the 
hired management. Thomas soon initiated considerable processes of modernisation comprising 
both the CWS and co-operative trade more generally. But, then he tragically died in a plane crash, 
just a little more than a year after his appointment at the national co-operative wholesale.897  
The progress of the Norwegian consumer co-ops during the second half of the twentieth 
century was in important ways pushed forward by a few, very influential leaders, who managed to 
transfer their visions and commercial ideas into applicable and effective retail strategies. In 
Britain, such leaders, capable of uniting the movement along a common national strategy, didn't 
evolve. It is important to note, however, that the comparatively more limited role played by co-
operative leaders in the UK was not primarily caused by weak leadership. Rather, it was related to 
how the organisational structure of the British co-op movement did not facilitate concerted 
action from one or a few leaders on behalf of the movement as a whole. 
 
Organisational structure 
The British and Norwegian consumer co-operative movements were organised differently. In 
Britain, increasingly large, regional societies dominated the movement. At the national level 
federative responsibilities were divided between two organisations. No clear division of labour 
existed between the national and the local levels. Many retail societies had integrated backwards 
into wholesaling, while the wholesale organisations had integrated forward into retailing. In 
Norway, more numerous, small and medium sized societies dominated the movement. All 
                                                 
896 See chapter two in the present thesis.  
897 For a account, see W. Richardson, The CWS in war and peace 1938-1976 (Manchester: Co-operative Wholesale 
Society Limited, 1977), pp. 295-335. 
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common functions were gathered in one national association, the NKL. The movement also 
upheld a traditional federative division of labour. Local societies remained fully responsible for 
the retailing operations, while the NKL focused on wholesaling, distribution and other common 
functions. These differences in the organisational structures of the Norwegian and British 
consumer co-operatives further added to the divergent developments of the two movements. 
Already from the establishment of the NKL, it was clear to the central leadership that the 
common organisation should combine ideological and commercial activities. This strategic choice 
stood in contrast to the British model, based as it was on two national wholesalers (the 
Cooperative Wholesale Society (CWS) and the Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society (SCWS)) 
and one national interest organisation (the Co-operative Union). Hence, already from 1906 
onwards the basic organisational structures of the Norwegian and British consumer co-ops were 
markedly different. The most obvious advantage of the Norwegian model was that it provided 
the local retail societies with direct influence on both the commercial and the ideological 
development of the movement through one, single democratic decision-making arena. This 
organisational model proved especially important when the developments within the retail sector 
demanded a tighter coordination of the wholesale and the retail operations of the co-ops. Even if 
the NKL Congress had limited direct authority over the retail societies’ day-to-day operation, it 
became an important arena for the NKL leadership to present its commercial strategies for the 
local societies and to anchor controversial strategies in the movement as a whole. When the 
congress had expressed its support, controversial strategies could be put into effect faster and 
more smoothly. With only one national association in operation, potentially exhausting tensions 
between parallel national federations was also avoided.  
The Norwegians also seem to have been advantaged by their continued reliance on small 
and medium sized retail societies and the persistence of a traditional division of labour between 
the national wholesaler and the retail societies. While many national consumer co-operatives 
abandoned the federative structure; either partly through the development of wholesale owned 
retail operations or fully by implementing a complete national merger of all consumer co-
operative societies, the Norwegians upheld a traditional federative organisational structure 
throughout the post-war years. They centralised by merging small societies into larger units. But 
most societies remained small or medium sized. These societies continued to operate primarily as 
retailers, while the NKL took care of wholesaling, distribution and later also buying and 
marketing for co-operative stores. The possible advantages of such an organisational structure 
have already been indicated. Most importantly, in the Norwegian case it seems to have increased 
the retail societies’ need for common functions and thus helped push forward necessary 
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processes of integration and standardisation. Hence, even if the organisational centralisation of 
co-operative trade in Norway remained comparatively limited – by 2002, 235 independent retail 
societies were still in operation, the similar figure in Britain was 42 – the overall coordination of 
trade was substantial. By the turn of the millennium, buying and marketing were fully centralised, 
stores were branded and operated on a standardised basis across society structures and the 
internal system of distribution was fully integrated. Hence, all the main operational features of the 
chain store had been adopted. At the same time, retail societies continued to hold some leverage 
in their day-to-day business operations and, most importantly, they continued to hold full 
economic responsibility. What essentially had been developed in this process was a national chain 
store on co-operative lines, fruitfully combining the advantages of central coordination with the 
advantages of local responsibility and local market knowledge.  
The UK experience again represents a telling contrast. First, the division of federative 
responsibilities in two (or if counting the SCWS, over a long period, three) separate organisations 
may seem to have been a disadvantage. Being the most important arena for co-operators to 
discuss the national development of co-operative trade, pressing commercial issues in the form of 
national wholesaling, integration of functions or standardisation of outlets had no formal role to 
play at Co-operative Union congresses. Meetings were primarily set to discuss the development 
within the Co-op Union during the subsequent years and the Union was not primarily a 
commercial organisation, but an ideological one. And even if commercial issues were debated at 
length, the Congress had no authority or efficient means by which to make local societies follow 
existing recommendations. The analysis of this thesis has repeatedly shown how, throughout the 
post-war years numerous plans and committee reports developed by resolution from the Co-
operative Union were simply ignored by the retail societies.  
Secondly, while the Norwegian movement was based on numerous small and medium 
sized societies, the British societies were fewer and on average much larger, both in terms of 
trade and in terms of registered membership. While highly centralised, this structure made it 
more difficult to obtain the necessary standardisation and integration of functions on a national 
scale. The large British regional societies were less inclined to hand over authority to national 
federations than were the smaller Norwegian societies. Instead they tended to develop as self-
sufficient regional retail businesses, controlling their own wholesaling business and running stores 
of numerous different types and under numerous different brands. There is also a clear 
impression that these societies wanted to be viewed primarily as full blown businesses in their 
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own right and not just as branches of the co-op.898 The effect was, however, that throughout the 
post-war years the overall approach taken to the challenges facing the co-op movement remained 
fragmented; in terms of store development, in terms of creating an efficient system of 
distribution to serve these stores and in terms of developing an attractive national image.  
Taken together, the explanatory factors presented above all worked to shape the 
approach taken by the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives to the major societal and 
competitive challenges facing them during the post-war period. A simplified presentation of the 
overall argument and the main explanatory components is provided in the table below 
 
                                                 
898 They seem largely to have succeeded in this task. It its revealing how most recent research on British retailing, 
providing overviews of the country’s largest food retailers, very seldom present the co-ops as one entity (and thus as 
one of the largest food retailers in the country). As a consequence the co-op is often left out of the overviews (see 
for example S. Burt and L. Sparks, ‘Performance in Food Retailing: A Cross-national Consideration and Comparison 
of Retail Margins’, British Journal of Management 8:2 (1997), 133-50; N. Wrigley and M. Lowe, Reading Retail. A 
geographical perspective on retailing and consumption spaces (London: Arnold, 2002)). Even the large public Competition 
Commission, presenting its findings in 2000, failed to provide a total market share figure for co-operative trade. 
Rather, the market share of co-operative trade was presented in three separate columns, containing the CWS, the 
CRS and ‘Others’ respectively (Competition Commission, Supermarkets. A report on the supply of groceries from multiple 
stores in the United Kingdom, volume 2 (Competition Commission, 2000)). In Norway by contrast, all major overviews of 
market share development in the food retail market include Coop as one national entity. In fact, it is very hard to 
obtain market share figures of single retail societies, indicating how strongly connected these are to the co-op as 
single national retailer. 
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Table 11.1: The divergent development of the Norwegian and British consumer co-
operatives 
 
 Norway  UK 
 
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPMENT 
   
Stores  Self-service innovator 
Leading in new formats 
Multi-format approach 
Self-service innovator 
Lagging in new formats 
Uni-format approach 
   
Organisational 
structure 
Partial centralisation 
National standardisation 
National integration 
Co-operative chain store 
Substantial centralisation 
Local/regional standardisation 
Partial integration  
Co-operative concern + federative structure 
   
Ideology Commercialised consumerism 
Economic participation 
National dividend scheme 
Co-operative consumerism 
Democratic participation 
Regional dividend/loyalty schemes 
   
   
 
MAIN EXPLANATORY FACTORS 
   
Contextual factors   
   
- Competitive 
differences 
Late development of multiple retailing Early development of multiple retailing 
   
- Geographic and 
demographic 
differences  
Small, local communities 
Population density low 
Small/medium sized markets 
Regional/Urban communities 
Population density high  
Medium/large regional markets 
   
Internal factors   
   
- Political ambitions 
and ideological 
profile 
Political neutrality 
Commercial ambitions 
Moderate/right wing social-democrats 
Broad political and public support 
Working class affiliations 
Political/societal ambitions 
Radical/left wing social-democrats 
Narrow political and public support 
   
- Leadership Stable 
Shared visions 
National influence 
Unstable 
Conflicting visions 
Local/regional influence 
   
- Organisational 
culture  
Commercial pragmatism Conservative utopianism 
   
- Organisational 
structure 
 
Size of societies: Small and medium 
One national federation: commercial and 
ideological functions integrated 
 
Clear division of labour 
Size of societies: regional/large 
Two (three) national federations: 
commercial and ideological functions 
separated 
Unclear division of labour 
 
 
The above figure concludes the analysis of why the Norwegian consumer co-operative 
movement throughout the post-war period was able to strengthen and sustain its market share 
and increase its membership, while the British movement in the same period lost substantial 
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market share and saw its membership figures decline dramatically. One question does, however, 
still remain. How may the findings of the present analysis shed light on the more general 
phenomenon of post-war success and decline among consumer co-operative organisations?  
 
The divergent development of consumer co-operatives – towards a broader 
understanding 
The divergent economic developments of the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives is 
an illustrative example of a more general development pattern of post-war consumer co-
operative organisations. But to what extent may our analysis of the British and Norwegian 
developments increase our understanding of post-war consumer co-operative development more 
generally? One way of approaching this question would be to analyse the findings of the present 
study in the light of existing knowledge, as this was presented in the introductory chapter. This 
will be the task of the present sub-chapter  
The first explanatory framework we examined in the introductory part was that of 
competition. It was shown how several accounts have pointed to the level of competition in a 
given country’s retail market as a precondition for the rise or decline of consumer co-operative 
enterprises. Within this framework, decline in co-operative trade was typically seen to correlate 
with strong competition, while success for co-operative businesses was seen to correlate with 
weak competition or slow adoption of large scale distribution systems.  
At first glance, this reasoning seems to fit well with the findings of the present analysis. 
By 1950, the British retail market was already very competitive, while the Norwegian food retail 
market remained among Europe’s most fragmented for another forty years. And indeed, in 
Britain co-operative trade declined while in Norway it prospered. We have also shown more 
specifically how the Norwegian co-ops were advantaged by the limited competitive climate 
characteristic of the country’s food retail sector in the first three decades of the post-war years. 
Similarly, we have shown how the strong competition of the UK food market made survival and 
expansion of co-operative trade a more challenging task. An instinctive conclusion to these 
findings would be that the divergent development of co-operative trade was explained by 
differences in competitive climate. 
As was noted in the introduction, however, a major problem with the type of reasoning 
offered by proponents of this framework is that it directly infers the causes for one macro 
observation (survival or collapse of consumer co-operation) from the existence or non-existence 
of another macro observation (competitive climate), without specifying the mechanisms 
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connecting the two. The relationship is simply too often anticipated and not investigated. In our 
investigation of the Norwegian and British consumer co-ops, it was thus argued that to relate the 
divergent developments of the two organisations merely to differences in the overall strength of 
the major competitors is a too simplistic form of reasoning. There are two reasons for this. First, 
when compared, it becomes evident that the Norwegian co-ops simply performed better than the 
British consumer co-ops. They transferred trade to larger units at a faster pace, they developed 
more efficient systems of distribution and they managed to redefine their ideological mission and 
secure a steady influx of new and loyal members in a better way. The progress of the Norwegian 
co-ops can therefore not be related singularly to the weakness of their competitors. It also has to 
be related to the administrative, operational and financial capabilities held by the Norwegian co-
operators.  
The second reason is related to how the Norwegian co-operators approached the 
intensified competition of the Norwegian retail market from the mid-1980s onwards. During this 
period, the Norwegian co-ops in many ways experienced the same challenges that the British had 
experienced thirty years earlier. But contrary to the British, the Norwegians managed to counter 
the challenge by implementing a series of drastic changes in how they organised their trading 
activities. The consequence was that they managed to contain their market share despite a 
strengthening of the competitive climate.  
The argument that the survival and decline of consumer co-operative enterprises are 
intrinsically linked to the competitive climate in which these organisations have operated is thus 
only partly supported by the present analysis. When the Norwegian co-ops prospered during the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s, it was indeed operating in a market characterised by limited competition. 
At the same time, however, they were well ahead of their British counterparts and when 
competition intensified from 1990 onwards, they defended their market position and remained 
among the leading food retailers in the country. The claim that survival of co-operative 
enterprises may be explained by weak competition can thus not be sustained as a general 
argument. Subsequent studies should therefore investigate carefully, and case by case, how 
competition actually has been approached by the consumer co-operative in question and how the 
strategies chosen affected their survival.  
The second explanatory framework presented in the introduction was the set of accounts 
focusing on how specific organisational and managerial aspects of the co-operative form of trade 
worked to shape the co-operative movements’ competitiveness. These perspectives were of three 
major types. First, perspectives that focus on the role of the federative organisational model. 
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Second, perspectives that focus on the effect of organisational culture and third, perspectives 
pointing to the role of management. 
Concerning the first, a major weakness pointed out in the introduction was, again, the 
tendency to make simplistic generalisations. The typical view announced by this perspective is 
that the federative model has disadvantaged the survival of co-operative trade. But, this general 
assertion is not supported by the findings of the present analysis. Studying the different 
organisational models of the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives it has been shown 
that the Norwegian co-operators, compared with the British, were in fact advantaged by their 
federative organisational model. Developing a structure combining local control of retail 
operations within independent retail societies, with substantial centralisation, standardisation and 
integration of common functions such as wholesaling, distribution, buying and marketing, the 
Norwegian co-ops managed to reap the benefits of the chain store organisation without having to 
sacrifice the benefit of local market knowledge and local accountability. Thus throughout the 
post-war period the Norwegian co-ops advanced despite their continued reliance on a federative 
model. The comparison with Britain has, indeed, suggested that the model was an advantage.  
The general conclusion that the federative organisational structure is ‘at a serious 
disadvantage’ can therefore not be sustained.899 Students of consumer co-operative development 
should therefore refrain from simplistic generalisations concerning the effect of different 
organisational models on consumer co-operative survival and rather investigate in detail how the 
organisational structure operated by a given co-op has in fact shaped its development.  
Concerning the two other perspectives within this framework, the role of organisational 
culture and the role of co-operative managers in shaping the development of consumer co-ops, 
the conclusions in the introductory evaluation were largely that more research was needed to 
decide their actual applicability to the study of consumer co-operative development. The present 
study has demonstrated the usefulness of both explanations, and outlined in detail how 
organisational culture and managerial capabilities matter in the development of consumer co-
operative enterprises. 
The cultural perspective generally presupposes that factors related to the overall attitudes 
and beliefs held by dominant co-operators and which are ultimately contained in a detectable 
organisational culture, shape the development of consumer co-operatives. Typically, studies have 
shown how co-operative decline has been caused by conservatism or by ‘a culture of not facing 
                                                 
899 J. Brazda and R. Schediwy, ‘Federal co-operative systems – part of the problem or part of its solution?’, The World 
of Co-operative Enterprise, (1996), 11-16. 
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problems’.900 The present study has similarly argued that the economic decline of the British 
consumer co-operatives was partly related to how dominant values and belief systems held by 
British co-operators hindered and delayed vital reforms in the operational and organisational 
structure of the co-ops movement. At the same time, however, the study has also shown how 
cultural factors may have a positive effect on consumer co-operative development. In the case of 
Norway, the dominance of a pragmatist and commercially oriented organisational culture 
facilitated a fast and effective adaptation to the competitive and societal challenges of the post-
war years, ultimately laying the grounds for further expansion in co-operative trade. Hence, it 
seems evident that even if consumer co-operative organisations belong to an international 
movement of consumer co-operatives, they have developed and operated according to highly 
nation specific organisational cultures. Future studies should therefore provide major attention to 
how different organisational cultures among different consumer co-operative enterprises may 
have created different paths of economic development. 
Existing studies focusing on the role of managers in shaping consumer co-operative 
development has also largely focused on cases of decline. Again, the present study has shown the 
viability of this perspective when analysing success. Specifically, it has analysed how a stable and 
visionary management, with the ability to draw authority from existing organisational structures, 
may have a substantial positive impact on the development of consumer co-operatives. The role 
of managers in creating co-operative success should therefore not be confined to that of a pre-
war development, as has been the tendency in existing accounts.901 The present study has shown 
the fruitfulness of adding a ‘managerial perspective’ in the study of post-war developments and 
also outlined more specifically how managers may take on a vital role in creating co-operative 
success. 
The third explanatory framework introduced in chapter one was the political. This 
perspective was shown to depart in two major directions. Some focus on the role of direct 
political hostilities as explanations for co-operative decline. Others focus on how the existence of 
positive discrimination on behalf of the co-operative form of enterprise explains continued 
growth among such types of organisations. In evaluating these studies it was argued that they 
have generally failed to convince in their analysis of how the political milieu have actually shaped 
                                                 
900 J. Brazda and R. Schediwy, ‘Consumer co-operatives on the defensive. A short overview’, in J. Brazda and R. 
Schediwy (eds), Consumer co-operatives in a changing world, vol. 1 (Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance, 1989), p. 
33.  
901 See chapter one in the present thesis and J. Brazda and R. Schediwy, ‘Preconditions for successful co-operative 
ventures in the light of historical evidence’, Review of International Co-operation, 94:1 (2001), 35-42. 
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consumer co-operative strategic choices and subsequently also their development. Again they 
tend to draw simplistic conclusions based on parallel observations at the macro level. 
This does not, however, imply that the perspective is unfruitful and the present study has 
tried to show how co-operative development may be shaped by different kinds of political 
processes. In the Norwegian case it was shown how the development of a feeling of shared 
interest and common values between co-operators on the one hand and national and local 
political leaders on the other, had many positive effects on the development of co-operative 
trade. The co-operators trusted that the political authorities could take good care of functions 
earlier handled by the co-ops and they could thus focus more on their core commercial functions. 
Ultimately this helped secure further growth. In Britain by contrast, conflicting relationships with 
the political environment made the co-ops refrain from cooperation or the handing over of 
responsibilities to state led or private organisations. They simply felt they could not abandon their 
broader task of societal improvement as long as these were not well enough handled by 
alternative public organs. The end result was the British co-operators continued to operate 
according to broad societal goals, unlike the Norwegians who had defined their main mission 
simply as one of rationalising the existing retailing industry along co-operative lines.  
Studies of the role of politics in shaping co-operative development have primarily focused 
on the role of direct positive discrimination or alternatively the role of direct political opposition. 
These studies have, however, had some problems specifying exactly how this relationship 
unfolds. The present study has therefore highlighted the importance of more indirect types of 
political influence. The more general finding seems to be that co-ops which are able to square 
their interest with the dominant political milieu and develop a general confidence in the ability of 
the political authorities to take care of important societal functions, may have a clear advantage 
over those movements not able to square their interests with dominant political groups or share a 
similar confidence in the abilities of politics.  
A fourth set of explanations presented in the introductory part were the ideological ones. 
These were of three main kinds. They concerned the role of the dividend in shaping co-operative 
successes, the role of societal and cultural transformations more generally and the role of 
membership participation.  
The dividend explanation relates co-operative development to the ability of the co-ops to 
retain the dividend principle as a specific advantage of co-operative trade. The typical argument is 
that reductions or abandonment of dividend payment is positively related to co-operative decline 
and vice versa. The present study has largely supported this assertion, arguing that the stable 
dividend payments of the Norwegian co-ops were an important factor in shaping the continued 
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increase in membership during the post-war period. This increase ultimately helped stabilise the 
co-operative market share. The contrary experience was seen in Britain where continued decline 
in co-operative membership went alongside massive experimentation with alternative forms of 
surplus distribution and in some instances total abandonment of the dividend. Hence, even if the 
dividend obviously has lost much of its importance in the day-to-day economic survival of the 
consumer, it still may attract members to join the co-op and also work to stabilise the market 
position of co-operative trade.  
Turning to the role of general social and cultural transformations in shaping consumer 
co-operative success, it was argued in the introductory chapter that existing accounts pointing to 
the importance of such factors have failed to provide convincing empirical backing for the 
conclusions drawn. After the present study has been conducted, it is evident that many of their 
assertions do not hold. Take for example the argument that the inability to adapt to the ‘major 
shift away from food as the primary item of expenditure’ was a factor causing serious problems 
for the co-operatives.902 Such an explanation can, for one, not account for the lack of progress in 
the food business, the dominant form of trade in most consumer co-ops. It is self-evident that 
the declining markets share within the food trades experienced by the British consumer co-ops 
throughout the entire post-war period can not be accounted for by a general failure to expand 
into other types of trades. Moreover, the inability to widen the scope of products sold through 
the co-operative shops has not always caused economic problems and subsequent collapse. 
Indeed, the Norwegian consumer co-operatives have never managed to create a stable 
profitability within the non-food segment. Rather, most attempts at developing independent non-
food businesses have turned into fiascos, causing huge financial losses for both the NKL and the 
retail societies.903 The movement still managed to survive and flourish within the food trades.  
Despite these specific objections, the general claim that societal transformations have 
fundamentally affected the unequal post-war development of consumer co-operative enterprises 
should not be discounted. If we are to fully understand this relationship we need, however, to 
specify concretely how the societal changes in question actually affected aspects of co-operative 
trade. In this respect, the present study specifically focused on how societal and competitive 
transformations challenged three basic aspects of the co-op as an alternative organisational form: 
                                                 
902 E. Furlough and C. Strikwerda, ‘Economics, Consumer Culture and Gender: An Introduction to the Politics of 
Consumer Cooperation’, in E. Furlough and C. Strikwerda (eds), Consumers against Capitalism? Consumer Cooperation in 
Europe, North America and Japan, 1840-1990 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1999), p. 34. 
903 For a few examples see E. Ekberg and J. Vatnaland, Visjonen som brast. Forbrukersamvirkets møbelsatsing 1993-2001 
(Oslo: Institute for social research, 2003) and E. Ekberg and J. Vatnaland, ‘The organisational dynamics of success 
and failure: The failed expansion of the Norwegian consumer co-operatives, 1990-2000. Paper presented at the tenth 
annual conference of the European Business History Association, Copenhagen 17-20 August 2006.  
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its legitimacy as a consumer movement, the popular support for its democratic decision-making 
structure and its claim to offer unique economic advantages to the consumer by distributing a 
share of the enterprise’s surplus to the members on the basis of use. It was further shown how 
different approaches to these challenges affected the development of consumer co-operative 
trade in Norway and Britain. By integrating traditional societal functions with day-to-day trading 
operations, by focusing exclusively on the economic advantages offered by co-operative 
membership and by developing a coherent national membership scheme, the Norwegian co-ops 
managed to sustain substantial popular support in the form of increased membership and strong 
customer loyalty. The British movement on the other hand, struggled harder to find an effective 
strategy of adaptation and ultimately failed to keep similar popular support as the Norwegians.  
The final set of explanations within this framework is represented by those arguing that 
the development of consumer co-operative enterprises needs to be related to how they have 
managed to secure active membership participation. The general argument offered by this 
perspective is, put simply, that low levels of membership participation causes decline, while more 
substantial levels of membership participation facilitates co-operative progress. 
If by participation is meant participation in the democratic-decision making procedures of 
the co-op, these assertions have not been sustained by the present analysis. As we recall from a 
previous chapter, some British co-operators were inclined to suggest that the many problems 
experienced by the British movement were caused by its inability to sustain an acceptable level of 
democratic participation.904 But, compared with the continued progress of the Norwegians, this 
reasoning does not hold. The simple fact is that the advance of the Norwegian consumer co-
operatives throughout the post-war years was not paralleled with active membership participation 
in the democratic decision-making procedures of the movement.  
If, however, participation refers more broadly to active membership involvement in the 
form of high levels of savings or strong buying loyalty, such aspects seem to have a closer 
relation to the fortunes of co-operative trade. As we recall from the analysis, the Norwegian co-
ops, in contrast to the British, already from the 1950s onwards defined participation in a broad 
fashion, including such things as member's savings and members buying loyalty. By way of this 
broad focus they managed to increase members' savings and thus increase the available capital for 
expansions. They also managed to sustain high levels of buyer’s loyalty. Hence, during the 1990s, 
when competition in the Norwegian retail market was radically strengthened, members’ average 
                                                 
904 See chapter nine in the present thesis.  
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buying in the co-operative store increased by approximately 14 per cent in fixed prices.905 Hence, 
while the effect of democratic participation on co-operative development seems quite tenuous, 
the ability to secure membership participation in a broader sense of the word seems to have a 
positive effect on consumer co-operative development.  
Finally, we turn to the adaptation perspective and specifically the work of Patricia 
Battilani. Studying the achievement of the Italian consumer co-operatives, Battilani showed how 
the success of this movement in the last quarter of the twentieth century was related to its ability 
to implement three basic strategies. First, the development of a nationally governed ‘system of 
firms’, securing ‘collaboration and exchange of experiences among single co-operatives’; secondly 
the ability to ‘make the renewal and modernisation of retail outlets … [a] main goal’; and thirdly, 
the ability of the co-operative movement to ‘revaluate its role in society’. 906 She further shows 
how the implementation of these strategies was secured by a genuine pro-active approach to the 
challenges of the post-war period, as well as a general inclination among the co-ops to join forces 
in order to sustain their competitiveness and societal importance.  
Battilani’s findings closely resemble those of the present study. As in the Italian case, the 
Norwegian success was based on the ability of the movement to adapt its commercial operations, 
organisational structure and ideological profile in such a way that it became capable of dealing 
with the competitive and societal transformations of the post-war era. Both organisations 
managed to develop a competitive structure of stores, to reconcile their federative model into an 
efficient system of distribution and to develop an image of their organisation capable of attracting 
support from present day consumers. They managed these tasks by taking an active and 
pragmatist approach to the challenges of the post-war period and by advocating cooperation 
between local and regional retail societies and their national federations.  
As such, the perspective offered by Battilani, when held up against the findings of the 
present analysis, is indeed very promising. Further strength is added to this perspective when 
compared with the findings of Leigh Sparks, analysing the core problems of British consumer co-
operative trade by the turn of the millennium. As we recall from the introduction, Sparks point to 
three areas were the co-ops have been left behind their competitors. These are ‘the development 
of new formats, the development of the corporate brand and the importance of logistics.’907 
                                                 
905 Figures adopted from E. Lange (ed.), E. Ekberg, E. Merok, I. Theien and J. Vatnaland, Organisert kjøpekraft. 
Forbrukesamvirkets historie i Norge (Oslo: Pax, 2006), p. 532. 
906 P. Battilani, ‘How to beat competition without loosing co-operative identity: the case of Italian consumer co-
operatives’, in ACTA of the International Congress, Consumerism versus capitalism? Co-operatives seen from an international 
comparative perspective (Gent: AMSAB, 2005), p. 113./p. 117/p. 122. 
907 L. Sparks, ‘Being the best? Co-operative retailing and corporate competitors’, Journal of Co-operative Studies, 104 
(2002), 14. 
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Analysing these three areas respectively Sparks show how the troubled position of the British co-
ops is related to how they have failed to measure up to their main competitors along all these 
lines.  
The factors highlighted by Sparks are essentially the same as those investigated by 
Battilani. The major strength of this perspective is how it relates co-operative development 
directly to major transformations in the retailing industry. It focuses on some of the most vital 
changes in the competitive and societal environment in which the co-ops have operated and 
analyse how the co-ops have approached these changes. Such an analytical framework is exactly 
what the present study has tried to develop.  
Existing studies of the post-war development of consumer co-operative enterprises have 
offered many interesting and important suggestions in their attempt to understand the 
development of this alternative form of retail enterprise. The present study has partly supported 
the existing findings, partly refined them and also in some instances criticised them and offered 
alternative interpretations. Taken together, the discussion of the present sub-chapter have thus 
offered an attempt to widen the scope of the main analysis and to provide new and improved 
insights into the more general phenomenon of post-war success and decline among consumer 
co-operative organisations.  
 
Further research 
The starting point of the present study was to explore the divergent developments of consumer 
co-operative enterprises during the post-war period. The contention was that this is a historical 
phenomenon not adequately understood in existing research and that there was a need for a fresh 
approach. The approach offered was to conduct a thorough historical inquiry into the divergent 
developments of the Norwegian and British consumer co-operatives, focusing on how these two 
organisations approached fundamental transformations in the societal and competitive 
environment in which they operated and how this approach shaped the two movements' 
economic development. The present conclusion has summarised the main findings of the 
comparative analysis. It has also discussed these findings in light of existing research and 
suggested some more general interpretations of the factors shaping post-war success and decline 
among consumer co-operative enterprises.  
Writing the economic history of consumer co-operation is in many ways to write the 
history of a looser. The dominant, and for most also the ideal form of economic organisation 
today is represented by the investor-owned, capitalist firm. Consumer co-operatives are largely 
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neglected by modern economics.908 They have also been more or less overlooked by historians of 
modern retailing. In the public perception, the co-ops is typically regarded an outmoded 
organisational form, something that existed ‘in the past’. But as we have seen in the present 
study, consumer co-operatives continue to thrive in several markets. They have adapted their 
stores, their organisational structures and their ideological basis to the demands of a 
(post)modern consumer society, but continue to endorse important alternative principles of 
economic organisation. In Norway, the co-op is still owned by its users. The retail societies are 
still governed by formal democratic procedures. And each year a substantial share of the surplus 
is handed out to the owners in the form of dividend on purchase.   
Apart from understanding the divergent development of the British and Norwegian 
consumer co-operatives, the analysis offered here has been an attempt to increase the overall 
awareness of the co-op as an alternative form of economic organisation. Such increased 
awareness of alternative ways of organising economic activity is important in a time where a 
single type of economic organisation seem to dominate. On these grounds, it is also contended 
that economic historians should take more interest in studying consumer co-ops. The analysis 
offered here can only be regarded as one step. There is still need to increase our understanding of 
the consumer co-operative as an alternative figure in the history of modern retailing. Let me 
conclude by suggesting some possible avenues such research might take.  
I suggest that there is need to do more research along the lines developed here. That is, 
there is a need to study how consumer co-operative enterprises in other countries have 
approached the post-war challenges to their operational, organisational and ideological 
environment and how differences in approach have shaped these organisations developments.  
As our basic knowledge of developments in different countries becomes more 
sophisticated, there also might be a substantial potential in developing broader historical 
comparisons including more countries in one systematic analysis. One possible avenue for such 
research would be to adopt advanced qualitative statistical techniques capable of comparing large 
data sets in a systematic cross-case analysis.909  
A third avenue of research would be to study consumer co-operative development from 
below. The present analysis has focused on the development of national consumer co-operative 
enterprises. It has studied these developments through national co-operative archives, using 
statistical overviews and other data on general development patterns as the prime source of 
                                                 
908 See T. Kalmi, ‘The Disappearance of Co-operatives from Economics Textbooks’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
31:4 (2007), 625-47. 
909 So-called qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), see e.g. C. Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Chicago: University 
Chicago Press, 2000). 
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information. The main goal has been to develop an overall interpretation of the development 
taking place and departures from the ‘average’ pattern have not been scrutinised. In a recent 
study of British and Swedish consumer co-operatives, Swedish historian Katarina Friberg chose a 
very different approach from that taken here.910 She studied and compared the developments of 
two retail societies, one in Britain and one in Sweden. On the account of this comparison she 
developed a general argument concerning the internal ‘workings of co-operation’. Future research 
focusing more explicitly on the economic development of consumer co-operative retailers might 
have much to gain by taking such an approach from below. Studying the comparative 
development of, say, two retail societies in Britain and Norway, focusing on how these societies 
adapted their trading operations in order to approach local challenges to their market position, 
their profitability and their membership, would surely offer interesting additional viewpoints to 
the analysis presented here. I believe, however, that it would not dramatically alter the 
conclusions put forward in this thesis.  
                                                 
910 See K. Friberg, The workings of co-operation. A comparative study of consumer co-operative organisations in Britain and Sweden 
1860 to 1970 (Växjö: Växjö University Press, 2005). 
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Sources and references 
 
Unprinted sources 
 
The archive of the Norwegian Co-operative Association (NKL), Kirkegata 4 Oslo 911 
 
The archive of the Norwegian Co-operative Association (NKL) holds the main collection of 
sources on the development of consumer co-operative trade in Norway. The archive holds 
collections concerning the development of the NKL as well as the development of the broader 
movement. The prime focus of study was protocols from the NKL Board and from the NKL 
Board of Representatives:  
 
- K4, various shelves, NKL Board of Representatives, protocols 1949- 1965 
- K4, anteroom of the administration, safe, NKL Board, protocols 1952-2002 
 
The archive also holds a large collection of letters and documents from the Board of NKL in the 
period from 1945-1965. These are organised thematically, under such headings as ‘grocery 
department’, ‘the Filipstad commission’ etc. In addition there are different, rather unorganised 
boxes containing various documents from the NKL secretariat/head of administration. In 
particular the following proved valuable: 
 
- K4, 6A, letters from the board, boks merket, styrets brev 1949 
- K4, 6b, 4, memo by S. Nilsen, ‘Ad. N.K.L.s organisasjonsform’, 16 June 1952 
- K4, 5B, letters from the board, boks merket, styrets brev A-F  
- K4, 5b, letters from the board, boks merket, Filipstadutvalget, Innstilling til N.K.L.’s styre 
om bygging av nytt Oslolager, 22/2-1954 
- K4, 4A.3.4, Sekretariatet 1962, ’Aktuelle problemer vedrørende den kooperative 
detaljomsetning: innstilling fra det utvalg N.K.L. satte ned den 24. januar 1959. 
 
                                                 
911 After the data collection was made, the archive has been moved to the National Archives (Riksarkivet).  
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In addition, for the period from 1980 to 2000 the archive contains a full collection of all 
documents presented at each board meeting. These have all been systematically researched: 
 
- K4, various shelves, NKL Board meetings, documents 1980-2002 
 
I have also investigated three smaller selections of private archives from Peder Søiland, Knut 
Moe and Olav Meisdalshagen.  
 
- K4, anteroom of the administration, safe, Peder Søilands etterlatte materiale 
- K4, anteroom of the administration, safe, (transferred from archive at the Co-operative 
College (Samvirkeskolen), Knut Moes etterlatte arkiv 
- K4, 6A, Hylle 2, boks 11 merket Olav Meisdalshagens etterlatte arkiv 
- K4, 6A, Hylle 2, boks 11 merket O. Meisdalshagen - Diverse korrespondanse 
- K4 6A, Hylle 2, boks 12 merket Olav Meisdalshagens etterlatte arkiv 
 
Printed co-operative sources 
 
The archive of the Norwegian Co-operative Association (NKL), Kirkegata 4 Oslo and The National Co-
operative Archive, Manchester, UK 
 
In addition to the unprinted sources, the study draws heavily on various types of printed sources. 
The large majority of these have been collected from the National Co-operative Archive in 
Manchester, UK. This archive holds a wide array of records relating to the British consumer co-
operative movement, as well as to co-operative businesses worldwide.   
 
Statistics 
 
- Co-operative Union, Co-operative statistics (Manchester, Co-operative Union), 1950-2001 
- Co-operatives UK, Consumer Co-operatives Performance Review (Manchester: Co-operatives 
UK), 2002-2004 
- Co-operatives UK, Performance and statistical review (Manchester: Co-operatives UK) 
- Coop NKL, Våre tall 1907-2005 (Statistics compiled by Tore Kristoffersen, Coop NKL, 
2006).  
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- K4, anteroom of the administration, ‘figures developed by AC Nielsen for the Boston 
Consulting Group and Coop NKL’, 24 January 2006  
  
Congress proceedings 
 
- Stenographic reports, annual congress of the Co-operative Union Ltd, 1950-2001 
- Stenographic reports, congress of Norges Kooperative Landsforening, 1950-1990 
 
Annual reports and accounts 
 
- Co-operative Wholesale society, Annual report, 1980-2000 
- The Co-operative Group, Annual report and accounts, 2001-2002 
- Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Annual report, 1946-2005 
 
Other co-operative annual reports 
 
- Coop Øst, Årsberetning 2005,  
- Domus stormarked, Lade, Beretning og regnskap 1969  
- Trondos, Årsberetning 2006 
- Varehusforningen Domus, Årsberetning og Regnskap, 1965-1976 
 
Trade reports and commissions  
 
Corina, J., Spotlight on self-service (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd., 1948) 
 
Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd, Questions and answers on co-operative self-service (Manchester: Co-
operative Wholesale Society Ltd, 1949) 
 
Jacques, J. and H. G. Wilding, Conversion to self-service. A practical guide (Manchester: Co-operative 
Wholesale Society Ltd, 1949) 
 
Hough, J. A. and F. Lambert, Self-Service Shops. A Joint Report (Manchester: Co-operative Union 
Ltd., 1952) 
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Co-operative Union Ltd, Co-operative Independent Commission Report (Manchester: Co-operative 
Union Ltd, 1958) 
 
Co-operative Wholesale Society, The present competitive situation in the grocery trade (Manchester: Co-
operative Wholesale Society, 1960) 
 
Co-operative Union Ltd, A New Look at the Co-op. A radio discussion on the issues raised at the Blackpool 
Congress 1960 as to the best way the Co-operative Movement can challenge its chief trading rivals – the multiple 
stores (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1960) 
 
Co-operative Union Ltd, National Amalgamation Survey (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 
1960) 
 
Co-operative Union Ltd, Supermarkets. A trade guide (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1964) 
 
Co-operative Union Ltd., ‘Self-service trading, 1961’, Trade Advisory Bulletin, 12 (1964) 
 
Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd., Report of the Joint Reorganisation Committee (Manchester: Co-
operative Wholesale Society Ltd, 1965)  
 
Co-operative Union Ltd., ‘Capital accumulation’, Trade Advisory Bulletin, 27 (1966) 
 
Norges Kooperative Landsforenings s Utredningskomité, Forbrukersamvirket under utvikling. 
Innstilling fra NKLs utredningskomite 1966 (Oslo: Norges Kooperative Landsforening, 1967) 
 
Co-operative Union Ltd., ‘Co-operative supermarkets 1967’, Trade Advisory Bulletin, 38 (1968) 
 
Co-operative Union Ltd, Regional Plan for Co-operative Societies in England, Wales, and Ireland 
(Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1968) 
 
Co-operative Union Ltd, Regional Plan II (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1968) 
 
Norges Kooperative Landsforening, Strategiplan for S-lagene og NKL 1985-1994 (Oslo: Norges 
Kooperative Landsforening, 1985) 
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Co-operative Union Ltd, Report on convenience stores (Manchester: Co-operative Union Ltd, 1988) 
 
The Co-operative Commission, The co-operative advantage. Creating a successful family of co-operative 
businesses (Manchester: The Co-operative Commission, 2001) 
 
Wilson, M. and T. Woodin, ‘Recruiting and developing active members in co-operatives’, in M. 
Wilson, T. Woodin, R. Simmons and J. Birchall, Getting Involved. Studies of member participation in co-
operatives across the West Midlands (Manchester: The Co-operative College, 2003) 
 
Co-operative journals 
 
Forbrukeren, volume 1 – 35, 1946-1981 
 
Kooperatøren, volume 44 – 53, 1950-1959 
 
Co-operative Review, volume 20 –  61, 1946-1987 
 
Agenda, volume 1 – 15, 1953-1967  
 
Co-operative Management and Marketing, volume 1 – 8, 1968- 1975 
 
Co-operative Marketing and Management, volume 1– 13, 1976-1988 
 
Retail Marketing and Management, volume 13 – 20, 1988-1995  
  
Society for Co-operative Studies Bulletin, number 1 – 53, 1967-1985  
 
Journal of Co-operative Studies, number 54 – 106, 1985- 2002 
 
Co-operative News, volume 89 – 131, 1960-2002.  
 
The Review of International Co-operation, volume 43 – 95, 1950-2002 
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Printed non co-operative sources 
 
Statistics 
National Statistic, Social trends No 36 (amended 2006 edition), available at www.statistics.gov.uk 
National statistics, Population trends no 123 (spring 2006), available at www.statistics.gov.uk 
Statistics Norway, Statistisk årbok, 47 Folkemengde per 1. januar, fødte, døde, flyttinger og folketilvekst, 
avaliable at www.ssb.no  
 
Annual reports 
SOK Annual report, 1997-2002 
Tesco plc, Annual report and accounts, 1995-2002 
 
Other sources 
 
Interviews 
Magne Bølviken, 27 November 2002 
Jarle Benum, 12 December 2002 
Knut Værdal, 16 December 2002 
Knut Moe, 19 December 2002 
Geir Myklebust, 23 September 2004 
Arnfinn Hofstad, 25 January 2005 
Svein Skorstad, 27 January 2005 
Nils Edvard Olsen, 9 February 2005 
Rolf Rønning, 3 March 2005 
Rolf Rønning, 22 June 2005 
Egil Sætveidt, 12 October 2005 
 
Internet sources 
www.cia.gov/redirects/factbookredirect.html, accessed 31 January 2008 
www.ci-cooperative.com, accessed 5 July 2008 
www.nationsencyclopedia.com, accessed 31 January 2008 
www.tescocorporate.com, accessed 13 December 2007 
www.norgesgruppen.no, accessed 23 November 2007 
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